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The Nungambakkam Dhanarakshaka Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. By The President v. The Registrar Of Companies
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a limited company (a Nidhi) engaged in taking fixed deposits, recurring deposits, savings deposits etc., and had about 11,500 members on the roll. The company's financial year ran from 1 January to 31 December, and under the statute an annual general meeting (AGM) should be held by 30 June of the succeeding year. In January 1971 a strike among staff disrupted the company's normal working. Relying on that ground, the company wrote to the Registrar of Companies on 29 May 1971 requesting three months' time to hold the general body meeting from 1 July 1971. The Registrar declined that request by letter dated 8 June 1971 and informed the company that expeditious steps should be taken to hold the meeting in accordance with law. Company representatives met the Registrar and, by a further letter dated 24 June 1971, asked for an extension of up to about ten weeks; the Registrar again refused by letter dated 3 September 1971.
The company then presented an application to the company court on 18 September 1971 under Rules 9 and 11(b) of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, praying that the court extend the time for holding the AGM up to the middle of November 1971. The Registrar of Companies filed an affidavit asserting that the application was not maintainable because the statutory power to extend time to hold an AGM rested with the Registrar (and ultimately the Central Government), and that the court had no power to grant such an extension.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the company court has an inherent power to extend the time within which the annual general meeting of a company should be held.
- Whether the court may rely on Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 (an "inherent powers" provision analogous to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure), to grant relief in the face of express statutory provisions conferring power on the Registrar or Central Government.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant (the Nidhi) / Counsel for Applicant
- The applicant contended that the company court could exercise an inherent power to grant the extension sought for holding the AGM.
- Counsel for the applicant (Mr. Srinivasan) relied on Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, which preserves the inherent powers of the court to give directions or pass orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process.
Registrar of Companies / Respondent
- The Registrar asserted by affidavit that the application was not maintainable in law.
- The Registrar maintained that the statutory power to extend the time within which an AGM should be held rests with the Registrar (and the Central Government under certain provisions), and that the company court does not have the power to grant such an extension.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Selvaraj v. Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund, [1968] 38 Comp. Cas. 153 (Mad.) | Whether the company court can appoint a person to supervise and preside over an adjourned annual general meeting called by the board. | The court observed that Selvaraj permitted appointment of a person to supervise and preside over an adjourned AGM, but held that that principle cannot be extended to permit the court to call or grant an extension for holding an AGM; Section 186 expressly excludes the court's power in relation to annual general meetings. |
| In re Coal Marketing Co. of India Private Ltd., [1967] 37 Comp. Cas. 720 (Cal.) | Whether the court can grant the relief of permitting an AGM to be held within a time specified by the court where statutory provisions delimit power. | The opinion notes Mukharji J.'s conclusion that the court had no power to grant the requested time for holding the AGM, having regard to Sections 166, 167 and 186 of the Act; the decision supports the view that the court cannot exercise power to extend time for AGMs. |
| S. L. Kapur v. Registrar of Companies, [1964] 1 Comp. L.J. 211 (Orissa) | Excusing directors for default in holding AGM; relief under Section 633(2) for negligence/default by officers of the company. | The court treated this decision as distinguishable: there the judge excused directors for default under Section 633(2) without considering Sections 166, 167 and 186, because the relief sought was to excuse the directors for default and not to obtain an extension of time to hold the AGM. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded by reference to the relevant statutory provisions and the legislative policy embodied in them. The opinion cites and interprets the following statutory provisions from the Companies Act, 1956:
- Section 166 — prescribes that every company shall hold an annual general meeting each year (no more than fifteen months between AGMs) and provides that the Registrar may, for any special reason, extend the time for holding any annual general meeting (other than the first) by a period not exceeding three months.
- Section 167 — empowers the Central Government to call or direct the calling of a general meeting on the application of any member where a company defaults in holding an AGM in accordance with Section 166, and to give ancillary or consequential directions; a meeting so called is to be deemed an annual general meeting.
- Section 186 — confers on the court power to order meetings to be called, held and conducted in such manner as it thinks fit, but this power is expressly limited to meetings other than annual general meetings.
