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Thangam Textiles v. First Income-Tax Officer, Circle Ii, Salem-4.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ramaswami, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent from pursuing reassessment proceedings initiated by a notice dated 6 July 1967 issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment year 1963–64.
The petitioner was a partnership firm originally consisting of five partners. On 24 April 1963 one partner, K. Ramaswami, retired; on 26 December 1963 two other partners, M/s. Krishnaswami and Thiagarajan, retired. The firm was thereafter continued by the two remaining partners, Perumalsami and Uthamraj, until the firm was dissolved on 3 January 1965.
For assessment year 1963–64 the petitioner filed a return of income accompanied by an auditor’s statement describing these partnership changes and stating that a deed of partnership was executed on 27 December 1963 between the two partners to continue the firm and that application for registration for 1964–65 was filed on 15 February 1964.
The petitioner traded in the purchase, manufacture and export of cotton and art silk cloth and made admissions in the return's accompanying statement concerning disposal of import licences for art silk and dyes, while stating that the income returned was an estimate.
The Income-tax Officer (ITO) estimated profits from sale of import licences and completed assessment on 28 February 1966. Subsequently, the ITO reopened the assessment under section 147(b) and issued a notice under section 148 dated 6 July 1967, which was served on 17 July 1967 on Krishnaswami (who had retired on 26 December 1963). The reopening was based on information from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, grounded on market reports indicating higher premiums on sale of import licences than those used by the ITO in the original assessment.
The petitioner objected to the section 148 notice on 20 April 1968, including the objection that the notice served on Krishnaswami was invalid and that no proper notice had been served on the petitioner. The petitioner then filed this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, served on a person who had ceased to be a partner before the dissolution of the firm (specifically, notice served on Krishnaswami who retired 26 December 1963) was a valid notice to initiate reassessment proceedings against the firm for assessment year 1963–64.
- Whether the information communicated by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner based on market reports (regarding premiums on sale of import licences) was sufficient by itself to clothe the Income-tax Officer with jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under section 147(b) in the absence of an allegation that the petitioner had sold licences at those rates.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by learned counsel)
- That a valid notice is a condition precedent to initiation of proceedings under section 147(b), and the notice served on Krishnaswami—who had retired from the firm prior to the firm's dissolution—was invalid; therefore the proceedings taken pursuant to that notice are illegal and void.
- That the information furnished by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, based on market reports as to premiums, would not in itself confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to initiate reassessment under section 147(b) unless there was an allegation that the petitioner had sold licences at those rates—particularly since the petitioner's return had disclosed sales and the ITO had already estimated profits.
Revenue's Arguments
- The phrase “immediately before” in section 283(2) should not be given its ordinary meaning but should be understood with reference to the year of assessment, so that notice in respect of assessment year 1963–64 could be issued to any person who was a partner during the accounting year relevant to that assessment year.
- That the decision in Narayanan Chetti v. Income-tax Officer (under the old Act) rests on the language of the old section 34 and that under sections 147 and 148 of the new Act, the issue of the notice is a mere formality and not the foundation for initiating reassessment proceedings.
- An ancillary contention was that the notice served on the retired partner nevertheless reached the petitioner and the petitioner filed an objection to the notice, and therefore the reassessment proceedings were validly initiated.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayanan Chetti v. Income-tax Officer [1959] 35 I.T.R. 388; [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 189 (Supreme Court) | Held that service of the requisite notice on the assessee is a condition precedent to validity of any reassessment made under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (corresponding to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961); if a valid notice was not issued, proceedings and reassessment orders would be void and inoperative. | The court relied on this holding to support the proposition that notice under section 148 of the 1961 Act is likewise a condition precedent to reassessment under section 147 and that the absence of valid notice renders the reassessment void. |
| Nataraj v. Fifth Income-tax Officer (Mysore High Court) | On construction of sections 147 and 148, the Mysore High Court concluded that a notice prescribed under section 148 for initiating reassessment proceedings is not a mere procedural requirement; service of the prescribed notice is a condition precedent to validity of any reassessment under section 147. Also held that mode of service must be in accordance with the Act. | The court cited this decision as supporting authority for the view that service must comply strictly with statutory provisions and that an invalidly served notice does not confer jurisdiction for reassessment. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dey Brothers [1935] 3 I.T.R. 213 (Rangoon) | Principle that service must be in accordance with provisions of the Act and that failure to comply with mode of service can vitiate reassessment proceedings (as relied upon by the Mysore High Court). | The court relied on this decision (as cited by the Mysore High Court) to support the proposition that strict compliance with statutory mode of service is required and that non-compliance renders proceedings without jurisdiction. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Baxiram Rodmal [1934] 2 I.T.R. 438 (Nagpur) | Similar authority relied on for the proposition that service must comply with statutory requirements and that non-compliant service invalidates proceedings. | The court relied on this decision (as cited by the Mysore High Court) to reinforce the conclusion that improper service defeats jurisdiction to reassess. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying statutory text and prior authority to the facts presented.
