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Nagercoil East Street Asarimar Samudayam Muthuraman And Natesaswami Trust v. Natarajan Asari
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs (appellants) filed O.S. No. 373 of 1969 in the District Munsiff Court, Nagercoil, seeking a declaration that plaintiffs 1 to 8 were the legally constituted trustees of the "Nagercoil East Street, Asarimar Samudayam Mutharamman and Natesaswamy Trust," with the right to manage certain temples, and an injunction restraining defendants 1 to 5 (trustees appointed by the area committee) and the sixth defendant (the area committee, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Suchindram) from interfering with such management. The plaintiffs' case was that the temples belonged to the Asarimar community and trustees are elected by that community, so the area committee under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (the Act) had no jurisdiction to appoint trustees for these denominational temples; in effect they sought a declaration that the area committee's order appointing defendants 1 to 5 was without jurisdiction.
The sixth defendant and defendants 1 to 5 resisted the suit, contending that the temples were public religious institutions and that the area committee had power to appoint trustees under Section 49 of the Act; they argued the appointment did not fall within "matters of religion" protected by Article 26 of the Constitution. The sixth defendant also contended that the suit was not maintainable for want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and because it was barred by Section 108 of the Act.
The trial Court found the temples to be denominational, with worship confined to the Asarimar community, concluded the department had no power to take away management rights and held the area committee's order void under Article 26 of the Constitution. The trial Court also held the suit maintainable (rejecting the Section 80 objection and following a precedent regarding exhaustion of statutory remedies) and decreed the suit as prayed.
On appeal, the lower appellate Court agreed the temples were denominational and that the area committee's order was void under Article 26, but held the plaintiffs' remedy was to invoke the Deputy Commissioner under the Act and that the suit was barred by Section 108 of the Act (relying on State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melatnatam and Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar). The appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
The present Second Appeal principally raised whether the suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act. The court ultimately set aside the appellate Court's judgment and restored the trial Court's decree. Separately, Civil Revision Petitions arising from eviction orders were considered: the court upheld the eviction orders and dismissed the Civil Revisions, giving three months for vacation and clarifying the position of amounts deposited by tenants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit filed in the civil Court is barred under Section 108 of Madras Act (XXII of 1959) (i.e., whether the plaintiffs were required to invoke statutory remedies before the Deputy Commissioner rather than sue in a civil Court).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The temples in question belong to the Asarimar community.
- The trustees for management are elected only by members of the Asarimar community, who are entitled to manage the temples.
- The area committee constituted under the Act had no right to interfere with management by appointing trustees of its choice; consequently, the area committee's order appointing defendants 1 to 5 was without jurisdiction.
Defendants' Arguments (including the Sixth Defendant / Area Committee)
- The temples are public religious institutions and the area committee has power to appoint trustees under Section 49 of the Act.
- The area committee's order appointing trustees does not fall within the expression "matters of religion" mentioned in Article 26 of the Constitution.
- The suit is not maintainable because (a) there was lack of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (b) the suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act (i.e., statutory remedies before the Deputy Commissioner must be exhausted).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rao Sahib Dr. Ananda Baliga v. Srimad Ananteswar Temple (also cited as Dr. Ananda Baliga v. Ananteswar Temple) | The decision was applied on the question of maintainability and it contains observations that Sections 79 and 79(a) of the Act are not intended to determine denominational rights of a community over a temple; those sections relate to matters such as rituals, honours, perquisites, emoluments etc., and are not suitable for adjudicating rights of a denomination over a temple. | The trial Court followed this decision in holding the suit maintainable; the present Court relied on the decision to support the view that the statutory machinery under the Act (Sections 79/79(a)) is not intended to determine denominational rights of magnitude and thus such rights can be litigated in a civil Court in appropriate cases. |
| State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melatnatam alias Annathana Matam and Anr (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41 | Held that whether an institution is a religious institution is a question to be first mooted before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 57 (and later in statutory suits in conformity with Section 62 of Madras Act (XIX of 1951)). | The appellate Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that the plaintiffs should have gone to the Deputy Commissioner and that the suit was barred under Section 108. The present Court analyzed and distinguished this authority because the plaintiffs in this case did not challenge the applicability of the Act to the temples as a whole. |
| Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar | Following the Kunnakudi decision, it was held that when the applicability of Madras Act (XXII of 1959) to a temple is challenged, the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction under Section 63(a) to decide that question; therefore, a civil suit claiming reliefs on the basis that the Act does not apply would be barred by Section 63(a) read with Section 108 of the Act. | The appellate Court used this decision to justify dismissal under Section 108. The present Court referred to and distinguished this decision on the ground that in the present case the plaintiffs did not assert that the Act was inapplicable to the temples generally but instead challenged the area committee's jurisdiction under Article 26 to appoint trustees for denominational temples. |
| Muthuswamy Mudaliar v. Subbarayan (1970) 84 L.W. | Held that a suit for a declaration that a temple was a denominational one (entitled to constitutional protection under Article 26), to which Madras Act (XXII of 1959) would have a restricted application, is maintainable in a civil Court. | The present Court cited this decision to support its conclusion that a civil suit like the present one, challenging the area committee's interference with denominational management under Article 26, is not necessarily barred by the statutory scheme and can be maintainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded from the pleadings: it examined the plaint averments to determine whether the plaintiffs based their reliefs on a contention that the Madras Act (XXII of 1959) did not apply to the temples (which would, by authority, require first approaching the Deputy Commissioner under Section 63(a) and might attract the bar in Section 108), or whether the plaintiffs simply challenged the area committee's jurisdiction to appoint trustees by invoking Article 26 of the Constitution.
