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Purushothama Chettiar v. Ramanuja Padayachi And Others

Madras High Court
Mar 14, 1968
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Suit on Mortgage — Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit on a mortgage executed by the first defendant on 23 July 1951 for Rs. 6,000. The plaintiff alleged that Rs. 2,000 was paid towards the mortgage on 30 July 1953 but that the balance remained unpaid. The first defendant admitted payment of Rs. 2,000 (the sum the plaintiff admitted) and further claimed an additional payment of Rs. 2,000 on 10 March 1958 which he said was endorsed on the mortgage. The first defendant also contended that a promissory note for Rs. 1,250 (executed by him in favour of the plaintiff on 29 January 1957) was towards the interest due on the suit mortgage.

The plaintiff sued on a registration copy of the mortgage, claiming loss of the original. Both Courts below found that the pleaded loss of the original mortgage deed was not true. Both Courts also found that the defendants' claim of the second Rs. 2,000 payment was true, and that the promissory note for Rs. 1,250 had nothing to do with the suit mortgage.

The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that no secondary evidence could be admitted regarding the contents of the suit mortgage. The lower appellate Court, however, treated the first defendant's statements as an admission of execution and partly decreed the suit. The appellate Court also held that, because the first defendant's admission had to be taken as a whole, the Rs. 1,250 promissory note would also be deducted from the plaintiff's claim.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether secondary evidence could be admitted as to the contents of the (lost) suit mortgage or, alternatively, whether the first defendant's admission could be relied upon to decree the suit.
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in disallowing (deducting) the sum of Rs. 1,250 due on the promissory note executed by the first defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on a registration copy of the mortgage on the basis that the original was lost (plaintiff stated the original was lost).
  • The plaintiff alleged payment of Rs. 2,000 on 30 July 1953 and claimed the balance due on the mortgage.
  • The plaintiff maintained that the promissory note for Rs. 1,250 was not towards the mortgage (implicitly, the plaintiff disputed that the promissory note should be set off against the mortgage debt).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that the original mortgage had not been lost as pleaded and therefore the plaintiff could not succeed by producing only the registration copy of the mortgage deed.
  • They relied on Order 7 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and related procedural provisions) to argue that the plaintiff's failure to produce the original document should defeat the plaintiff's claim.
  • The first defendant asserted an additional payment of Rs. 2,000 (10 March 1958) endorsed on the mortgage and also claimed that a promissory note for Rs. 1,250 represented interest on the mortgage and should be set off.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Chuni Kuar v. Udairam (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 73 Cited among decisions bearing on admissibility of secondary evidence and admission. Listed as one of several authorities considered on the point of admitting secondary evidence when original document is not produced.
Sri Ram v. Ram Lal (1913) 11 All. L.J. 255 Cited among decisions bearing on admissibility of secondary evidence and admission. Referred to as authority considered by the lower appellate Court on secondary evidence/admission issues.
Mullu v. Deokaran (1913) 20 I.C. 955 Cited on the proposition that a suit on a lost mortgage deed could be maintained where the defendant's pleading amounted to an admission of execution. Cited as support for the proposition that a pleading by defendant that amounts to admission can permit suit on a lost deed.
Kukmatullah Khan v. Abdul Azim Khan A.I.R. 1921 All. 218 Cited among decisions bearing on admissibility of secondary evidence and admission. Included in the list of decisions considered by the lower appellate Court and this Court on the general point.
Muhammad Zafar v. Zabur Hussain A.I.R. 1926 All. 741 Cited among decisions bearing on admissibility of secondary evidence and admission. Referred to as one of the authorities on which the lower appellate Court relied.
Pyarey Lal v. Hira Dey A.I.R. 1941 All. 150 Principle that a written admission of contents of a document must be admission by the person against whom it is sought to be proved. Cited to emphasize that in the present case the admission is by the executant himself and so is directly relevant.
Hira Lal v. Ram Prasad A.I.R. 1949 All. 677 Cited among decisions bearing on admissibility of secondary evidence and admission. Included in the list of authorities considered on the point of secondary evidence and admissions.
Sundara Rajali v. Gopala Thevan A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 100 Discussed as an example where an admission relating to the contents of a lost promissory note had to be accepted in full, which would bar the suit by limitation. Distinguished: Court explained that Sundara Rajali is not contrary to the present conclusion because there the admission directly related to the contents of the lost promissory note and could not be divorced from the rest of the admission.
Ananta Raghuram v. Raja Bommadevara A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 418 Cited for the proposition that a plea of ignorance of execution amounts to a denial of execution (i.e., not an admission). Distinguished: not a case of admission; therefore not applicable to facts of the present case where there was an admission by the executant.
Brahmananda v. Kunduri Charas Das A.I.R. 1939 Orissa 126 Examined in relation to cases involving minors and admissions by other parties; principle about third parties not being bound by admissions of executants. Distinguished: relevant circumstances (minors and third parties) differ from the present case where executant admitted execution and other defendants did not contest execution.
Gopal v. Vishnu I.L.R. (1898) 22 Bom. 971 Cited regarding consequences of non-production of a document by plaintiff under procedural rules. Used to show that non-production does not necessarily lead to dismissal of suit; discussed with Order 7 rules.
Lakhpat Pathak v. Chiran Pathak A.I.R. 1937 All. 55 Cited regarding procedural consequences where plaintiff fails to produce a document required to be annexed to plaint. Referred to support the view that failure to produce a document does not automatically dismiss the suit; rather the admission of secondary evidence is governed by procedural provisions.
Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v. Mulji Haridas (1915) I.L.R. 39 Bom. 399; L.R. 42 I.A. 103; 28 M.L.J. 589 (Privy Council) Principle that an admission in pleading cannot be dissected; if made subject to a condition it must be accepted subject to the condition or rejected entirely. Applied to hold the defendants' admission regarding the additional Rs. 2,000 payment must be accepted (admissions must be taken as a whole) but the Court limited that rule to admissions relating to contents of the lost document and not to unrelated matters (e.g., the promissory note).
Ram Saran Das v. Tulsi Ram A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 417 Cited as a case where secondary evidence of a promissory note was refused because the note was not proved lost. Distinguished: the Bench there did not consider the effect of a defendant's admission under Section 65(b), so it does not determine the present question concerning admissions enabling secondary evidence.
Bonnerji v. Sitanath Das (1922) 42 M.L.J. 403; L.R. 46 Held that where a proper case for admission of secondary evidence was not made out, it is not permissible to go to other evidence to indicate the contents of the written document. Distinguished: the issue of a defendant's admission under Section 65(b) did not arise in Bonnerji and therefore the decision does not govern the present case where admission did arise.
Pearey Lal v. Hira Dey A.I.R. 1941 All. 150 Principle that written admission of contents must be by the person against whom it is sought to be proved (not by another person). Applied to note that in the present case the admission is by the executant himself, making it directly relevant under Section 65(b).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court limited the contested issues to two factual/legal questions: admissibility of secondary evidence (or reliance on the defendant's admission) and whether the Rs. 1,250 promissory note should be deducted from the plaintiff's claim by reason of the defendant's admission.

