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State Of Madras
Summary of the Opinion delivered by Sadasivam, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Madras, represented by the Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Town Planning Scheme, Coimbatore, preferred appeals against a common order of the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, on C.C. Nos. 141 to 147 of 1960. Those matters arose from references made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (the Act) by the Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer.
The lands concerned form one continuous block on Power House Road in a developed residential locality and were acquired for widening an existing 75 ft road to 100 ft. Buildings were present only on the lands involved in App. Nos. 386 and 391 of 1962; the tenant on App. 386 had received compensation for the superstructure. The principal controversies in the appeals concerned (a) the valuation of the sites (site value as building sites), (b) valuation of buildings and certain structures, (c) valuation of a coconut tree in App. No. 393 of 1962, and (d) whether the trial court could award compensation in excess of amounts claimed in the claimants' counter‑statements in the reference under Section 18.
Legal Issues Presented
- What was the correct market value of the acquired sites as on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act (25th August 1959)?
- Whether the coconut tree on one acquired site could be valued as a fruit‑bearing tree (capitalised income over 20 years) in addition to valuing the site as a house site?
- Whether, in a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the court has jurisdiction to award compensation in excess of the amount claimed by the claimant pursuant to the notice under Section 9 (i.e., in excess of the amounts claimed in the counter‑statement filed before the Collector)?
- Whether the decrees were correctly drafted to reflect the court's orders (in particular, whether the decrees incorrectly described awarded sums as amounts in addition to those previously awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Government Pleader's Arguments
- The learned Government Pleader contended that once a site is valued as a house site, fruit‑bearing trees (like a coconut tree) should not be separately valued on the basis of yield because that would duplicate compensation; at most the tree could be valued as timber or fuel. He relied on precedent authorities to this effect and sought restoration of the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation of Rs. 45 for the coconut tree.
- With respect to the quantum awarded in the references, the Government Pleader contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant anything more than the amounts claimed by the claimants in their counter‑statements, and that enhancements should be confined to the amounts actually claimed before the Collector (i.e., the amounts in the counter‑statements).
Claimants' Arguments
- The claimants (through their advocate) argued that the court has jurisdiction in a reference under Section 18 to award compensation determined on the relevant statutory provisions irrespective of the fact that the claim pleaded a lesser amount. This contention was noted by the court as being unsupported by authority.
- The claimants' counter‑statements set out specific claimed values (for example, several claimants stated the site was worth Rs. 1000 per cent and then limited their monetary prayer to a lower 'modest' sum). These pleaded figures were central to the dispute over whether the court could award amounts in excess of those pleaded.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shanmugham Velayudha v. Collector of Tanjore, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 945 | Authority noting that where a coconut tree is valued on the basis of its yield, the period for computation should be taken as ten years (not 20), and that a land should not be valued both as a building site and simultaneously on the footing of the produce of fruit trees. | The court relied on this authority to support the principle that valuing a site as a house site and separately valuing fruit‑yielding trees on the same footing would duplicate compensation; the court therefore held the trial judge erred in capitalising twenty years' yield and restored the Land Acquisition Officer's lower valuation for the coconut tree. |
| Collector of Thana v. Chaturbhuj, A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 365 | Held that if a court ascribes a fictitious/inclusive value to property on account of potentiality for building purposes, nothing additional can be allowed for trees (i.e., the inclusive rate displaces separate valuation for trees). | The court cited this decision to reinforce the principle that trees should not be separately awarded as fruit‑bearing trees where the site has been valued as a house site; it used the authority to justify setting aside the judge's large award for the coconut tree. |
| Thareesamma v. Deputy Collector, 45 M.L.J. 339 | Holds that claimants cannot claim separate value for trees as fruit‑bearing where the land has been treated/valued as a building site and the compensation awarded is inclusive. | The court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that the trial judge's separate capitalisation of the coconut tree's yield (for 20 years) was untenable when the land had been valued as building sites; the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation was restored. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds through discrete issues as follows:
-
Valuation of land:
The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) treated the sites as building sites and relied on certain sale deeds (one marked Ex. B.3) to value the lands at 72 pies per sq. ft. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge examined oral and documentary evidence, including more proximate and contemporaneous sale transactions (Ex. A‑2, A‑3, A‑4 and an award Ex. A.1), and fixed the value at Rs. 1,000 per cent (Rs. 2.30 per sq. ft.) as on the date of the Section 4(1) notification (25th August 1959). The court found no sufficient ground to differ from the trial judge's valuation: nearer and more contemporaneous transactions and an earlier award supported the figure adopted by the judge.
