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C.P Kandaswamy (Died) And Others v. Mariappa Stores And Other
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from a motor-accident claim instituted by Mr. C. P. Kandaswami, an advocate of Coimbatore, for injuries he sustained on 1-11-1962 on the Perundurai-Erode Road. Mr. Kandaswami was travelling in a Fiat taxi (Reg. No. MDE 5747) when an Ambassador car (Reg. No. MDY 7077) belonging to the 1st respondent and driven by that respondent's driver allegedly dashed into the taxi in a rash and negligent manner, causing several injuries to the claimant.
The claimant sought Rs. 25,000 in total (breakdown: Rs. 1,000 medical expenses; Rs. 4,000 loss of professional income; Rs. 10,000 for shock, pain and suffering; Rs. 10,000 for permanent partial disability). The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore found the Ambassador driver's rash and negligent driving to be the cause and awarded Rs. 5,000 (Rs. 1,000 medical; Rs. 2,000 loss of professional income for the period disabled; Rs. 2,000 for shock, pain and suffering), rejecting the rest.
Respondents 1 (owner of the Ambassador) and 3 (insurer of the Ambassador) accepted the Tribunal's award and did not appeal. The claimant appealed only in respect of the disallowed portion of the claim. After the appeal was filed, the claimant died. His legal representatives were impleaded as appellants, but that impleading was expressly made subject to the question whether the cause of action survived the claimant's death.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the physical injuries sustained by the petitioner fall within the exception "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" contained in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, thereby causing the cause of action to not survive on the claimant's death.
- Where the injured claimant himself filed an appeal in respect of the disallowed portion of his claim and died during the pendency of that appeal, whether the appeal abates (i.e., whether the cause of action survives to his legal representatives so they may continue the appeal).
Arguments of the Parties
Contesting Respondents' Objection
- The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is not maintainable because, after the death of the claimant, the cause of action did not survive (relying on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona).
Appellants' (Legal Representatives') Arguments
- The appellants' learned counsel contended that the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" in Section 306 should be construed ejusdem generis with the earlier exceptions and, because the earlier exceptions (e.g., defamation) do not relate to physical injuries, the clause should be interpreted as excluding physical injuries (i.e., it should not take in bodily injuries).
- The appellants also relied on decisions such as Piriska Rozario v. Ford Foundation, where the claimant died of the injuries caused by the accident and thus dependants could claim — an argument aimed at showing survival in certain factual contexts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Paramen Chetty v. Sundararaja Naick, ILR (1903) 26 Mad 499 | That where a claim has merged into a decree, the legal representatives may prosecute an appeal to overturn the decree; the cause of action having merged in the decree survives for purposes of appeal. | The Court distinguished this case: it does not apply because the present appeal challenges the disallowed portion (a cause of action not merged into a decree), not a decree already passed in the claimant's favour. |
| Rustomji Dorabji v. Nurse, ILR 44 Mad 357 = (AIR 1921 Mad 1) | Full Bench holding that where a suit for malicious prosecution is pending and the defendant dies before judgment, the right to sue does not survive under Order XXII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure; the clause for "personal injuries not causing the death" was held to include bodily injuries as well as other injuries. | The Court relied on and cited this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that the clause covers bodily injuries and that such rights do not survive. |
| Kandaswami v. Thirugnanasambandam, (1970) 1 Mad LJ 455 | Followed the Full Bench decision in Rustomji Dorabji v. Nurse regarding non-survival of certain personal injury causes of action. | The Court noted that this later decision followed the Full Bench and therefore supports its interpretation that bodily injuries fall within the Section 306 exception. |
| Murugappa Chettiar v. Ponnusami Pillai, ILR 44 Mad 828 = (AIR 1921 Mad 405) | Full Bench decision holding that an appeal abates when the injured person dies pending an appeal in respect of a portion of damages not awarded (similar factual locus to the present matter). | The Court treated this Full Bench decision as directly applicable: it squarely supports abatement of the present appeal on the claimant's death. |
| Piriska Rozario v. Ford Foundation (reported in the record linked in the opinion) | A motor-accident claim where the injured person died from the injuries; dependants could claim compensation for death, so the cause of action for death survives. | The Court held this decision inapplicable here because in that case death was caused by the accident, giving rise to dependants' claims; in the present case the claimant did not die as a result of the injuries (per the facts before the Court). |
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. Godavarthi Kasiviswanadham, AIR 1970 Andh Pra 80 (FB) | Principle that actio personalis moritur cum persona has no application where statute clearly provides for survival of liability after death. | The Court observed that this principle is inapplicable here because no statute in the present case creates such a post-death survival of the tortious cause of action. |
| Margarida Gomes v. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. | Held that Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act does not apply to claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the latter creates an immediate statutory liability (debt) that passes to heirs; thus workmen's compensation claims do not abate on the worker's death. | The Court found this decision inapplicable: the present claim arises from tort (not statutory liability), so the Workmen's Compensation exception does not help the appellants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the two formally framed aspects in turn.