Procedural provisions were considered first. The defendants relied on Order 7 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure to argue that the plaintiff's failure to produce the original mortgage should defeat the suit. The Court explained that Order 7 Rule 18 — not Order 7 Rule 14 itself — prescribes the consequence of non-production: a document not produced or entered as required "shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit." The Court emphasized that this provision does not mandate dismissal of the suit; it only regulates admissibility of the document at trial. The Court cited authorities (Gopal v. Vishnu; Lakhpat Pathak v. Chiran Pathak) to that effect.

Turning to the law of evidence, the Court relied on Section 65 of the Evidence Act. In particular, Section 65(b) allows secondary evidence of the contents of a document when "the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative-in-interest." The Court found that the first defendant's statement amounted to an admission of the execution of the mortgage deed and of the consideration, and the plaintiff admitted the payment of Rs. 2,000. Accordingly, secondary evidence (or reliance on the admission) as to the mortgage deed's contents was permissible under Section 65(b).

On the specific question of the additional Rs. 2,000 which the defendants alleged was endorsed on the suit mortgage, the Court held that this too must be credited to the defendants because admissions in pleading must be taken as a whole (citing the Privy Council decision in Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v. Mulji Haridas). The Court explained that an admission in pleading cannot be dissected and accepted in part while rejecting other parts — it must either be accepted complete or rejected complete — when the admission relates to the contents of the lost document.

However, the Court drew a critical distinction as to the promissory note for Rs. 1,250. The Court observed that the defendant did not say that payment represented by that promissory note was endorsed on the suit mortgage. Therefore the promissory note and the payment represented by it were matters outside the contents of the lost mortgage deed. Because the promissory note did not relate to the contents of the lost mortgage, Section 65(b) (and the rule about taking admissions as a whole in relation to the lost document) was not applicable to it. Section 91 of the Evidence Act (submission of writings to prove transactions) was held to have no application to this point. Evidence concerning the promissory note could be received and assessed on its merits; both Courts below had in fact found on the evidence that the promissory note had nothing to do with the mortgage.