The Court found that the plaintiffs did not plead that the Act was inapplicable to the temples or that the temples were not "religious institutions" as defined in the Act. Rather, the plaintiffs argued that the temples were denominational (managed exclusively by the Asarimar community) and that management could not be interfered with by the area committee because of the protection conferred by Article 26. Thus the plaintiffs challenged only the jurisdiction of the area committee to appoint trustees, not the general applicability of the Act to the temples.
The Court reviewed Section 63(a) (powers of the Deputy Commissioner) and observed that it empowers the Deputy Commissioner to inquire into whether an institution is a religious institution (and similar questions). The Court held that Section 63(a) is engaged only when a declaration is sought that a temple is not a religious institution as defined in the Act. Because no such issue was raised in the plaint, the question before the Court was outside the scope of Section 63(a) and hence did not attract the procedural bar relied upon by the appellate Court.
The Court further explained that prior authorities (including the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Kunnakudi and the decision in Santhanagopala Chettiar) establish that where a plaintiff seeks a declaration that a temple lies outside the purview of the Act, statutory remedies must be exhausted. However, those authorities do not govern cases where the claim is that a denominational temple's management cannot be interfered with because of Article 26, and the applicability of the Act to the temple in general has not been questioned.
The Court also relied on Muthuswamy Mudaliar v. Subbarayan and the observations in the Baliga decisions to support the proposition that the statutory summary machinery (Sections 79/79(a) and related provisions) was not intended to determine extensive denominational rights over temples. On that basis, the Court concluded the suit in the instant case did not fall under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 63 and therefore was not barred by Section 108.
For these reasons, the Court set aside the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court and restored the trial Court's decree (which had held the area committee's order void under Article 26). The Court ordered no costs and noted "No leave."
Separately, in Civil Revision Petitions arising from eviction orders (paras 10–11), the Court analyzed the tenants' defences (invalidity of mortgage by trustees appointed by the community; non-attornment to usufructuary mortgagee; no clause in the mortgage deed enabling demolition and reconstruction; lack of bona fides). The Court accepted the District Judge's findings that (a) since the community-appointed trustees' right to manage and deal with trust property was upheld, tenants' argument that the mortgage by those trustees was invalid failed; (b) despite lack of attornment, a usufructuary mortgagee who becomes a "landlord" under the Rent Control Act can maintain eviction; (c) the mortgagee's long-term mortgage justified putting the property to intended use and the question of use could be objected to only by the mortgagor; (d) the eviction petitions were bona fide, the mortgagee had funds and local authority sanction for reconstruction. On these facts the Court upheld the eviction orders and dismissed the Civil Revisions (without costs), gave three months to vacate, and clarified that amounts deposited by tenants towards arrears should be paid out to the petitioners in the eviction petitions.
Holding and Implications
Primary Holding: The decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. The trial Court's decree had held the area committee's order appointing trustees void under Article 26 of the Constitution and had decreed the suit as prayed for.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The plaintiffs' position that the community-appointed trustees have the right to manage the denominational temples is upheld (trial Court decree restored).
- The appellate Court's conclusion that the suit was barred under Section 108 of the Act is reversed on the facts and pleadings of this case because the plaintiffs did not challenge the general applicability of the Act to the temples; they challenged only the exercise of jurisdiction by the area committee under Article 26.
- There is no order as to costs in relation to the Second Appeal; the opinion states "No leave."
- Civil Revision Petitions relating to eviction orders were dismissed; the eviction orders were upheld, the petitioners were given three months to vacate, and tenants' deposited amounts towards arrears are to be paid out to the petitioners in the eviction petitions.
Broader implications:
- The Court distinguished prior authorities that require statutory forums where the question is whether a temple generally lies outside the Act's purview; where pleadings do not challenge the Act's applicability, a civil Court may adjudicate a limited challenge to administrative action (here, the area committee's appointment of trustees) grounded in Article 26.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond the specific reasoning that suits which do not challenge the Act's applicability are not automatically barred by Section 108; it relies on and differentiates earlier decisions on their facts.