- Construction of section 283(2): The court examined section 283(2) (mode of service for dissolved firms) which provides that when a firm is dissolved, notices in respect of the income of the firm may be served on any person who was a partner immediately before its dissolution. The firm was dissolved on 3 January 1965, and immediately before dissolution the firm consisted of only two partners; Krishnaswami had retired earlier on 26 December 1963. On a plain reading the court held that Krishnaswami was not a partner "immediately before" dissolution and therefore service on him was not a valid service under section 283(2).
- Rejection of revenue's temporal argument: The court rejected the revenue's argument that the phrase "immediately before" should be read with reference to the accounting year or the assessment year (i.e., that any person who was a partner during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year could be validly served). The court read the phrase in context to mean "preceding the date of dissolution".
- Statutory context and partner liability: The court referred to sections 187, 189(1) and 189(3) of the Act to explain that assessments are to be made on the firm as constituted at the time of assessment and that where a firm is dissolved, the ITO shall make assessment of the firm's total income as if no dissolution had taken place and that persons who are liable to bear the tax are the partners at the time of dissolution. From these provisions the court concluded that notices under section 283(2) need to be issued only to persons who were partners immediately before dissolution.
- Role of notice under section 148: The court considered the revenue’s submission that, unlike the old section 34, sections 147 and 148 of the new Act did not make service of notice foundational for initiation of reassessment. The court rejected any distinction and held that section 148 requires that before making an assessment or reassessment under section 147 the ITO shall serve on the assessee a notice. The court concluded that notice under section 148 is the foundation (a condition precedent) for initiation of reassessment proceedings and that the requirement is not a mere formality.
- Reliance on authorities: The court relied on Narayanan Chetti (Supreme Court) and the Mysore High Court decision in Nataraj to support the proposition that service of the prescribed notice is a condition precedent to validity of reassessment. The court also accepted the view (as in Nataraj and earlier decisions Dey Brothers and Baxiram Rodmal) that mode of service must be strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions and that mere knowledge or participation by the taxpayer, or reaching the taxpayer informally, does not cure defective service.
- Application to facts and conclusion: Applying the statutory construction and authorities, the court concluded that the notice served on Krishnaswami was not a valid notice on the petitioner-firm because Krishnaswami was not a partner immediately before dissolution and because the statutory mode of service had not been satisfied. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings initiated in pursuance of that notice were without jurisdiction. Given this jurisdictional defect, the court found it unnecessary to consider the petitioner's secondary contention about adequacy of the information supplied to the ITO.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court's final decision was to allow the writ petition. The decisive legal holding is presented here:
HOLDING: The notice under section 148 served on Krishnaswami was invalid and consequently the reassessment proceedings initiated in pursuance of that notice were without jurisdiction; the writ petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute with costs.
Consequences and implications:
- The direct effect on the parties is that reassessment proceedings based on the section 148 notice served on Krishnaswami are prohibited and have no legal effect; the respondent lacks jurisdiction to proceed on that basis.
- The petitioner’s writ is allowed with costs and counsel's fee awarded (stated as Rs. 150 in the opinion).
- The court applied existing statutory construction and precedents to reach its conclusion; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established principles that service in accordance with the Act is a condition precedent to reassessment and that partners liable are those immediately before dissolution.
