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Kanyalal Thakurdas, ... v. The Bombay Cycle Imp...
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Delivered by Sadasivam, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Bombay Cycle Importing Company (plaintiff / respondent) filed four suits (O.S. 2765 & 2838 of 1959 and S.C. 7 of 1960 and 17 of 1961) in the City Civil Court, Madras, seeking recovery of specified sums (Rs. 3,249-11-0; Rs. 3,890-14-0; Rs. 559-50; and Rs. 559-63 respectively) with subsequent interest and costs against four defendants in each suit.
The first defendant in each suit was P.V.A. Chari, employed by the plaintiff as a steno-typist (salary Rs. 110 per month) during the periods December 1955–July 1956 and September 1956–April 1957. His duties included attending to incoming mail ("tapals") and passing drafts and cheques to the plaintiff's manager. The manager (P.W.1 Ratilal J. Shah) testified that certain drafts and cheques (identified in evidence as Exhibits A-6, A-14, A-17, A-20, A-22, A-24, A-26, A-28, A-31, A-32 and A-33) were not handed over to him by the first defendant and that the first defendant had access to the manager's rubber stamp during the manager's absence at lunch.
The second defendant in the suits was Nilgiri Potato Supply Co., a trader dealing in potatoes (distinct business from the plaintiff, which dealt only in cycles). The contested drafts and cheques bore endorsements purporting to be by the plaintiff's manager and appearing to transfer the instruments in favour of the second defendant. The second defendant collected the amounts by presenting the instruments through the third defendant and paid commission to the third defendant.
The first defendant filed a written statement but remained effectively ex parte and was later convicted for offences in relation to the cheques and drafts. The trial judge disbelieved the second defendant's account that the instruments were given to it by the plaintiff as accommodation: there was no correspondence, no dealings shown in accounts, and other indicia undermining that plea. The trial judge found that the first defendant had taken the drafts and cheques without the knowledge of the plaintiff's manager, had forged endorsements and misappropriated proceeds, and that there was a conspiracy between the first and second defendants. Those factual findings were not challenged on appeal.
The third defendants (Kanyalal Thakurdas in some suits; Jethanand Thakurdas in others) guaranteed the prior endorsements and collected amounts from the drawee banks (the fourth defendants). The suits against the fourth defendants (various banks) were dismissed at trial on the ground that they were protected under S.131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The trial court entered decrees against defendants 1 to 3; only the third defendants appealed and filed revision petitions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the third defendants (appellants) are bankers entitled to the protection of S.131 (and S.85) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- Whether the third defendants, even if bankers, acted "in good faith and without negligence" so as to be entitled to S.131 protection when they collected payment on the cheques and drafts.
- Whether alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff (in failing to secure its rubber stamp and maintain registers/supervision) is a valid defence to the appellants' liability for conversion of the plaintiff's cheques and drafts.
- Whether the plea of estoppel can bar the plaintiff's claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The third defendants contended they were bankers and therefore entitled to the statutory protection of S.131 (and S.85) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- They argued that the plaintiff had been negligent (e.g., allowing use of the rubber seal, failing to maintain registers and proper supervision), and that such contributory negligence should preclude or reduce the plaintiff's recovery.
- They also advanced a plea of estoppel, asserting that the plaintiff's conduct should prevent it from enforcing the claim (though the opinion records that they could not point to conduct amounting to estoppel under S.115 of the Evidence Act).
Respondent (Plaintiff) and Trial Court Findings
- The plaintiff maintained that the contested cheques and drafts were obtained without the knowledge of its manager, that endorsements were forged by the first defendant, and that the second defendant had no legitimate dealings with the plaintiff.
