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Pandurangan And Another v. Dasu Reddy

Madras High Court
Jan 19, 1972
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The auction purchaser is the first appellant and the decree-holder is the second appellant. The judgment-debtor (respondent) filed E.A. 669 of 1969 under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. seeking to set aside a Court auction sale held on 25-6-1969. The application alleged that the property, worth about Rs. 7,000, was knocked down for Rs. 701; that there was no proper advertisement and fraud was played upon the Court; and that there was no need to furnish security to set aside the sale. The decree-holder filed a counter-claiming the application was devoid of merit and instituted to delay execution.

The District Munsif, Chingleput, heard E.A. 669 of 1969 and dismissed the application, holding the proclamation of sale and the sale itself to be in order. The judgment-debtor then preferred C.M.A. 13 of 1970 before the District Judge, Chingleput, who found material irregularities in the sale proclamation (including omission of encumbrances, assessed revenue and valuations) and allowed the appeal, holding the proclamation suffered from material irregularities. Aggrieved, the auction purchaser and the decree-holder brought a civil miscellaneous second appeal against the District Judge's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. to set aside a Court auction sale can be entertained and succeed even after the sale has been confirmed and a sale certificate issued.
  2. Whether the findings of material irregularity and that the judgment-debtor was "damnified" (i.e., suffered substantial injury) by the low sale price justify setting aside the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90.
  3. Whether the civil miscellaneous second appeal is maintainable against an order arising from an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 — in particular, whether such orders fall within the class of appealable orders under Order XLIII and the prohibition in Section 104, Civil P. C. (i.e., the question of appealability / maintainability of a second appeal).
  4. Whether, alternatively, an application alleging total want of notice could be treated as one under Section 47, Civil P. C., with the consequence that a second appeal may lie.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Auction purchaser and Decree-holder)

  • Once a sale has taken place, been confirmed, a sale certificate issued and possession handed over, the sale cannot be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90.
  • No substantial injury was alleged in the application under Order XXI, Rule 90; therefore the application does not meet the statutory threshold for setting aside a sale.
  • The District Judge took extraneous matters into consideration in setting aside the Court auction sale.
  • Cited authority (Bojjanna v. Kistappa) for the proposition that the Court has no inherent power under Section 151, Civil P. C. to cancel a sale after confirmation for fraud not the subject of a timely application under Order XXI, Rule 90.
  • Invoked Section 65, C.P.C. (that property sold becomes vested in purchaser from the time of sale) to support the contention that confirmation and issuance of sale certificate makes setting aside inappropriate (though the opinion records the court did not find relevance in this citation).
  • Argued that in some circumstances (where there was alleged want of notice) the application could be construed as one under Section 47, Civil P. C., and if so a second appeal would lie.

Respondent's Arguments (Judgment-debtor)

