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Konappa Mudaliar v. Kusalaru Alias Muauswami Mndali And Others.

Madras High Court
Feb 6, 1969
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (who is the appellant before this Court) brought a suit relating to a house that originally belonged to Venkatachalam. His son Balu left the house in 1932 and was thereafter not heard of; Venkatachalam died soon after. Balu's wife, Thiruppathiammal (the plaintiff's vendor), also left the house around the same time and went to live with her parents. On 27 April 1945 she executed a sale in favour of the plaintiff. The first defendant purchased the same property from Chennammal (Venkatachalam's widow) on 6 December 1945.

The matter previously came before this Court on appeal. The courts below had found that the plaintiff had title to the property; this Court affirmed that finding but remanded the matter to the lower appellate court to determine whether the plaintiff was in possession within 12 years of the suit. After remand, the learned District Judge, Salem, after detailed examination of the evidence, concluded that the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of the suit. That factual finding was treated as one that must stand and was described as being amply supported by the record.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff who has title and sues for possession must also establish possession within 12 years of the suit to succeed, particularly after the enactment of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the Supreme Court decision in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander.
  2. Whether the lower appellate court, on remand from this Court, could apply the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Articles 64 and 65) instead of applying Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as directed by this Court's earlier order of remand.
  3. Whether this Court can revisit and reverse its own earlier order of remand in light of a later decision of the Supreme Court which interpreted Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as declaratory.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant urged that, in view of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the Supreme Court decision in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander, the question whether a title-holder plaintiff must show possession within 12 years no longer arises: the 1963 provisions are declaratory and should govern rather than Article 142 of the 1908 Act.
  • The appellant relied on the Supreme Court view that Articles 64 and 65 are merely declaratory and therefore a person with title need not be in possession within 12 years of suit to succeed unless the defendant establishes a prescribed title by adverse possession.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to consider any question other than the specific question directed by this Court's order of remand, and it was not open to that court to apply Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in place of Article 142 of the 1908 Act.
  • It was also urged that Section 30 of the 1963 Act applies only where the period of limitation under the 1963 Act is shorter than under the 1908 Act, and hence Section 30 did not apply in this case.
  • The respondents relied on the timing of decisions: the lower appellate court decided the remanded question on 26 June 1964 (before the Supreme Court decision relied upon by the appellant, which was rendered on 12 December 1968), and thus, at that time, the Full Bench decision interpreting Article 142 was the binding authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander The Supreme Court held that Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are declaratory (i.e., they state what the law always was) rather than remedial. The appellant relied on this decision to argue that the lower court should apply Arts. 64 and 65 rather than Art. 142 (1908). The Court noted the decision but observed it was rendered after the lower appellate court had given its decision on remand, so that decision was not binding on that court at the time.
Lalbati v. Satchitanand Establishes that matters finally disposed of by an order of remand cannot be reopened when the case returns from the lower court — principle of constructive res judicata. The Court relied on this principle to hold that it could not now go back on the earlier view taken in its order of remand; the view had become final and could not be reopened by this Court when the case returned after remand.
Sunder Ahir v. Phuljharia Held to the same effect as Lalbati v. Satchitanand regarding the finality of matters dealt with by an order of remand. Used to support the proposition that the matters disposed of by the order of remand cannot be reopened when the case comes back from the lower court.
Kanhaiya Singh v. Bhagwat Singh Further cited in support of the rule that remand orders create finality as to the matters decided on remand. Referenced to buttress the Court's conclusion that it could not revisit its earlier remand direction.
Satyadhavan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi Discusses the effect of statutory provisions (S. 105(2) CPC) on orders of remand and whether the correctness of a remand order can later be challenged on appeal from the final decree. The Court relied on the exposition in this case to explain the limits on challenging remand orders and to distinguish the competence of the Supreme Court to examine such remand orders from the competence of the High Court to reopen its own remand direction.
A.I.R. 1963 M.P. 344 Referenced for procedural law on remand orders and their finality (as discussed in the opinion). Referred to in the discussion to demonstrate that decisions dealing with remand-order finality were not overruled by the later Supreme Court decision relied upon by the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds through a sequence of interrelated analysis points drawn directly from the opinion:

