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Mohammed Kunhi v. Mohammed Koya And Others.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 29 January 1970, Mohammed Koya arrived at Madras Central Station and the Railway Police Inspector searched him on suspicion, finding currency notes totalling Rs. 1,00,000 on his person. Koya was arrested and produced before the Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras; he was remanded and later released on bail. The police investigation concluded that no cognizable offence had been made out, and the police proceedings were dropped after intimating the income-tax department.
The income-tax department investigated and concluded that the Rs. 1,00,000 represented undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya. The Commissioner of Income-tax authorised the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, to take possession of the amount under section 132 of the Income-tax Act. Pursuant to this, the Income-tax Officer filed a petition before the Second Presidency Magistrate claiming entitlement to the amount held in court deposit and seeking delivery of the sum to him.
Mohammed Kunhi filed a petition in the same court seeking return of the amount to him. Mohammed Koya supported Kunhi's petition, asserting that he had been merely a carrier entrusted with the money by Mohammed Kunhi (managing partner of M/s. P. Mamunchi C. Ebrahim & Company) to carry funds from Mangalore to Bombay on behalf of Kallatre Textorium for payment to Southern India Trading Corporation Ltd. The income-tax authorities, however, assessed Mohammed Koya to tax of Rs. 62,375 under section 147 read with section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act and imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 under section 273(b), treating the amount as Koya's undisclosed income; appeals from those orders are pending.
Legal Issues Presented
- Who is entitled under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code to possession of the Rs. 1,00,000 seized from Mohammed Koya?
- Whether an Income-tax Officer who has not physically seized the amount from court deposit under section 132 of the Income-tax Act can nonetheless be regarded as a person entitled to possession within the meaning of section 523 CrPC?
- Whether the Commissioner’s authorisation to the Income-tax Officer under section 132 required a prior, physical discovery of the money as a result of a search as contemplated by clause (i) and (ii) of section 132(1), so that seizure from court custody would be impermissible?
- Whether the condition precedent for authorisation under section 132 — that the Commissioner have reason to believe the money represented undisclosed income — was fulfilled in this case?
Arguments of the Parties
Mohammed Kunhi (revision petitioner) — arguments advanced by his counsel
- The Income-tax Officer has not actually seized the amount in court deposit under section 132 of the Income-tax Act; therefore he cannot be regarded as a person entitled to possession within the meaning of section 523, CrPC.
- The Commissioner of Income-tax lacked the necessary reason to believe that the money represented undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya (i.e., the condition precedent for seizure under section 132 was not fulfilled).
- The Income-tax Officer has no power to seize money in court deposit because the money was not discovered as a result of a search of any building or place as contemplated by section 132(1)(i)–(iii) of the Income-tax Act.
Mohammed Koya — asserted position
- Koya maintained that the Rs. 1,00,000 did not belong to him but belonged to Mohammed Kunhi and/or to Kallatre Textorium, and that Koya was merely a carrier entrusted with transporting the money for payment to Southern India Trading Corporation.
Income-tax Department — position taken in the record
- After investigation and account scrutiny (of Koya, Kunhi and Kallatre Textorium), the income-tax authorities concluded that the entrustment theory was false and that the money was Koya's undisclosed income; the Commissioner authorised seizure under section 132 and the Income-tax Officer sought delivery from court custody.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bavajee Fakkir Mohammed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1967 Ker. 282 | Held that where an officer is entitled by law to seize property that is in custody of a court, the officer should move the court for handing over possession and the court should hand it over if it does not require it for lawful purposes. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that an Income-tax Officer entitled to seize may move the court for delivery of property in court custody and that the court should hand it over if not needed. |
| Krishnan Sukumaran v. Enforcement Officer, Cochin, A.I.R. 1968 Ker. 208 | Same principle as above concerning delivery of property held in court custody to an entitled officer. | Used alongside other High Court decisions to justify that the Income-tax Officer could apply to the magistrate for possession of money held in court deposit. |
| Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Preventive, West Bengal v. Sitaram Navsaria, A.I.R. 1968 Cal. 274 | Same principle regarding an entitled officer obtaining court custody property by application to the court. | Cited to reinforce the view that seizure can be effectuated by seeking delivery from the court where property is held. |