1) Interpretation of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act: The Court read Section 306 literally, noting that it provides that demands and rights to prosecute or defend actions survive to executors/administrators except causes of action for defamation, assault (as defined in the Indian Penal Code), or "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party." The Court concluded that the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" plainly includes physical (bodily) injuries.
The Court rejected the appellants' contention that the phrase should be read ejusdem generis so as to exclude bodily injuries. The Court reasoned:
- The earlier enumerated exceptions include "assault" which the Court regarded as involving physical injury (per the IPC definition of assault). Therefore, ejusdem generis does not exclude bodily injuries.
- The clause itself refers to injuries "not causing the death of the party," language that naturally ties to bodily injuries: if such injuries could cause death, the resulting cause of action would belong to dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act.
- Illustration (i) to Section 306 (railway passenger severely hurt but not fatally, and dying later without bringing action) explicitly demonstrates that bodily injury situations are within the clause.
2) Effect of the claimant's death on the pending appeal: The Court distinguished situations where a claim has merged into a decree (in which case legal representatives may prosecute an appeal against that decree) from situations where the claimant merely appealed against a disallowed portion of his claim (so that the cause of action has not merged into a decree). The Court held that where the appeal is by the injured person in respect of a disallowed portion which has not become a decree, and the injured dies pending the appeal, the cause of action in respect of that disallowed portion does not survive and the appeal abates under Section 306.
The Court surveyed and applied relevant authorities:
- Paramen Chetty was noted as supporting survival where a decree had been passed and is challenged on appeal; the Court distinguished it as inapplicable because the present appeal concerned a portion not merged into decree.
- Rustomji Dorabji (Full Bench) and its subsequent following (Kandaswami v. Thirugnanasambandam) were invoked to show that the clause in question takes in bodily injuries and that such rights do not survive where the victim dies before judgment.
- Murugappa Chettiar (Full Bench) was treated as directly on point: an appeal abates when the injured person dies pending appeal in respect of additional damages claimed but not awarded. The Court held this authority squarely applicable.
- Decisions cited by the appellants such as Piriska Rozario, the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax case, and Margarida Gomes were examined and either distinguished (Piriska Rozario and Margarida Gomes) or held inapplicable to the present tort claim (State of Andhra Pradesh case).
On balance, the Court concluded that Section 306 excludes bodily-injury causes of action from surviving the victim's death, and thus the present appeal (seeking the disallowed portion) abates.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The appeal filed by the claimant in respect of the disallowed portion of his claim abates on his death and is dismissed.
- The Tribunal's award of Rs. 5,000 (which had been accepted by respondents 1 and 3 and was not challenged on appeal by them) stands unaffected by this dismissal.
- The Court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying Section 306 and existing precedent; its effect is limited to the dismissal of this appeal and the abatement of the cause of action for the disallowed portion on the claimant's death.
1. A preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is raised by the contesting respondents and we think that the objection has to be upheld and the appeal dismissed. The appeal arises out of a claim of Rs. 25,000/- made by one Mr. C. P. Kandaswami, an Advocate practising at Coimbatore, for injuries sustained by him in a motor accident that occurred on 1-11-1962 on the Perundurai-Erode Road. He was travelling in a Fiat Taxi bearing registration No. MDE 5747 and proceeding from Perundurai to Erode, when the Ambassador car bearing registration No. MDY 7077 belonging to the 1st respondent to the petition and driven by the 1st respondent's driver Senniappan came in the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against the Fiat Taxi and thereby caused several injuries to Mr. Kandasami, the petitioner. The petitioner claimed in all a sum of Rs. 25,000/- made up of Rs. 1,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs. 4,000/- towards loss of professional income Rs. 10,000/- for shock, pain and suffering and another sum of Rs. 10,000/- for the permanent partial disability suffered by him on account of the accident.