-
Relevance and weight of sale deeds and awards:
The court analysed the provenance and relevance of relied-upon sale deeds: Ex. B.3 related to land in T.S. 1268 at a furlong's distance and dated earlier, so it was of limited guidance. By contrast, Ex. A.1 (an award dated 14th March 1959) related to lands nearer the acquired sites and showed valuation at Rs. 1.34 per sq. ft. The court accepted that sale deeds executed a few months after the Section 4 notification (Ex. A.2 and A.4) were relevant unless shown to be bona fide transactions brought about for the acquisition; no such attack was made, and these deeds directly abutted or were close to the acquired sites and supported the judge's valuation of Rs. 1,000 per cent.
-
Valuation of the coconut tree (App. No. 393 of 1962):
The learned judge had capitalised the net income from the coconut tree for 20 years, fixing compensation at Rs. 252.40. The Government Pleader relied on the cited authorities (see Table of Precedents) and argued that if a site is valued as a house site, the coconut tree should not be separately valued as a fruit‑bearing tree, for that would duplicate compensation. Applying the cited authorities and the principle against double valuation, the court held the trial judge erred in awarding Rs. 252.40; it restored the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation of Rs. 45 for the coconut tree. Accordingly, App. No. 393 of 1962 was allowed only insofar as it challenged the higher valuation for the coconut tree and was otherwise dismissed. Costs were apportioned in proportion to success.
-
Valuation of buildings and rented income (App. Nos. 386 and 391 of 1962):
The court reviewed evidence of rents and tax receipts (e.g., Ex. A.6 and A.7), and the trial judge's approach of capitalising annual net income (25 years purchase, premised on gilt‑edged securities yielding 4% at the notification date) in arriving at values for the site with building. Certain defence evidence (R.W.2 Mathai) regarding construction cost was found unreliable because the witness could not recollect rates in cross‑examination and the Government Pleader did not press that evidence. The judge's findings on evidential matters and his calculations of compensation for demolished structures and consequential damages were described in the opinion; the court did not disturb the judge's valuations on these points except where other legal principles (e.g., claim limits) applied.
-
Decrees inconsistent with orders:
The court observed that the decrees in O.P. 196 and 202 of 1960 (which underlie App. Nos. 391 and 386 of 1962) were not drafted in conformity with the trial judge's order; they incorrectly stated awarded sums as 'enhanced' amounts in addition to the amounts awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The court noted the decrees should have been drafted to reflect the order accurately.
-
Jurisdiction to award amounts in excess of claimed sums (statutory construction):
The court examined Sections 9, 18, 25 and 53 of the Act. It quoted Section 25 (sub‑clauses (1), (2) and (3)) and explained their effect:
- Under Section 25(1) the court's award shall not exceed the amount claimed pursuant to the notice under Section 9 (nor be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11) when the applicant has made a claim.
- Section 25(2) restricts awards where the applicant refused or omitted without sufficient reason to make a claim (award in no case to exceed Collector's award).
- Section 25(3) permits the court, when satisfied of sufficient reason for omission to claim, to award an amount not less than and possibly exceeding the Collector's award.
The court further observed that Section 53 makes the Civil Procedure Code applicable to proceedings under the Act so far as not inconsistent; while that permits amendment of pleadings under ordinary procedural law, allowing an amendment that increases the claim beyond what was claimed before the Collector would be inconsistent with Section 25(1). The court analogised the rule to ordinary suits ( plaintiff cannot get a decree for more than claimed unless amended) and concluded the trial court had no jurisdiction to award more than the amounts claimed in the counter‑statements when those claims had been made pursuant to the Section 9 notice. Therefore, enhancements awarded by the trial court in App. Nos. 386 and 391 were to be confined to the amounts actually claimed in the counter‑statements filed in the lower court.
-
Disposition as to contested point of excess awards:
The court expressly rejected the claimants' argument (unsupported by authority) that the court could award what it deems appropriate irrespective of the pleaded claim. It upheld the Government Pleader's objection and ordered that enhancements be reduced to the amounts claimed in the counter‑statements; otherwise the appeals were dismissed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- App. No. 393 of 1962: Allowed insofar as the trial judge's higher valuation of the coconut tree (Rs. 252.40) was set aside; the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation of Rs. 45 for the coconut tree is restored. In other respects App. No. 393 is dismissed. Parties entitled to costs in proportion to their success.
