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Rajamani Ammal v. Bboorasami Padayachi And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (appellant) filed suit seeking declaration of title and/or possession with mesne profits in respect of eight suit items. She alleged the properties originally belonged to her mother, Alamelu Ammal, who had acquired them by sale deed Ex. A.2 dated 8-4-1935. The plaintiff claimed to be her mother's stridhana heir and said that during her minority the properties were managed first by her father, Kannusami Padayachi, and thereafter by her brother, the first defendant. The plaintiff alleged that, shortly after attaining majority, she was induced by coercion and undue influence to execute a registered release deed Ex. A.7 dated 7-9-1957 in favour of the first defendant; she contended Ex. A.7 is void and that subsequent alienations by the first defendant (to the second and third defendants) are not binding on her.
Procedurally: the first defendant appeared and endorsed that the suit might be decreed as prayed; the second defendant remained ex parte (minor through guardian); the third defendant alone contested, denying the plaintiff's claims, asserting benami purchase/alleged family ownership, asserting limitation, and maintaining that the release deed was taken as a precaution and binds bona fide purchasers.
The trial Court framed and decided three main issues: (i) whether Ex. A.2 was benami for the joint family; (ii) whether Ex. A.7 was vitiated by misrepresentation, undue influence and coercion; and (iii) whether the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court found Ex. A.2 was not benami and that Ex. A.7 was void and inoperative due to undue influence, and further held the suit was not barred by limitation; it decreed the plaintiff's suit.
On appeal limited to items 3 and 6, the lower appellate Court agreed Ex. A.2 was not benami but held Ex. A.7 was not vitiated; alternatively it held that, even if vitiated, it was only voidable and had to be set aside within three years and the plaintiff had not done so, thus concluding the suit was barred by limitation and dismissing the plaintiff's suit in entirety.
The present (second) appeal challenges the lower appellate Court's conclusions on (a) the validity of Ex. A.7 and (b) the applicability of limitation to the plaintiff's cause of action.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sale deed Ex. A.2 in favour of Alamelu Ammal was benami for the benefit of the joint family.
- Whether the release deed Ex. A.7 dated 7-9-1957 executed by the plaintiff is vitiated by misrepresentation, undue influence and coercion.
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation (in particular, whether the three-year limitation for setting aside a voidable instrument applies or other articles apply).
- Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in dismissing the entire suit, though its appeal concerned items 3 and 6 only (i.e., scope of Order 41 Rule 33 in these circumstances).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments
- The suit properties belonged to her mother having been purchased by her mother under Ex. A.2 and, as stridhana heir, the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title and possession.
- The release deed Ex. A.7 was obtained by the first defendant by coercion and undue influence immediately after the plaintiff attained majority and is therefore void and inoperative.
- The lower appellate Court's contrary view on the validity of Ex. A.7 and its conclusion on limitation cannot be sustained; the trial Court's view should be upheld.
Third Defendant's Arguments
- The suit is not maintainable and is barred by limitation because it was not filed within three years from the date of Ex. A.7.
- The suit properties were not stridhana of Alamelu Ammal and she lacked means to have purchased them; the properties were purchased by Kannuswami Padayachi for the benefit of the family (benami) in the name of his wife.
- Kannuswami Padayachi and thereafter the first defendant enjoyed the properties in their own right and thus the plaintiff cannot claim rights.
- The release deed Ex. A.7 was taken as a precaution ("by way of abundant caution") and is binding on a bona fide purchaser for consideration (specifically purchaser of items 3 and 6 under Ex. B.5 dated 21-4-1962).