- The trial judge found that defendants 1 and 2 conspired, that the first defendant misappropriated the instruments and forged endorsements, and that the third defendants acted not as bona fide bankers but as money-lenders/discounting agents who collected instruments for commission.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China | Approval of the test that bank officials should be attributed the ordinary degree of intelligence and knowledge required of their position; no requirement of microscopic examination of cheques paid in for collection. | Used to illustrate the standard of care a collecting banker must exercise and to reject an expectation that bank officials act as "amateur detectives." |
| Underwood (A.L.) Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool | Adoption of the test that a bank's action must be in accordance with the "ordinary practice of bankers" (as suggested in other authority). | Referenced to support the formulation of negligence/duty standard applicable to collecting bankers. |
| Taxation Commissioners v. English, Scottish and Australian Bank | Quoted for Lord Dunedin's formulation that a bank's action must conform to the "ordinary practice of bankers." | Relied on as part of the textual authority describing the ordinary standard of banking practice against which negligence is judged. |
| Rose v. London County, Westminster and Parr's Bank Ltd. | Considered in the line of authority addressing the standard to be expected of bank clerks and cashiers. | Cited (via approval in Lloyds Bank case) to support the proposition that bankers' staff are to be credited with ordinary competence, not expected to make exhaustive inquiries. |
| Bank of Ireland v. Evans Trustees | Holds that mere negligence of the plaintiff is not a complete answer to an action for conversion unless there is estoppel or ratification; Lord Chancellor rejected a direction that plaintiff's negligence alone absolved defendant. | Used to demonstrate that plaintiff's negligence, by itself, does not automatically bar recovery in conversion; estoppel or ratification is required to make negligence a complete defence. |
| Bapulal v. Nath Bank | Authority that however negligent the true owner may be, that negligence is not a defence to a person who converts the article; and that absent the protection of S.131 a bank would have no defence to the true owner's claim. | Applied to support the court's conclusion that contributory negligence is not a valid defence to conversion and to note the significance of statutory protection under S.131 for banks. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing first the status of the third defendants, then whether they acted in good faith and without negligence, and finally whether the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence could bar recovery.
1. Status as Bankers: The trial judge examined evidence (including testimony of D.W.5 and D.W.6) and concluded that the third defendants did not carry on banking as defined by law (they conducted money-lending and discounted cheques for commission). The appellate counsel did not challenge that finding. On that basis the court accepted the trial judge's finding that the third defendants were not bankers entitled to the benefits of S.85 and S.131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
2. The Protection under S.131 and the Requirement of Good Faith and Absence of Negligence: The court set out the statutory protection prescribed by S.131 (a banker who in good faith and without negligence receives payment for a customer of a crossed cheque shall not incur liability to the true owner if the title proves defective). It explained that S.131 provides limited protection similar to S.4 of the Cheques Act (England) but does not give absolute immunity. The court distilled the conditions (as stated in Bashyam & Adiga as cited in the opinion): (a) banker must act in good faith and without negligence during collection; (b) receive payment for a customer (agent role), not on his own account; (c) the person for whom he acts must be his customer; and (d) the cheque should be crossed generally or specially to the banker.
The court further explored the concept of negligence in this statutory context by reference to banking authorities and texts (including Paget and the English cases cited). Those authorities illustrate that the standard is whether the banker exercised the care a reasonable business person would exercise on his own business and that judges have resisted requiring exhaustive investigation by collecting bankers.
3. Application of Standard to the Facts: Applying the legal standard to the evidence, the court concluded that the appellants did not act in good faith and without negligence. Specific factual bases included: appellants (third defendants) generally did not obtain guarantees of endorsements from the second defendant (except in one instance, Ex. A.14); they did not verify the authenticity of endorsements with the plaintiff; they did not inquire into whether the plaintiff had dealings with the second defendant; it was suspicious that a cycle dealer would endorse customers' cheques in favour of a potato dealer; and one agent gave evidence that his firm guaranteed endorsements "as a matter of course." The trial judge's additional reasons (not all repeated in detail) supported the finding of negligence.
4. Contributory Negligence and Conversion: The court then addressed the appellants' main contention that the plaintiff's own negligence (e.g., failure to secure the rubber seal, absence of registers) amounted to contributory negligence barring the claim. The court reviewed authority and academic commentary (Winfield on Tort; S. Ramaswami Iyer's Law of Torts; Bank of Ireland case) and concluded, relying on precedent (including Bapulal v. Nath Bank), that contributory negligence is not a defence in an action for conversion: negligence of the true owner does not absolve the converter of liability. The court noted that estoppel or ratification could, in some circumstances, be decisive, but the appellants had not established estoppel (they pointed to no conduct by the plaintiff that misled them in the requisite legal sense under S.115 Evidence Act).
Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the appellants were bankers under S.131, they could not claim the statutory defence because they had not acted in good faith and without negligence. Separately, contributory negligence of the plaintiff was not a valid defence to a conversion claim in the circumstances shown.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The decrees and judgments of the learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge are confirmed; the appeals and civil revision petitions are dismissed with costs in favour of the respondent-plaintiff.
Implications (direct and limited to the case):
- The appellate court affirmed the trial court's factual findings that the first defendant misappropriated and forged endorsements and that there was a conspiracy with the second defendant.
- The court held that the third defendants were not entitled to rely on S.131 because they did not act in good faith and without negligence in collecting the cheques and drafts.
- The court held that alleged contributory negligence by the plaintiff (such as failure to lock a rubber seal or maintain registers) is not a defence to an action for conversion in the circumstances shown, and estoppel was not established.
- No broader rule limiting or expanding statutory protection beyond the application to the facts was announced; the decision confirms the trial court's outcome and enforces the plaintiff's right to recover as adjudicated below.
This summary is confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond the text of that opinion.
(Delivered by Sadasivam, J.)
The Bombay Cycle Importing Company, the respondent in these appeals and civil revision petitions, filed O.S 2765 and 2838 of 1959 and S.C 7 of 1960 and 17 of 1961, on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, to recover Rs. 3249-11-0, Rs. 3890-14-0, Rs. 559-50 and Rs. 559-63 respectively with subsequent interest and costs, against the four defendants in all the suits under the following circumstances.
The first defendant, P.V.A Chari in each of the suits was employed in the plaintiff-company as a steno-typist on a salary of Rs. 110 a month and he was in such employment from December 1955 to July, 1956 and from September, 1956 to April, 1957. His duties were to attend to the tapals and pass on the drafts and cheques to the Manager of the company. The evidence of P.W 1 Ratilal J. Shah, who is the manager of the plaintiff's firm for the last 20 years, is that in respect of the drafts and cheques Ex. A-6, A-14, A.17 and A-20 forming the subject matter of O.S 2838 of 1959, Ex. A-22, A-24, A-26 and A-28 forming the subject matter of O.S 2765 of 1959, Ex. A-31 and A-32 forming the subject matter of S.C 7 of I960 and Ex. A-33 forming the subject matter of S.C 17 of 1961, the first defendant P.V.A Chary did not hand over the cheques drafts to him. According to him, the first defendant had access to his rubber stamp seal during his absence at lunch interval. The second defendant in these cases is the Nilgiri Potato Supply Co. The plaintiff-company deals only in cycles and it had no dealings with the Nilgiri Potato Supply Co. who deal only in potatoes. The above drafts and cheques contained endorsements purporting to have been signed by the Manager of the plaintiff-company, as though they were transferred in favour of the second defendant-company. Admittedly, the second defendant-company as customers of the third defendant in each of the suits collected the amounts of the cheques and drafts by paying commission to the third defendant. The plea of defendants 1 and 2 is that these cheques and drafts were given by the plaintiff-company to the second defendant-company by way of accommodation. The first defendant filed a written statement in the original suits, but he remained ex parte. In fact, it is admitted before us that the first defendant has been convicted for the offences committed by him with regard to the cheques and drafts. The evidence of the second defendant as D.W 1 in this case that he got the cheques and drafts by way of accommodation from the plaintiff-company has been disbelieved by the learned VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, for the very good reasons given by him. There was no correspondence between the second defendant and the plaintiff and they have not seen each other. Even the account books maintained by the second defendant company do not show that they had dealings with the plaintiff-company. It is also unnatural that the plaintiff-company would endorse their cheques and drafts in favour of the second defendant-company directly, instead of giving their own drafts and cheques, if they wanted to give accommodation to the second defendant-company. Further, D.W 1 started giving evidence by saying that he is the second defendant in the suit and the manager of the company. He admitted in cross-examination that he became an insolvent in 1955. He put forward a new case that his son is carrying on the business of the second defendant-company ever since he became insolvent and that his son has not come to give evidence in these cases. His explanation is that his son asked him to appear in these cases. The learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge has rightly pointed out that the plaintiff-company would not have given accomodation for a company owned by an insolvent. In fact, he has found that the above drafts and cheques which have been issued by the customers in favour of the plaintiff-company have been taken without the knowledge of the manager or partners of the plaintiff-company by the first defendant and that the first defendant had forged the endorsements and misappropriated the amounts paid to him. He has also found that there was a conspiracy between defendants 1 and 2. In fact, these findings were not challenged by the learned advocate for the appellants.
