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V.G Row v. A. Alagiriswamy And Others

Madras High Court

Aug 17, 1966

Judgment

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Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition for a writ of quo warranto was filed on 11 August 1966 challenging the appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as an Additional Judge of the High Court (appointed 8 August 1966). The petitioner is a long-standing member of the High Court Bar (practising for 34 years) who moved the Court asserting a public interest in the "purity of the administration of justice." The petition advances two broad grounds: (1) that Sri Alagiriswami did not possess the qualification prescribed by Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution (specifically, that he had not been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years in the sense contended by the petitioner); and (2) that the appointment was tainted by mala fides and was a "fraud on power" because an earlier appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader had been criticised by a Bench of this Court as having been motivated by extraneous considerations intended to secure a qualification enabling elevation to the Bench.

Relevant chronological facts sworn in affidavit: Sri Alagiriswami was enrolled as an advocate of the High Court in 1936 but initially practised in mofussil (district) Courts, principally at Madurai. He was appointed District Munsif in 1941 and served until 1947 (judicial office), and held various non-judicial posts between 1947 and 1959. He served about a year as Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras, and was appointed Government Pleader on 1 July 1960.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, for the purpose of Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution, the phrase "has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court" requires that the person must have been actively practising before a High Court for that period, or whether being enrolled and entitled to practise (and periods appropriately computed under the Article and its Explanation) suffices.
Whether periods during which the person held judicial office (specifically Sri Alagiriswami's service as District Munsif from 1941–1947) can be included in computing the period during which he "has been an advocate of a High Court" under the Explanation to Article 217.
Whether the appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as a Judge was vitiated by mala fides or constituted a fraud on power because an earlier Bench had held that his appointment as Government Pleader had been influenced by extraneous considerations intended to make him eligible for the Bench.
Whether a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution should be granted for immediate appellate consideration.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. G. Vasantha Pai)

The qualification in Article 217(2)(b) requires that the person must have "been an advocate of a High Court" in the sense of having practised actively before a High Court for at least ten years, not merely having been enrolled or admitted.
Historical and statutory materials (Charter of 1800, High Courts Act 1861, Section 2 of 24–25 Vict. Ch. 104, and the 1915 Act under Section 96(2)(d)) used the terms "pleader" or involved persons who had actually pleaded in Court; by analogy Article 217(2)(b)'s language should be read to require active practice before the High Court.
Rules requiring an advocate to declare where he ordinarily practises (Bar Council rules, High Court practice rules) show that venue of practice matters and supports the contention that mere enrollment is insufficient.
Article 233(2) (relating to District Judges) uses the phrase "an advocate" without qualification; the different wording supports the petitioner's narrower interpretation of Article 217(2)(b).
The Explanation to Article 217 should not be read to include a period of judicial office held before the person actually practised as an advocate of the High Court; therefore Sri Alagiriswami's earlier judicial service (1941–1947) cannot be counted towards the ten-year requirement and at best he has been an advocate of the High Court only since his appointment as Government Pleader on 1 July 1960 (six years at the time of appointment).
The appointment as Judge is the culmination of a scheme engineered when the State appointed Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader; an earlier Bench of this Court had concluded that the Government Pleader appointment was motivated by extraneous considerations (i.e., favouritism) intended to secure a qualification enabling elevation to the Bench; hence the present appointment is tainted by mala fides/fraud on power.
Petitioner sought a certificate under Article 132(1) for expedited appellate consideration, arguing importance of the question.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's (or Government's) separate legal arguments in adversarial form; the judgment addresses and rejects the petitioner's contentions in the course of the Court's analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Writ petition disposed of by Kailasam J. (unnamed citation in the opinion)	Held that an "advocate of a High Court" meant a person who was an advocate and had the right to practise in the High Court; the Article does not require actual practice in the High Court for the requisite period.	The Court expressly agreed with this view and accepted that Article 217 does not in terms require that an advocate must have been actually practising in a High Court for the requisite period; it suffices that the person was entitled to practise in a High Court.
In re A.K. Gopalan, 1953 Cri LJ 224 : AIR 1953 Mad 41	Quoted for the principle (via Satyanarayana Rao J.) that the Crown and executive must obey the law and, if in doubt, should seek the Court's assistance to ascertain the law rather than disregard it.	The petitioner invoked the decision (and the quotation from Burghes v. Attorney General contained therein) to contend the Executive should have acted lawfully; the Court noted the citation but did not accept that the earlier proceedings infirming the Government Pleader appointment required denial of the present appointment.
Burghes v. Attorney General, 1912-1 Ch. 173	Expressed the duty of the Crown/Executive to abide by and obey the law; cited by Satyanarayana Rao J. in In re A.K. Gopalan.	Referenced in the opinion (via the A.K. Gopalan citation) as a general principle about executive obedience to law; the Court did not find that principle required invalidation of the appointment in the facts before it.
Earlier Bench decision of this Court questioning the appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader	That earlier decision held the appointment as Government Pleader was influenced by extraneous considerations (i.e., amounted to favouritism intended to make the appointee eligible for a Judgeship later).	The Court considered the earlier decision but held that the mere fact the Government Pleader appointment had been criticised did not prevent the appointing authorities (including the President after consultation) from being satisfied that the qualifications for appointment as Judge under Article 217 were met; thus the earlier decision did not invalidate the present appointment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the petitioner's principal contention that Article 217(2)(b) requires an advocate to have "practised" before a High Court for ten years, rather than merely being enrolled or entitled to practise. The Court reviewed historical usages in earlier legislation (Charter 1800; High Courts Act 1861; 1915 Act) where the words "pleader" or similar expressions occurred, and acknowledged the petitioner's argument that earlier statutes had emphasized persons who actually pleaded. However, the Court found several barriers to adopting the narrow construction urged by the petitioner:

The Constitution's language—"has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court"—is a deliberately neutral expression intended to secure necessary legal qualification and standing, while leaving evaluation of practical matters (volume of practice, standing at the Bar, etc.) to those charged with selection. The Court considered that if the makers had intended the narrower meaning ("practising before the High Court") they could have expressed it.
The Court noted practical difficulties in defining "actually practising" (e.g., an advocate handling very few briefs might nonetheless be regarded as practising). The Constitution-makers could not have intended such uncertainty to be embedded in the qualification language.
The Court relied on an earlier decision by Kailasam J. which rejected the petitioner's distinction between an advocate entitled to practise in a High Court and one actually practising there; that decision held that entitlement to practise sufficed for Article 217, and the Court explicitly agreed with that conclusion.
The Court then addressed the Explanation to Article 217 dealing with computation of the period and whether periods during which the person held judicial office after becoming an advocate may be included. The Explanation was interpreted to exclude only judicial service held before the person became an advocate; it does not exclude judicial service held after enrollment as an advocate. The Court observed the grammatical juxtaposition of "an advocate of a High Court" and "an advocate" in the Explanation, concluding the two expressions have different meanings and that the Explanation should not be construed to exclude Sri Alagiriswami's judicial service as District Munsif (1941–1947), because that service was held after his enrollment as an advocate in 1936.
The petitioner argued that the judicial office held by Sri Alagiriswami was in the pre-Constitution period under the Government of India Act and that such office would not qualify under the analogous pre-constitutional rules. The Court rejected the invitation to interpret the Explanation to carry forward the Government of India Act's ineligibility; it noted that the Constitution expressly provided for inclusion of judicial office held after becoming an advocate (as in Article 124 Explanation II) and declined to impose the pre-constitutional limitation when construing Article 217's Explanation.
On the mala fides/fraud-on-power allegation, the Court examined the earlier Bench's critical findings about the Government Pleader appointment. The Court acknowledged that the earlier Bench had expressed the view that the Government Pleader appointment was motivated by extraneous considerations, but the Court found this did not compel invalidation of the subsequent judicial appointment. The Court reasoned that the Government Pleader tenure (1960–1966) indisputably made Sri Alagiriswami an advocate of the High Court "even in the sense of an advocate practising in the High Court," and that the appointing authorities (including the President) would have been aware of the earlier proceedings. If the President, after consultation required by Article 217, was satisfied that the qualifications existed, the Court saw no sustainable basis to characterize the appointment as vitiated by mala fides.
Finally, on the request for a certificate under Article 132(1), the Court concluded that, although the question was important, it did not present such urgency as to bypass the ordinary appellate route; accordingly the certificate was refused.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The quo warranto petition challenging Sri Alagiriswami's appointment as an Additional Judge was dismissed and, consequently, the appointment is not set aside by this proceeding.
The petitioner's request for a certificate under Article 132(1) for immediate appellate relief was refused.