- App. Nos. 387, 389, 407 and 408 of 1962: Dismissed with costs (the opinion states "with costs in A.S 389 of 1962").
- App. Nos. 386 and 391 of 1962: The appeals are allowed to the extent that the court's enhancements are to be reduced and confined to the amounts claimed by the claimants in their counter‑statements filed before the Collector; in other respects those appeals are dismissed. The parties are entitled to costs in proportion to their success.
Implications:
The direct effects of the decision are:
- The trial judge's valuation of the acquired sites at Rs. 1,000 per cent (as on 25th August 1959) is affirmed.
- The award for the coconut tree in App. No. 393 is reduced to the Land Acquisition Officer's valuation of Rs. 45 (the higher award based on a 20‑year capitalisation was set aside).
- The court ruled that in a reference under Section 18 of the Act the court cannot award an amount exceeding what the claimant has claimed pursuant to the Section 9 notice (i.e., beyond the amounts stated in the counter‑statement filed before the Collector), and accordingly reduced enhancements to the pleaded amounts in App. Nos. 386 and 391.
- Decrees must be drafted to conform to the court's orders; where they do not, they should be corrected to reflect the order accurately.
The opinion does not announce a novel statutory principle beyond its interpretation and application of Sections 9, 18, 25 and 53 of the Land Acquisition Act to the facts of these references; its central practical ruling confines the court's power to award amounts to the sums claimed pursuant to the Section 9 notice (subject to the limited powers in Section 25(2) and (3)).
(Signed) V.C.S — as recorded in the opinion
(Delivered by Sadasivam, J.)
The State of Madras represented by the Special Tashildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Town Planning Scheme Coimbatore has preferred these appeals against the common order passed by the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Choimbatore; on C.C Nos. 141 to 147 of 1960, on references made under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the Special Tashil-dar and Land Acquisition Officer, Town Planning Scheme, Coimbatore. The lands concerned in these cases form one continuous block and they are situate in an important, busy and well developed residential locality in Power House Road and the object of the acquisition was to widen the existing 75 ft broad road into a 100 ft broad road. There were buildings only in the lands concerned in App. 391 and 386 of 1962. The tenant who had put up a construction on the land concerned in App. 386 of 1962 has received compensation for the superstructure. The claim of the owner of that land has rightly been considered only on the same footing as the claim of the owners of the other lands on which there were no buildings.
The land Acquisition Officer has treated the sites acquired as building sites for the purpose of valuation. The Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was made on 25th August 1959. The Land Acquisition Officer relied on two sale deeds, a registration copy of one of which alone has been marked as Ex. B. 3 in this case and valued the lands as on the date of the notification at 72 p. per sq ft. on the strength of the said sale deeds. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has, on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence in the case, fixed fhe value of the land as on the date of the said notification at Rs. 1000 per cent or Rs. 2-30 per sq. ft. He has considered this aspect of the case in detail in paragraphs 11 to 14 of his common order and we see no sufficient ground to differ from him on the question of the valuation of the land.
The registration copy of the sale deed marked as Ex. B. 3 in the case and the other sale deed relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer relate to portions of land in T.S No 1268 situate at a distance of a furlong from the acquired sites and the notification in this case was made much later en 25th August 1959. Thus the sale price mentioned in Ex. B. 3 in respect of a land at a distance of a furlong and at a very much earlier period cannot afford a real guidance to value the acquired sites as on the date of the notification On 14th March 1959, that is much earlier to the notification in this case, an award 1 of 1959 was passed by the Special Tashildar, Coimbatore, a copy of which has been marked as Ex. A. 1. The award relates to the acquisition of T.S 1143 and 1144 situate in No 3. Street, Gandhipuram. T.S 1143 and 1144 are much nearer to the acquired sites than T.S 1268. It is clear from Ex A. 1, that the sites have been acquired at the rate of Rs. 1.34 p. per sq. ft. The valuation adopted in Ex. A. 1 is based on a sale deed in respect of a land in T.S 1066 dated 28th August 1958, that is nearly a year prior to the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act in this case.