Kanyalal Thakurdas is the third defendant in O.S No. 2765 of 1959 and S.C 17 of 1961 and Jethanand Thakurdas is the third defendant in O.S 2838 of 1959 and S.C 7 of 1960. Admittedly, the third defendant in these suits guaranteed the signatures on the prior endorsements on the cheques and drafts and collected the amounts from the several Banks, who were the drawees of the cheques and drafts. The United Commercial Bank Ltd., is the fourth defendant in O.S 2765 of 1959 and S.C 17 of 1961, the Bank of Bikaner Ltd., is the fourth defendant in O.S 2838 of 1959 and Devakaram Nanjee Banking Corporation is the fourth defendant in S.C 7 of 1960. The suits against the fourth defendant have been dismissed as they were protected under S. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The case of defendants 1 and 2 is that the plaintiff-company accommodated the second defendant by endorsing the cheques and drafts and sent them through the first defendant, who was the accredited agent and representative. But the learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras, rejected this contention and passed a decree against defendants 1 to 3 in all the suits. Defendants 1 and 2 have not preferred any appeal. The third defendant in the suits, namely, Kanyalal Thakurdas and Jethanand Thakurdas, alone have filed the appeals and revision petitions.
The only point urged in these appeals and civil revision petition is that the plaintiff-company was negligent in having allowed the second defendant company to seal the cheques and drafts and commit forgeries and hence the plaintiff-company cannot claim the amounts of the cheques and drafts from the appellants and petitioners herein. The learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge has referred to the following definition of a “Banker” in Vol. 1, 2nd Edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England, in dealing with the claim of the third defendant in these suits that they are bankers entitled to the benefit of S. 131 Negotiable Instruments Act:
“A Banker is an individual, partnership or Corporation whose sole or predominating business is Banking, that is the receipt of money on current or deposit account and the payment and collection of cheques drawn by or paid in by a customer”.
He found that the third defendant in all these suits are not bankers entitled to the benefits of S. 85 and 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is true D.W 5 Purushotham Das, agent of Jethanand Thakurdas, and D.W 6 Thakurdas partner of Kanyalal Thakurdas, gave evidence that the third defendant in the suits are bankers. But it is clear from their evidence that they do only money lending business. They have discounted the cheques and drafts concerned in these cases for commission.
Under S. 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a banker, (sic) and any Post Office Savings Bank. This section does not define the term “banker”. But according to S. 5(b) of the Banking Regulation Act X of 1949,
“Banking” means the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and with drawable by cheque, draft, order or otherwise”.
A banker is one who in the ordinary course of business honours cheques drawn upon him by a person from whom and for whom he receives meneys on current account. The learned Advocates for the appellants did not attempt to canvass the correctness of the findings of the learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge that the appellants are not bankers entitled to the benefits of S. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is as follows:
“A banker who has in good faith and without negligence received payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially to himself shall not, in case the title to the cheque proves defective, incur any liability to the true owner of the cheque by reason only of having received such payment”.