The lower appellate Court's error, according to the present Court, was to apply the rule that an admission must be accepted or rejected as a whole (derived from Motabhoy) beyond its proper scope — i.e., to matters that were not admissions about the contents of the lost document. That led the appellate Court to disallow the plaintiff's claim to the extent of Rs. 1,250 despite its own finding (and the trial Court's finding) that the promissory note did not relate to the mortgage. The present Court held that the "accept or reject as a whole" rule applies only to admissions as to the contents of the document itself and not to collateral matter external to the document.

The Court reviewed and distinguished several authorities relied upon by the defendants and the lower appellate Court (including Sundara Rajali v. Gopala Thevan, Ram Saran Das, Bonnerji v. Sitanath Das and Brahmananda v. Kunduri Charan Das), explaining why those decisions do not support the proposition that a suit cannot be maintained on a lost mortgage where the executant has admitted execution.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Second Appeal is allowed in part with reference to the sum of Rs. 1,250 alone.

The Court held that:

  • The lower appellate Court was correct insofar as it decreed the suit on the basis that the first defendant's admission permitted reliance on secondary evidence (or acceptance of the admission) concerning the contents of the lost mortgage deed under Section 65(b) of the Evidence Act.
  • However, the lower appellate Court was incorrect in disallowing the plaintiff's claim by deducting Rs. 1,250 (the promissory note) on the basis that the admission had to be accepted as a whole; the rule about accepting or rejecting an admission as a whole applies only to admissions relating to the contents of the lost document and not to matters outside it.
  • Accordingly, the portion of the decree disallowing Rs. 1,250 is set aside: the Second Appeal is allowed in part as to that sum. The memorandum of cross-objections filed by the defendants is dismissed.

Direct consequences expressly stated in the opinion:

  • The Second Appeal is allowed in part with reference to Rs. 1,250.
  • The memorandum of cross-objections by the defendants is dismissed.
  • The parties will bear their own costs.
  • Time for payment: six months.
  • No leave (i.e., no leave to appeal further was granted in the terms used).

The opinion does not state any broader binding precedent beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and the cited authorities to the specific facts; its direct effect is the alteration of the decree to restore the plaintiff's claim insofar as the Rs. 1,250 promissory note was wrongly disallowed by the lower appellate Court.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of a suit on a mortgage. The suit mortgage, was executed by the first defendant on 23rd July, 1951 for Rs. 6,000. The plaintiff alleged that the first defendant paid Rs. 2,000 towards the mortgage on 30th July 1953, but had not paid the balance. The first defendant claimed that in addition to the sum of Rs. 2,000 mentioned by the plaintiff, he had made another payment of Rs. 2,000 on 10th March, 1958 and had endorsed it on the mortgage. He also contended that a promissory note for Rs. 1,250 executed by him in favour of the plaintiff on 29th January, 1957 was also towards the interest due on the suit mortgage. The plaintiff filed the suit on a registration copy of the mortgage alleging that he had lost the original. Both the Courts below have found that the loss pleaded is not true. They have also found that the second payment of Rs. 2,000 pleaded by the first defendant was true and that the promissory note for Rs. 1,250 had nothing to do with the suit mortgage. But the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that no secondary evidence could be let in regarding the contents of the suit mortgage. The lower appellate Court on the other hand has taken the view that the statement of the first defendant amounted to an admission of the execution of the mortgage and decreed the suit in part. But in respect of the amount due on the promissory note, it has taken the view that the admission of the first defendant has to be taken as a whole and therefore, this sum of Rs. 1,250 will also have to be deducted from the plaintiff's claim.