| Enforcement Officer v. Sub-Inspector of Police, [1971] K.L.J. 267 (Ker) | Same principle regarding delivery of property from court custody to an entitled enforcement officer. | Relied upon by the court as part of the established High Court practice that supports handing over custody to an entitled officer. |
| Union of India v. Hadibandhu Das (Orissa High Court, K. Ahmad C.J.) | Applied a narrower construction of section 132: held that clause (iii) of section 132(1) requires the discovery of property as a result of a search contemplated by clauses (i)–(ii), and thus seizure from court deposit was not permissible on that basis. | The court acknowledged this authority as favouring the narrow construction argued by the petitioner, but expressly disagreed with it and declined to adopt that restrictive interpretation. |
| Crl. Revision Petition No. 306/72 (Kerala High Court, K. Baskaran J.) | Adopted the view that clause (iii) of section 132(1) requires discovery as a result of the search described in clauses (i)–(ii), supporting the argument that seizure from court deposit was not permissible absent such a search. | The court noted this decision as one which had taken the narrow approach, but the present court disagreed with that approach and declined to follow it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the principal question as who was entitled under section 523, CrPC, to possession of the Rs. 1,00,000. The analysis proceeded in discrete steps corresponding to the main contentions:
- On whether the Income-tax Officer can be treated as a person entitled to possession under section 523 CrPC even though the officer had not physically seized the amount in court custody: the court reasoned that seizure is the process by which possession is obtained and that it would be futile to distinguish between a person entitled to possession and a person entitled to seize. If an officer has statutory power to seize under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, he is a person entitled to possession. Where property that an officer is entitled to seize is in custody of a court, the proper process is for the officer to move the court for delivery; the court should hand it over if it does not require it for a lawful purpose. The court cited multiple High Court authorities to support this proposition and applied that principle to hold that the Income-tax Officer could be regarded as entitled to possession and could properly move the magistrate for delivery of the money in court deposit.
- On the contention that the Commissioner did not have the requisite "reason to believe" (a condition precedent) when authorising seizure: the court declined to inquire into the ultimate correctness of the income-tax authorities' assessment. Instead it examined the surrounding circumstances (the suspicious manner of carriage of a large sum by Koya, account scrutiny performed by income-tax authorities, and the subsequent assessment and penalty orders) and held that there was sufficient material to show that the Commissioner had reason to believe the money represented undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya at the time of authorisation.
- On the narrow-construction argument that clause (iii) of section 132(1) permits seizure only of items "found as a result of such search" as contemplated by clauses (i) and (ii): the court rejected a constricted reading. It analysed statutory structure and purpose, observing that Parliament conferred a primary power of seizure and ancillary powers of entering, searching and breaking open receptacles to facilitate that seizure. The court held that to require a literal, mechanical antecedent search (enter, break open locks, then find) before any seizure could lawfully occur would confuse means and ends and frustrate legislative intent. The court further noted that "search" can encompass looking for or seeking out the item and that the Income-tax Officer's entry into the magistrate's court building to look for and claim the money in court custody fell within the search contemplated by the statute. The court expressly disagreed with earlier High Court decisions that had favoured the narrow view, characterising that approach as too restrictive and inconsistent with the primary power to seize created by section 132.
- On the overall question of entitlement under section 523 CrPC: applying the foregoing reasoning, the court concluded that the order of the court below directing payment of the amount in court deposit to the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, was correct.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court upheld the order of the court below directing refund of the entire amount in court deposit to the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, and dismissed the criminal revision of Mohammed Kunhi.
Direct consequences and procedural effects explicitly stated in the opinion:
- The criminal revision petition of Mohammed Kunhi is dismissed.
- The order of the court below directing payment of the amount in court deposit to the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, is upheld.
- Interim stay granted in Crl. M.P. No. 2702 of 1970 is vacated.
- No orders on Crl. M. Ps. Nos. 613/72 and 989/72 were considered necessary in view of the order in the main revision case.
The opinion does not set out any statement that it intended to create a new binding precedent; it applied existing statutory interpretation and cited High Court authorities in support of the conclusion. The opinion does not otherwise discuss broader implications beyond the described direct effect on the parties and the court-filed petitions.