2. The four respondents impleaded in the petition are the owner of the Ambassador car (1st respondent). The owner-driver of the Fiat taxi (2nd respondent), the insurer of the Ambassador car (3rd respondent) and the insurer of the Fiat taxi (4th respondent). The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore found that the accident was as a result of rash and negligent driving of the Ambassador car MDY 7077 belonging to the 1st respondent and that therefore the compensation payable to the petitioner should come out of the 3rd respondent, the insurer of the said Ambassador car. Though the petitioner claimed a total sum of Rs. 25,000/- the Tribunal awarded only a sum of Rs. 5,000/- made up of Rs. 1,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs. 2,000/- towards loss of professional income during the period when the petitioner was unable to attend to his professional work and another sum of Rs. 2,000/- towards shock, pain and suffering as a result of the injuries sustained. The Tribunal negatived the rest of the claim. Respondents 1 and 3, against whom the above said compensation was awarded by the Tribunal, accepted the awarded by the Tribunal, accepted the award and they have not filed any appeal against the same. The petitioner (claimant) filed this appeal in respect of the disallowed portion of the claim. After the filing of the appeal, the petitioner died. His legal representatives have now come an record as appellants. But even when they were impleaded as legal representatives, it has been made clear that such impleading was only subject to the question whether the cause of action survived after the death of Mr. Kandasami, the petitioner-appellant.
3. Now, the preliminary objection raised by the contesting respondents is that after the death of Mr. Kandasami, the cause of action did not survive on the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona. there are two aspects to this question. The first is whether the physical injuries sustained by the petitioner come under the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" excepted under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. The second aspect is, the claim having been filed by the injured himself and the same having been partially allowed, after which the injured himself filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, whether on his death during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal should abate.
4. A plain reading of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act would undoubtedly go to show that the cause of action regarding the injuries sustained by the petitioner in this case would not survive on his death. We will extract Section 306 and it is as follows:--
"All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favor of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases whether, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.
Illustrations
(i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive.
(ii) A sues for divorce. A dies. The cause of action does not survive to his representative.
5. The question is whether the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" would take in the physical injuries sustained by the petitioner in this case. We have no doubt that the present case would come under the above said clause which means that the cause of action would not survive after the death of the injured. The learned counsel for the present appellants (the legal representatives of the petitioner), however, contends that the above said clause, viz., "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" should be construed enjusdem generis and as the earlier clauses, which relate to causes of action which would not survive the death of the wronged, do not relate to physical injuries, the above said clause, viz., "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" should also be construed as relating to injuries other than physical injuries. This contention is undoubtedly fallacious. The earlier clauses which enumerate the causes of action which do not survive after the death of the wronged include not only defamation, but also assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel that assault does not involve any physical injury. A perusal of the definition of the word "assault" in the Indian Penal Code would go to show that it is a physical injury which falls short of criminal force. Therefore, even on the principle of ejusdem generis, it is not possible to accede to the contention of the learned counsel that the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party" does not take in causes of physical injuries. In fact, the very clause in question gives an indication that it relates to physical injuries as well, for it speaks of injuries not causing the death of the party. Unless the clause relates to physical injuries, there is no question of death of the party being linked with them. If physical injuries are so serious as to cause the death of the party concerned, then the cause of action is with the dependents as defined under the Fatal Accidents Act and there would be no question of the cause of action not surviving. But, if the physical injuries are not so serious as to cause the death of the man, the cause of action is available to the injured himself, and if he dies later (not due to the physical injuries suffered), the cause of action would not survive to his legal representatives. That is the effect of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. As a matter of fact. Illustration (i) to Section 306 makes it abundantly clear that the clause in question does relate to cases of physical injuries. That illustration says that in a case where a railway passenger is severely hurt (physical injury), but not so as to cause death, due to neglect or default on the part of railway officials, the cause of action would not survive after his death. This illustration would squarely apply to the present case.
6. On the second aspect of the question also, we are clear that the fact that the claim had been partially allowed by the Tribunal and an appeal regarding the disallowed portion had been filed by the injured himself, does not make any difference and that the appeal abates because, on the death of the injured pending the appeal, the cause of action regarding the disallowed portion of the claim does not survive. If the claim merges into a decree and the decree itself is being challenged by the opposite party, then the maxim action personalis moritur cum persona has no application. For instance, in the present case, if the insurance company has filed an appeal against the award of the sum of Rs. 5,000/- made by the Tribunal below, the death of the petitioner pending such appeal would not affect the rights of the legal representatives to contest the appeal as respondents therein. But that is not the case here. the appeal is one by the injured in respect of the disallowed portion of the claim. The injured having died subsequently, the cause of action regarding the disallowed portion of the claim, which has not so far fructified into a decree, would not survive as per the terms of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act.
