Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. G. Venkataraman.

Madras High Court
Mar 1, 1973
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

For the assessment year 1960-61 the Income-tax Officer treated a sum of Rs. 3,21,173 as dividend under Section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and included it in the assessee's total income. The assessee was the karta of a Hindu undivided family; his predecessor Rudrappan had been the karta earlier and was the managing partner (with a six annas share) in the managing-agency firm R. Guruswamy Naidu & Co., which was managing agent of Vijayakumar Mills Ltd. The company had a share capital of Rs. 20 lakhs (8,000 preference shares of Rs. 100 each and 12,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each); Table "A" of the Companies Act was applied to its articles and its regulation gave one vote per share with no distinction between preference and equity for voting.

During 1959, 6,834 of the 12,000 equity shares were held by the director and his relations (including several family members and some shares registered in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd., which were pledged by G. Krishnan). The company had reserves (reserve for redemption of preference shares Rs. 3,20,000; development rebate reserve Rs. 1,50,600; total Rs. 4,70,600) and a brought forward net loss of Rs. 1,49,427. The auditor recorded large sums debited to suspense account (about Rs. 5,90,705.30) pending information; the board explained that late Rudrappan had handled cash and, after his sudden death, information was missing. The assessee (as executor/representative of Rudrappan's estate) indicated that Rs. 4,50,000 had been advanced to various parties from Rudrappan's account and did not dispute the estate's liability to pay that sum. The Income-tax Officer treated Rs. 4,50,000 as a loan/advance by the company and, on examining availability of profits (reserves less brought forward loss), considered Rs. 3,21,173 as accumulated profits and therefore as dividend under s.2(6A)(e).

