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Koneridoss v. N. Subbiah Naidu And Others

Madras High Court
Apr 16, 1974
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion by N.S. Ramaswami, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition under Section 115, Civil P. C. challenges the order in I.A. No. 282 of 1973 in O.S. No. 36 of 1963 before the District Munsif, Periyakularn. The original suit was a partition suit filed by Seethammal, in which a preliminary decree was drawn and a second appeal (S.A. No. 935 of 1969) was pending in this Court when Seethammal died.

Koneridoss (the present revision petitioner), described as Seethammal's husband's sister's son, got himself impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal in the second appeal as the 7th respondent. Subsequently, Subbiah Naidu (the contesting respondent in this revision) filed a petition in the second appeal claiming to be the legal representative under a registered will naming him sole legatee. Ramanujam, J. in C.M.P. No. 14623 of 1970 in S.A. 935 of 1969 allowed both rival claimants to remain parties in that second appeal for the limited purpose of the appeal and expressly left the question of the genuineness of the will and the true legal representative to be decided in separate proceedings.

After the second appeal's disposal, I.A. 115 of 1968 in O.S. 36 of 1963 (for passing a final decree) proceeded. The respondent then filed I.A. 282 of 1973 under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C., asserting that by virtue of the will he is the legal representative and ought to be impleaded. The District Munsif considered evidence and found the will valid, declaring the respondent to be the legal representative and excluding Koneridoss. This order is the subject of the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Munsif was wrong to entertain I.A. No. 282 of 1973 under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C., and to hold that the respondent is the legal representative of Seethammal (i.e., whether the order ought to be set aside in revision).
  2. Whether the earlier order of Ramanujam, J. in C.M.P. No. 14623 of 1970 — which had allowed both rival claimants to be parties in the second appeal and reserved the question of the true legal representative for separate proceedings — operates so as to preclude the court below from determining the legal representative in subsequent proceedings (including final decree proceedings).
  3. Whether the finding of the court below on the validity of the will (in I.A. 282 of 1973) operates as res judicata in any future suit the revision petitioner may institute to establish succession to Seethammal's estate.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Koneridoss) — Principal Contentions

  • The order of Ramanujam, J. in C.M.P. No. 14623 of 1970 had brought both rival claimants on record as legal representatives in the second appeal; relying on Rangubai v. Sundarabai (Supreme Court), once legal representatives are brought on record at one stage of the suit it enures for subsequent stages, so both claimants should continue as legal representatives in all subsequent proceedings including final decree proceedings.
  • Consequently, the District Munsif should not have entertained I.A. 282 of 1973 filed by the respondent to be impleaded as the legal representative on the basis of the will.
  • Argues that the “separate proceedings” mentioned by Ramanujam, J. should be construed as a separate suit rather than proceedings such as the I.A. 282 of 1973, thus he asserts both should remain on record pending resolution in a separate suit.