The claimants rely on 3 sale deeds, Ex. A-2 to A-4. Ex. A-3 dated 9th November, 1957 is a sale deed in respect of an extent of 1 1/2 cents of land in T.S 1125 which is almost adjacent to the land concerned in App. No. 386 of 1962 and it abuts the Power House Road. Toe sale price of Rs. 1,000 in that document works out to Rs. 666.66, per cent. R.W 1 Stanls Soundararaja Udayar, Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, admitted that the market price of the sites in the locality was more in 1959 and 1960 than in 1957 and 1958. Ex. A-2 and A-4 are registration copies of sale deeds executed on 9th March, 1960 and 10th February, 1960 in respect of 5 1/2 and 7 cents of lands in T.S No. 1259 and 1124 respectively for Rs. 7,500 each. The value of one cent of land works out to Rs. 1363-62 according to Ex. A-2 and Rs. 1071-43, according to Ex. A-4. It is true the sale deeds are a few months after the date of the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act, but prior to the notification under S. 6 of the Act made in 1960. Even the sale transactions subsequent to the notification under S, 4 (1) of the Act are relevant and they cannot oe ignored. It is true that if the subsequent transactions are net bona fide and they have been brought about for the purpose of the acquisition proceedings, they will have no value. But no such attack has been made against the originals of Ex. A-2 and A-4. It is also true that if by reason of the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act, the value of the lands in the neighbourhood has increased, it should be taken into account in considering the value adopted in the subsequent transactions. It should be noted that the acquisition of an extent of 9452 sq ft. for the purpose of widening the Power House Road in one part it cannot affect the value of the sites in the neighbourhood. The sale deeds under the originals of fix. A-2 and A-4 have come into existence within a few months of the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act. The land sold under the original of Ex. A-2 abuts the Power House road and is just opposite to the sites acquired in this case. The land sold under the original of Ex. A-4 is 100 yards from the site concerned in App. No. 391 of 1962. It is true there is a building with basement in the property sold under Ex. A-2. P.W 1, Mariappa Mudaliar, the vendee under Ex. A-2, has given evidence that the building is only on a small portion of the site and the basement is not worth anything. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has observed that even if the vaiue of the basement is fixed at the maximum amount of Rs. 1,000 the value of the land alone would work cut to Rs. 1,000 per cent. There was a shed on the land sold under the original of Ex. A-4. P.W 2, Manjappa Gounder, the claimant in App. No. 391 of 1962, has stated that it is only a Mangalore tiled shed on polls and the value of the same would not exceed Rs. 500. Thus, excluding the value of the shed, the value of the land works out to Rs. 1,000 per cent. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has rightly found on the evidence adduced in this case that the value of the acquired sites as on the date of the notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act was Rs. 1,000 per cent.
We have already referred to the fact that only in App. No. 386 and 391 of 1962 the valuation of buildings has to be considered. The value of site is the only question raised in the other appeals with the qualification that in App. No. 393 of 1962, there is a further question about the valuation of a coconut tree. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has in paragraph 29 of his judgment made an elaborate calculation of the not income from the coconut tree for a period of twenty years and fixed the value of the cocomat tree at Rs. 252-40. The learned Government Pleader referred to the decision in Shanmugham Velayudha v. Collector of Tanjore A.I.R 1926 Mad. 945, where it hat been pointed out that if a coconut tree is to be valued on the basis of its yield, the period for computation of value should be taken as only ten years. The more important contention urged by the learned Government Pleader is that once a site has been valued as a house site, the coconut tree should not have been valued again on the basis of its being a yielding tree. This contention is well founded as such mode of valuation will really result in duplication of values. If the land had been valued as an agricultural land, it is reasonable to ascertain the capita-Used income of fruit bearing trees. But, if the site is valued as a house site, the tree could not be valued on the basis that it is a fruit yielding tree and at best, the value of the tree as timber or fuel alone could be taken into account. In the decision above cited, it has been held that the land acquired under the Act should not be valued as a building site and at the same time valued upon the footing of the produce of fruit of the trees remaining there. In Collector of Thana v. Chaturbhuj A.I.R 1926 Bom. 365, it has been held that if the court puts a fictitious value on the property, on account of its so called potentiality for building purposes, then that is an inclusive rate and nothing can he allowed in addition for the trees. In Thareesamma v. Deputy Collector 45 M.L.J 339 the contention of Mr. C.V Ananthakrishna Aiyar for the appellants (claimants) that they were entitled to the value of the trees on the land on the footing that they were fruit hearing trees was rejected as untenable because the basis of the claim was that the lands were valued as buildings sites and the claimants could not alsoghave the advantage which they would be entitled to only if the lands had been dealt with as agricultural lands. It is pointed out in the decision that what has been awarded to the claimants is an inclusive priee and that they cannot be heard to say that the trees should be separately assessed as fruit bearing trees. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has erred in valuing the coconut trees as a fruit bearing tree by computing the income for 20 years and awarding compensation of Rs. 252—40 in respect of the same. The learned Government Pleader has no objection to the value of the tree fixed by the Land Acquisition officer at Rs. 45. Therefore the order of the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge fixing compensation for the cocoanut tree at Rs. 252—40 is set aside and that part of the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer fixing the value of the tree at Rs. 45 is restored. For the foregoing resons, App. N. 393 of 1962 is allowed in reaspect of the difference in valuation as regards the cocoanut tree, but is|otherwise dismissed. The appellant and the respondent in the appeal are entitled to costs in proportion to their success.
