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Medarai Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M. Balasubramaniam And Another

Madras High Court
Mar 19, 1971
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, in M.A.C.T.O.P. 157 of 1966. On 21 February 1966, at about 7:40 a.m., a lorry (registration MDA 297) struck a lamp post in front of No. 43 Moore Street, Madras. The lamp post, in turn, struck the right leg of the first respondent, causing deep and extensive lacerations to the sole of the foot, heel and back of the right ankle joint, with bleeding. The first respondent was admitted as an in-patient at the General Hospital on the day of the accident and at other intervals thereafter.

The first respondent claimed Rs. 30,560 (broken down in the claim as Rs. 15,000 for injuries, pain and suffering; Rs. 15,000 for loss of work, physical impairment and loss of future prospects; and Rs. 500 for expenses). The Tribunal awarded a total of Rs. 14,500: Rs. 12,000 for physical impairment and loss of future prospects, Rs. 2,000 for pain and suffering, and Rs. 500 for medical expenses.

The appellant insurer appealed against the Tribunal's award. In the appeal the insurer did not contest liability for the accident: counsel for the insurer conceded that the Tribunal's findings that the lorry driver drove rashly and negligently and that the first respondent was not contributorily negligent could not be successfully challenged. The sole issue before the court on appeal became whether the quantum awarded by the Tribunal was just and reasonable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal (specifically Rs. 12,000 for physical impairment and loss of future prospects) is just and reasonable.
  2. Whether the insurer's liability should extend to consequences that occurred after the accident which may have been caused or aggravated by the first respondent's conduct (in particular, his early discharge from hospital and alleged failure to obtain adequate treatment).
  3. Whether and to what extent reduction or apportionment of the Tribunal's award is appropriate given evidence that the wound became infected after the first respondent left hospital and that no satisfactory evidence of effective private treatment was produced.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurer and vehicle owner) — Contentions as recorded

  • Initially resisted liability, denying rash and negligent driving and alleging the accident resulted from the first respondent's negligence or from the lamp post falling after being slightly hit by the lorry.
  • Pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the first respondent.
  • Contended the compensation claimed was exaggerated.
  • On appeal (after conceding liability), argued that the Tribunal failed to consider certain facts: the first respondent discharged himself from hospital while the wound was not healed, there is no evidence of effective private treatment between 11 March and 14 April 1966, and the wound later became infected requiring skin grafting and other treatment.
  • Argued the insurer should not be liable for consequences caused by the first respondent's alleged neglect and that Rs. 12,000 for physical impairment and loss of future prospects was excessive and unsupported by material showing loss of prospects.

Respondent (First respondent / claimant) — Contentions as recorded

  • Claimed compensation for injuries, pain and suffering, loss of work, physical impairment and loss of future prospects and expenses — totaling Rs. 30,560.
  • The Tribunal had found that the accident resulted from the rash and negligent driving of the lorry driver and that the first respondent was not guilty of contributory negligence; these findings were accepted by the court as not challengeable on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recording the insurer's concession that the Tribunal's findings on the cause of the accident and absence of contributory negligence on the part of the first respondent could not be successfully challenged. Consequently, the court proceeded on the basis that the insurer was liable to pay compensation to the first respondent and confined the dispute to quantum.

The court then examined facts which, it found, had not been adequately considered by the Tribunal: the chronology of hospital admissions and treatment. The factual timeline accepted by the court included (a) initial admission to the General Hospital immediately after the accident and discharge on 10 March 1966 at the first respondent's request even though the wound was not fully healed; (b) alleged private treatment between 11 March and 14 April 1966 for which no corroborating material was produced; (c) readmission to the General Hospital on 15 April 1966 with the wound infected; (d) treatment by the Plastic Surgeon (P.W.3) who performed skin grafts and advised use of a surgical shoe, stating that the first respondent could not walk without a specially padded shoe and that the disability was permanent; and (e) a further period of admission from 22 July to 7 December 1966 when additional full-thickness skin coverage was required because ulcers developed after an unsuitable surgical shoe was supplied in the first week of July.

The court relied on testimony that when the first respondent left hospital on 10 March 1966 at his own request the wound was not completely healed and that the treating hospital doctors had advised continued inpatient care. The Plastic Surgeon (P.W.3) admitted in cross-examination that the wound was infected when seen on 15 April and that earlier operative treatment might have avoided infection. P.W.4 (an Assistant Surgeon) corroborated that the patient was discharged at his own request against medical advice.

From these facts the court inferred that the wound became infected and required more serious treatment because the first respondent had left hospital prematurely and had not produced acceptable evidence of competent private treatment during the interim. The court concluded that the insurer should not be held liable for all consequences that flowed from the first respondent's failure to obtain or continue proper treatment after initial discharge; in other words, the insurer's liability did not extend to the full extent of subsequent damage that was plausibly caused or exacerbated by the claimant's own conduct.