  1. Factual determination: The Court accepted the lower appellate finding (after remand) that the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of suit. That finding was treated as one of fact and "has got to stand" because it was amply supported by the record.
  2. On the substantive Limitation point the appellant argued that Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (and the Supreme Court decision interpreting them as declaratory) remove the requirement for a title-holder plaintiff to prove possession within 12 years. The respondents resisted that position on jurisdictional and temporal grounds.
  3. The Court examined the temporal and statutory framework: for suits filed before the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force, the provisions of the 1963 Act apply where fresh procedural steps (like an appeal) have to be taken, subject to Section 30 of the 1963 Act. However, Section 30 applies only where the period of limitation under the 1963 Act is shorter than that under the 1908 Act; the opinion records that Section 30 did not apply to this case.
  4. The Court observed the legal position under the Limitation Act, 1908: when this suit was filed, Article 142 applied. A Full Bench of the Court had interpreted Article 142 to mean that even a person with title suing for possession had to show possession within 12 years of suit or else fail. The 1963 Act remedied that defect, and the Supreme Court later interpreted Articles 64 and 65 as declaratory of that law.
  5. Temporal sequencing of decisions mattered: the lower appellate court decided the remanded question on 26 June 1964. The Supreme Court decision relied on by the appellant was delivered on 12 December 1968. Therefore, when the lower appellate court decided the remand matter, it was bound by the earlier Full Bench decision interpreting Article 142; it could not apply a Supreme Court decision that did not yet exist.
  6. On the procedural question whether the High Court (this Court) could now reverse or revisit its earlier order of remand in light of the later Supreme Court decision, the Court held it was not open to do so. The Court relied on Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of constructive res judicata as applied in earlier cases (Lalbati, Sunder Ahir, Kanhaiya Singh) to conclude that the earlier remand view had become final and could not be reopened by this Court when the case returned from the lower court.
  7. The opinion distinguished the competence of the Supreme Court to examine an earlier remand order (even where no appeal lay against that remand order) from the competence of the High Court to itself change its earlier remand direction when the matter came back after disposal by the lower court. The Court held the Supreme Court could consider such questions, but that did not authorize this Court to revisit its own remand order.
  8. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the lower appellate court acted correctly in following the earlier remand direction and the Full Bench precedent that governed at the time of its decision, and that the appellant could not now challenge the correctness of the earlier remand direction before this Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave refused.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The appellant (plaintiff) fails in the Second Appeal and remains bound by the earlier adjudication: in particular, the lower appellate finding that the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of suit stands.
  • The lower appellate court's application of the law (as it stood at the time of its decision) was upheld: because its decision was rendered before the later Supreme Court ruling relied on by the appellant, it was bound by the Full Bench interpretation of Article 142 of the 1908 Act and acted correctly.
  • The Court held that it is not open to this Court to re-open or go back upon the earlier order of remand which it itself made; that earlier view had become final for the purposes explained in the opinion.

The opinion does not state that a new precedent is being laid down; rather, it enforces the finality of the Court's earlier remand order and upholds the correctness of the lower appellate court's decision on the facts and procedural law as it existed when that court decided the remanded issue.

V.C.S
Show all summary ...

The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit relates to a house which originally belonged to one Venkatachalam. His son Balu left the house in 1932 and was thereafter not heard of. Venkatachalam also died soon after. From the evidence in this case it appears that Balu's wife Thiruppathiammal, who is the plaintiff's vendor also left the house at about the tame time and went to live with her parents. On 27th April, 1945, she executed a sale in plaintiff's favour. The first defendant purchased the same property from Chennammal, Venkatachalam's widow on 6th December, 1945. The matter same up once before to this Court, on appeal. The finding of the courts below that the plaintiff had title to the property was confirmed. It was remanded to the loner appellate court for a finding whether the plaintiff was in possession within 12 years of suit. After remand, the learned, District Judge, Salem, has, after an exhaustive discussion of the evidence on record, come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years of suit. This finding being one of fact has got to stand. In any ease, it is amply supported by the evidence on record.

But the point urged on behalf of the appellant is that the question whether the plaintiff who has title and who sues for possession of the property to which he is entitled should, in order to succeed in his suit, also show possession within 12 years of suit no longer arises, in view of the provisions of the articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and as the Supreme Court has in its decision in Nair Service Society v. K.C Alexandar(1) held that the present articles 64 and 65 are merely declaratory, the matter must be decided on the basis of the present Arts. 64 and 65 rather than under Art. 142 as was directed by this Court in its order of remand. On the ether hand, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the court below had no jurisdiction to consider any question other than the one it Was directed to consider by the order of remand of this court and that it was not open to the lower appellate court to consider whether the matter fell within Arts. 14 and 65 of the present Limitation Act. In respect of salts filed before the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force, the provisions of that Act have to be given effect to where fresh steps like appeal, etc., have to be taken and not the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908 subject, of course, to the provisions of S. 30 of the 1963 Act, the provision of S. 30 applies however, only to suits for which the period of limitation under 1963 Act is shorter than the period prescribed under the 1908 Act. Therefore, S. 30 of the 1963 Act does not apply to this case. When this suit was filed Art. 142 applied. The effect of Art. 142 of 1908 Act as interpreted by a Full Bench of this Court is that even where a person with a title files a suit for possession, but fails to show possession within 12 years of suit, he has got to fall, even though the person in possession might not have completed his title by adverse possession. It is this defect that has been cored by the 1963 Act. Articles 64 and 65 have been interpreted by the Supreme Court as declaratory and cot remedial. The effect therefore, of the decision of the Supreme Court is that it should always be deemed to have been the law that when a person who has tide sues for possession, he need not be in possession within 12 years of suit and he is entitled to succeed unless the defendant is able to establish that he has prescribed title by adverse possession. Now in this case, the first defendant's possession is only from the date of sale, 27th December, 1945, and it is less than 12 years. Of course, he can add the possession of his vendor, to his own possession, provided his vendor's possession was adverse to the plaintiff's vendor. From what we have already stated, it would be obvious that the plaintiff's vendor had never heed in possession though she bad title. Can it then be said that the first defendant's vendor's possession was adverse to the plaintiff's vendor, and therefore, to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's vendor having left the house as early as 1932 and come down to the village in 1945 merely for the purpose of executing the sale deed, it is not unreasonable to think that the first defendant's vendor, was in possession in aasertion of title of hers. Even according to the plaintiff's witnesses, the first defendant's vendor drove away the plaintiff's vendor within two months of the execution of the sale deed by her in favour of the plaintiff and then executed the sale deed in favour of the first defendant. The first defendant's vendor, in view of the fast that her son had left even before her husband's death and the plaintiff's vendor had left the village soon after, should have been in possession in her own right. This was not a case of possession among two co-owners where it could be said that the possession of one co-owner cannot be adverse to the other co-owner, unless the former's possession in openly hostile to the knowledge of the other co-owner. It was a case of a person who had no title to be in possession being in possession and therefore, the defendant's vendor's possession mist be adverse to the plaintiff's right from the date of her own possession. There fore, even applying the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1963, the defendants should be deemed to have prescribed title by adverse possession.