The court reasoned that the statute expressly allocates the remedial power in the case of default concerning AGMs to the Registrar (and to the Central Government under Section 167), while Section 186 explicitly confines the court's meeting-ordering power to meetings other than annual general meetings. The legislative scheme, supported by the Company Law Committee's report (which recommended giving discretionary power to the Registrar and giving the Central Authority power to call meetings in default), and by analogous provisions in English law (Section 131 of the English Companies Act), demonstrates an intention to exclude the company court from exercising a general power to extend the time for AGMs.
The court examined earlier authorities and held that:
- Selvaraj permitted the court to appoint a person to supervise/presume over an adjourned AGM called by the board, but that limited supervisory power does not equate to a power to call or extend time for an AGM.
- Mukharji J.'s decision in In re Coal Marketing supports the proposition that the court lacks power to grant the kind of extension sought, considering Sections 166, 167 and 186.
- S. L. Kapur was distinguishable because it involved excusing directors under Section 633(2) for default and did not address the statutory allocation of power to the Registrar/Central Government to deal with AGMs.
The court also addressed the applicant's reliance on Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 (an "inherent powers" provision). It treated Rule 9 as analogous to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and applied the well-settled principle that inherent powers cannot be invoked to displace an express statutory scheme that confers powers on other authorities. Therefore, Rule 9 could not be used to override the explicit provisions of the Companies Act which allocate power in relation to AGMs to the Registrar/Central Government.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the application was not maintainable and dismissed it. The court found that it does not have inherent power to grant the extension of time sought for holding the annual general meeting, and that the power in relation to AGMs is vested by statute in the Registrar (and, where applicable, the Central Government under Section 167).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The applicant company's request for a judicial extension of time to hold its AGM was dismissed; the company must seek relief from the statutory authority empowered to grant extensions (the Registrar or the Central Government as appropriate).
- The court declined to exercise Rule 9 inherent powers to override the express statutory allocation of authority. The opinion emphasizes that inherent powers are not available to displace an express scheme conferring remedial power on other authorities.
- The decision does not purport to create a new broader jurisdiction for the company court regarding AGMs; rather it enforces the existing statutory allocation of functions. The order concludes with "No costs."
This summary is strictly confined to the statements and material contained in the provided opinion.
1. This application raises an important question under the company law, namely, whether the company court has inherent power to extend the time within which the annual general meeting of a company should be held. The short facts are these. The petitioner is a limited company and is carrying on the business of receiving fixed deposits, recurring deposits, savings deposits, etc. There are about 11,500 members on roll. The financial year of the company is from 1st January to 31st December. The annual general meeting should be held on 30th June of the succeeding year. In the month of January, 1971, there was a strike among the members of the staff with the result that the normal working of the Nidhi was dislocated. Putting forward that ground, the company approached the Registrar of Companies by letter dated May 29, 1971, requesting for three months' time to hold the general body meeting from July 1, 1971. The Registrar, by letter dated June 8, 1971, declined to grant time and informed the Nidhi that expeditious steps should be taken to hold the meeting in accordance with law. The persons in charge of the affairs of the company appear to have met the Registrar in person and explained the position and reiterated the request for time and followed up the request by a letter dated June 24, 1971, requesting for extension of time up to at least 10 weeks. By letter dated 3rd September, 1971, the Registrar turned down that request also. It is in these circumstances that this application has been taken under Rules 9 and 11(b) of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, praying that this court may be pleased to extend the time for holding the annual general meeting up to the middle of November, 1971. This application was presented on 18th September, 1971.
2. The Registrar of Companies has filed an affidavit contending that the application is not maintainable in law, that the power to extend the time within which the annual general meeting should be held rests with the Registrar and that this court has no power to grant extension of time.
3. It is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as " the Act "), bearing on the subject. Section 165 defines what a statutory meeting is. It also sets out what a statutory report should contain. Section 166 deals with annual general meeting. It reads :
"166. Annual general meeting--(1) Every company shallin each year hold in addition to any other meetings a general meeting as its annual general meeting and shall specify the meeting as such in the notices calling it ; and not more than fifteen months shall elapse between the date of one annual general meeting of a company and that of the next :
Provided that a company may hold its first annual general meeting within a period of not more than eighteen months from the date of its incorporation ; and if such general meeting is held within that period, it shall not be necessary for the company to hold any annual general meeting in the year of its incorporation or in the following year :
Provided further that the Registrar may, for any special reason, extend the time within which any annual general meeting (not being the first annual general meeting) shall be held, by a period not exceeding three months.