Note: This summary reflects only the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts not expressly stated therein.
Ramaswami, J.:— This is a petition for the issue of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondent from pursuing the reassessment proceedings in pursuance of the notice dated July 6, 1967, issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called “the Act”), in respect of the assessment year 1963-64. The petitioner, a firm of partnership, originally consisted of five partners. On April 24, 1963, one K. Ramaswami, a partner of the firm, retired and on December 26, 1963, M/s. Krishnaswami and Thiagarajan, two other partners of the firm, also retired. The partner-ship firm was continued by Perumalsami and Uthamraj, the two remaining partners, up to January 3, 1965, on which date the firm was dissolved.
2. For the assessment year 1963–64, the petitioner filed a return of income and this return was accompanied by a statement of the auditor, containing the above facts relating to the partnership firm and also a statement that the deed of partnership was executed on December 27, 1963, between the two partners to continue the firm and the application for registration for 1964–65 was also filed on February 15, 1964.
3. The petitioner was doing business in purchase, manufacture and export of cotton and art silk cloth to Ceylon and there were also some local sales. In the statement accompanying the return of income the petitioner admitted that the licences for import of art silk and dyes were disposed of but the profits were not brought into account. The petitioner however stated that for the reasons stated in the statement accompanying the return the income returned was only an estimate.
4. The Income-tax Officer estimated the petitioner's profit on the sale of the licences at 125 per cent on the face value of import licences relating to art silk yarn and at 50 per cent on the face value of the licences concerning dyes, besides estimating the petitioner's profit on local sales, and completed the assessment on February 28, 1966. The Income-tax Officer reopened the assessment under section 147(b) of the Act and a notice under section 148 dated July 6, 196?, was served on July 17, 1967, on Krishnaswami, who retired from the firm on December 26, 1963. This notice was issued, as it now appears from the records and the counter-affidavit, subsequent to the assessment on information conveyed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Officer on the basis of authentic market reports that the premiums on the sale of import licences during the relevant time were 205 per cent on art silk import licences and anything between 150 to 170 per cent on licences for dyes. On this information the Income-tax Officer was said to have entertained the belief that the assessee's income had been under-assessed in the original assessment.
5. The petitioner filed an objection on April 20, 1968, to the notice issued under section 148 of the Act. It may be stated that one of the objections taken by the petitioner was that the notice served on Krishnaswami was not legal and valid and there was no proper notice served on the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner has filed this writ petition.
6. Though the petitioner had raised a number of grounds in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, Thiru K. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, had confined himself to only two of the grounds in the arguments. The first contention was that a valid notice was a condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under section 147(b) and that the notice served on Krishnaswami, who had retired from the firm, is invalid and, therefore, the proceedings taken in pursuance of that notice is illegal and void. The second contention was that the information furnished by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner based on the authentic market reports relating to the premiums on the sale of import licences would not itself clothe the jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to initiate reassessment proceedings under section 147(b) in the absence of an allegation that the information furnished showed that the petitioner had sold the licences at those rates especially when the petitioners reported that they had sold the licences and the profit on sales had already been estimated by the income-tax Officer.
7. We are of opinion that the learned counsel for the petitioner is well-founded in his submission that the notice served on Krishnaswami was not valid. Section 283(2) of the Act requires that where a firm is dissolved, notices under the Act in respect of the income of the firm may be served on any person who was a partner immediately before its dissolution. The dissolution of the firm was on January 3, 1965, and immediately before that the firm consisted of only two partners and Krishnaswami was not then a partner, he having already retired on December 26, 1963. Therefore, on a plain reading of the section, it is clear that there was no valid notice in this case. But, what the learned counsel for the revenue would contend is that the phrase “immediately before” occurring in section 283(2) should not be given its ordinary and plain meaning but should be understood and given a meaning with reference to the year of assessment and that the notice issued is in respect of under-assessment of the income of the firm for the assessment year 1963–64 and that, therefore, the notice could be issued to any of the persons who were partners during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year. We are unable to accept this argument of the learned counsel for the revenue. Under section 187, where at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or section 144, it was found that a change had occurred in the constitution of a firm, the assessment should be made on the firm as constituted at the time of making the assessment. Section 189(1) provides that where a firm is dissolved the Income-tax Officer shall make an assessment of the total income of the firm as if no dissolution had taken place and all the provisions of the Act shall apply so far as may be to such assessment and under section 189(3) every person who was a partner at the time of dissolution of the firm and the legal representative of any such person who is deceased shall be jointly and severally liable for the amount of tax and all the provisions of the Act, so far as may be, shall apply to any such assessment. These provisions, in our opinion, make it clear that the persons who are liable to bear the tax are the partners at the time of dissolution. Therefore, the notice under section 283(2) has to be issued only to such of those persons who were partners immediately before the dissolution of the firm. In the context, we are of the view, that the phrase “immediately before” means “preceding the date of dissolution”. Hence, the notice issued on Krishnaswami was not a valid notice on the petitioner-firm.