The other appeals, App. 387, 389, 407 and 408 of 1962. in which the question of valuation of the land is the only question involved, are dismissed with costs in A.S 389 of 1962.
App. 391 of 1962 is against the award in, O.P 196 of 1960. relating to compensation case No. 141 of 1960. The buildings on the acquired site which were demolished consisted of a laundry, a cycle shed and mutton stall which were leased on a monthly rent of Rs. 15, 20 and 10 respectively. There is the evidence of P.W 2, Nanjappa and the evidence of P.W 5, Gopinath, who is a tenant of the fourth room south of the three rooms which were demolished by reason of the acquisition. In fact, the claimant has asked for compensatien for the damage to the wall of the room occupied by P.W 5, Gopinath. The tax receipts, Ex. A 6 and A, 7, have also been produced and the half yearly tax of Rs. 47-39 supports the claim of P.W 2 that he was getting rent of Rs. 45 per month. In fact, there is no contra evidence in this case. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has taken the market value of the site with the building at 25 years annual net income on the ground that the guilt edged securities fetch 4 percent per annum on the date of the notification, 25th August 1959. On this basis he arrived at the value of Rs. 10005—50 and adding a sum of Rs. 500 as compensation for the damages to the wall of the fourth room and the demolition of the latrine (partly used for the three rooms that were demolished and partly used for the other portion of the building of the claimant, P.W.2, Nanjappa which have net been acquired), be found that P.W.2, was entitled to Rs. 10505— 50.
It is not possible to rely on the evidence of R.W.2, Mathai, Minor Irrigation Officer, to find out the value of the building on the basis of the cost of construction of such buildings. It is true R.W-2 Mathai stated that the buildings are Katcha and not pucca buildings. But in cross examination he has stated that he does not recollect the rate per cubic feet. In fact, the learned Government Pleader did not attempt to rely on the evidence of R.W.2
Even in respect of the value of the building in App. No. 386 of 1962, the evidence of P.W 3, Raju, the husband of the claimant in O.P 202 of 1960, is that one Room vat let at Rs. 20 per month and two rooms at Rs. 15 each and a bunk at Rs. 10, and thus the buildings were fecthing Rs. 60 per month. P.W 7. Raju a tenant in respect of one of the five rooms has also been examined to corroborate the evidence of P.W 3. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has found that the value of the land acquired in T.S 1006/1 will be Rs. 12016 and he has separately valued the land in T.S 1007/1 as a vacant site. The evidence of R.W 2, is that the buildings were of brick and lime mortar and plastered with cement mortar. We need not repeat the comments made by us with regard to the evidence of R.W 2.
In both O.P 196 and 202 of 1960 against which App. Nos. 391 and 386 of 1962 have been filed, the decrees are not in conformity with the order of the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge. In the decrees, the amount which the claimants are entitled to get have been wrongly mentioned as the ‘enhanced’ amounts to which they are entitled in addition to the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The decree shouid have been drafted in accordance with the order.
The main substantial question argued in both these appeals, App. 386 and 391 of 1962, is whether the claimants in these appeals are entitled to the amounts awarded as compensation whinh are in excess of the amounts claimed by them in the counter statement filed by them in the lower court in the reference under S. 18 of the Act. Thus in paragraph 2 of the counter statement filed by the claimant in C. C. 147 of 1960 in O.P 202 of 1960 on the file of the lower court, she has stated that the site acquired from her was worth at least Rs. 1000 per cent. It is clearly stated in that paragraph that capitalising the value at 20 years purchase, the loss to the claimant was Rs. 14400. But the claimant has specifically stated that she has confined her claim to the modest amount of Rs. 5000. In paragraph 9 of the counter statement the claimant has prayed that the court may fix the price of the site acquired at Rs. 1000 per cent and grant Rs, 5000 towards compensation for the loss of income from the buildings. Thus she has claimed anly Rs. 13,944—40. As against the amount of Rs. 4313—14, awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the wanted an enhanced amount of Rs. 9631-26. But, the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has awarded an enhanced amount of Rs. 10296-22, according to the order and it has been wrongly mentioned in the decree as Rs. 14609-36. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that the court had no jurisdiction to grant anything more than the amount of Rs. 9631-26 claimed by Alameluthayammal, the respondent in App. 386 of 1962.