First Defendant
- On the first hearing date the first defendant appeared and endorsed on the plaint that the suit might be decreed as prayed for (i.e., did not contest the primary relief initially).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayandoss v. Bucharaj, AIR 1928 Mad 6 | Relief can be given where a fiduciary relation gives rise to confidence and advantage is taken; when a third party is aware of the fiduciary relation he is equally under disability. | Cited to support the proposition that a person in a fiduciary position who obtains advantage may be deprived of that advantage and that a third party aware of the fiduciary relation is under similar disability; used to sustain finding of undue influence. |
| Mariam Bibi v. Cassim Ebrahim, AIR 1939 Rang 278 | Undue influence may be inferred from a special relationship of confidence (e.g., parent-child) without proof of actual fraud; transactions just after attainment of majority raise a presumption of undue influence. | Relied on to support the presumption of undue influence between parent (or parental figure) and child even after majority, and to justify setting aside Ex. A.7 on the basis of the relationship and timing. |
| Archer v. Hudson, 1844-7 Beav 551 (quoted) | Observation: pecuniary transactions between parent and child soon after majority, prior to 'emancipation' and without benefit to child, give rise to a presumption of undue influence. | Quoted with approval via Mariam Bibi to illustrate the presumption of undue influence in parent-child pecuniary transactions shortly after majority; used as persuasive authority in assessing Ex. A.7. |
| Abdul Malick Saheb v. Md. Yousuf Sahib (Division Bench) | Transactions of bounty from child to parent are viewed with caution; donee must prove the gift resulted from free exercise of independent will; fiduciary relation raises a presumption of undue influence. | Invoked to reinforce that fiduciary parent-child relations raise a presumption of undue influence which the donee/donee's representative must rebut; applied to conclude the first defendant failed to rebut presumption. |
| AIR 1934 All 507 (cited at p.511) | When consent is caused by undue influence, the contract is voidable and a mere suit for declaration that the instrument is void and ineffective will not lie; one must set it aside. | Used to support the proposition that where a document is voidable for undue influence a suit to set it aside must be brought within the applicable limitation period rather than merely seeking a declaration of ineffectiveness. |
| Ramachandra v. Laxman, AIR 1945 PC 54 | Suits to set aside or cancel voidable instruments must be filed within three years from date of knowledge (i.e., from the date of the document). | Relied upon to hold that Ex. A.7, if voidable, had to be set aside within three years from its date and that the present suit was therefore barred by limitation if so treated. |
| Someshwar Dutt v. Tribhawan Dutt, AIR 1934 PC 130 | Same principle as Ramachandra: limitation for actions to set aside voidable instruments runs from the date of the instrument. | Applied together with Ramachandra to support the conclusion that a suit to set aside Ex. A.7 was required to be filed within three years from the date of Ex. A.7. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, relying strictly on the facts found and the legal provisions and authorities cited in the opinion.
- Concurrent finding on title: Both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court had earlier held that Ex. A.2 was not benami and that the suit properties were the separate properties of Alamelu Ammal. The Court treated this concurrent finding as final and accepted that the first defendant had no title to the suit properties prior to the execution of Ex. A.7.
-
Undue influence analysis: The Court examined the factual matrix leading to Ex. A.7. Key facts relied on were:
- The plaintiff was a minor at her mother's death and thereafter under the care of her father and, after his death, under the brother (first defendant).
- The plaintiff was uneducated and made only a mark as her signature; she had just attained majority when Ex. A.7 was obtained.
- Ex. A.7 was taken immediately after she attained majority while she remained under the control, care and protection of the first defendant, without opportunity for independent advice.
- The plaintiff alleged that misrepresentation was made that the property belonged to the joint family and that she did not know the contents of the document when she signed.
- Limitation analysis: Despite the Court's conclusion that Ex. A.7 was vitiated, it considered whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. The Court accepted the lower appellate Court's reasoning that when consent is caused by undue influence the contract is voidable (citing Section 19-A of the Contract Act), and that a suit to set aside a voidable instrument must be instituted within three years from knowledge (i.e., from the date of the document), as supported by authorities (AIR 1934 All 507, Ramachandra v. Laxman, Someshwar Dutt v. Tribhawan Dutt). Applying those authorities, the Court concluded that, even treating Ex. A.7 as voidable on account of undue influence, the plaintiff's suit to set it aside was not filed within the three-year period prescribed by Article 59 (and related precedent), and therefore the suit is barred by limitation.