  • Supported the District Judge's judgment setting aside the sale, arguing there is clear reasoning and a clear finding by the District Judge that substantial injury was caused to the judgment-debtor by the auction sale.
  • Contended that the appeal is not maintainable because the order passed under Order XXI, Rule 90 should be construed as one passed under Order XXI, Rule 92 and therefore as an order under Order XLIII, Civil P. C., which would preclude a second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bojjanna v. Kistappa (1947-1 Mad LJ 10 = AIR 1947 Mad 268) That a Court has no power under Section 151, Civil P. C. to cancel a sale in execution after confirmation on the ground of fraud not subject of an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 proved within time; and that the Code provides the specific remedy and precludes an overlapping inherent power. The court noted this authority but held it to be irrelevant to the present case and not decisive of the appellants' proposition.
Janakraj v. Gurdial Singh (1968-1 SCJ 222) That where a decree put into execution is subsequently set aside and the judgment-debtor did not apply under Order XXI, Rule 89 or 90, the court should protect auction purchasers and confirm the sale. The court observed this decision does not help the appellants because the right of the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale is reserved under Order XXI, Rules 89 and 90, and lack of resort to those remedies in Janakraj distinguished it.
Shri Radhey Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh That the right to set aside a sale under Order XXI, Rule 90 is available; also that an order under that rule by a single Judge is a 'judgment' for Letters Patent purposes (making Letters Patent Appeal maintainable in that context). The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the remedy under Order XXI, Rule 90 is available to a judgment-debtor.
Baliram Singh v. Narasingdas (45 Mad LJ 403 = AIR 1923 PC 93) Interpreting Order XXI, Rule 90: to set aside a sale, substantial injury must be proved (consistent with the proviso to that rule). The court accepted this principle as settled law and applied it when assessing whether the District Judge's finding of damage to the judgment-debtor justified setting aside the sale.
Natarajan v. Chandulal Amarchand (1971-1 Mad LJ 474) Authority cited for the proposition that a sale without notice is a nullity and that an application may be construed as one under Section 47, Civil P. C., with consequent implications for the availability of a second appeal. The court recorded that this decision was cited by appellants to argue maintainability of a second appeal if the application were treated under Section 47; the court, however, found these decisions did not support the appellants' primary contention that confirmed sales cannot be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90.
Ramalingam Pillai v. Sankara Iyer (cited) Cited among authorities concerning notice, Section 47 and appealability questions. The court referenced it as part of the group of cases cited by the appellants on appealability/Section 47, but the opinion does not adopt these authorities as dispositive of the principal issue.
Official Receiver v. P. R. M. and Co., and Ramaswami Gounder v. Muthuvel Gounder (1959-2 Mad LJ 212) Cited in the context of appealability and whether a second appeal will lie where want of notice is alleged (Section 47 arguments). These cases were cited by counsel for the appellants; the court discussed them but ultimately found they did not support the contention that a confirmed sale could not be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90.
Ramathal v. Nagaratnammal (1967-1 Mad LJ 260) That restoration of an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 operated to vacate or render ineffective an earlier order confirming the sale in a mortgage action. The court relied on this decision to support the view that an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 may render ineffective an earlier confirmation and thus to set aside the sale.
Nagendra Iyer v. Varadaraja That gross under-valuation and realization of price far below market price causing substantial injury to the judgment-debtor justify setting aside the sale. The court treated this authority as confirming that gross under-valuation causing substantial injury is a valid ground to set aside a sale and applied the reasoning analogously to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from the statutory rubric of Order XXI, Rule 90 and the factual findings below. The judgment-debtor's application alleged lack of proper advertisement, suppression of sale information (so many villagers were not aware), fraud in conducting the auction and a grossly inadequate sale price (Rs. 701 against an alleged value of about Rs. 7,000). The District Judge had adverted to defects in the sale proclamation (omissions of encumbrances, assessed revenue, and valuations) and explicitly found that the auction procedure involved failure to announce the sale properly (for example, by beat of tom-tom), material irregularities and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale.

Critically, the District Judge found that the judgment-debtor had been "damnified" — that is, substantially injured — by reason of the sale for a low and inadequate price. The appellate court (this court) placed weight on that clear finding of substantial injury, stating that even if the District Judge discussed other defects in the sale proclamation, those discussions would not affect the operative conclusion: the finding of substantial injury alone justified setting aside the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90.

The court examined earlier authorities invoked by the parties. It noted the proposition in Bojjanna v. Kistappa that Section 151 cannot be used to cancel a sale after confirmation for a fraud not timely raised under Order XXI, Rule 90, but found that decision not relevant to the facts before it. The court also observed Janakraj v. Gurdial Singh (which protects auction purchasers where the judgment-debtor fails to invoke Order XXI remedies) and clarified that Janakraj does not undermine the present judgment because the right to apply under Order XXI, Rules 89 and 90 is expressly preserved. Authorities such as Ramathal v. Nagaratnammal and Nagendra Iyer v. Varadaraja were taken as direct support for the proposition that where there is gross undervaluation and substantial injury, a sale may be set aside even after confirmation.

The court expressly held that an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 can lie to set aside a sale "even after the sale has been confirmed and sale certificate issued." Applying the settled requirement that substantial injury must be proved (Baliram Singh), and accepting the District Judge's finding that such injury occurred, the court concluded the sale should be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90.