The question whether it was open to the lower appellate court to apply the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1963 notwithstanding the order of remand directing it to consider the question from the point of view of Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, presents no difficulty whatsoever. It was not open to the tower appellate court to do anything, but to carry out the terms of the order of remand, which it has done. Even if it considered that the order of remand made by thin court on the earlier occasion was not in accordance with law, it was not open to that Court to apply what it might consider to be the correct provision of law. The decision of the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed for the appellant was rendered on 12th December, 1968. This appeal was disposed of by the lower appellate court after remand on 26th June, 1964. On that date, the only decision that was binding on the lower appellate court was the decision of the Full Bench of this Court. Therefore, the decision of the lower appellate court was correct on the facts of the case.

But the question still remains whether this court is at present entitled to take into consideration, the later decision of the Supreme Court ad go back on its own earlier order of remand which proceeds on the basis that Article 142 of the Limitation Act of 1908 applies. It is true that against the order of remand made by this court on the earlier occasion, no appeal lay. An appeal under the Letters Patent could have been preferred to a Bench of this court and an appeal to the Supreme Court would be open, only with special leave of the court. Therefore, this is a case where there was no appeal open to the plaintiff against this Court's earlier order of emand. But even so, I do not think it is open to this court to go back on the earlier view it had taken. Right or wrong, that view has become final. S. 105(2) of Code of Civil Procedure provides.

“(2) Notwithstanding anything contalned in sub-S. (1) where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness”.

Though, in this case, it is true that an appeal does not lie, it does not mean that the appellant in this case can dispute the correctness of the earlier order of remand before this very Court. In Lalbati v. Satchitanand, it was held that if the High Court in second appeal remands a case to the lower court the matters finally disposed of by the order of remand cannot be reopened when the case comes back from the lower court on the principle of constructive res judicata. To the same effect was the earlier decision of that Court in Sunder Ahir v. Phuljharia(2). See also the decision in Kanhaiya Singh v. Bhagwat Singh(3).

In Satyadhavan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi(4) it is observed:

“As regards orders of remand it had been held that under S. 591 of the Code a party aggrieved by an order of remand could object to its validity in an appeal against the final decree, though he might have appealed against the order under S. 588 and had not done so. The second sub-section of S. 105 precludes an appellant from taking on an appeal from the final decree, any objection that might have been urged by way of appeal from an order of remand………………if an appeal lay and still the appeal from was not taken, the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal against the final decision. If, however, an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the case of ether interlocutory orders”.

Now, this may apply to a case of an appeal against the judgment of the court which made the order of remand itself. But, it does not lay down that the court which made the order of remand can itself re-consider its order of remand and hold that it was not correct. Their Lordships went on farther to say in that, case.

“There appears, to be no reason, therefore, why the appellant should be precluded from raising before this court the question about the applicability of S. 28, merely because he had not appealed from the High Court's order of remand, taking the view against him that the section was applicable”.

This merely means that the Supreme Court was competent to consider whether the view taken by the Court in its order of remand was correct or not, even though an appeal had not been taken against the order of remand. It does not amount to a decision that the High Court itself would have been competent when the matter came back to it after disposal by the lower appellate court after remand to take a view contrary to what it had taken earlier in its order of remand with respect to that point. (See A.I.R 1963 M.P 344). The decision referred to earlier also dealt with this question and these decisions have not been in any way overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court. It should, therefore, be held that it is not open to this court to go back upon the view it had taken in its earlier order of remand. On this ground also, the appellant has get to fall.

The Second Appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Leave refused.

V.C.S