On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found criminal misappropriation by Rudrappan and held there was no entry in the company's books showing any loan or payment by the company to the assessee; he therefore held there was no payment by the company as required under section 2(6A)(e). The department appealed to the Tribunal, which requested further findings from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on whether the company was one in which the public were substantially interested and whether there were accumulated profits of Rs. 3,21,173. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner answered both in the affirmative; the Tribunal concurred. At the Commissioner of Income-tax's instance the Tribunal referred three questions to the High Court; at the assessee's instance two additional questions were referred by way of counter-reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Vijayakumar Mills Ltd. was a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 3,21,173 could be treated as dividend under Section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?
  3. Whether the whole of the amount standing to the credit of the development rebate reserve would form part of the accumulated profits within the meaning of Section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922?
  4. (Counter-question referred by the assessee) Whether the excess in the development rebate reserve over the statutory reserve created under the Income-tax Act was part of the accumulated profits of the company within the meaning of Section 2(6A)(e)?
  5. (Counter-question referred by the assessee) Whether the sum standing to the credit of the reserve for redemption of preference shares was part of the accumulated profits of the company within the meaning of Section 2(6A)(e)?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The sum of Rs. 4,50,000 represented a payment by way of loan or advance by the company to the assessee (through actions of the late Rudrappan) and thus should be treated as dividend under Section 2(6A)(e).
  • The company was not one in which the public were substantially interested: if the pledged shares registered in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. are disregarded as public holdings, the holdings of the controlling group would reduce public holdings below the statutory threshold.
  • The company's sale of cotton (Rs. 17 lakhs) in 1959 showed that its business was not wholly manufacture/processing of goods (yarn), so the reduced percentage threshold (40%) for public holdings (applicable to companies whose business consists wholly in manufacture or processing) should not apply.
  • A clause in the articles empowering directors to refuse registration of transfers without assigning reason demonstrated that shares were not "freely transferable" and thus the third condition of Explanation 1(b) to Section 23A was not satisfied.
  • The fact that the number of directors was less than six indicated potential control by fewer than six persons (four of the six directors were father and three sons), supporting the view that the company was controlled and not one in which the public were substantially interested.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The 1,328 equity shares registered in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. were pledged by G. Krishnan but were registered in the bank's name and therefore the bank was the legal holder entitled to exercise voting power; those shares should be treated as unconditionally and beneficially held by the public.
  • The company's main business was manufacture and sale of yarn; the sale of Rs. 17 lakhs of cotton in 1959 represented disposal of raw material not required for immediate use (with Textile Commissioner's permission) and did not change the essential character of the company's business; thus the reduced 40% threshold applied.
  • The mere presence of a clause in the articles allowing refusal of transfer registration does not mean shares are not in fact freely transferable; absent evidence of misuse (no instance of refusal in the year), shares should be regarded as freely transferable.
  • The Rs. 4,50,000 represented misappropriation or embezzlement by Rudrappan (criminal acts) and not an actual payment by the company to a director/shareholder; therefore it could not be treated as a loan/advance by the company attracting Section 2(6A)(e).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 62 ITR 334 (Cal) Support for the reading that the four conditions in Explanation 1(b) to Section 23A are cumulative (all must be satisfied). The court relied on this authority to confirm that all four conditions are cumulative before holding a company to be one in which the public are substantially interested.
Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 41 ITR 613 (SC) Interpretation of "unconditionally" and "beneficially" (shares held for one's own benefit and voting power freely exercisable); the concept of a controlling "block" acting in unison. The court used these principles to analyse whether certain shares (including those registered in the bank's name) were unconditionally and beneficially held by the public or by a controlling block.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. East Coast Commercial Co. Ltd., [1967] 63 ITR 449 (SC) Affirmed the test: (i) existence of an individual/group controlling voting power as a block and (ii) whether that block exercised controlling interest; discussed percentage thresholds in earlier form of section. The court relied on this authority in explaining how to test control by a block of shareholders and how that bears on public-interest determination under Section 23A.
East India Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 61 ITR 16 (Mad) Held that "freely transferable" in Section 23A does not require actual transfers; a factual tendency towards free transferability subject to reasonable restrictions suffices; mere clause granting directors discretion to refuse transfers is not determinative. The court followed this decision to hold that the article empowering directors to refuse registration without assigning reasons did not prove shares were not freely transferable (third condition satisfied).
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tona Jute Company Ltd., [1963] 48 ITR 902 (Cal) Held (by Calcutta High Court) that shares were not freely transferable where articles empower directors to refuse transfer registration. The court noted this contrary view but disagreed with it; it cited East India Corporation and authorities to reject the Tona Jute conclusion for the present facts.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jubilee Mills Ltd., [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 9 Observation that control of affairs is ordinarily in hands of directors but managing agents or shareholders with substantial holdings can exercise control; the court discussed percentages relevant to control. Used to illustrate that mere small number of directors does not by itself establish control unless linked to voting power; helped reject the revenue's argument that fewer than six directors meant absence of public interest.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. H. Bjordal, [1955] 28 ITR 25 (PC) Privy Council view that 51% may be adopted as the figure conferring controlling interest (able to control ordinary resolutions and influence director elections). The court cited this authority when discussing percentages constituting control and used it to reason about the absence of overpowering controlling shareholding in the present company.
Govindarajulu Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1973] 90 ITR 13 (Mad) Held that to attract section 2(6A)(e) there must be an actual outgoing or flow of money (a cash advance/loan) from the company to the shareholder; mere book entries creating debtor-creditor relationship are insufficient. The court applied this binding principle to conclude that misappropriation by a director (without company payment entries) did not amount to an advance or loan by the company and thus did not attract s.2(6A)(e).
G. Ramaswami Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1972] 86 ITR 768 (Mad) Held that development rebate reserve would form part of accumulated profits. The court applied this authority to answer the third question, concluding that the development rebate reserve is part of accumulated profits.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Eathnam Nadar, [1969] 71 ITR 433 (Mad) Procedural rule: a party who did not initiate an application under Section 66(1) cannot, merely in reply to the other's application, seek a reference; the correct course is to file an independent application under s.66(1) or proceed under s.66(2). The court relied on this procedural authority to hold that the questions referred at the instance of the assessee were not properly before the court and returned that reference unanswered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a structured analysis in two main parts: (A) whether the company was one in which the public were substantially interested within Section 23A (Explanation 1(b) conditions), and (B) whether the impugned sum could be treated as dividend under Section 2(6A)(e), followed by (C) whether the development rebate reserve formed part of accumulated profits and (D) procedural issues about the assessees' counter-questions.