On the procedural question whether the civil miscellaneous second appeal was maintainable (whether an order under Order XXI, Rule 90 falls strictly within the appealable orders under Order XLIII and thus attracts the prohibition under Section 104, Civil P. C.), the court considered the issue "arguable" and explicitly left it open without deciding it finally.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the auction sale must be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C., in view of the District Judge's finding that the judgment-debtor was substantially injured by the sale. Accordingly, the civil miscellaneous second appeal was DISMISSED, but without costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Court's decision upholds the set-aside of the auction sale (the sale confirmation and its effects are rendered ineffective insofar as the District Judge's order and this judgment require). The civil miscellaneous second appeal brought by the auction purchaser and decree-holder is dismissed without costs.
  • Broader precedent and open questions: The court did not issue a definitive ruling on the wider and more technical question whether an order under Order XXI, Rule 90 strictly falls within the 'appealable orders' under Order XLIII and thereby attracts the prohibition in Section 104, Civil P. C.; that question was left open as arguable. The opinion therefore decides the present dispute on its facts and statutory application of Order XXI, Rule 90 but does not establish a final, sweeping rule on the appealability question.

Disposition

The civil miscellaneous second appeal is dismissed without costs. The court recorded a prior delivery of judgment and refused to alter an observation of the lower appellate court (paragraph 13 of the lower appellate court judgment) because the appellant had not pleaded a ground to seek such deletion in the grounds of appeal. The court made an order accordingly.

This summary is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The auction purchaser is the first appellant. The decree holder is the second appellant. The judgment debtor, respondent herein, filed an application in E. A. 669 of 1969 under Order XXI. Rule 90 Civil P. C. to set aside the Court auction sale held on 25-6-1969. It was alleged in that application that the property worth about Rs. 7,000/- has been knocked down for Rs. 701/-, that no proper advertisement had been made before the property was brought to sale, that fraud was played upon the Court in order to make the property be knocked down for a low price and that there was no need to furnish security to set aside the sale. The decree-holder, second appellant herein, filed a counter stating that there were no merits in the application and that the same had been filed with a view to protract the execution proceedings and delay the realization of the decree amount. E. A. 669 of 1969 was heard by the District Munsif, Chingleput, who held that the proclamation of sale and the sale were in order and thus dismissed of the application. Aggrieved by the order of the District Munsif, the judgment-debtor preferred C. M. A. 13 of 1970 before the District Judge, Chingleput. The District Judge held that in the sale proclamation no encumbrances have been mentioned, that the revenue assessed upon the land has not been noted, that the value mentioned by the judgment-debtor in his counter to E. A. 224 of 1969 has not been mentioned, that even the decree-holder's valuation was not given and that the proclamation suffered from material irregularities. Thus he allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the decision of the District Judge, Chingleput, the auction purchaser and the decree-holder have preferred this civil miscellaneous second appeal.

2. Thiru K. M. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that there cannot be any setting aside of the sale under O. XXI, R. 90, Civil P. C. in view of the fact that the sale has taken place and confirmation of the sale has also been made with the issue of a sale certificate and possession being handed over to the auction purchaser. The learned counsel has also stated that there is no substantial injury caused to the judgment-debtor for setting aside the sale and that the District Judge has taken extraneous matters into consideration in setting aside the Court auction sale. It has also been further submitted by the learned counsel that there is no allegation made in the application filed under Order XXI, Rule 90, as to the substantial injury alleged to have been caused to the judgment-debtor.

3. Thiru M. V. Krishnan, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor, supported the judgment of the District Judge and submitted that there is a clear reasoning given by the District Judge for his setting aside the Court auction sale and that there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the District Judge who disposed of the C. M. A., has clearly found the substantial injury caused to the judgment-debtor in the holding of the Court auction sale. The learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that this appeal is not maintainable since the order passed by the District Munsif and the one by the District Judge arose out of an application under Order XXI, Rule 90 and that the order passed under Order XXI, Rule 90 has to be construed to be one passed under O. XXI, R. 92 and hence the same comes under Order XLIII. Civil P. C. and as such there cannot be any second appeal against the order in C. M. A. 13 of 1970.