8. In Narayanan Chetti v. Income-tax Officer [1959] 35 I.T.R 388, [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R 189 S.C., the Supreme Court held that the service of requisite notice on the assessee is a condition precedent to the validity of any reassessment made under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (which corresponds to section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961), and if a valid notice was not issued as required, the proceeding taken by the Income-tax Officer in pursuance of an invalid notice and consequent orders of reassessment passed by him would be void and inoperative. The learned counsel for the revenue submitted that this decision of the Supreme Court rested on the language of section 34 and that the provisions of sections 147 and 148 had not made service of notice the foundation for the initiation of the reassessment proceedings. Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, required the Income-tax Officer to “serve on the assessee…. a notice…. and may proceed to assess or reassess ….” Because this section requires that notice to be served and then proceed to assess, the notice was considered to be the foundation for initiation of proceedings under section 34. But, under section 147 of the Act the existence of the reasons or the grounds as stated therein are not foundations for the initiation of the proceedings and the issue of the notice under section 143 is a mere formality to be observed before a reassessment, so ran the argument for the revenue.
9. We are unable to find any such distinction between section 34 of the old Act and sections 147 and 148 of the new Act, except that the provision requiring the notice is put as a separate provision. In our opinion, there is no difference between the provisions of the old Act and the new Act in this regard. Section 148 requires that, before making the assessment or reassessment under section 147, the Income-tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice. In our view, the notice under section 148 is the foundation for the initiation of reassessment proceedings and a condition precedent for the validity of any reassessment. We are supported in this view by a decision of the Mysore High Court in Nataraj v. Fifth Income-tax Officer. Though no argument appears to have been placed distinguishing section 34 of the old Act and sections 147 and 148 of the new Act, on a construction of sections 147 and 148, the learned judges came to the conclusion that a notice prescribed under section 148 of the Act for initiating reassessment proceedings is not a mere procedural requirement and that the service of the prescribed notice on the assessee is a condition precedent to the validity of any reassessment under section 147.
10. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the revenue that the notice issued and served on Krishriaswami, a retired partner, found its way to the petitioner and in fact the petitioner filed an objection to the notice and that, therefore, there was a valid initiation of the reassessment proceedings. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for revenue. Section 282 of the Act provides for the mode of service and section 283(2) is a special provision relating to the mode of service in cases of dissolved firms. Unless the notice is served in the prescribed manner, the service is insufficient. In Nataraj v. Fifth Income-tax Officer, also the assessee appeared and submitted returns in pursuance of an invalid notice and the counsel for the revenue relied on that fact, in support of the validity of the reassessment proceedings. The Mysore High Court, however, held that the service should be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and unless the provisions relating to the mode of service are strictly complied with the reassessment proceeding was without jurisdiction. In support of this view, the learned judges relied on two earlier decisions in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dey Brothers [1935] 3 I.T.R 213 Rang.., and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Baxiram Rodmal [1934] 2 I.T.R 438 Nag... We are in entire agreement with this view. It, therefore, follows that there was no valid notice for initiation of the proceedings for reassessment and that the respondent had no jursdiction to proceed with the reassessment proceedings in pursuance of that notice. In view of this finding, it is not necessary for us to consider the second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
11. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150.
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