A banker who deals with a cheque in a manner contrary to the rights of the true owner is under common law liable in an action for conversion or trover. S. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act gives some protection to the banker in the same manner as S. 4 of the Cheques Act, 1957, in England. But this does not provide an absolute immunity to the collecting banker and unless he can bring himself within the conditions formulated in the section, his common law liability for conversion remains. The conditions are (a) that the banker should act in good faith and without negligence in receiving payment, i.e, in the process of collection, (b) that the banker should receive payment for a customer, i.e, act as mere agent in the collection of the cheque, and not on his own account as holder, (c) that the person for whom the banker acts must be his customer, and (d) that the cheques should be one crossed generally or specially to himself (See Bashyam and Adiga on the Negotiable Instruments Act, 12th Edn. page 584). Commenting on the corresponding S. 4 of the Cheques Act, 1957, in England, Pagent has stated at page 347 of his Law of Banking, 6th Edn., that the importation of negligence into that section is in a sense an anomaly. The author points out that there can be no negligence without a duty and that there is no contractual relation between the collecting banker and the true owner, giving rise to a duty on the part of the former to the latter. The banker's only contractual obligation is to his own customer and conduct beneficial to the customer at the expense of the true owner is no breach of that duty. At page 348 of the book, it is pointed out by the learned author that the duty is purely statutory one imposed on the banker in favour of the true owner and the negligence consists in the disregard of his interests, apart from those of the customer. The breach of the implied duty to the true owner is explained in the following terms at page 348 of the same book:
“The assumption of this duty and liability to a stranger must be regarded as part of the price paid by bankers for protection under statute. It is from the standpoint, then, of the true owner that all questions of negligence under this section must be viewed. It would be futile to try and formulate particular conditions or circumstances which might or might not establish negligence in this connection. Broadly speaking, the banker must exercise the same care and forethought in the interests of the true owner, with regard to cheques paid by customer, as a reasonable business man would bring to bear on similar business of his own. This formula was approved by Sankey L.J in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China(1). In Underwood (A.L) Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool(2), Bankers L.J adopts the test suggested by Lord Dunedin in Taxation Commissioners v. English, Scottish and Australian Bank(3) where he says that the bank's action must be in accordance with the ‘ordinary practice of bankers.”
In Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China(4) Sankey L.J approved the view taken by Bailnache J. in Rose v. London County, Westminister and Parr's Bank Ltd.(5) that he must attribute to the clerks and cashiers of the defendant bank the degree of intelligence and knowledge ordinarily required of persons in their position to fit them for the discharge of their duties, but that no microscopic examination of cheques paid in for collection was necessary. ‘It is not expected’, he said, that officials of banks should also be amateur detectives’. In the same case, Scrutton, L.J said that ‘to require a thorough enquiry into the history of each cheque would render banking business impracticable”.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could hardly be said that the appellants acted in good faith and without negligence in collecting the amounts of the cheques and drafts. Except in the cheque Ex. A.14, the appellants have not asked the second defendant, who was their customer, to guarantee the endorsement of the payee. The appellants have not cared to ask the plaintiff-company about the truth of the endorsements alleged to have been made by them. In fact, it should have accused the suspicion of the appellants that the plaintiff-company who are dealers in cycles should have assigned the cheques and drafts of their customers to the second defendant company who are dealers in potatoes. D.W 5 Purushotham Das, the agent of Jetanand Thakurdoss, the third defendant in O.S 2838 of 1965, went to the extent of stating that his firm guaranteed the endorsements on the cheques and drafts as a matter of course. The evidence of D.W 6, Thakurdas, who is a partner of Kanyalal Thakurdas, the third defendant firm in O.S 2765 of 1959 and S.C 17 of 1961 is that he did not ascertain whether the endorsements in the name of the plaintiff-company are genuine. Admittedly D.W 6 did not enquire whether the plaintiff-company had any dealings with the second defendant. It is unnecessary to refer to the other reasons given by the learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge to show that the appellants did not act in good faith and that they have acted negligently in collecting the cheques and drafts of the plaintiff at the instance of the second defendant. Hence even if the appellants are bankers within the meaning of Sec. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, they cannot claim the benefit of that section.