Respondent (Subbiah Naidu) — Principal Contentions and Positions

  • Maintained that he is the true legal representative of Seethammal under a registered will and that he should be impleaded as such in the final decree proceedings — hence the filing of I.A. 282 of 1973 under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C.
  • After the court's analysis, counsel for the respondent (Mr. Sivamani) unequivocally stated that if the revision petitioner files a separate suit to establish his claim to Seethammal's estate, the respondent will not raise the plea that the decision in I.A. 282 of 1973 is res judicata against the plaintiff in such suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rangubai v. Sundarabai (Supreme Court) Principle that where legal representatives are brought on record at one stage of the suit, that impleading will enure for the benefit of subsequent stages of the suit. The Court considered the principle but distinguished the present facts because Ramanujam, J. had explicitly left the question of who is the true legal representative open for separate proceedings and had allowed both parties on record only for the limited purpose of the second appeal.
Venkatakrishna Reddy v. Krishna Reddy, ILR 49 Mad 450 = AIR 1926 Mad 586 (Full Bench) Authority that no appeal lies against an order under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C. The Court relied on this Full Bench view to note that an order under Order 22, Rule 5 is not appealable and that the enquiry under that provision is summary in character.
Pakkran v. Pathumma (1913) 25 Mad LJ 279 Held that the question whether a person should be admitted as legal representative is collateral to the suit and an order on that question does not operate as res judicata in another suit on succession. The Court cited this Division Bench authority to support the proposition that the finding on admission as legal representative in an Order 22, Rule 5 proceeding will not bind parties in a subsequent suit to determine succession.
Ram Kalap v. Banshi Dhar (Allahabad High Court, Division Bench) Similar view to Pakkran v. Pathumma: the decision on legal representation in such proceedings does not operate as res judicata in other suits. Cited as supportive authority for the non-res judicata effect of Order 22, Rule 5 decisions in subsequent suits over succession.
APPavoo Pillai v. Vijayammal (Division Bench) Observed that a decision regarding who is the legal representative would operate as constructive res judicata in a subsequent suit where the question arose in execution proceedings and was appealable under Section 47, Civil P. C. The Court distinguished that decision on its facts: there, the dispute arose in execution proceedings making the order appealable under Section 47; thus the constructive res judicata effect was tied to appealability, a condition not present in the instant case.
Rangasami Naicker v. Rangammal (opinion of Venkataraman, J.) Echoed the view that where the decision on legal representation is appealable (as in execution proceedings under Section 47), it may operate as res judicata. Referenced to reinforce the Court's analysis that appealability (e.g., under Section 47) is decisive for res judicata consequences; not applicable here where O.22 R.5 orders are not appealable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the nature of the present remedy: this is a revision under Section 115, Civil P. C., which does not permit re-appraisal of primary factual findings on merits rendered by the trial court (here, the District Munsif's finding on the validity of the will). The Court therefore treated the revision petition as not an appropriate vehicle to re-examine the factual conclusion about the will.

The Court then analyzed the revision petitioner’s reliance on the earlier order of Ramanujam, J. that allowed both rival claimants to be on record in the second appeal. The Court emphasized that:

  • Ramanujam, J. had explicitly not decided who was the true legal representative and had allowed both rival claimants to remain on record only for the limited purpose of the second appeal;
  • the Judge had expressly left the dispute to be decided in separate proceedings;
  • construing the earlier disposition as entitling both claimants to remain on record for all subsequent stages (including final decree proceedings) would produce practical difficulties and confusion in final decree and partition processes (e.g., conflicting contentions about allotment of shares and division by metes and bounds).

On the meaning of “separate proceedings,” the Court rejected the revision petitioner’s narrow construction that it must mean a separate suit exclusively. Instead, the Court reasoned that the learned Judge could not have intended both rival claimants to continue on record at the final decree stage without any determination as to who properly represented the deceased’s estate, because that would obstruct the orderly adjudication of final distribution.

The Court therefore held that the District Munsif was entitled to entertain I.A. 282 of 1973 under Order 22, Rule 5 and to decide, on summary inquiry and on evidence, that the respondent was the legal representative. The Court observed that the inquiry under Order 22, Rule 5 is summary in character (citing precedent) and that such an order is not appealable; this explains why revision under Section 115 has been invoked.

Finally, the Court addressed the res judicata consequence of the District Munsif’s finding. It distinguished authorities and held that where the decision on legal representation arises in execution proceedings and is appealable under Section 47, Civil P. C., it may operate as constructive res judicata in subsequent suits. By contrast, an Order 22, Rule 5 decision that is not appealable does not carry that effect; therefore the District Munsif’s finding on the will does not preclude the revision petitioner from instituting a separate suit to establish succession. The respondent's counsel also undertook not to rely on res judicata if such a suit were filed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition fails and the order of the District Munsif (I.A. No. 282 of 1973) holding that the respondent is the legal representative of Seethammal is sustained.

Implications:

  • The immediate practical effect is that the District Munsif's order admitting the respondent as the legal representative (after a summary enquiry under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C.) stands; the revision is dismissed.
  • The Court made clear that such an Order 22, Rule 5 determination is summary in nature and is not appealable; consequently, the finding in I.A. 282 of 1973 will not operate as res judicata in any separate suit that the revision petitioner may bring to establish succession to Seethammal's estate.
  • No new principle of law was laid down; the decision applies existing authorities and distinctions regarding the effect of orders on legal representation and the role of appealability (notably under Section 47) in producing res judicata consequences.
  • The respondent's counsel expressly stated he would not plead res judicata in any future suit by the revision petitioner, removing a practical impediment to such suit being heard on its merits.

This summary is prepared solely from the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those expressly stated therein.

Show all summary ...

Order N.S. Ramaswami, J.