Maharajan, J.:— The question that arises for consideration in this criminal revision is, who is entitled under section 523, Criminal Procedure Code, to the amount of cash seized from one Mohammed Koya on January 29, 1970? As Mohammed Koya arrived at the Madras Central Station at about 4.30 p.m on that day by West Coast Express, the Inspector, Railway Police, searched him on suspicion and found on his person currency notes of the value of rupees one lakh. Suspecting him of commission of an offence cognizable by the police, the Inspector arrested him and produced him before the Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras, along with the amount seized. Mohammed Koya was remanded to custody and released on bail subsequently. The Inspector, Railway Police, Madras Central, found on investigation that no cognizable offence has been made out against Mohammed Koya, and dropped the proceedings after intimating the income-tax department. The income-tax department found, on investigation, that the amount of rupees one lakh represented the income of Mohammed Koya which he had failed to disclose to the income-tax department. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, Kerala and Bombay, authorised the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, to take possession of the amount under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, and in pursuance of this authorisation, the Income-tax Officer filed a petition before the Second Presidency Magistrate claiming to be the person entitled to the possession of the amount, in court deposit and requesting the court to hand over the amount to him. On the other hand, one Mohammed Kunhi filed a petition before the court below praying for the return of the amount to him. Mohammed Koya supported the application of Mohammed Kunhi on the ground that the amount seized by the police from him did not represent the monies belonging to him, and that the monies really belonged to Mohammed Kunhi, who as the managing partner of M/s. P. Mamunchi C. Ebrahim & Company, Nileshwar, Cannanore, had entrusted him with the amount on behalf of Kallatre Textorium, Mangalore, for being paid to the Southern India Trading Corporation Ltd., Bombay. In other words, the case of Mohammed Koya was that he was merely a carrier entrusted with the task of carrying the amount of rupees one lakh from Mangalore to Bombay for the purpose of payment of the same to the Southern India Trading Corporation on behalf of Kallatre Textorium, Mangalore. If really any monies were payable by Kallatre Textorium to the Southern India Trading Corporation, one would expect them to have sent it by means of a crossed cheque or a demand draft. The carriage of this huge amount by Mohammed Koya over several hundreds of miles was attended with evident risks. That Mohammed Kunhi should have resorted to this hazardous method of transporting the money has naturally enough aroused the suspicion of the income-tax department. Further, Mohammed Koya claims to be only a hawker doing business in Bombay Railway Station platform, and the income-tax department is entitled to wonder if Mohammed Kunhi could have reposed confidence in this platform pedlar and entrusted him with rupees one lakh as a carrier. If in these circumstances and in consequence of information, which he says he had in his possession, the Commissioner of Income-tax authorised the Income-tax Officer to seize the amount, the authorisation cannot be attacked in this court on the ground that there is no basis for his reason to believe that the money represented either wholly or partly income which has not been disclosed by Mohammed Koya for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act. In fact, the income-tax department, has, after notice to Mohammed Koya, assessed him to an income-tax of Rs. 62,375 under section 147 read with section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act on the basis that the amount of rupees one lakh represents his undisclosed income. It has also imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 under section 273(b) of the Act on the ground that the assessee had without reasonable cause failed to disclose his income. The orders of the Income-tax Officer are under appeal, and it is open to the aggrieved party to canvass the correctness of the orders before the heirarchy of Tribunals constituted under Chapter XX of the Income-tax Act. If, ultimately, the aggrieved party succeeds, he will be entitled not only to the refund of the entire amount, but also to interest at 9 per cent, per annum on the amount in case of delayed refund (vide section 243 of the Income-tax Act). It is true that the powers of seizure given to the Income-tax Officer might lead to harassment of innocent citizens if unreasonably exercised. But, Parliament in its wisdom has conferred such powers after taking care to see that such powers are not exercised unless authorised by the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner of Income-tax, and that too, if either of them has reason to believe that the article or thing to be seized represents either wholly or partly income or property which has not been disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act.
2. Learned counsel for Mohammed Kunhi, the revision petitioner, advanced three grounds upon which he attacked the correctness of the order of the court below dismissing the petition of Mohammed Kunhi and directing payment of the amount in court deposit to the income-tax department: The first ground is that inasmuch as the Income-tax Officer has not seized the amount in court deposit under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, he cannot be regarded as a person entitled to the possession of the amount within the meaning of section 523, Criminal Procedure Code.
3. I am unable to agree. If the Income-tax Officer is clothed by the statute with the power to seize the amount in court deposit, he would certainly be a person entitled to possession of the amount, because seizure is the process by which possession is procured, and it would be idle to draw a distinction between a person entitled to possession and a person entitled to seize. If the court is convinced that the Income-tax Officer has the power under section 132 of the Income-tax Act to seize the money in court deposit, it would be a wholly needless and empty ritual to ask him to wait till after the court has refunded the amount to Mohammed Koya or Mohammed Kunhi and then to allow the Income-tax Officer to seize the amount from either of them the moment it is handed over to them. In fact, it has been held by the different High Courts in India that if a property which an officer is entitled under the law to seize is in custody of a court, what the officer has to do is to move the court for handing over possession of the property for any lawful purpose, and it is the duty of the court to hand it over to the officer if it does not require it for some lawful purpose: vide Bavajee Fakkir Mohammed v. State of Kerala A.I.R 1967 Ker. 282., Krishnan Sukumaran,… v. Enforcement Officer, Cochin,…. A.I.R 1968 Ker. 208., Deputy Superintendent, Customs, Preventive, West Bengal v. Sitaram Navsaria A.I.R 1968 Cal. 274. and Enforcement Officer v. Sub-Inspector of Police [1971] K.L.J 267 Ker...