2. The plaintiff has filed an appeal and the defendants have filed a memorandum of cross objections in respect of the portion decreed against them. All these findings being findings of fact, only two questions arise for decision in this case, (1) Whether secondary evidence could be let in regarding the contents of the suit mortgage or at least the admission of the first defendant could be relied upon for purposes of decreeing the suit and (2) Whether the lower appellate Court was correct in disallowing the sum of Rs. 1,250 due on the promissory note executed by the first defendant. As far as the decreeing of the suit is concerned, I think the lower appellate Court is correct. It has considered a number of decisions bearing on the point, that is, in Chuni Kuar v. Udairam (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 73; Sri Ram v. Ram Lal (1913)11 All.L.J. 255 Mullu v. Deokaran (1913) I.C. 955; Kukmatullah Khan v. Abdul Azim Khan A.I.R. 1921 All. 218, Muhammad Zafar v. Zabur Hussain A.I.R. 1926 All. 741, Pyarey Lal v. Hira Deir A.I.R. 1941 All. 150 Hira Lal v. Ram Prasad A.I.R. 1949 All. 677; Sundara Rajali v. Gopala Thevan A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 100; Ananta Raguram v. Raja Bemmadevara A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 418, Brahmananda v. Kunduri Charas Das A.I.R. 1939 Orissa 126. The contention on behalf of the defendants is that as the original mortgage have been held by the Courts below not to have been lost, the plaintiff cannot succeed in the suit by producing the registration copy of the mortgage deed alone. Order 7 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure is relied upon for this purpose. I do not accept the contention on behalf of the defendants that the failure of the plaintiff to produce the document in his possession or authority necessarily means that his suit should be dismissed. The provision regarding the consequence of non-production by the plaintiff of a document in his possession as required under Order 7, Rule 14, is provided in Order 7, Rule 18, which provides that a document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint and which is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. It does not provide for the dismissal of the suit itself. See the decisions in Gopal v. Vishnu I.L.R. (1898) 22 Bom. 971, Lakhpat Pathak v. Chiran Phathak A.I.R. 1937 All. 55. Under Section 65 of the Evidence Act secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases:

(b) When the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative-in-interest.

In this case the first defendant's admission amounts to an admission of the execution of the document, and the consideration for the document, as well as the payment of Rs. 2,000 is admitted by the plaintiff. As regards the payment of another sum of Rs. 2,000 pleaded by the defendants, but not admitted by the plaintiff, that also would have to be given credit to, because the admission of the defendants must be taken as a whole and it cannot be accepted in part or rejected in part. See the decision of the Privy Council in Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v. Mulji Haridas (1915) I.L.R. 39 Bom. 399 : L.R. 42 I.A. 103 : 28 M.L.J. 589 where their Lordships have held as follows:

It is permissible for a tribunal to accept part and reject the rest of any witnesses testimony. But an admission in pleading cannot be so dissected and if it is made subject to a condition it must either be accepted subject to the condition or not accepted at all.

Therefore, as far as the payment of Rs. 2,000 pleaded by the defendants is concerned, which they say was endorsed on the suit mortgage, that has got to be accepted, because the admission must be taken as a whole or rejected as a whole. But the admission only as far as it relates to what is admitted to be found on the lost mortgage deed is relevant for the purposes of Section 65. His contention regarding the promissory note has nothing to do with the contents of the mortgage deed. He did not say that that payment was endorsed on the suit mortgage. So in seeking to give evidence about that promissory note, the plaintiff is not seeking to give evidence about the contents of the suit mortgage. He is only seeking to give evidence about something which is outside the suit mortgage. It is, therefore, not a case of his seeking to give secondary evidence of the contents of a document which has been lost. He need not therefore rely upon Section 65 (b) of the Evidence Act. Section 91 of the Evidence Act can have no application to the facts of the case. The evidence on this point on the side of the plaintiffs as well as on the side of defendants is admissible and a conclusion can be arrived at on the basis of that evidence. Both the Courts below having found that the promissory note had nothing' to do with the interest due on the suit mortgage, the lower appellate Court was not right in holding that it was compelled by authority to hold that because the first defendant's admission must be either accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, it was bound to accept the defendants' story regarding the promissory note notwithstanding its finding on the evidence that that story was not true. It follows therefore, that the lower appellate Court was not right in disallowing the plaintiff's claim to the extent of Rs. 1,250 represented by the promissory note by the defendants in his favour.

3. The decision in Sundara Rajali v. Gopala Thevan A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 100. I.L.R. (1915) 39 Bom. 399, relied upon by the lower appellate Court as well as by the defendants in this case is really not against this, conclusion if it is properly considered. There the defendant admitted the execution of the promissory note. Both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that there was a payment of Rs. 35 in July 1924. But while the plaintiff claimed that there. was another payment in May, 1926 or thereabouts, an allegation which was necessary in order to enable the plaintiff to save limitation, the defendant contended that he paid Rs. 50 about the end of September, 1924 which payment was endorsed on the promissory note. The promissory note in that case having been lost, the defendant's admission had to be accepted in full or rejected in full. If the defendant's admission was accepted in full, the suit would be barred by limitation. In the circumstances, the Court could not consider any other evidence and hold that the payment in May 1926 pleaded by the plaintiff could be true. The admission then related to the contents of the lost document and no evidence apart from the admission of the defendant could be received. The ratio of the decision is found in the following sentence in that decision.