1. This revision petition is against the order in I. A. No 282 of 1973 in O. S. No 36. of 1963. on the file of the District Munsif, Periyakularn, which is an application under Order 22. Rule 5, Civil P. C. One Seethammal filed the above suit for partition. There was a preliminary decree and a second appeal (S. A No. 935 of 1969) against the preliminary decree was pending in this Court. The said Seethammal died. Koneridoss. the present revision petitioner who is the husband's sister's son of the abovesaid Seethammal first got himself impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal in the second appeal (S. A. 935 of 1969). He had been so impleaded as the 7th respondent in that second appeal. At a later stage, Subbiah Naidu the contesting respondent herein filed a petition before this Court in the above second appeal for getting himself impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal on the ground that Seethammal had left a registered will under which he (Subbiah Naidu) is the sole legatee and that therefore he is the only legal representative of Seethammal. The above said petition C. M. P. No. 14623 of 1970 in S. A. 935 of 1969 was disposed of by Ramanujam. J. The learned Judge did not decide who among the two rival claimants is the real legal representative of Seethammal but allowed both of them to be parties to the second appeal. Subbiah Naidu (herein-after referred to as the respondent) was added as the 8th respondent in the above said second appeal, while Koneridoss (hereinafter referred to as the revision petitioner) had already been added as the 7th respondent in the second appeal The learned Judge in that order observed that as there is rival claim as to who is the legal representative of deceased Seethammal both of them would be treated as legal representatives for the purpose of the second appeal and that such order is without prejudice to the contentions of either of the parties. The learned Judge also directed that the question regarding the genuineness of the will set up by the respondent herein is a matter to be agitated in separate proceedings.

2. After the disposal of the second appeal I. A. 115 of 1968 in O. S. 36 of 1963 come to be filed for passing a final decree. Then the respondent herein filed I. A. 282 of 1973. out of which the ore-sent revision petition arises, contending that by virtue of the will left by Seethammal he is the real legal representative entitled to continue the proceedings and that therefore he should be impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal. This application is under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C. The learned District Munsif on a consideration of the evidence placed before him held that the will propounded by the respondent is valid and that therefore he is the only legal representative of Seethammal and that the revision petitioner herein who claims to be the heir of Seethammal (husband's sister's son) is not the legal representative of Seethammal. It js this order that is questioned in the present revision petition.

3. Being a revision under Section 115, Civil P. C., it is not open to the revision petitioner to canvas the correctness or otherwise of the factual finding given by the learned District Munsif regarding the will. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that in view of the order passed by Ramanujam, J., in C. M. P. 14623 of 1970 in S. A. 935 of 1969. the revision petitioner and the respondent should be allowed to continue as the legal representatives of Seethammal even in subsequent proceedings (final decree proceedings) and that the Court below is wrong in entertaining an application under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C. filed by the respondent herein. The learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rangubai v. Sundarabai. where at page 1797. it has been ob-served by the Supreme Court that if the legal representatives are brought on record at one stage of the suit, it will enure for the benefit of all subsequent stages of the suit. The contention of the learned counsel is that the revision petitioner and the respondent having been brought on record as the legal representatives of Seethammal in the second appeal which arose against the preliminary decree passed in the suit, such impleading will enure for all the subsequent stages including the final decree proceedings which are now pending in the trial Court. There can be no dispute that if once a legal representative is impleaded in a suit that would have effect in respect of subsequent proceedings in the same suit. But in the present case what has happened is, in the second appeal, the question as to who among the two rival claimants has to be impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal had not been decided and the learned Judge (Ramanujam. J.) has specifically left open that question to be decided in separate proceedings. It would appear that while the revision petitioner came to be impleaded as the legal representative of Seethammal the respondent and others had no notice of such application. Whatever that be when the respondent filed the C. M. P. in the second appeal, for getting himself impleaded as the legal representative on the basis of the will, the learned Judge did not so into the merits of the claim of the respective parties as to who is entitled to represent the estate of Seethammal but allowed both of them to be on record only for the limited purpose of the second appeal. As already seen, the learned Judge has reserved the dispute between the parties to be decided in separate proceedings.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that the separate proceedings contemplated by the learned Judge in his order in C. M. P. No. 14623 of 1970 is a separate suit and not a proceeding as the present one. The contention is that even in the final decree proceedings, both the revision petitioner and the respondent should be allowed to be parties as legal representatives of Seethammal and they ought to have been referred to a separate suit to resolve the dispute between them. Though the contention of the learned counsel appears to be plausible, on a careful consideration I am of the view that the observation of the learned Judge in the abovesaid C. M. P. is not to be construed in the way in which the learned counsel for the revision petitioner wants to construe. The learned Judge could not have contemplated that in the final decree proceedings in the pre-