The court accepted that apportioning precise responsibility between the tortfeasor (and insurer) and the first respondent was not possible on the record. Nevertheless, exercising its evaluative discretion on quantum, the court found the Rs. 12,000 award for physical impairment and loss of future prospects to be excessive in the light of the claimant's partial responsibility for deterioration. The court reduced that head to Rs. 6,000 as a reasonable share to be borne by the appellant. It accepted the Tribunal's awards under the other two heads — Rs. 2,000 for pain and suffering and Rs. 500 for medical expenses — and declined to disturb them.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is partly allowed. The court modified the Tribunal's award so that the total compensation payable by the appellant (insurer) is fixed at Rs. 8,500.

Breakdown of the court's revised award as set out in the opinion:

  • Rs. 6,000 — compensation for physical impairment and loss of future prospects (reduced from Rs. 12,000).
  • Rs. 2,000 — pain and suffering (Tribunal's award upheld).
  • Rs. 500 — medical expenses (Tribunal's award upheld).

Consequences and immediate implications:

  • The insurer remains liable to pay Rs. 8,500 to the first respondent as final compensation in modification of the Tribunal's award of Rs. 14,500.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the appeal.
  • The court did not purport to lay down any new legal principle or precedent; it reached a fact-specific decision on apportionment of compensation guided by the factual record concerning post-accident treatment and the claimant's conduct.

This summary reflects only the matters and findings expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or interpret facts beyond those recorded in the text.

Show all summary ...

This is an appeal filed by the appellant insurance Co. against the decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, in M.A.C.T.O.P 157 of 1966. There was an accident at about 7-40 am on 21st February 1966 in front of premises No. 43 Moore Street, Madras, when the lorry MDA 297 hit against a lamp post which In torn hit the right leg of the first respondent herein. Thereby the first respondent sustained Injuries, namely, deep and extensive laceration of the sole of foot heel and the back of right ankle joint with bleeding. His was an In-patient In the General Hospital for some time. He claimed a compensation of Rs. 30560 for the injuries sustained by him. The compensation of 30500 claimed comprised of Rs. 15000 for Injuries, pain, suffering and sheek and its. 15000 for lots of work, physical Impairment and leas of future prospects and Rs. 500 for expenses incurred. The claim was resisted by the appellant insurance Co., as well as the second respondent herein, the owner of the terry, en various grounds. They denied that the accident was as a result of any rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the lorry. They alleged that the accident was due to the negligence of the first respondent herein and that in any event, the first respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. It was also pleaded by them that the lorry never came into direct contact with the first respondent bit he was Injured on account of the fall of the worn out lamp post which was slightly hit by the lorry. They also pleaded that the compensation claimed was highly exaggerated, the Tribunal had found on consideration of the materials adduced before it that the accident had occurred only dee to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry and that the first respondent was not guilty of any contributory negligence. On the quantum of compensation the Tribunal held that a sum of Rs. 12000 had to be awarded for physical Impairment and loss of future prospects, that farther sum of Rs. 2000 and Rs. 500 are payable as compensation for pain and suffering towards medical expenses respectively. Thus the total compensation awarded came to Rs. 14500.

In this appeal filed by the Insurer, the question of Its liability for compensation his not been canvassed. The learned counsel for the insurer fairly conceded that the finding given by the Tribunal that the driver of the lorry ceased the accident by his rash and negligent driving and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the first respondent cannot be successfully challenged. Hence this court has to proceed on the basis that the liability of the insurer to pay compensation to the first respondent has been established. The only question, therefore, is whether the compensation awarded by the tribunal is just and reasonable.