7. Let us look at the case law on this question. Paramen Chetty v. Sundararaja Naick, ILR (1903) 26 Mad 499 is a case of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The suit had been decreed and an appeal to the District Judge had also been dismissed. The defendant filed a second appeal to this court, but during the pendency of the second appeal, he died. His legal representatives prosecuted the second appeal. The objection raised was that the legal representatives of the defendant to the suit cannot maintain the second appeal. The objection raised was that the legal representatives of the defendant to the suit cannot maintain the second appeal on the ground that the cause of action for damages for malicious prosecution could not survive after the death of the defendant. That was negatived by a Bench of this Court. That is so, because the claim has already merged into a decree and when the decree was being challenged in appeal, there is no question of the cause of action not surviving after the death of the defendant-appellant. It was pointed out that the final judgment having been given against the defendant during his lifetime and the cause of action having merged in the decree, the legal representative of the defendant is entitled to prosecute the appeal in order to get rid of the decree which otherwise must be satisfied out of the estate of the deceased. As we said, in the present case, the appeal is not against that portion of the claim that has been allowed. But, it is in respect of the disallowed portion of the claim. Therefore, the above decision would have no application to the present case.
8. In Rustomji Dorabji v. Nurse, ILR 44 Mad 357 = (AIR 1921 Mad 1) a Full Bench of this court has held that where in a suit for malicious prosecution the defendant dies after the institution of the suit but before judgment is given, the right to sue does not survive within the meaning of Order XXII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, it seems to have been contended that the term "personal injuries not causing the death of the party" in Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act (corresponding to Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act) would relate only to bodily injuries and not to injuries such as malicious prosecution. Such a contention had been negatived by this court. What the learned counsel for the appellants in the present case contends is the converse position. As already noticed, he would say that the term "other bodily injuries not causing the death of the party" would not take in injuries to the body but only injuries such as defamation, malicious prosecution, etc. We have already pointed out that such a contention is wholly baseless. The observation of the Full Bench in the above case, (i.e.) ILR 44 Mad 357 = (AIR 1921 Mad 1) indicates clearly that the said clause would take in cases of bodily injuries as it is pointed out there that it would take in not only cases of bodily injuries but all other injuries, In Kandaswami v. Thirugnanasambandam, (1970) 1 Mad LJ 455 Anantanarayanan, C. J., has followed the above decision.
9. There is another Full Bench decision in Murugappa Chettiar v. Ponnusami Pillai, ILR 44 Mad 828 = (AIR 1921 Mad 405). That is exactly a similar case as the present one regarding the question whether an appeal would abate on the death of the injured in cases whether the cause of action does not survive as per the terms of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. That was a case where a person sued for damages for malicious prosecution and obtained a decree but preferred an appeal claiming more damages than he has been awarded and died pending the appeal. The Full Bench held that the appeal abates. That squarely applies to the present case, as in this case also the appeal is in respect of the disallowed portion of the claim and the appellant having died, the appeal should abate.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to Piriska Rozario v. Ford Foundation, which is a case of a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for injuries sustained in the motor accident. The man died after instituting the claim. But the death was due to injuries sustained in the motor accident itself. Therefore there was no question of the cause of action not surviving, for the dependants of the deceased who ultimately succumbed to the injuries had a right to claim compensation for the death of the man. Therefore, the decision has no application here. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Godavarthi Kasiviswanadham, (AIR 1970 Andh Pra 80 (FB) is a case under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. It was pointed out there that the principle action personalis moritur cum persona has no application where the law clearly provides for the survival of the liability after the death of the concerned person. We do not see how this has any application to the present case. Margarida Gomes v. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co., , is a case arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The workman who was injured died during the claim proceedings. The court held that Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act does not apply on the ground that the compensation payable under Workmen's Compensation Act does not arise out of any tort or wrong-doing by the employer, that the liability is an absolute one and that the liability to pay compensation is created immediately on the accident occurring and the workman suffering injury and must amount to a debt payable to the workman and passes on the heirs of the workman on his death. It was under such circumstances it was held that the claim does not abate on the death of the workman during the pendency of the claim proceedings and Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act has no application to such a case. That decision would have no application at all to the present case. Undoubtedly, the claim in the present case arises out of tort and not a statutory liability as one under the Workmen's Compensation Act resulting in liability to pay compensation being created immediately on the accident and the compensation amounting to a debt payable to the workman immediately on such accident,. All that the learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in the above case has said is that on the principle of ejusdem generis the words "other injuries" occurring in Sec. 306 of the Indian Succession Act must be confined to the injuries of the nature referred to earlier in the said Section and that the said clause would not take in injury to a workman resulting in compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as such compensation is not born out of any tort. This decision of the Bombay High Court cannot be construed as saying that all cases of bodily injuries are outside the purview of the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party". As already pointed out, the very illustration to Section 306 makes it abundantly clear that bodily injury caused due to the tortious act of the wrong-does is taken in by the clause "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party."
11. We have no doubt that the cause of action relating to the disallowed portion of the claim, which is the subject-matter of the appeal before us, does not survive after the death of the petitioner and that therefore the appeal abates. The result is, the appeal is dismissed. But under the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.
12. Appeal dismissed.
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