Similarly in App. 491 of 1962 the claimant, Nanjappa Goundan has mentioned in para 6 of the counter statement that the value of the acquired site cannot be less than Rs. 1000 per cent and further stated that though he would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 18000 for the buildings, on the basis of 25 years annual net income, he is content to receive Rs. 4500 in ail for the buildings. Including the value of the latrine he has claimed that he is entitled to Rs. 5000 for the buildings, apart from Rs. 1000 for the construction of the wall for the room not included in the acquisition proceedings. In the last paragraph he has stated that he is entitled to compensation at Rs. 1000 per cent for the site, Rs. 5000 for the lost of the buildings and Rs. 1000 for the other inconveniences referred to above. Thus including the 15 per cent solatium he hat claimed Rs. 8973-20 and deducting Rs. 1674-95 awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, he hat claimed by way of enhancement Rs. 7298-25. But the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge has awarded enhanced compensation of Rs. 10505-50. The contention of the learned Government Pleader is that the court had no jurisdiction to grant anything mere than the sum of Rs. 7298-25, claimed by Nanjappa Gounder.
Thus the important question for considera-tion in these two appeals 386 and 391 of 1962 is, whether the court has jurisdiction in a reference under S. 18 of the Act, to award compensation in excess of the amount prayed for by the claimant. S. 9 of the Act provides for notice to be given by the Collector to persons known or believed to be interested in the property sought to be acquired calling up on them to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensation for such interests. Under S. 18 of the Act, any person interested, who has not accepted the award of the Land Acquisition Officer may by a written application require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court. S. 25 of the Act is the relevant section for determining the jurisdiction of the court with regard to the amount of compensation and It runs as follows:
“1. When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under S. 9, the amout awarded to him by the court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under S. 11.
2. When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector.
3. When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector.”
Thus, under Sub-Cl. (1) of S. 25 of the Act, the court has no jurisdiction to award anything more than what has been claimed pursuant to any notification given under S. 9 of the Act. Sub-Cl. (2) of S. 25 of the Act provides for cases where the applicant has refused to make such a claim, or has omitted without sufficient reason to make such claim. In such cases, the amount awarded by the court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. But no objection was taken to the reference under S. 18 of the Act on the above ground. The Land Acquisition Judge will be incompetent to award a sum exceeding the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer where the claimant did not state the specific amount of compensation for bis property in pursuance of the notification under S. 9 of the Act. Clause (3) of S. 25 of the Act gives power to the court to award compensation of a sum sot less than the amount awarded by the Collector in cases of omission by the claimant to make such claim, when it is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for such failure. This clause gives power to the court la suitable cases to relieve the party from the stringent provisions contained in sub-clause (2) of S. 25 of the Act. Sec. 53 of the Act provides that save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the court under the Act. The court hearing a reference under S. 18 of the Act has power to allow an amendment of the pleadings in a reference. But the jurisdiction to allow such amendment cannot extend to increasing the claim to a figure beyound that which was claimed before the Collector, as it would be against the provisions of Sec. 25 (1) of the Act. The appellants did not take any objection to the reference under S. 18. of the Act and the learned Government Pleader took exception only to the grant of compensation in excess of the amounts claimed in the counter statement of the claimants.
Having regard to the above principles, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned advocate for the claimants, unsupported by any authority, that the court has jurisdiction to award an amount of compensation determined on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act irrespective of the fact that the claim is for a lesser amount. Even in a suit the plaintiff cannot get a decree for more than the amount claimed by him unless he gets the plaint amended. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable to the Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. The court has, therefore, ao jurisdiction to award anything more than what was claimed as compensation ia the several cases.
For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the objection of the learned Government Pleader that the enhancement prayed for by the claimants in App. 386 and 391 of 1962 should be confined to the amounts claimed by them ia their counter statements in the lower court, and we order accordingly. Thus the said appeals are allowed to this extent, namely, that the enhancement allowed by the court shall be reduced to the amounts claimed in the counter statements, but they are dismissed in other respects. The parties in these appeals will be entitled to eosts in proportion to their success.
V.C.S
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