Broader implications: The Court's decision interprets Article 217(2)(b) to mean that being an advocate of a High Court (i.e., being enrolled and entitled to practise, with periods to be computed under the Article and its Explanation) is the constitutional qualification; the Article does not, as a matter of law, rigidly require a demonstration of continuous active practice before a High Court for the full ten-year period. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel principle beyond this interpretation; it applies existing textual and precedential materials and accepts the view previously taken by Kailasam J. The Court did not find the earlier criticism of the Government Pleader appointment sufficient to establish mala fides invalidating the present appointment.

End of summary.

Show all summary ...

1. Sri Alagiriswami, the first respondent, to this petition, was appointed an Additional Judge of this High Court on 8th August 1966. On the 11th August 1966, this petition seeking the issue of a quo warranto calling upon the first respondent to show under what authority he holds the office in question was filed. The petitioner is a member of the High Court Bar and has been a practitioner before this Court for the last 34 years. He claims that as a member of the Bar, he is vitally interested in the purity of the administration of justice and for reasons that would be apparent from what follows, he finds it to be his duty to move this Court in this matter. According to the petitioner, Sri Alagiriswami does not possess the qualification prescribed by Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution. Secondly, it is contended that the appointment has been made virtually in the teeth of a Bench decision of this Court in which on an earlier occasion the propriety of the appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader was brought into question and it was held by this Court that appointment was an act of favouritism intended to sphere the first respondent to a High Court Judgeship through the back door. Though this Court felt powerless to interfere with the first respondent's appointment as Government Pleader, the decision of that Bench established that in making that appointment, the Government was moved by extraneous consideration, principally that of conferring upon the first respondent a qualification solely for the purpose of enabling him to become a Judge of the High Court. It is said accordingly that the appointment of the first respondent as a Judge is the fulfilment of the scheme engineered by those in authority when the first respondent was some years ago appointed as Government Pleader, and on this ground his appointment is attacked as affected by mala fides and is fraud on power.

2. These are two grounds broadly speaking that have been amplified in the lengthy affidavit accompanying the petition. I do not think it necessary to set out the contents of the affidavit in any great detail; but I shall refer to such portions thereof as may be required.