(A) Section 23A — cumulative conditions

  1. The court reiterated that the four conditions in Explanation 1(b) to Section 23A are cumulative (citing Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd.). The four conditions were set out by the court: (i) not a private company; (ii) a specified percentage of voting power held by the public unconditionally and beneficially (reduced to 40% for companies whose business consists wholly in manufacture/processing of goods); (iii) the relevant class of shares were dealt in a recognised stock exchange or freely transferable to the public; (iv) the affairs or shares carrying more than the relevant voting power were at no time controlled/held by less than six persons.
  2. Clause (bi): the court examined whether 1,328 equity shares registered in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. (pledged by G. Krishnan) should be treated as held by the public or by the controlling group. The court relied on company-law principles (Gower and Gore-Browne passages cited) to explain that when shares are registered in the mortgagee's name the mortgagee can exercise the vote; the mortgagor/pledger cannot direct voting. The court therefore treated those 1,328 shares as held by the public.
  3. Threshold for "wholly" manufacture or processing: the assessee argued that the company mainly manufactured yarn and the sale of cotton (Rs. 17 lakhs) was incidental. The revenue emphasised the word "wholly". The court held that too much emphasis should not be placed on "wholly" and noted (by way of comparison) that the later Income-tax Act uses "mainly". The court accepted the Tribunal's/Appellate Assistant Commissioner's factual finding that the cotton sold was only that not required for the company's purposes and sold with Textile Commissioner's permission; the company's business was therefore manufacture and sale of yarn and it fell within the proviso reducing the percentage to 40%.
  4. Clause (bii) (free transferability): the Tribunal and Appellate Assistant Commissioner found shares were the subject of dealings on the Madras Stock Exchange and that transfers had not been refused. The revenue relied on an article empowering directors to refuse registration without assigning reason. The court followed East India Corporation Ltd. v. CIT, holding that mere vesting of discretion in directors to refuse transfers does not, without further facts, establish that shares are not in fact freely transferable; no instance of refusal in the accounting year was shown. The court therefore held the third condition satisfied.
  5. Clause (biii) (control by less than six persons): the court observed that the test in sub-clause (biii) contains two distinct tests: (i) control of affairs at any time by less than six persons, and (ii) shares carrying more than the relevant voting power held at any time by less than six persons. The court noted four directors were father and three sons (to be treated as a single person under the definition of "relative"), reducing the number of distinct persons among directors to three, but found no evidence they controlled affairs by voting power or other means. Reliance was placed on the principle that mere small number of directors does not automatically equate to control unless tied to voting power; the court cited Jubilee Mills and Privy Council authority on percentages. Looking at total shareholdings (preference and equity together), the court found public persons held 14,284 out of 20,000 shares and the controlling group held much less than 50% of total voting power. The court therefore held the fourth condition satisfied.
  6. On the cumulation of all four conditions the court concluded the company was one in which the public were substantially interested under Section 23A.

(B) Section 2(6A)(e) — whether Rs. 3,21,173 is dividend

The court applied its prior decision in Govindarajulu Naidu v. CIT: to attract section 2(6A)(e) there must be an actual cash advance or loan (an outgoing or flow of money) from the company to the shareholder; mere book adjustments or entries creating a debtor-creditor relationship are insufficient. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Tribunal had found on facts that Rudrappan had criminally misappropriated company funds, other partners were unaware, and there were no entries showing any loan by the company to the assessee. The court accepted those findings and applied the principle that a director or shareholder "helping himself" to company funds cannot be treated as the company making a loan/advance. Consequently, there was no actual payment by the company and the amount could not be treated as dividend under s.2(6A)(e).

(C) Accumulated profits — development rebate reserve

The court followed its decision in G. Ramaswami Naidu v. CIT that the development rebate reserve forms part of accumulated profits and applied it to answer the third question in the affirmative.

(D) Procedural issue on assessee's counter-questions

The court held that the two questions referred at the instance of the assessee were not properly referred because the assessee had not filed an independent application under Section 66(1) (or, if refused, proceeded under s.66(2)). Relying on Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Eathnam Nadar the court returned the counter-reference unanswered.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court answered the Tribunal's three referred questions as follows:

  • First question: The company (Vijayakumar Mills Ltd.) is a company in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. (Answered against the revenue.)
  • Second question: The sum of Rs. 3,21,173 could not be treated as dividend under Section 2(6A)(e) because there was no actual payment by the company (the sum arose from misappropriation by a director rather than a loan or advance by the company). (Answered against the revenue.)
  • Third question: The whole of the amount standing to the credit of the development rebate reserve forms part of the accumulated profits within the meaning of Section 2(6A)(e). (Answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The court's conclusions mean the company's character as one in which the public were substantially interested stands, the contested Rs. 3,21,173 is not taxable as a dividend under s.2(6A)(e) in the hands of the assessee (on the facts found), and the development rebate reserve is to be treated as part of accumulated profits.
  • No new broad precedent beyond articulation and application of established principles was created; the court principally applied and reaffirmed existing authorities (notably on the meaning of "unconditionally" and "beneficially", free transferability, the requirement of actual payment for s.2(6A)(e), and the treatment of development rebate reserve).
  • Procedural consequence: the two questions sought by the assessee were returned unanswered because they were not properly referred under the statutory procedure (Section 66(1)); the court emphasized the correct procedural route for seeking a reference.
Show all summary ...