The main contention urged in these appeals and revision petitions is that the plaintiff-company acted negligently and that on account of the said contributory negligence, the plaintiff-company is not entitled to recover the amounts of the cheques and drafts from the appellants. It is urged that the plaintiff company should have kept the rubber seal under lock and key. The mere use of the rubber seal of the plaintiff-company is not sufficient to forge the endorsements on the cheques and drafts. In fact, the first defendant could have easily procured a duplicate rubber seal in the market. It is true the plaintiff-company did not maintain any register to show the letters received every day, or a register showing that papers were given to each clerk. But the failure on the part of the plaintiff-company to maintain such registers cannot lead to the inference that it is negligent. The learned VII Asst. City Civil Judge has however observed that the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 show that they did not have proper control and supervision over the first defendant and keep necessary registers, which would prevent fraud being committed, and that because of this negligence and want of proper supervision by P.Ws 1 and 2, the first defendant on whom confidence was reposed, took advantage of it and handled the cheques and drafts dishonestly and fraudulently and forged them. On the strength of this finding, the learned advocates for the appellants urged that the plaintiff-company was guilty of contributory negligence and it could not enforce the suit claim. They also pleaded that the plaintiff company is estopped from enforcing the suit claim. But they were unable to point out any conduct or statement of the plaintiff which misled them to act in a way detriment to their own interest to invoke the plea of estoppel defined in Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act.
Hence the only question to be considered in these appeals is whether the alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff-company is a valid defence to the suit claim. The law has been clearly stated at page 541 of Winfield on Tort, 7th Edition:—
“There is now in existence a body of academic opinion to the effect that in some cases of conversion at least, if the plaintiff's own negligence has contributed to his loss, the damages should be apponrioned under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, and the moral case for this seems strong. Why for example, should a plaintiff whose lack of ordinary care has not enabled a thief to make off with his property recover its full value from an innocent third party who bought the property from the thief in good faith. It is true that it is the plaintiff's property and that the thief can pass no title, but as Delvin L.J has suggested, ‘the loss should be divided between them in such proportion as is just in all the circumstances. If it be pure misfortune, the loss should be borne equally; if the fault or imprudence of either party has caused or contributed to the loss, it should be borne by that party, in the whole or in the greater part. The question is, however, whether this is at all possible as the law now stands.
“It is submitted that the question is probably to be answered in the negative. In Bank of Ireland v. Evans Trustees the trial Judge had directed the Jury that if the plaintiffs' loss had been caused by their own negligence then the defendant was absolved, but of this the Lord Chancellor said, ‘I apprehend that there is no such principle of law. I think that there must be something that amounts to an estoppel or something that amounts to a ratification, in order to make the negligence a good answer.’ That case, it is true, was decided at a time when contributory negligence, if a defence at all, was complete defence, and its use in cases of conversion would therefore have had the result of depriving a plaintiff of his property altogether on account of some initial carelessness. This consequence the courts were not prepared to accept. As Lord Macnaughten said, in a famous passage ‘If I lose a dog and find it afterwards in the possession of a gentleman who bought it from somebody whom he believed to be the owner, it is no answer to me to say he never would have been cheated into buying the dog if I had chained it up or put a collar on it or kept it under proper control…… If that be so, how can carelessness, however extreme, in the conduct of a man's own business preclude him from recovering his own property which has been stolen from him?”
It is clear from page 169 of the Law of Torts by S. Ramaswami Iyer, Fifth Edn. that contributory negligence is not one of the defences open to a defendant in an action for conversion. In Bapulal v. Nath Bank it has been held that however negligent the true owner may be, it can be no answer by the person who converts the article that he should be let off from his liability because of the negligence of the true owner. It is also pointed out in the same decision that but for the protection afforded to the Bank by S. 131 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Bank would have no defence whatever to the claim of the plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the appellants are not entitled to rely on the alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff-company as a defence for their having collected the cheques and drafts of the plaintiff-company and committed the tort of conversion. The decrees and judgments of the learned VII Assistant City Civil Judge are confirmed and the appeals and civil revision petitions are dismissed with costs of the respondent-plaintff.
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