3. Under Article 217(2)(b), a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts, in succession. It is the contention of Mr. G. Vasantha Pai, learned counsel for the petitioner, that at the best it can be said that the first respondent has been an advocate of the High Court since the date of his appointment as Government Pleader on 1st July 1960, and not earlier. Before commenting upon this particular contention, the following facts are necessary to be set out. These facts appear in the affidavit itself. The first respondent was enrolled as an advocate for the High Court in 1936, but he chose to practise only in the mofussri Courts, principally at Madurai, at that time. In 1941, he was appointed as District Munsif, undoubtedly a judicial office, and served in that capacity between 1941 and 1947. It is said that he was functioning intermittently, but no precise dates are given which would indicate the length of that service. Simultaneously with this appointment to the Judicial service, he had necessarily to cease practice as an advocate. Between 1947 and 1959, he occupied various posts. They were not posts which could be regarded as judicial posts. For about a year, thereafter, he acted as Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras. As stated already, on 1-7-1960, he was appointed as Government Pleader. The contention of Mr. Vasantha Pai is that the qualification prescribed by the, above article as an advocate of a High Court requires the qualification of a “practising” advocate of a High Court, and not merely a person who has been enrolled as an advocate of the High Court, who for a variety of reasons practises elsewhere than before the High Court; that is to say, the expression “has for at least ten years, been an advocate of a High Court” means according to the learned counsel, a person who has for that period been actively practising as an advocate in the High Court and not elsewhere. That an advocate normally means a practising advocate may be accepted without any difficulty. Learned counsel has referred to the history of legislation in this regard and pointed out that the Charter establishing the Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras, 1800, referred to persons enrolled and authorised to appear and plead and act for the suitors of the said Court. In the High Courts Act, 1861, in providing for the qualifications of persons to be appointed as Judges, Section 2 of 24-25 Vict. Ch. 104, says “Persons who have been pleaders of a Sadar Court or High Court for a period of not less than ten years, if such pleaders of a Sadar Court shall have been admitted, as Pleaders of a High Court”. Learned counsel seeks to draw the inference from the form used herein that only pleaders who have been actually practising before the High Court are contemplated and it was in that sense that the earlier Acts dealt with the question. In the 1915 Act, under Section 96(2)(d), the qualification of a person to be appointed as a Judge was that he should have been a pleader of a High Court for a period of not less than ten years. The use of the word “pleader” in the earlier Acts, it is said, was for the reason that a person should have pleaded in the Indian sense, that is to say, should have actually appeared on behalf of the suitor and pleaded the cause. Learned counsel accordingly urges that Article 217(2)(b) equally requires that the expression “advocate of a High Court” should be so interpreted as to mean that he should have been an advocate, not merely enrolled as an advocate of the High Court, but should have continuously practised as such advocate in the High Court for at least ten years.

4. Pursuing this line of argument, it is further pointed out that where a person enrolled himself as an advocate, he is required under the relevant rule, the Bar Council Rules and the High Court Original Side and Appellate Side Rules, to indicate where he ordinarily desires to practise. This would also show that despite the fact that a person has been enrolled as an Advocate of the High Court, the venue of his practise is of importance and of the greatest importance when the question of an advocate's qualification for appointment as a Judge is concerned.

5. In contrast to Article 217(2)(b), reference has been made in the course of the argument to Article 233(2) which relates to the appointment of District Judges. This provision states that a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge, if lie has been for not less than seven years an advocate or pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. The use of the expression “an advocate” not qualified in the manner in which it is qualified in Article 217(2)(b) is relied on, on behalf of the petitioner to indicate the intention underlying the qualification of a person for High Court Judgeship.

6. It is somewhat difficult to agree that this article of the Constitution interpreted as it stands compulsorily requires that the expression “has been an advocate of a High Court” should be taken to mean “has been practising before the High Court”. If that was the underlying intention, it could have been so expressed. The difficulty insisted upon such a qualification is very apparent, for it is impossible to say whether an advocate who handles very few briefs in a year could be said to be actually practising. The makers of the Constitution could not have been unaware that a very many persons are enrolled as advocates of the High Court, but have little, or no work by way of pleading or acting. It is no doubt true that practising as an advocate is an essential requisite before those entrusted with file selection of a person to be a Judge would sponsor his case. But this is a matter which the Constitution makers apparently left to be examined by the persons charged with the duty of selection. The colourless expression “has been an advocate of a High Court” has to my mind been designedly put in only to ensure the necessary legal qualification and standing as an advocate, leaving out other matters which max call for a practical ??? the assessment of the ability of the advocate, the volume of his practice, his standing at the Bar and the like. In the absence of anything which would compel the particular construction which learned counsel seeks to put upon it. I am of opinion that the article does not requite that the person should have practised before a High Court as an advocate and that if he has confined his practice to the Courts other than the High Court, he lacks the qualification prescribed. Learned counsel sought to support his ??? by reference to some debates in the Constitution Assembly where apparently an attempt was made to amend the ??? regarding the qualification of a person for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court by including a pleader practising for a certain minimum period, in a District Court and that amendment was rejected. That has only been relied upon for the purpose of showing that when reference is made in the Constitution to advocate it refers to a practising advocate and when it is made to an advocate of a High Court, it refers to ??? who has been practising ??? As I said, I am unable to agree with this interpretation. It was pointed out by the learned counsel again that there is no case of an advocate who has practised in the ??? being appointed as a Judge of the High Court. That to my mind will not be of assistance in interpreting the words of a written constitution.