1. For the assessment year 1960-61, the Income-tax Officer treated a sum of Rs. 3,21,173 as dividend within the meaning of Section 2(6A)(e)of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called "the Act", and included the sarna in the assessee's total income. The assessee is the karta of a Hindu undivided family. One .Rudrappan was the karta of the Hindu undivided family prior to the present assessee. He was the managing partner in a firm called R. Guruswamy Naidu & Co. with six annas share. This firm was the managing agent of a public limited company called Vijayakumar Mills Ltd., hereinafter called "the company". The company had a share capital of Rs. 20 lakhs divided into 8,000 preference shares of Rs. 100 each and 12,000 equity shares of Rs. 100 each. According to one of the articles of association of the company, the regulations contained in Table "A" of the First Schedule of the Companies Act governed the company. According to regulation 60 of Table "A" every member has one vote for every share held by him, no distinction being kept between preference and equity shares. The accounting year of the company is the calendar year. During the year 1959, out of the 12,000 equity shares 6,834 were held as under :

1. V. Gopal Naidu Shares Director

2. G. Purushotham (son of No. 1) "

"

3. G. Krishnan (son of No. 1) "

"

4. G. N. Sam (son of No. 1) "

"

5. G. R. Rudrappan (step-brother of G. Krishnan) 2,015 "

"

6. G. Venkataraman (Brother of No. 5) "

"

7. P. Balasubramaniam (son of No. 2) "

"

8. Vijayakumar (son of No. 3) "

"

9. Mani (unmarried daughter of No. 2) "

"

10. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd.

1,328 "

"

11. Mrs. Kamalam Purushotham (wife of No. 2) "

"

12. A. Amirtha (married daughter of No. 2) "

"

13. P. Neelaveni (married daughter of No. 2) "

"

14. S. V. Raman "

"

Total 6,834

2. The shares held by Travancore. For ward Bank Ltd. are the shares pledged by G. Krishnan. In the register of members of the company, the name of this bank appears as the holder of the shares. The dividend income from these shares was assessed in the hands of G. Krishnan. The main business of the company was manufacture and sale of yarn, but in the year 1959, it sold besides yarn, cotton worth Rs. 17 lakhs. The cotton that was sold was not required for its immediate use in the mills and was sold after obtaining the permission of the Textile Commissioner. The board of directors of the company consisted of six persons of which four were the father and three sons.

3. The balance sheet of the company as on January 31, 1959, showed the following reserves:

" Reserve for redemption of preference shares ...

Rs. 3,20,000 Development rebate reserve ...

Rs. 1,50,600 Rs. 4,70,600"

4. There was net loss of Rs. 1,49,427 brought forward from the previous year. In the balance-sheet as on December 31, 1959, the statutory auditor made an observation that from the current books he found large sums of money received in the current year were paid and debited to suspense account for want of information and that such sums amounted to Rs. 5.90,705.30. The board of directors explained stating that late Rudrappan was handling the company's cash balance and, due to his sudden and unexpected death, they were not able to collect the relevant information and hence such amounts pending clarification had been debited to suspense account. The board of directors corresponded with the assessee herein and got a reply from the assessee that in late Rudrappan's account a sum of Rs. 4,50,000 had been advanced to various parties without corresponding credit in his account books and that it was possible that Rudrappan might have utilised the company's money in his possession for making such advances. In order to set the matter at rest, the assessee further added that he did not propose to question the liability of the estate to pay the sum of Rs. 4,50,000.

5. The Income-tax Officer considered that the company was one in which the public were not substantially interested, that the whole sum of Rs. 4,50,000 represented a payment by way of loan or advance by the company to the assessee. He then went into the question of availability of profits. He determined that the balance of Rs. 3,21,173 arrived at after deducting Rs. 1,49,427, the brought forward loss from the two reserve amounts amounting to Rs. 4,70,000 represented the accumulated profits in the hands of the company. The Income-tax Officer rejected the contention that there was no loan or advance by the company to the individual shareholders and that the said Rudrappan helped himself with the funds of the company and that misappropriation or embezzlement should not be considered as payment by way of a loan. In that view he held Rs. 3,21,173 as dividend under section 2(6a)(e) of the Act in the hands of the assessee.

6. In the appeal preferred by the assessee originally, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confined his consideration to the question whether the sum of Rs. 4,50,000 represented a loan or advance by the company to the assessee. He held that Rudrappan had criminally misappropriated the funds of the company, that the other partners of the managing agency firm were not aware of the acts of Rudrappan, that there was no entry in the books of the company to show that any loan had been given to the assessee and that, therefore, there was no payment by the company to a director or a shareholder as required under section 2(6a)(e). In that view he did hot consider it necessary to decide the other issue. The department preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal called for a finding from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the question whether the company is one in which the public are substantially interested and whether there was the accumulated profit to the extent of Rs. 3,21,173. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner submitted a report holding that all the conditions in Section 23A, Explanation 1, Clause (b) of the Act, are satisfied and that, therefore, the public are substantially interested. He also held that the sum of Rs. 3,21,173 represented accumulated profits. The Tribunal concurred with the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on all the issues. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the following three questions have been referred by the Tribunal:

"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the company called Vijayakumar Mills Ltd. was a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 3,21,173 could be treated as dividend under section 2(6a)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?

3. Whether the whole of the amount standing to the credit of reserve for development rebate would form part of the accumulated profits within the meaning of section 2(6a)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?"