4. Thiru K. N. Srinivasan, in support of his contention that a sale once confirmed, cannot be set aside cited the decision in Bojjanna v. Kistappa, 1947-1 Mad LJ 10 = (AIR 1947 Mad 268). In that decision, a Bench of this Court has stated that a Court has no power under Section 151. Civil P. C. to cancel a sale in execution after it has been confirmed, on the ground of a fraud on the court in the matter of the valuation of the property sold, which fraud had not been the subject-matter of an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, proved within the time allowed. The court further held that the Code having given a specific remedy, the court cannot be presumed to have an inherent power overlapping or running parallel to the procedure laid down in the code. But as far as the present case is concerned, this decision has no relevance to the proposition stated by the learned counsel for the appellant.

5. The learned counsel also read Section 65. C.P.C. to support his contention. Section 65 makes it clear that the property sold becomes vested with the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not fro the time when the sale becomes absolute. I do not think there is any relevance in quoting this section for the proposition set up by the learned counsel for the appellant.

6. Mr. K. N. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the appellant, cited the decision in Janakraj v. Gurdial Singh, 1968-1 SCJ 222 wherein the Supreme Court took up for determination the question as to whether a sale of an immovable property in execution of a money decree ought to be confirmed when it is found that the ex parte decree which was put into execution has been set aside subsequently. That was a case in which subsequent to the court auction sale the decree was reversed by the appellate court. The judgment-debtor in that case did not take out any application under Order XXI, Rule 89 or 90, Civil P. C., to set aside the auction sale. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the court to protect the auction purchasers irrespective of the fact that the decree has been reversed by the appellant court. In the view, the Supreme Court found that the sale has to be confirmed. But in that case it has been observed that the Civil Procedure Code 1908, makes ample provision for the protection of the interest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree ought not to have been passed against him and that the judgment debtor not having resorted to the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 89 it must be held that the auction purchaser was entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding the fact that after the holding of the sale the decree had been set aside. Therefore, it is clear that the judgment debtor's right to set aside the sale is always reserved under Order XXI, Rules 89 and 90, Civil P. C. Hence the above decision of the Supreme Court cannot be of any avail to the appellant.

7. The decision reported in Shri Radhey Shyam v. Shyam Behari Singh ., cited by Thiru K. N. Srinivasan, supports the case of the judgment debtor (respondent), inasmuch as the right to set aside the sale under the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 90 are always available. The decision, after setting out the rights of the judgment debtor proceeds to state that the decision under Order XXI, Rule 90. Civil P. C. by a single Judge is a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 10, Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court and as such Letters Patent Appeal against that order was maintainable.

8. Baliram Singh v. Narasingdas, 45 Mad LJ 403 = (AIR 1923 PC 93) deals with Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. and stated that to set aside a sale substantial injury must be proved. There is absolutely no dispute with regard to this proposition since the proviso to Order XXI, Rule 90 itself mentions the same.

9. In the application by the judgment debtor under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C., there is a clear averment in paragraph 4 of the application to the effect that there was no proper advertisement for the sale, that due to improper advertisement the sale was not known to many of the villagers, that since the auction was held fraudulently the property, which would have fetched more than Rs. 7,000 has fetched a very low amount of Rs. 701 and that the same should be set aside on that account. The District Judge, no doubt, in many parts of his judgment, has adverted to the defects which were anterior to the publication and conducting of the sale as contemplated under Order XXI, Rule 90; but he has definitely taken into consideration the very low price fetched in the auction; the failure to announce the sale by beat of tom-tom and other material irregularities and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale. The District Judge has also given a finding to the effect that the judgment debtor has been damnified by the sale of the property for a low and inadequate price. In the teeth of such a clear finding. I do not think that the other discussions made by the District Judge regarding the defects in the proclamation of sale will in any way affect the order. There is a clear averment in the application under Order XXI, Rule 90 that the sale has been fraudulently conducted and there is a clear finding by the District Judge that the judgment debtor has been damnified by such sale.