The learned counsel for the appellant brings to my notice certain facts the significance of which was neither noted or considered by the Tribunal and contends that of those facts are kept in mind the compensation awarded by the Tribunal will be found to be disproportionate to the legal liability of the insurer. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the fasts referred to by the learned counsel width arc not in much controversy. The accident occurred on 21st February 1966 and the first respondent got himself admitted in the General Hospital Immediately after the accident and he was an Inpatient there till 10th March 1966. From 11th March 1966 till 14th April 1966 the first respondent is said to have been treated by a private doctor as per the directions given by the doctors in the General Hospital. Since the wound did not heal properly, he again got himself admitted in the General hospital on 15th April, 1966 where he was ans inpatient till 15th May, 1966. In the first week of July 1966 he was provided with a surgical shoe but that was found unsuitable and as a result ulcers developed. Once a gala he get himself admitted In the General Hospital on 22nd July, 1966 where be remained as an Inpatient till 7th December, 1966 P.W 3. the Plastic Surgeon In the General Hospital who attended on the petitioner from 15th April, 1966 to 15th May, 1966 and once again from 22nd July, 1966 to 7th December, 1966 has stated that when the first respondent came to the hospital ea 15th April, 1966 he recovered the wound with skin graft to have the ulcer healed, that on the second occasion he had to cover the same area with fall thickness skin, that he advised the first respondent to wear surgical shoe, that the first respondent cannot walk without a specially padded shoe and that the disability Is a permanent one. He has, however, admitted In cross-examination that when the first respondent came to the hospital on 15th April, 1966, he found the wound was Infected and that there would not have been infection if the tissues had been cut and operated earlier. P.W 4 an Assistant-Surgeon in the General Hospital who treated the first rest pendent during the period from 22nd February, 1966 to 10th March, 1966 stated that the first respondent was admitted for injuries over his right foot at that stage, that he had extensive laceration over the sole of the right foot heel and back of right ankle joint, that he stitched the wound, that the first respondent was discharged en 10th March, 1966 at his own request even though the wound was not completely healed, an the representation that he would take farther treatment as an eat patient, and that but for his request he would not have discharged having regard to the nature of the wound. The evidence of P.W 3 shows that if the first respondent had remained in the General Hospital as an inpatient for continuous treatment of the wound, it would have been healed and the wound would not have infected leading to the skin grafting and to the necessity to wear surgical thee. The fact is clear that the first respondent got himself discharged from the hospital at his ova request even though the wound was not completely healed, much against the wishes of the doctors in the General Hospital. Though the first respondent is said to have been treated by a private doctor between 11th March, 1966 and 14th April, 1966, no material has been placed before the court as to who was the person who treated him and what was the treatment that was taken by him. If really the wound was treated by a private doc or, It would not have become infected as was found at the time when he was readmitted in the General Hospital for the second time. If really the first respondent had neglected to take the proper treatment having got himself discharged from the General Hospital at his own request, he should be held partly responsible for the wound becoming Infected and necessitating a more serious treatment. In this ease, at the initial stage when the first respondent was treated in the General Hospital between 22nd February, 1966 and 10th March, 1966, the wound was not so serious and that is why he was discharged when he represented that he would take treatment as an out-patient. The first respondent admittedly did not take any treatment as an out patient from the General Hospital after he was discharged en 10th March, 1966. But his case was that he was being treated by a private doctor. No evidence Is forth coming as to what happened after 10th March, 1966 till 15th April, 1966 when he was readmitted in the hospital with the wound very much Infected.

The learned counsel for the appellant contends that though the first respondent is entitled to compensation for such injury as has been caused as a result of the accident, the liability for compensation cannot extend to all things that had happened as a result of the first respondent neglecting to treat the wound and making it much mere a serious one than it was before. There is some force in the contention pat forward by the learned counsel. If the first respondent had combined to remain In the General Hospital after 10th March, 1966 for treatment of the wound, the wound would have healed without much difficulty. The wound became infected requiring a much mere serious treatment than it was necessary originally and the first respondent was the cause for such a state of things. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant was liable for all that has happened subsequent to the accident.

The learned counsel then contends that the fixation of Rs. 12000 as damages for the physical impairment and loss of future prospects ad for being necessitates to go every day in a taxi to his office was not justified. It is pointed out that the compensation cannot be paid for the physical impairment, as is found new, which was not entirely due to the injury caused by the accident and that as such the entirety of the compensation of Rs. 12000 for physics impairment cannot be directed to be borne by the insurer. As regards the loss of future prospects it is urged, there is no material to show that the first respondent had any prospects and that he lost those prospects because of the physical impairment of his leg. It is the evidence of P.W 1 that he can walk and even climb up the stairs and this evidence is referred to show that he attends to his normal activities and there is no evidence to show that the first respondent has suffered any loss of emoluments, that the first respondent was working is cashier receiving a salary of Rs. 475 pm at the time of this accident, and that he continues to be in the same job even now.

On a due consideration of the matter, I consider that the fixation of Rs. 12000 as compensation for physical Impairment and loss of future prospects is somewhat excessive, especially when the physical impairment of the first respondent as it exists today was not entirely due to the accident. The first respondent was also to blame for getting away from the hospital without the wound being properly healed and neglecting it for nearly a month without proper treatment, resulting in the wound becoming Infected leading to a more serious treatment. Though it is not possible to apportion the responsibility between the first respondent and the person who caused the accident, I think it is reasonable to fix a sum of Rs. 6000 as the appellant's Llanelli towards the compensation for the physical Impairment and loss of future prospects if any. However, in respect of the other two heads, that is, pain, suffering and shock, and for medical expenses, there is no room for interference from this court. The award under these heads are, therefore, accepted.

In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and the total compensation payable by the appellant is fixed at Rs. 8500 in modification of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

V.C.S