To treat the admission of defendant 1 that he and defendant 2 executed the pronote but to divorce it from his statement that the note was discharged except for Rs. 10 that this payment was endorsed and that the suit was time bared would appear to contravene the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v. Mulji Haridas (1915) L.R. 42 I.A. 103 : 28 M.L.J. 589.

Therefore, this decision is no authority for the contention urged on behalf of the defendants that because the mortgage deed has been lost, no suit can be maintained on the mortgage. The sentence in that judgment where the learned Judge remarks that the defendants did not admit that the lost pronote was the pronote, as it was described to have been at the time of its loss by the plaintiff was a reference to the fact that the admission by the defendants was only of a pronote with an endorsement on it, which would not save limitation and not an admission of a pronote with an endorsement on it which would save limitation. The decision in Ram Saran Das v. Tulsi Ram A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 417, relied upon by the learned Judge of this Court who decided the case in Sundara Rajali v. Gopala Thevan A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 100. I.L.R. (1915) 39 Bom. 399, cannot also help the defendants in this case. It is true that in that case, the Bench held that the promissory note on which the suit was based was not proved to have been lost and that secondary evidence of its existence and contents could not be given in spite of the admission of the defendant about the execution of the promissory note. But the Bench has not considered the effect of the admission made by the defendant in that case and how far that admission could help the plaintiff in that case under Section 65 (b) of the Evidence Act. The decision of the Privy Council in Bonnerji v. Sitanath Das (1922) 42 M.L.J. 403 : L.R.46, is not relevant for the purpose of this case. What their Lordships have held there is that where a proper case for admission of secondary evidence of the contents of a document had not been made out and objection had been taken to the reception of such secondary evidence, it is not permissible to go to other evidence for the purpose of indicating the contents of the written document. There again the question of admission on the part of the defendant which would enable the plaintiff to give secondary evidence under the provisions of Section 65 (b) of the Evidence Act did not arise and therefore has not been considered. As I already mentioned, the evidence regarding the promissory note is not secondary evidence. It does not relate to the contents of the lost document. The decision in Brahmananda v. Kanduri Charan Das cannot also help the defendants, because in that case apart from the executants, who admitted the execution of the bond, the minor sons of one of the executants were parties to the suit who did not admit the mortgage and put the mortgagee to proof of the mortgage and the payment of consideration thereunder and that is why it was held that in order to pass a mortgage decree against the minors it was absolutely necessary that the execution and attestation of the mortgage should be proved, because where a party to an attested document admits its execution a third party is not bound by such admission. The decision in Ananta Raghuram v. Raja Bommadevara A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 418, was a case where the defendants pleaded ignorance of the execution of the document for all intents and purposes and that was held a denial of the execution of the document. That case also does not, thus, deal with a case of admission. I may also refer to the decision in Mull v. Deokaran (1913) 20 I.C. 955, where it was held that a suit on the basis of a lost mortgage deed could be maintained where the defendant pleaded that the original was not lost, but had been suppressed as it contained an endorsement of payment on the ground that the pleading of the defendant amounted to an admission of execution of the document. The case in Pearey Lal v. Hira Dey A.I.R. 1941 All. 150, was one where it was held that the written admission of the contents of the document, sought to be produced, has to be the admission of the person against whom it is sought to be proved, and not by any other person. In the present case the admission is by the executant himself. The other defendants have not questioned the execution at all. It is not necessary to refer at length to the other decisions considered by the lower appellate Court. The principle that emerges from a consideration of these decisions and the relevant provision of law is that where a document on the basis of which a suit is laid has been lost or is not in the possession of the plaintiff, the various clauses of Section 65 of the Evidence Act would come into play. But even where those conditions do not apply, if the condition or the contents of the original have been admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest, secondary evidence could be given about the contents of the document and the admission of the person against whom it is proved can itself be relied upon for holding that the facts so admitted have been proved. The admission has to be accepted or rejected as a whole, but that applies only to the contents of the document itself and not to matters which are not contained in that document though it might relate to or be connected with the document which is said to have been lost. There is no rule of law that if a plaintiff, who has a document in his possession, does not produce it, the suit has necessarily to be dismissed. It follows, therefore, in this case that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in his appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections filed by the defendants has to be dismissed.

4. The Second Appeal is allowed in part with reference to the sum of Rs. 1,250 alone and the Memorandum of cross-objections is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. Time for payment 6 months. No leave.