10. Thiru K. N. Srinivasan cited the decisions in Natarajan v. Chandulal Amarchand, 1971-1 Mad LJ 474. Ramalingam Pillai v. Sankara Iyer. ; Official Receiver v. P. R. M. and Co., and Ramaswami Gounder v. Muthuvel Gounder, 1959-2 Mad LJ 212 and argued that a second appeal will lie in view of the fact that there was a clear allegation of want of notice. Natarajan v. Chandmul Amarchand, 1971-1 Mad LJ 474 according to Thiru K. N. Srinivasan, clearly states that a sale without notice is a nullity and as such the application filed can be construed as one under Section 47, Civil P. C. If it is one under Section 47, Civil P. C., Thiru K. N. Srinivasan stated that a second appeal will lie following the above decisions. Nevertheless, the learned counsel submitted that in view of the fact that the sale certificate has been issued, there is no question of setting aside the sale. Thus the argument of Thiru K. N. Srinivasan proceeded on the footing that the application filed by the judgment debtor must be considered as one under Sec. 47. Civil P. C. No doubt, he started his argument by stating that if the sale has been confirmed and a sale certificate issued, there is no question of setting aside the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90. Civil P. C. I am of the view that an application will lie under Order XXI, Rule 90, to set aside the sale evenafter the sale has been confirmed and sale certificate issued. The decisions in do not lend any support to the proposition advanced by Thiru K. N. Srinivasan. I have discussed these cases supra for the purpose of fortifying my view that an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. will lie to set aside sale even in cases where the sale has been confirmed and the sale certificate issued.

11. In Ramathal v. Nagaratnammal 1967-1 Mad LJ 260 a Bench of this court held that restoration of an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. automatically operated to vacate or render ineffective the earlier order confirming the sale held in pursuance of a final decree in a mortgage action. In Nagendra Iyer v. Varadaraja, , a Bench of this court has confirmed the decision of a single Judge and held that there was gross under-valuation of the property, that the price realized was far below the market price and thereby a substantial injury was caused to the judgment debtor and on that ground set aside the sale. Considering the facts in that case, it is clear that the price fetched by the sale of the property in that case was far below the market price and thereby a substantial injury was caused to the judgment debtor. Taking into a consideration the above decision, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the sale in the present case has to be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 90, Civil P. C. in view of the finding of the District Judge that the judgment debtor has been damnified by such a sale.

12. In view of my finding that the sale has to be set aside, the question as to the maintainability of the civil miscellaneous second appeal assumes little importance. The question as to whether an order passed under Order XXI, Rule 90. Civil P. C. will strictly come under the 'appealable orders' under Order XLIII attracting the prohibition under Sec. 104, Civil P. C. is an arguable question which I leave open.

13. The civil miscellaneous second appeal is dismissed but, without costs.

(This appeal having been posted for being mentioned the court made the following Order:(19-1-1972)

14. I delivered the judgment in the above appeal as early as 17-12-1971. Mr. K. N. Srinivasan learned counsel for the appellant, has placed with matter again on a letter filed by him for the purpose of certain clarification. He wants to delete paragraph 13 of the lower appellate court judgment which states that the judgment debtor can deposit the entire amount under Order 34, Rule 5, Civil P. C. before the trial court. The lower appellate court's order further gives certain relief's on such deposits. Sri M.V. Krishnan the learned counsel for the respondent correctly contends that there is absolutely no ground taken for this deletion in the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant herein. I am not prepared to express any opinion with regard to the observation made by the lower appellate court in paragraph 13 of its judgment. It is sufficient to dispose of the present contention on the ground that the appellant in the above civil miscellaneous second appeal has not taken up any ground regarding the same in his grounds of appeal. In that view, there is no need to change any portion of my judgment rendered in C. M. A. No. 3 of 1971 on 17-12-1971.

15. Order accordingly.