7. Though the assessee did not file any independent application under Section 256, in the application filed by the Commissioner he asked for a reference by way of a counter certain questions and overruling the objections of the department for such a reference, the following two questions have been referred at the instance of the assessee:

"1. Whether the excess in the development rebate reserve over the statutory reserve created under the Income-tax Act was part of the accumulated profits of the company within the meaning of section 2(6a)(e) of the Income-tax Act ?

2. Whether the sum standing to the credit of the reserve for redemption of preference shares was part of the accumulated profits of the company within the meaning of section 2(6a)(e) of the Act ?"

8. In order to attract the provisions of Section 2(6A)(e) the payment shall be by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23A. Explanation 1 to Section 23A defines the expression " company in which the public are substantially interested". We are not concerned with Clause (a) of that Explanation, Clause (b) prescribes four conditions. Unless all these four conditions are satisfied, the company shall not be deemed to be a company in which the public are substantially interested. The four conditions are:

1. The company should not be a private company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956.

2. Its shares, other than shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend, whether with or without a further right to participate in profits, carrying not less than fifty per cent. of the voting power have been allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by, and were throughout the previous year beneficially held by the public. This fifty per cent. which shall be regarded as held by the public is reduced to 40 per cent. in the case of Indian companies whose business consists wholly in the manufacture or processing of goods.

3. The shares of the class mentioned in condition (2) were either subject matter of dealings in the previous year in any recognised stock exchange in India or freely transferable by the holder to other members of the public.

4. The affairs of the company or the shares of the company carrying more than 50 per cent. of the total voting power were at no time during the previous year controlled or held by less than six persons.

9. A reading of the section, in particular the use of the conjunction "and" after Clause (b) and before Clause (bi) and after Clause (bii) and before Clause (biii) clearly shows that all these four conditions are cumulative and not alternative and unless all the four conditions are satisfied, the company shall not be deemed to be a company in which public are substantially interested. It has also been so held in Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd, v. Commissioner of income-tax, [1966] 62 ITR 334 (Cal). So in order to answer the first question referred to us at the instance of the revenue, we have to find out whether the company satisfies all the conditions. But before we do so, with reference to the facts of this case, it would be useful if we refer to one or two cases dealing with the scope of the condition prescribed in Clause (bi) of the Explanation 1 to Section 23A. We may add that there is no dispute on the first condition, namely, that it is not a private company as defined in the Companies Act. It is a public limited company.

10. In Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 41 ITR613 (SC).

the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the words, shares allotted "unconditionally" and "beneficially", in the Explanation to Section 23A as it stood prior to the amendment in 1955. The amendment is not relevant for the purpose of the present consideration. The Supreme Court held:

"The essence of the Explanation lies not in the percentage which only shows the limit of the minimum holding by the public, but lies in the words 'unconditionally' and 'beneficially'. These words underline the fact that no person who holds a share or shares not for his own benefit but for the benefit of another and who does not exercise freely his voting power, can be said to belong to that body, which is designated 'public'. The word 'public' is used in contradistinction to one or more persons who act in unison and among whom the voting power constitutes a block. If such a block exists and possesses more than seventy-five per cent. of the voting power (now 50 per cent.), then the company cannot be said to be one in which the public are substantially interested."

11. The Supreme Court further held ;

" The test is first to find out whether there is an individual or a group which controls the voting power as a block. If there be such a block, the shares held by it cannot be said to be 'unconditionally ' and ' beneficially' held by members of the public."

12. These principles were again affirmed in Commissioner of Income-tax v. East Coast Commercial Co. Ltd., [1967] 63 ITR 449, 455 (SC).

and the Supreme Court further observed :

"It is clear that in deciding whether an order under Section 23A(1) is called for, the Income-tax Officer must determine: (i) whether there is an individual or a group which can control the voting power as a block. The existence of such a block may be established by showing that the voting power is vested in persons possessing more than fifty per cent. of the shares issued who act in concert; and (ii) that the block exercises a controlling interest over the affairs of the company. This condition is satisfied only if the voting power of the block or group is seventy-five per cent. or more. If the block holds seventy-five per cent. of the voting power, it shall be deemed that the company is one in which the public are not substantially interested. On the other hand, if the members of the public hold shares of the company (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend, whether with or without a further right to participate in profits) carrying not less than twenty-five per cent. of the voting power allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by, them, the company shall be deemed to be one in which the public are substantially interested."

13. The percentage referred to in this decision also is with reference to the provision as it stood prior to the amedment of Section 23A in 1955. As noted already, the equity shares of this company are 12,000 carrying one vote for every share. The total number of shares in the possession of the directors and their near relations including those registered in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. amount to 6,834. The remaining shares out of 12,000 held by the public, therefore, would be less than 50 per cent.