- Exercise of appellate power: The Court addressed the procedural point that the lower appellate Court's appeal related only to items 3 and 6 but that the appellate Court dismissed the entire suit. The present Court held that the lower appellate Court correctly exercised its powers under Order 41, Rule 33 to dismiss the suit in entirety in view of its finding that the suit was barred by limitation.
- Outcome synthesis: The Court thus reconciled the apparent tension between finding Ex. A.7 vitiated by undue influence (on merits) and holding the suit barred on limitation — concluding that the limitation bar prevented the plaintiff from obtaining relief despite the flawed character of Ex. A.7.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The second appeal is dismissed and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are confirmed.
Additional orders: There will be no order as to costs. "No leave." The final statement in the opinion is: "Appeal dismissed."
Implications:
- On the merits, the Court found that Ex. A.7 was vitiated by undue influence because of the fiduciary relationship and surrounding circumstances; the first defendant had no title to the suit properties prior to Ex. A.7. (These are findings of fact and law as recorded in the opinion.)
- Despite the finding on undue influence, the plaintiff's attempt to set aside Ex. A.7 failed because her suit was not brought within the three-year period applicable to actions to set aside voidable instruments; accordingly, the suit is barred by limitation.
- Because the suit was held barred by limitation, the lower appellate Court's dismissal of the suit was upheld, and no substantive relief was granted to the plaintiff despite the Court's view on undue influence. The Court confirmed dismissal of the entire suit under appellate powers (Order 41, Rule 33).
- No broader precedent-altering rule was announced beyond the application of the cited authorities and statutes to the facts; the direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit fails and the lower appellate decree stands, with no order as to costs.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion itself.
1. The plaintiff is the appellant. She filed a suit for a declaration of her title to the suit properties consisting of 8 items and or possession of the same from the defendants with mesne profits. The plaintiff claimed that the suit properties originally belonged to her mother Alamelu Ammal, she having purchased the same with her own funds from one Venkatachala Padayachi under a sale deed Ex. A.2 dated 8-4-1935 for a sum of Rs. 500, that the plaintiff has become the stridhana heir of her mother, and that as the plaintiff was a minor at the time of her mother's death her father Kannusami Padayachi and after his death the first defendant, her brother, had been managing the suit properties on her behalf. The plaintiff alleged that neither her father, Kannusami Padayachi nor her brother, the first defendant, had any right or interest over the suit properties, but that taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiff had just attained majority, the first defendant obtained a registered release deed Ex. A.7, dated 7-9-1957, by exercise of coercion and undue influence. The plaintiff's case is that the said release deed Ex. A.7 is void and inoperative, that the first defendant, taking advantage of the said release deed purported to have been executed by the plaintiff, had sold items 3 and 6 measuring in the aggregate 1 acre 11 cents to the third defendant, that similarly second defendant also is an alienee of some of the suit items, that the alienations made by the first defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3 are not valid and binding on her, and that, therefore, she is entitled to have her title to the suit properties declared and to recover possession of the same from the defendants.
2. The first defendant appeared in Court on the first hearing date and endorsed on the plaint that the suit might be decreed as prayed for. The second defendant who is a minor acting through her mother as guardian remained ex parte. The 3rd defendant alone contested the suit. He contended that the suit as framed is not maintainable, that it is also barred by limitation as it has not been filed within 3 years from the date of execution of the release deed by the plaintiff, that the suit properties were not the stridhana properties of the plaintiff's mother, Alamelu Ammal, that she had no wherewithall to purchase the properties, that the properties had been purchased by the first defendant's father, Kannuswami Padayachi for the benefit of the family benami in the name of his wife, Alamelu Ammal, that Kannuswami Padayachi alone enjoyed the properties in his own right till his lifetime and thereafter the first defendant had been enjoying the same in his own right and that, therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any right in the suit properties. According to the third defendant the release deed Ex. A.7 was taken by the first defendant from the plaintiff only by way of abundant caution and to place the matter beyond controversy it is binding a bona fide purchaser from the first defendant of items 3 and 6 for a consideration of Rs. 4500 under Ex. B.5 dated 21-4-1962.