4. The second ground of attack is that the condition precedent for the seizure is the reasonable belief on the part of the Commissioner that the money sought to be seized represents either wholly or partly income which has not been disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, and that such a condition precedent has not been fulfilled in this case. I am unable to accept this contention either. I have already referred to the peculiar circumstances under which Mohammed Koya was found in possession of the amount of rupees one lakh. It is the case of the income-tax authorities that they have scrutinised the accounts of Mohammed Kunhi as well as the accounts of Kallatre Textorium, Mangalore, and come to the conclusion that the theory of entrustment is false and has been conceived belatedly and that the money really belongs to Mohammed Koya and represents his undisclosed income. I am not concerned with the question whether the finding of the income-tax assessment authorities is correct or justified. But there is enough material to show that the Commissioner at the time he authorised the Income-tax Officer to seize the amount had reason to believe that the amount represented in whole or in part undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya.
5. It is lastly contended that the Income-tax Officer has no power to seize the amount in court deposit, because he has not found the money as a result of such search as has been contemplated under section 132 of the Income-tax Act. The relevant provisions of section 132 of the Act read:
“Where ……the Commissioner, in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe that—……
(c) any person is in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing and such money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represents either wholly or partly income or property which has not been disclosed for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act …….
he may authorise any ……. Income-tax Officer…… to—
(i) enter and search any building or place where he has reason to suspect that such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing are kept;
(ii) break open the lock of any door, box, locker, safe, almirah or other receptacle for exercising the powers conferred by clause (i) where the keys thereof are not available;
(iii) seize any such books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing found as a result of such search;…..”
6. The argument is that as the discovery of money in court deposit is not claimed to be the result of search of any building or place referred to in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 132 of the Act, the question of applying the provisions of clause (iii) of section 132(1) cannot arise. This argument, it is true, has found favour with two learned judges, one of the Orissa High Court (K. Ahmad C.J) in Union of India v. Hadibandhu Das and the other of the Kerala High Court (K. Baskaran J.) in Crl. Revision Petition No. 306/72.* With great respect to the two learned judges, I find myself unable to frustrate the legislative intent by putting too narrow a construction upon the language of section 132 of the Income-tax Act. The primary power conferred by Parliament upon the Income-tax Officer is the power of seizure. The power to enter and search any building or break open the lock of any door, box, locker, safe, almirah or other receptacle is only an incidental power, the exercise of which will be only a means to the primary end, viz., the seizure. To say that the power of seizure is not exercisable unless it is preceded by the search of a building or breaking open of locks is to confuse the end with the means and to caricature the intention of the legislature, which, in order to facilitate the power of seizure, has provided also for the ancillary power of invading the privacy of people, by entering and searching their buildings and breaking open the receptacles where the thing to be seized might remain concealed. It would indeed be a captious and pernicious play on words to tell the Income-tax Officer, “You have, no doubt, the power of seizure; but you cannot exercise it unless you go though the physical motions of entering a building, searching it, breaking open the locks therein and then finding the thing you want to seize as a result of your searching efforts.” It is conceivable that the thing to be seized is lying at the threshold of the building and without entering the building and searching and breaking open the locks, the Income-tax Officer may seize the thing straightaway. To say that such a seizure is illegal, because it is not the result of such a search as is contemplated in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of section. 132 of the Act is to indulge in a self-defeating piece of sophistry. After all, what is the meaning of the word “search”? The Concise Oxford Dictionary says that it means “look for” or “seek out”. What the Income-tax Officer has done in this case is to enter the building of the court of the Second Presidency Magistrate and to look for or seek out the amount kept in court custody and ask that it may be paid over to him, because it represents wholly or partly undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya. Be it noted that the section does not say that the Income-tax Officer can enter and search only the building of the person who had failed to disclose his income for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act. What the section says is that where any person is in possession of any money which represents wholly or partly undisclosed income, the Income-tax Officer can enter and search any building or place where he has reason to suspect that such money is kept. This means that seizure can be effected even from the custody of a person other than the person who has failed to disclose his income and from a building belonging to any person other than the defaulter. Putting even the narrowest construction upon clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 132 of the Act, I hold that the Income-tax Officer has found the money in court deposit only as a result of such search as has been contemplated in the section. The resulting position is that the order of the court below directing refund of the entire amount in court deposit to the V-Income-tax Officer, Madras, is correct, and is hereby upheld. The criminal revision case of Mohammed Kunhi is dismissed.
7. Interim stay granted in Crl. M.P No. 2702 of 1970 is vacated.
8. No orders on Crl. M. Ps. Nos. 613/72 and 989/72 are necessary in view of the order passed in the main criminal revision case.
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