14. The first point that arises for consideration, therefore, is whether the 1,328 equity shares held in the name of Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. should be deemed to have been held by the public or by G. Krishnan, one of the members of the controlling group. As already noticed, the shares held by the Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. are the shares pledged by G. Krishnan. In the register of members of the company, the name of the bank appears as the holder of the shares. But the dividend income from these shares were returned by G. Krishnan in his income-tax assessment. The argument of the learned counsel for the revenue is that these shares shall not be treated as having been allotted unconditionally to or acquired unconditionally by the bank and beneficially held by the bank. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, contended that the shares stand registered in the name of the bank, that the bank is entitled to freely exercise its voting power and that, therefore, the shares are unconditionally and beneficially held by the public. We think that the learned counsel for the assessee is well-founded in his contention. The position of a mortgagee or a pledgee of shares is clearly explained in the following passage in Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law at page 411:

"Shares, being items of property can, of course, be disposed of by way of security for a loan as well as sold outright. It follows from what has already been said that the security can be a legal mortgage only if the mortgagee is entered on the register, and that this can only be done if there is an outright transfer to him. Hence, a legal mortgage involves a registered transfer which, for the protection of the borrower, should be coupled with a written agreement setting out the terms and containing an undertaking by the lender to retransfer when the borrower redeems by repaying the principal, interest and costs."

15. When once the share is registered in the name of the mortgagee, it is the mortgagee who can exercise the vote. The mortgagor or the pledger had no right either to vote or control or direct the voting by the mortgagee. Even in cases where the name of the pledger of the share continued to be the holder of the pledged shares in the books of the company, the pledger is bound to vote according to the directions of the pledgee bank. This position is also supported from the following passage in the Hand Book on Formation, Management and Winding up of Joint Stock Companies by Sir Francis Gore-Browne (29th edition) at page 425:

Where an agreement for the sale of shares has been made, or where shares are mortgaged but the vendor's or mortgagor's name remains on the register of members, he alone can vote, but he must do so in accordance with the dictation of those entitled to the beneficial interest in the shares unless it is otherwise agreed.

16. We are, therefore, of the view that the 1,328 shares held by the bank shall be deemed to have been allotted unconditionally to or acquired unconditionally and held beneficially by the public.

17. The learned counsel for the assessee also contended that the company's business consists wholly in the manufacture or processing of goods and that, therefore, it is enough if the percentage of equity shares required to be held by the public is 40 per cent. If this contention is correct, then even if 1,328 shares standing in the name of the bank were to be taken as held by the controlling group, still the second condition for holding that the company is a company in which the public are substantially interested is satisfied. The main business of the company was manufacture and sale of yarn. In 1959 it sold besides yarn, cotton worth Rs. 17 lakhs, as being not required for its immediate use after obtaining the permission of the Textile Commissioner. It is contended by the assessee that it was not the business of the company to sell cotton and it was not dealing in cotton except for the purpose of its own consumption and whatever cotton that was not required for the purpose of the company only was sold. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the revenue laid strong emphasis on the word "wholly" and contended that unless the business of the company consists wholly in the manufacture or processing of goods, it could not be said to be a company within the meaning of that condition. We are of the opinion that too much emphasis should not be placed on the word "wholly" though the significance of that word also should not be ignored. It may also be mentioned that in the definition of "company in which the public are substantially interested" in Section 2(18) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the word "wholly" is replaced by the word "mainly". In all businesses, at certain times, part of the raw materials purchased may have to be sold as being not suitable or of inferior quality or on the ground that they could not be used for immediate purposes of the company. There may be very many circumstances, which it is difficult to set out in detail in which the company may be forced on commercial expediency to dispose of raw materials. From that fact alone it should not be said that they are dealers or doing business in selling those raw materials. In this case, the finding of the Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is that Rs. 17 lakhs worth of cotton sold represented only the cotton that was not required for the business of the company and it was sold after getting the express permission of the Textile Commissioner. We are, therefore, of opinion that the company's business is manufacture and sale of yarn and that, therefore, it comes within the proviso to Explana-tion I(bi). It that is so, even if these 1,328 shares held by the Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. are to be treated as not held by the public, the second condition is satisfied.

18. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have found that the equity shares of the company were the subject-matter of dealings in the Madras Stock Exchange and the company had not at any time in the year 1959 refused registration of the transfer of any shares. But the learned counsel for the revenue, relying on one of the articles of association of the 'company which empowered the directors to refuse without assigning any reason to register a share in favour of any person they consider undesirable, contended that the shares were not freely transferable by the holders to the other members of the public and, therefore, the third condition is not satisfied. This court in East India Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1966] 61 ITR 16 (Mad) has held that the words "are in fact freely transferable" in Section 23A do not mean that there should necessarily be actual transfers of shares, but that there should be a factual tendency towards free transfer of shares by holders to other members of the public subject to reasonable restrictions. This court also considered a clause in the articles of association similar to the one which is now relied on by the learned counsel for the revenue and held :

"It is true, Clause 13 vests in the directors absolute power to accept or not to accept applications for transfer of shares. Nevertheless, it is not to be suspected or assumed, to begin with, that the discretion vested in the board of directors will be misused so as to achieve an ulterior purpose. Facts may, however, appear on which it will be possible to find no misuse of power in that way. But the point is that from the mere fact of absolute discretion being vested in the board of directors it cannot be concluded that the shares in fact are not freely transferable. A contrary view would appear to have been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tona Jute Company Ltd., [1963] 48 ITR 902 (Cal) . With respect, we are of the view that, without further facts and circumstances, which will warrant a conclusion that shares are in effect not transferable, it will be neither wise nor right to lay down as a general proposition that wherever a clause like Clause 13 here occurs in the articles of association, the shares must be taken to be not freely transferable."

19. In this connection, we may also refer to a passage from Kanga and Palkhivala on Income-tax, 6th edition, volume 1, page 650, which is apposite and reads as follows:

In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd.a, the Calcutta High Court held that shares were not freely transferable to other members of the public because the articles of association of the company empowered the directors to refuse, without assigning any reason, to register transfer of a share in favour of a person whom they consider undesirable. The decision, is it is submitted, incorrect, and was dissented from by the Madras High Court in East India Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. (A similar point was raised before the Bombay High Court in some writ petitions and the department agreed to regard shares as freely transferable in such cases). Shares must be treated as freely transferable if any agreement or the articles of the company do not restrict the shareholder's right to transfer the shares, and the right to transfer the shares cannot be said to be restricted merely because the directors of the company have discretion to refuse to register transfer of shares in favour of a person whom they consider undesirable. The articles of public companies must always contain a provision conferring such discretion and it cannot be said that in such cases the public companies restrict the right to transfer their shares. Such restriction is really an attribute of a private company and not of a public company as is made clear in Section 3(1)(iii) of the Companies Act, 1956.

20. It may also be pointed out that no instance has been brought to the notice of any of the authorities below wherein such a refusal has taken place during the accounting year. We respectfully agree with the decision in East India Corporation Ltd, v. Commissioner of Income-tax, and hold that the mere provision in the articles of association of the company conferring a discretion on the directors to refuse without assigning any reason to register a transfer of the shares does not warrant the conclusion that the shares are not freely transferable to the members of the public. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that this third condition is also satisfied.

21. It is seen from Sub-clause (biii) of Explanation I to Section 23A, that two tests are provided in order to determine whether the control of the company is vested in less than six persons. Firstly, if the affairs of the company at any time during the previous year were controlled by less than six persons the company would be regarded as a controlled company and not a company in which the public are substantially interested. Secondly, if the shares carrying more than 60 per cent. (since this is an Indian company whose business consists solely in the manufacture and processing of goods) of the total voting power were at any time during the accounting year held by less than six persons, it would be a controlled company. This clause, therefore, seeks to impose two distinct and separate conditions. Therefore, unless both the conditions are satisfied, the company would not be one in which the public are substantially interested. The number of directors during the accounting year was six. Of these, four were father and his three sons, and therefore they have to be treated as a single person as they come within the definition of the word "relative" in Section 23A, Explanation I, Clause (biii), and that makes the number of directors of the company three. It is not the case of the revenue that these directors have any special power under the articles of association which enable them to control the company, though they do not possess more than 50 per cent. of the voting power. There is no other evidence or material from which it could be stated that the affairs of the company were at any time during the previous year controlled by these three directors. The control is normally exercised by voting power. The learned counsel for the revenue submitted that the control of the affairs of the company is ordinarily in the hands of the directors of the company and that since the number of directors in this case is less than six this condition is not satisfied. We are unable to accept this contention. Unless it is shown that though the number of directors is less than six, they have a direct or indirect control over more than 50 per cent. of the voting power, the company could not be said to be a controlled company. In fact, according to Section 252 of the Indian Companies Act, the minimum number of directors prescribed for a public limited company is only three. If the argument of the learned counsel for the revenue is to be accepted, then in all cases of public limited companies where the number of directors is less than six, the company will automatically have to be held as one in which the public are not substantially interested. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jubilee Mills Ltd., [1963] 48 ITR(SC) 9 the Supreme Court observed :

The control of the affairs of the company is ordinarily in the hands of the directors of the company but there may be cases in which the managing agents, by reason of their superior holding of shares, may be able to appoint the directors and generally to control the views of the directors. Where the managing agents hold the interest which is small and thus not capable of exercising an overriding power, other evidence may be required to show that they, in conjunction with others, are running the affairs of the company to the exclusion of the public. Where, however, the managing agents admittedly hold 51 per cent. or more of the shares, it is obvious that the controlling interest belongs to the managing agents. When such a body holds shares carrying more than 75 per cent. of the voting power, the company itself is run mainly as the managing agents desire it to be run. Such a managing agency could easily choose its own directors and the directors would not be independent persons but mere nominees of the managing agents......When this happens the company comes within the reach of Section 23A.