3. On these pleadings, the trial Court considered in the main three issues namely (i) whether the sale deed in favour of Alamelu Ammal, Ex. A.2 was benami for the benefit of the joint family as alleged by the 3rd defendant; (ii) if Ex. A.2 is not benami, whether the release deed Ex. A-7 dated 7-9-1957 executed by the plaintiff is vitiated by misrepresentation, undue influence and coercion as alleged by the plaintiff and (iii) whether the suit is barred by limitation. The trial Court held on a consideration of the evidence on record that Ex. A.2 is not benami for the benefit of the joint family and that the suit properties are the exclusive properties of Alamelu Ammal and not that of the joint family of her husband, Kannuswami Padavachi and his son. On the question as to whether the release deed Ex. A.7 is vitiated by misrepresentation, undue influence and coercion, the trial Court expressed the view that the same is void and inoperative as it has been brought about by the first defendant by exercising undue influence on the plaintiff when she was under his charge without any independent advice. On the third question the trial Court held that the suit as framed is not barred by limitation as in its view neither Art. 56 nor Art. 58 of the Limitation Act of 1963 applied to the facts of this case, and that Art. 65 prescribing the limitation of 12 years for recovery of possession alone applied to the facts of this case. In that view the trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit as prayed for.
4. On appeal by the 3rd defendant in respect of items 3 and 6 alone, the lower appellate Court agreed with the view of the trial Court on the first question that the suit properties have not been purchased for the joint family of Kannusami and his son benami under Ex. A.2 and that the properties were really that of Alamelu Ammal. On the second question, however, the lower appellate Court held that the release deed Ex. A.7 was not vitiated by any misrepresentation or undue influence that, in any event, even if Ex. A.7 is vitiated by undue influence and misrepresentation, still it is only a voidable document which has to be set aside within a period of 3 years, and that the suit not having been filed within 3 years, from the date of the document, it is barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court, therefore, not only allowed the appeal but dismissed the plaintiff's suit in entirety.
5. In this second appeal the plaintiff-appellant contends that the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the release deed Ex. A.7 is not vitiated by undue influence and misrepresentation and that the suit is barred by limitation cannot be sustained and that the view of the trial Court in that regard is quite in accordance with law. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the finding of the lower appellate Court on the questions of the validity and binding character of Ex. A.7 and of limitation are correct.
6. As already stated, both the courts have concurrently held that the suit properties are the separate properties of the plaintiff's mother Alamelu Ammal and not that of the joint family. This being a concurrent finding it has to be accepted and therefore, the first defendant must be held to have no title to suit property prior to the execution of the release deed by the plaintiff under Ex. A.7.
7. The question whether Ex. A.7 is vitiated by undue influence has to be considered in the light of the following facts. The plaintiff was admittedly a minor at the time when her mother Alamelu Ammal died. She was under the care and custody of her father Kannusami and after his death she was being looked after by her brother, the first defendant. Admittedly the plaintiff is not educated and she is only a markswoman. The first defendant has taken Ex. A.7 immediately after the plaintiff became a major and when she was completely under the care, protection and control of the first defendant without any opportunity of having independent advice. It is not in dispute that at the time when Ex. A.7 was executed she was unmarried having just then attained majority. The plaintiff has alleged that the first defendant, taking undue advantage of the dominant influence which he had over her and after making some misrepresentation that the property belonged to the joint family, made her sign the said release deed, that she did not know the contents of the document when she signed the same. On these proved and undisputed facts, the trial Court held that the document is vitiated by undue influence. But the lower appellate Court has chosen to express the view that it is not so vitiated. But I am of the view that it is not so vitiated. But I am of the view that the view of the trial Court that the document is vitiated by undue influence is correct.