(2) Every annual general meeting shall be called for a time during business hours, on a day that is not a public holiday, and shall be held either at the registered office of the company or at some other place within the city, town or village in which the registered office of the company is situate :
Provided that the Central Government may exempt any class of companies from the provisions of this sub-section subject to such conditions as it may impose :
Provided further that-
(a) a public company or a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company, may by its articles fix the time for its annual general meetings and may also by a resolution passed in one annual general meeting fix the time for its subsequent annual general meetings ; and
(b) a private company which is not a subsidiary of a public company, may in like manner and also by a resolution agreed to by all the members thereof, fix the times as well as the place for its annual general meeting."
4. This section corresponds to Section 76 of the Companies Act, 1913, It also corresponds to section 131 of the english act. It will be seen that the first annual general meeting should be held within 18 months of the company's incorporation. No provision is made for granting extension of time in such a case in contrast with the company's subsequent annual general meeting. The section, as it stood, originally conferred power upon the Registrar to extend the time for holding the meeting up to six months. But this period was reduced to three months by the Amending Act XLV of 1960. The language employed in Section 166 shows that the annual general meeting should be held whether or not the annual accounts are ready for consideration at that meeting. In other words, a clear statutory duty is cast on the directors to call the meeting whether or not the accounts, the consideration of which is one of the matters to be dealt with at an annual general meeting, are ready or not.
5. Section 167 confers certain powers on the Central Government in the matter of calling annual general meeting. It provides :
" 167. Power of Central Government to call annual general meeting.--(1) If default is made in holding an annual general meeting in accordance with Section 166, the Central Government may, notwithstanding anything in this Act or in the articles of the company, on the application of any member of the company, call, or direct the calling of, a general meeting of the company and give such ancillary or consequential directions as the Central Government thinks expedient in relation to the calling, holding and conducting of the meeting.
Explanation.--The directions that may be given under this sub-section . may include a direction that one member of the company present in pe'rson or by proxy shall be deemed to constitute a meeting.
(2) A general meeting held in pursuance of Sub-section (1) shall, subject to any directions of the Central Government, be deemed to be an annual general meeting of the company. "
6. This section also corresponds to Section 76 of the 1913 Act and to Section 131 of the English Act. This section provides for a remedy in case of default in holding the annual general meeting in accordance with Section 166. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or the articles of association of a company the Central Government may, on the application of any member of the company, call or direct calling of a general meeting of the company. The Central Government are also given power to give such ancillary and consequential directions as they may think expedient in relation to the calling, holding and conducting of the meeting. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 provides that a general meeting in pursuance of Section 167(1) shall, subject to any directions of the Central Government, be deemed to be an annual general meeting of the company. This is a clear statutory recognition of what should be done in case there is default in holding the general meeting within the time required by the statute. Thus, it is clear that exclusive power is conferred upon the Central Government to permit the calling of a general meeting in case of default to hold the general meeting notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act or in the articles of association of a company. The next relevant section is Section 186. It confers certain powers on the court in the matter of calling meetings. It reads :
" '186. Power of court to order meeting to be called.--(1) If for any reason it is impracticable to call a meeting of a company, other than an annual general meeting, in any manner in which meetings of the company may be called, or to hold or conduct the meeting of the company in the manner prescribed by this Act or the articles, the court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any director of the company, or of any member of the company who would be entitled to vote at the meeting,--
(a) order a meeting of the company to be called, held and conducted in such manner as the court thinks fit ; and
(b) give such ancillary or consequental directions as the court thinks expedient, including directions modifying or supplementing in relation to the calling, holding and conducting of the meeting, the operation of the provisions of this Act and of the company's articles.
Explanation.--The directions that may be given under this subsection may include a direction that one member of the company present in person or by proxy shall be deemed to constitute a meeting.