If any specific statutory quotations, full text of precedents, or detailed procedural orders are required, those were not reproduced in full in the provided opinion and therefore are not included here.
1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 373 of 1969 on the file of the District Munsiff, Nigercoil, are the appellants herein. They filed a suit for a declaration that plaintiffs a to 8 are the legally constituted trustees of one Nagercoil East Street, Asarimar Samudayam Mutharamman and Natesaswamy Trust and that in such capacity they are entitled to manage the affairs of certain temples and for an injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 5, the trustees appoint-ed by the area committee, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Department, Suchindram, the sixth defendant from interfering with such management of the temples. Their case was that the temples in question belonged to the Asarimar community and that the trustees for the management of the temples are elected only by the members of the community and that the area committee constituted under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 had no right to interfere with the management of the temples by appointing trustees of its choice. In effect they sought a declaration that the order of the area committee appointing the defendants 1 to 5 as trustees of the temples in question was without jurisdiction.
2. The suit was resisted by the sixth defendant, the area committee, and 'defendants 1 to 5, the trustees appointed by the. 6th defendant. Their contention was that the temples are public religious institutions that, therefore, the area committee has got powers for appointment of trustees under Section 49 of the Act, and that the order appointing the trustees by the area committee will not fall within the expression matters of religion mentioned in Article 26 of the Constitution. The 6th defendant further contended that the suit is not maintainable (1) for lack of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and (2) in view of the bar contained in Section 108 of the said Act.
3. The trial Court found that the three temples in question are denominational in character, the worship therein being confined as of right to the Asarimar community alone and that, therefore, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department will have no power to take away the right of management of the temples and its properties by plaintiffs 2 to 8 the trustees appointed by the community. It, therefore, held that the order passed by the 6th defendant was void under Article 26 of the Constitution. On the question of maintainability of the suit without exhausting the remedies provided under the provisions of Madras Act (XXII of 1959) hereinafter called the Act, the trial Court, following the decision in Rao Sahib Dr. Ananda Baliga v. Srimad Ananteswar Temple. Nanjeswear by its Executive Officer, Sri K.P. Kaurathan and Ors. , held that the suit is maintainable. On the question of lack of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it found that the suit was not against the State Government but it is only against the area committee and hence it is maintainable. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for.
4. On appeal, the lower appellate Court has agreed with the view of the trial Court that the temples are denominational in character and that the order taking away the right of management of the denomination passed by the sixth defendant has to be held to be void in view of Article 26 of the Constitution. It, however, held that the plaintiffs' remedy is to go before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, for the necessary reliefs and not to file a suit before the civil Court, and that the suit in barred under Section 108 of the Act in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melatnatam alias Annathana Matam and Anr. (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41, and of this Court in Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar In that view the lower. appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
5. In this Second Appeal the only question that arises is as to whether the suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act. In State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam alias Annathana Matam and Anr. (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41, it was held that the question whether an institution is a religious institution is a question that has to be mooted out first before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 57 and then in the statutory suits in conformity with Section 62 of Madras Act (XIX of 1951). In Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar , it was held, following the above decision of the Supreme Court that when the applicability of the provisions of Madras Act (XXII of 1959) to a temple is challenged, the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide that question under section 63 (a) of that act and that, therefore, a suit filed in a civil Court claiming certain reliefs on the basis that the provisions of the Act do not apply to the temple and as such is outside the purview of the Act would be barred by Section 63 (a) read With Section 108 of the Act.
6. The question is whether in the instant case the reliefs have been claimed by the the plaintiffs on the basis that the provisions of the Act do not apply to the suit temples. Having gone through the plaint averments, I am of the view that the reliefs claimed are not based on the inapplicability of the provisions of the Act to the suit temples but on the basis that the area committee had no jurisdiction to appoint trustees in view of Article 26 of the Constitution. In the plaint it is nowhere stated that the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act will not apply to the temples in question, and that the temples are not public. But what has been contended is that the temples are being exclusively managed by the Asarimar community and that the management of the temples which are denominational in character cannot be interfered with by the area committee in view of the protection contained in Article 26 of the Constitution. Therefore, the applicability of the Act to the suit temples in general has not at all been questioned. But the jurisdiction of the area committee to appoint trustees alone has been challenged. I am not able to see how such a question could come within the scope of Section 63 (a) of the Act. Section 63 (a) so far as it is relevant is set out below:
Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters:
(a) whether an institution is a religious institution;
(b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee.