22. In this connection it is useful to refer to Commissioner of Income-tax V. H. Bjordal, [1955J28 ITR 25 (PC). That was a case under the Income-tax Ordinance, 1940, Uganda. The Privy Council considering a similar provision made the following observation with reference to the control of the affairs of the company :

"For the purposes of a decision upon the arguments addressed to them, their Lordships are of opinion that 51 should be adopted as the figure of percentage requisite to confer a controlling interest. A member or a group of members holding 51 per cent. of the voting power would succeed in fulfilling his or their wishes with regard to the ordinary resolutions which come up before meetings of shareholders. They would generally have a dominant voice in the election of the directors when such elections fell due. Although they would not be able without support from others to secure the passing of a special resolution, nevertheless they would be able to resist a special resolution which was not in accordance with their wishes. They would be able generally to control the company, though their capacity to do so would not be as ample as that accompanying the possession of 75 per cent. of the voting power,"

23. As we have already seen, no special power under the articles of association which enabled the director to control a company is relied on by the learned counsel for the revenue.

24. The company had 8,000 preference shares and 12,000 equity shares carrying equal voting rights and one vote for each share. We have already held that the directors and their relations noted above were holding only 5,506 equity shares and the remaining 6,494 equity shares belong to the members of the public. In regard to preference shares, it has been found by the Tribunal that only 210 shares belonged to the controlling group and as such the remaining 7,790 preference shares belong to the public. Taking both the categories of shares together, out of the 20,000 shares, 14,284 shares are held by the public who are persons other than those forming the controlling group. Thus, the controlling group holds only very much less than 50 per cent. of the total voting power. We, therefore, hold that the fourth condition is also satisfied.

25. All the conditions have been cumulatively satisfied, the company is one in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

26. The second question is covered by our judgment in Govindarajulu Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1973] 90 ITR,13 (Mad). In that case, the assessee family held 3,300 partly paid up shares in a private limited company. Towards the first and second call money amounting to Rs. 1,65,000 the company debited the account of the assessee and the call monies have been treated as having been paid. This transaction by which a debit entry has been made against the assessee towards the call monies of Rs. 1,65,000 due by it and a credit entry made in favour of the company in relation thereto, was treated by the Income-tax Officer and Tribunal as a loan transaction by the company to the assessee family and the sum of Rs. 1,65,000 was treated as advance within the meaning of section 2(6a)(e). There was no cash payment of that sum but it was only a book adjustment in the company's account under which the assessee became a debtor and the company became a creditor. The question for consideration was whether the view of the Tribunal that this sum of Rs. 1,65,000 was advance of loan made by the company to the assessee and that attracted the application of section 2(6a)(e) was correct. It was held that in order to attract section 2(6a)(e) there should be an actual cash advance or loan from the company to the assessee and the mere creation of a debtor and creditor relationship between the company and the assessee will not be enough. There should be an outgoing or flow of money from the company to the shareholders. In the present case, the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal is that Rudrappan had criminally misappropriated the funds of the company, that the other partners of the managing agents were not aware of the acts of Rudrappan, that there were no entries in the books of the company relating to these transactions and that, therefore, the sum of Rs. 4,50,000 did not represent any payment by way of loan or advance, by the company to the assessee. We are in entire agreement with this finding. The director or shareholder helping himself out of the money of the company cannot be treated as lending or advancing. The company did not pay and unless there is an actual payment by the company as a loan or advance to the assessee it could not be treated as dividend under section 2(6a)(e).

27. The third question is also covered by our decision in G. Ramaswami Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1972] 86 ITR 768 (Mad) wherein we have held that the development rebate reserve would form part of the accumulated profits.

28. For the foregoing reasons we answer the first and second questions against the revenue. The third question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.

29. So far as the two questions referred to at the instance of the assessees are concerned, we have to state that they have not been properly referred and, therefore, we return the reference unanswered. This court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. Eathnam Nadar, [1969] 71 ITR 433 (Mad) has held that where either the Commissioner or the assessee has made the application under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, it is not open to the other party in reply to the application filed by the opposite party to ask for reference of a question which it wants to be referred. The only way by which a party can ask for a reference of any question to the High Court is by filing an application under Section 66(1) and, if that is refused, to apply to the High Court under Section 66(2). Therefore, we have to hold that the reference is not properly before us and accordingly we return the reference unanswered.