7. In a writ petition disposed of by Kailasam J., in which an identical question arose and precisely the same ??? appear to have been advanced ??? Vasantha Pai the learned Judge ??? to the. But Councils Act 1926, ??? the Advocates had to be prepared by the High Court under Section 8(2) of the Act, including all persons who were as advocates, vakils or pleaders entitled as of right to practise in that High Court and of other persons who have been admitted to be advocates of the High Court under the Act. The learned Judge held that an advocate of a High Court accordingly meant a person who was an advocate and had the right to practise in the High Court the repelled the contention, that for the purpose of Article 217, advocates should be classified, one into a category of persons actually practising in the High Court, and another into one of persons not actually practising in the High Court. The decision in that case was accordingly that this article of the Constitution does not in terms require that before an advocate could be appointed as a Judge of the High Court, he should have been actually practising in that or in any other High Court for the requisite period, but that it would suffice if he were entitled to practise in a High Court. With respect, I agree with this view.

8. Mr. Vasantha Pai's next contention is that at the best, the first respondent has been an advocate of the High Court only for six years since his appointment as Government Pleader in 1960. He, claims that an) earlier period during which the first respondent held judicial ??? in the light of the ??? to this article. The explanation thereto states that—

“In computing the period during which a person has been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any period during ??? has held judicial office after he become ???”

9. The ??? is that since the first respondent ??? advocate in the ??? of practising ??? High Court ??? 1-7-1966 ??? appointed ??? Pleader ??? during which he held judicial of ??? that date can alone be ??? period prior to 1-7-1960. ??? stated that in addition to ??? advocate of High Court practising in ??? Courts between 1936 and 1941. Sri ??? held judicial office as District Munsiff between 1941 and 1947. If is that latter period where Mr. Pai claims cannot be included under this Explanation as he interprets it. It will be noticed that even in ??? both the expressions advocates of a High ??? advocate” are used. Mr. Vasantha ??? that the expression “after he be ??? an advocate” occurring herein should ??? “after he became an ??? High Court that is to say, after he started practising in that High Court.

10. The use of the two different expressions ??? body of the same explanation is significant ??? in other parts of the Constitution ??? alone has been used in a context, where Mr. Pai does not deny that would include an advocate practising in a mofussil ??? holding of the judicial office after he became an advocate referred to in the explanation cannot ??? mind be so interpreted as to exclude the holding of such office by Sri Alagiriswami between 1941 and 1947. The two expressions “an advocate of a High Court” and “an advocate” are used in juxtaposition and grammatically construed must have different meanings. If that were otherwise, the Constitution could well have used the expression “after he became such advocate”. What the explanation excludes is only the period when the person held judicial office, before he became an advocate. It is not and cannot be denied that when Sri Alagiriswami held judicial office as District Munsif (between 1941 and 1947) he did so after he had become an advocate, having been enrolled in 1936.

11. Pursuing the same line of argument, Mr. Pai urges that the judicial office so held by Sri Alagiriswami was in the pre-Constitution period and at that time when the Government of India Act was in force, a judicial office such as that of a District Munsif was not an adequate qualification for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. It is true that, holding a judicial office lower than that of a Subordinate Judge was not within the scope of the qualification for appointment as a Judge of a High Court under the Government of India Act 1935. But that does not mean that we have to interpret the relevant provision in our Constitution in the ??? of that ineligibility under the Government of ??? will be noticed that in Article 124 Explanation II, any period during which a person has held judicial office not interim to that of a District Judge after he became an advocate can be included in computing the period during which a person has been an advocate for the purpose of that article. Clearly then, ??? thought necessary to specify the ??? judicial office, the Constitution ??? do so. The Constitution ??? the limitation upon the ??? of the judicial office ??? contained in ??? India ??? so far as the ??? High Court ??? is concerned ??? agree with Mr. Vasantha Pai ??? judicial office for the ??? appointment of a High Court Judge, under the Government of India Act, a like construction should be adopted in coustriug, the explanation to Article 217.