8. In Narayandoss v. Bucharaj, AIR 1928 Mad 6, Venkatasubba Rao, J. had expressed the view that if there is a relation which gives rise to confidence between the parties and if the person in fiduciary position obtains advantage, the Court can give relief to the party conferring the benefit unless the other party shows that he did not avail himself of the confidence which subsisted between the parties. the learned Judge also stated that even when a third party is involved the position is the same, that if it is shown that he was aware of the said confidential or fiduciary relation he is under the same disability as the party who occupied the position of confidence, that it to say, the Court gives relief to the party conferring the benefit without demanding proof of fraud or imposition or any specific act of undue influence. In Mariam Bibi v. Cassim Ebrahim, AIR 1939 Rang 278, immediately after his daughters had attained the age of legal majority, their father obtained from them full and unconditional release in respect of their shares in mother's property. On the question as to whether the release deed is vitiated by undue influence, the Court expressed the view that undue influence, is to be inferred from the special relationship between the parties, quite apart from proof of actual fraud or unfair advantage, and that in law a special relationship of confidence does exist between parent and child, notwithstanding that the child is actually of age at the time when the transaction took place. In that case the following observations of Lord Landgale M.R. in Archer v. Hudson, 1844-7 Beav 551 have been quoted with approval:--
"Nobody has ever asserted that there cannot be a pecuniary transaction between a parent and a child, the child being of age; but every one will affirm in this Court that if there be a pecuniary transaction between parent and child, just after the child attains the age of 21 years, and prior to what may be called a complete 'emancipation' without any benefit moving to the child, the presumption is that an undue influence has been exercised to procure that liability on the part of the child."
In Abdul Malick Saheb v. Md. Yousuf Sahib, a Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of Section 16 of the Contract Act with reference to a gift said to have been made by a child to a parent soon after attaining majority. In that case the Court expressed the view that the transactions in the nature of a bounty from a child to a parent are in equity looked upon with caution by courts and it is the duty of the donee to prove that the gift was the result of free exercise of independent will that the Court should be satisfied that the mere existence of a fiduciary relationship of parent and child between the donee and the donor will raise a presumption of undue influence and it is on the donee to rebut the presumption.
9. In view of the above decisions and of the specific provisions contained in Section 16 of the Contract Act as also Section 89 of the Trust Act, the conclusion on the facts of this case is inescapable that the first defendant had obtained an advantage over the plaintiff when he was in a fiduciary relation to the plaintiff. Neither the first defendant nor the third defendant who claims under the first defendant had attempted to rebut the presumption of undue influence arising out of the first defendant's fiduciary relation. Therefore, the view taken by the lower appellate Court that Ex. A.7 is not vitiated by exercise of undue influence cannot be accepted.
10. I am, however, inclined to agree with the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the suit is barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court has taken the view that even if the document is vitiated by undue influence, still the said document is only voidable and not void ab initio and that, therefore, the plaintiff must have the document set aside within three years from the date of the document. Section 19-A of the Contract Act says that when consent to an agreement is caused by undue influence, such an agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused and such contract may be set aside either absolutely or upon such terms and conditions as the Court may seem just. If Ex. A.7 is held to be merely voidable it is necessary for the document to be set aside within a period of three years referred to in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, and a mere suit for declaration that the instrument is void and ineffective will not lie (Vide AIR 1934 All 507, 511). In cases where the instruments are voidable at the instance of a party, a suit to set aside or cancel the document must be filed within 3 years from the date of knowledge, that is, the date of the document (Vide Ramachandra v. Laxman, AIR 1945 PC 54 and Someshwar Dutt v. Tribhawan Dutt, AIR 1934 PC 130). I have to, therefore, hold that the suit is barred by limitation even if it is treated as one for setting aside the release deed Ex. A.7.
11. It is, however, contended by the appellant's learned counsel that in any event the lower appellant Court erred in dismissing the entire suit even though the appeal before it related to items 3 and 6 alone. But I am of the view that the appellate Court was right in exercising its powers under Order 41, Rule 33 and dismissing the suit in entirety in view of its finding that the suit is barred by limitation.
12. The result, the second appeal is dismissed and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate Court are confirmed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. No leave.
13. Appeal dismissed.
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