(2) Any meeting called, held and conducted in accordance with any such order shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be a meeting of the company duly called, held and conducted. "
7. This corresponds to Section 79(3) of the 1913 Act and to Section 135 of the English Act. It would be seen from the language employed in this section that it confers power upon the court only in the case of meetings other than the annual general meeting. The obvious reason is that as regards the annual general meeting express power is conferred on the Central Government. The question arose before this court in Selvaraj v. Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund, [1968] 38 Comp. Cas. 153 (Mad.) whether the company court can appoint a person to supervise and preside over the adjourned annual general meeting called by the board. This court answered the question in the affirmative. But that principle cannot be extended to a case of calling a meeting itself. The expression " other than annual general meeting " occurring in Section 186 makes it abundantly clear that the legislature did not want the company court to exercise any power with regard to annual general meeting but restricted the power only with regard to other meetings. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the policy with which power has been conferred upon the Central Government with regard to calling any general meeting in case of default to hold a meeting as required under law and with regard to conferment of power on the court under Section 186. The Company Law Committee in its report at pages 54 and 55 observed :
" We further recommend that the Registrar should have the power, in special circumstances, to extend the time during which a general meeting should be ordinarily held. The absence of any such provision in the Act of 1913 makes for needless rigidity, and our recommendation that the annual general meeting should in future be held, within nine months from the end of each financial year, justifies the grant of this discretionary power to the Registrar to be exercised only in cases of proved hardship. In default of the holding of an annual general meeting by the company, under Section 76 of the present Act, the Central Authority should have the power to call such a meeting, on the application of any shareholder, and to give such directions for this purpose as it may think fit. This is in consonance with the provisions of Section 131 of the English Companies Act, 1948, which confers this power not on the court but on the Board of Trade."
8. Section 131 of the English Companies Act, 1948, confers power on the Board of Trade in the matter of calling annual general meeting on the application of any shareholder. That power is not conferred on the court. It is in line with the policy underlying Section 131 of the English Companies Act, that the Company Law Committee recommended incorporation of suitable provision and it is in those circumstances that express power has been conferred upon the Central Government under Section 167, and that under Section 186 the power of the court is expressly excluded with regard to calling an annual general meeting of the company.
9. A similar view was taken by Mukharji J. in In re Coal Marketing Co. of India Private Ltd., [1967] 37 Comp. Cas. 720 (Cal.). In that case, an application was taken out under Section 633(2) of the Act for an order that upon the undertaking of the applicants to hold the annual general meeting of the company (which should have been held previously) within six months from the date of the order, they may be relieved wholly from the liabilities for not holding such annual general meeting. The learned judge, on an examination of the provisions of the Act, came to the conclusion that the court has no power to grant the request for holding the annual general meeting within any time prayed for, having regard to Sections 166, 167 and 186 of the Act.
10. The decision in S. L. Kapur v. Registrar of Companies, [1964] 1 Comp. L.J. 211 (Orissa) on which Mr. Srinivasan, appearing for the petitioner, relied, is not relevant. In that case, the directors of Kalinga Tubes Ltd. took out an application under Section 633(2) of the Act praying to excuse them for the default committed in holding the annual general meeting. They approached the court after having failed to convince the Registrar to grant extension of time. They put forward certain reasons for not being able to hold the meeting within the time. The learned judge observed :
" In the circumstances stated in the petition I am satisfied that the delay in holding the annual general meeting and placing the balance-sheet, profit and loss account and directors' and auditors' report before the said meeting and forwarding copies thereof to the members was due to unavoidable reasons and that neither the company nor any of its directors who constitute the interim board, are individually responsible for the delay which was due to circumstances entirely beyond their control."
11. Having observed thus, the learned judge held that the applicants were excused for the default, as prayed for. The learned judge did not refer to Sections 166 ; 167 and 186. Obviously, those sections did not arise for consideration. All that was asked for was a prayer to excuse the directors for the default committed by them in not holding the general meeting within the specified time. Under Section 633(2) it is competent for the company court to grant relief in respect of any negligence, default or breach of duty, misfeasance or breach of trust by any officer of the company. The question as to whether the court has got power to grant extension of time for holding the annual general meeting did not arise for consideration.
12. Mr. Srinivasan, counsel for the applicant, contended that this court, under its inherent power, can grant the relief asked for by the Nidhi. Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, on which reliance is placed in this behalf, reads :
" Inherent powers of court.--Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to give such directions or pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court."
13. I am unable to accept the argument that by virtue of this rule, the applicant Nidhi can be granted the relief asked for. Rule 9 is analogous to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that the inherent power cannot be invoked where express provision is made for the relief by conferring power upon other authorities. No ground is made out by the applicant as to why they did not approach the Central Government to exercise their power under Section 167. Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules cannot be applied to override the express provisions of the Act.
14. In the result, I find that the application is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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