12. It is not defied that if this period is included and added to the period during which the first respondent has been Government Pleader, he ??? advocate of a High Court for at least ???

13. The next ??? Mr. Pai is that in making the ??? appointment ??? have been ??? the exercise of a ??? on power. This ??? is put in this way. I have referred to the earlier ??? before a Bench of this Court where ??? appointment of Sri ??? as Government Pleader was questioned. ??? Aiyar J. one of the Judges forming the Bench, thought that the Government ??? their power and that the apparent ??? to be appointed Government ??? Pleader really concealed the ??? intention of the Government to ??? a qualification on Sri Aiagiriswami to be considered for the post of a Judge of the High Court in the future. Finally, however the learned Judges held that the rules for the appointment of Government Pleader as they stood only required that the person appointed should have been an advocate of the High Court as on the date of the appointment and nothing more, which qualification the appointee fulfilled. Mr. Vasantha Pai urges that what was schemed by those in authority who appointed Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader has really been effectuated at the present time by the present appointment. He refers to In re, A.K Gopalan, 1953 Cri LJ 224 : (AIR 1953 Mad 41) wherein Satyanarayana Rao J. quoted the case of Burghes v. Attorney General, 1912-1 Ch. 173:

“It is the duty of the Crown and of every Branch of the Executive to abide by and obey the law. If there is any difficulty in ascertaining it, the Courts are open to the Crown to sue and it is the duty of the Executive in cases of doubt to ascertain the law in order to obey it, not to disregard it”.

14. Equally, it is said that when a Bench of this Court had in such categorical terms pronounced upon the appointment of Sri Alagiriswar as Government Pleader, decision cannot be ignored by those who chose to appoint him as a Judge. In the affidavit accompanying the ??? further asserted that at about the time when the name of Sri Alagiriswami was proposed for appointment as an Additional Judge, the Executive took advantage of the fact that the post of the. Chief Justice of this High Court was filled by an Officiating Chief Justice and the permanent incumbent was acting as the Governor, and it was in those circumstances that the Executive managed to get the approval of the Governor and the Officiating Chief Justice to the name of Sri ??? being sent upto the President for appointment. If what is claimed by Mr. Vasantha Pai is, that since the ??? of bri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader was declared by this Court in a contested proceeding to have been made for an ??? purpose, viz., to render him eligible for appointment as a Judge in the future, his name should not have been proposed at all or accepted, for appointment, it seems to be to go far beyond the real effect of that decision. Whether this appointment as Government Pleader won judicial approval or not, that he was Government Pleader between 1960 to 1966 can not be gainsaid, and that is undoubtedly a period ??? which Sri Alagiriswami was an advocate of the High Court, even in the sense of an advocate, practising in the High Court. I am unable to agree with Mr. Vasantha Pai that solely for the reason that the earlier decision impeached the propriety of Sri Algiriswami's appointment as Government Pleader, his further chances of elevation to the Bench should be forever lost, for that is in effect the argument advanced.

15. Nor am I ??? see how there can be said to be any fraud ??? “If the qualifications required by ??? in the case, it was open to ??? authority to suggest the name or ??? for appointment as a Judge. Under Article 217, a Judge of a High Court is appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State and the Chief Justice of the High Court. Having regard to the wide publicity which the earlier decision of this Court had, that is, the proceeding in which the appointment of Sri Alagiriswami as Government Pleader was challenged, there is no doubt that the facts relevant thereto would have been within the knowledge of the appointing authority, the President. If the President took note of the qualifications prescribed by the Article and was satisfied that the first respondent did have those qualifications, I am unable to see how such an appointment could be said to be affected by any mala fides, whatever breach of good faith and propriety the earlier proceedings six years ago might have tended to show on the part of the State Government. This argument fails to convince me. I am satisfied that both the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The petition is therefore dismissed.

16. Mr. G. Vasantha Pai prays that a Certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution may be granted. In my opinion though the question raised is one of importance, it is not of such urgency that the normal venue of appeal to a Bench of this Court should be side tracked. I decline to grant the certificate.

GK/SDP/D.V.C

17. Petition dismissed.