sent suit both the rival claimants should be allowed to be on record without the Court deciding as to who among the two can properly represent the estate of Seethammal. If both of them are allowed to be on record it would lead to a strange situation. In the final decree, the Court has to decide as to whom the share of Seethammal is to be allotted. That apart, with regard to the division of the suit properties by metes and bounds, the question would arise as to who among the two rival claimants should have a way. If both the rival claimants are allowed to be on record one may contend that the division of the property should be in a particular way and the other may take a different view in the matter. It would certainly create good deal of confusion. Under these circumstances, when the learned Judge while disposing of C. M. P. 14623 of 1970 in S. A. 935 of 1969, left the dispute between the parties open to be decided in separate proceedings, he could not have meant that the Court below is not expected to go into the question as to who among the two can properly represent the estate of Seethammal, Therefore the Court below is not wrong in entertaining I. A. 282 of 1973 under Order 22, Rule 5. Civil P. C. and holding that the respondent is the legal representative of Seethammal. The revision petition, therefore, should fail.

5. However, it must be made clear that the finding of the Court below regarding the validity of the will Propounded by the respondent is not res iudicata in any suit that might be instituted by the revision petitioner herein. It must be remembered that an order under Order 22, Rule 5, Civil P. C. is not an appealable one. Because it is not appealable the present revision petition has been filed as asainst that order. There is no dispute that the order passed by the Court below is not an appealable one. In fact it has been pointed out by a Full Bench of this Court in Venkatakrishna Reddv v. Krishna Reddy, ILR 49 Mad 450 = (AIR 1926 Mad 586) (FB) that no appeal lies against an order under Order 22. Rule 5. Civil P. C. The enquiry made under Order 22. Rule 5, Civil P. C. is only summary in character. Even though witnesses might be examined in support of the contention of either party to that proceedings, still the proceeding is only summary in character. In Pakkran v. Pathumma. (1913) 25 Mad LJ 279 it has been held that the question whether a person should be admitted as the legal representative of the plaintiff to continue a suit cannot be regarded as one of the questions arising in the suit itself being only a matter collateral to the suit and any decision arrived at cannot operate as res Iudicata when a question arises in some other suit as to succession to the deceased. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has also taken a similar view in Ram Kalap v. Banshi Dhar. . However, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner points out that in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in APPavoo Pillai v. Vijayammal Animal, difficulty might arise for the revision petitioner if he files a suit to establish his right to the estate of Seethammal. In the above decision, the Division Bench has observed that the decision of the Court regarding who among the rival claimants is the legal representative would operate as constructive res judicata in a subsequent suit. But that is a case where the dispute as to who is the legal representative of a deceased person arose in execution proceeding. Therefore the decision of the Court regarding who among the rival claimants was the legal representative become an appealable order by virtue of Section 47, Civil P. C. It should be noted that under Section 47(3) where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not a representative of the party such question shall for the purpose of that section be determined bv the Court. Therefore if an executing Court decides as to who among the rival claimants is the legal representative of a party, that decision is appealable. In Rangasami Naicker y. Rangammal. Venkataraman, J. has also taken the same view. Even though the Division Bench which decided had not stated so. I am clearly of the view that because the order regarding legal representative in that case was appealable, the Division Bench has held that under such circumstances it would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. If such a view is not taken of the above decision of the Division Bench it would be going counter to the decision of this Court in (1913) 25 Mad LJ 279 already referred to which is also a decision by a Division Bench. When there is a Bench decision directly on the point, a subsequent Bench, unless it is a larger Bench, cannot possibly take a different view. Under these circumstances, the decision in would in no way prejudice the revision petitioner in his right to file a separate suit to establish his claim to the estate of Seethammal. In fact this position is conceded by Mr. Sivamani. learned counsel appearing for the respondent and he unequivocally stated that if and when the revision petitioner files a suit claiming the estate of Seethammal, the plea that the decision in I. A. 282 of 1973 which is the subject-matter of the Present revision petition is res iudicata against the plaintiff would not be raised.