7. It is only when a declaration is sought for or a dispute is raised that the temples are not religious institutions as defined in the Act, the matter has to go before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 63 (a). But where, as in this case, no dispute has been raised that the suit temples are not religious institutions as defined in the Act the matter cannot be agitated before the Deputy Commissioner. Ismail, J., in Santhanagopala Chettiar v. Seetharama Chettiar (1968) 2 M.L.J. 41 held that having regard to the reliefs claimed in that suit wherein the plaintiff sought a declaration that the suit temple was outside the purview of Madras Act (XXII of 1959), the suit was not maintainable in a civil Court. The learned Judge has made the position clear by saying:
My decision in this case holding that the present suit is barred by the provisions contained in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act is based solely on the ground that the respondents 1 and 2 had claimed the relief on the basis of the contention that the suit temple is outside the purview of the Act. Whether the respondent will be entitled to file a suit in a civil Court for a declaration that the suit temple is a denominational temple entitled to the protection conferred by Article 26 of the Constitution of India and that the provisions contained in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, can be applied only subject to the constitutional right is recognised by Section 107 of the Act itself and that in any particular matter the authorities under the Act have not kept within their limits with reference to the rights of the denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution, does not arise for my consideration in the present suit and therefore my decision in this case will not affect any such question.
8. From the above observations it is obvious that the learned Judge was not concerned with the question as to whether a suit for a declaration that a temple is a denominational one entitled to the protection of Article 26 of the Constitution and as such the Madras Act (XXII of 1959) can be applied to those temples subject to the said constitutional guarantee is barred or not. The question of maintainability of a similar suit was considered in Muthuswamy Mudaliar v. Subbarayan (1970) 84 L.W. It has been held in that case that a suit for a declaration that a temple was a denominational one to which Madras Act (XXII) of 1959 would have a restricted application and that, therefore, the authorities constituted under the Act cannot interfere with the administration of the temple was one maintainable in a civil Court. I am, therefore, of the view that in the face of the pleadings and the dispute between the parties in this case, the suit cannot be treated as one coming under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 63 of the Act. This view of mine is supported by an earlier decision of a Bench of this Court in Dr. Ananda Baliga v. Ananteswar Temple , where the learned Judges have expressed:
Sections 79 and 79 (a) of the Act, in our opinion are not intended to provide a form for the determination of the denominational rights of a community over the temple but are intended to apply to matters like the usage regarding the rituals, honours, perquisites, emoluments and so on. It is inconceivable that the Legislature could have intended to give jurisdiction to the Board to consider and adjudicate upon rights of such a magnitude as rights of a particular denomination over a temple whether founded on usage or on other grounds by the simple and summary machinery, provided under Section 79 (a) of the Act.
9. For the reasons stated above, the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are restored. There will, however, be no order as to costs. No leave.
10. The Civil Revision Petitions arise out of two eviction orders passed against two different persons who became tenants of portions of the trust property under the trustees appointed by the community who are plaintiffs 2 to 8 in the suit. The eviction petitions had been filed by a mortgagee from the said trustees, for demolition and reconstruction under Section 14 (1) (6) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. One of the defences taken by the tenants was that the mortgage executed by the trustees is invalid and will not bind the trust and that the trustees appointed by the area committee can alone deal with the trust properties. Now that the right to manage the trust and its properties by the trustees appointed by the community has been upheld in the Second Appeal, this objection raised by the tenants has to fail.
11. The other defence taken in the eviction petitions was that they had not attorned to the usufructuary mortgagee, that there was no provision in the mortgage deed enabling the mortgagee to demolish and reconstruct the structures in the mortgaged property and that, in any event, the petitions for eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction were not at all bona fide. The District Court had held that notwithstanding the fact that there has been no attornment by the tenants, still the usufructuary mortgagee who becomes a landlord under the definition in the Act can maintain an eviction petition, that though there is no provision in the mortgage deed enabling the mortgagee to demolish and reconstruct, having regard to the fact that the mortgage was for a period often years the mortgagee is entitled to put the mortgaged property to any use he likes and if at all such an objection can be taken it can be only by the mortgagor and that the petitions for eviction have been filed bona fide, for the mortgagee required the premises for demolition and reconstruction and for the purpose of his business of carrying on a workshop for repair of lorries, buses and radios, which business he is at present carrying on. On the facts and circumstances of the case I have to accept the finding of the learned District Judge that the applications for eviction are bona fide, that the mortgagee has got sufficient funds for carrying out the intended reconstruction and that in fact he has obtained the necessary sanction from the local authority. Therefore, the eviction orders passed in the cases have to be upheld. The Civil Revision Petitions are, therefore, dismissed, but without costs. The petitioners are given three months' time to vacate. It is stated that pending Civil Revision Petitions certain amounts have been deposited by the tenants towards the arrears of rent. It is made clear that the petitioners in the eviction petitions are entitled to be paid out those amounts towards arrears of rent.
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