Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

The Trustebs Of The Port Of Madras v. Mettur Chemical And Industries, Ltd. Salem

Madras High Court
Jan 21, 1966
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision was preferred by the Trustees of the Port of Madras (petitioners/defendants) against a finding of the Court of Small Causes, Madras in a suit for recovery of damages for short delivery of goods. The Court of Small Causes found that the goods had been landed and held the defendants liable in damages to the plaintiffs for Rs. 940. The plaintiffs had received a C certificate on 2 July 1958, the date on which the cause of action is said to have arisen. The suit was filed on 22 January 1959. The petitioners challenged the entertaining of the suit on the ground that it was barred by S.110 of the Madras Port Trust Act. The revision was ultimately dismissed by the court below, with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act—which requires one month's prior notice and provides that no suit shall be commenced "after six months from the accrual of the cause"—operates to bar the plaintiffs' suit filed more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.
  2. Whether, and to what extent, the plaintiffs can invoke S. 15(2) of the Indian Limitation Act (to exclude the one-month notice period when computing limitation) by relying on S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, or whether S. 110 of the Port Trust Act expressly excludes the applicability of those provisions of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Trustees') Arguments

  • The suit was barred by S. 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act because the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued on 2 July 1958 and the suit was filed only on 22 January 1959 (i.e., after six months).
  • S. 110 provides a one-month notice requirement and then emphatically states that no suit shall be commenced "after six months from the accrual of the cause," which the petitioners contend operates as an absolute outer limit that cannot be extended.
  • The petitioners further argued that S. 110 is a complete code regarding the right and timing of suit under the Port Trust Act and that plaintiffs cannot rely on S. 29 of the Limitation Act to obtain benefit of S. 15(2).

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs relied on S. 15(2) of the Indian Limitation Act to exclude the one-month notice period required by S. 110 when computing the period of limitation, thereby contending that the suit as filed was within time.
  • They relied on S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act to permit application of S. 15(2) despite the special provision in the Port Trust Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sati Prasad George v. Govinda Chandra Shah Definition of "expressly" — that express reference must be made to a specific section to exclude it. Cited to support the view that a special/local law must expressly refer to particular sections of the Limitation Act to exclude them; mere implication is not enough.
Chhaganlal v. Thana Municipality Interpretation of language similar to S.110 (one month's notice and suit not to be commenced after six months) — such language excludes Limitation Act provisions only by implication, not expressly. Followed as authority that similar statutory language does not constitute an express exclusion of Limitation Act provisions under S.29(2).
Rewachand v. Karachi Municipality Conflicting treatments: single-judge view that "not after six months" expressly excluded extension under S.15(2) versus appellate reversal. The court noted a single-judge decision favoring express exclusion, but observed that that view was reversed on appeal and that the earlier appellate decision (which does not find express exclusion) was followed in Chhaganlal.
Palna Municipality v. Nirode Sundari Construction of the phrase "within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards" and whether that wording effectually excludes Limitation Act provisions. Cited for the proposition that words like "and not afterwards" may suggest legislative intent to exclude but, under S.29(2)(a), fall short of being an "express exclusion" absent specific reference to the Limitation Act sections.
Vidyachamn v. Khubchand Scope of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act — requirement of express exclusion; explanation that a special provision which provides limitation and circumstances for excusing delay does not necessarily expressly exclude the Limitation Act. Quoted (Subba Rao, J.) to support the conclusion that absence of an explicit mention of Limitation Act sections in the special provision means there is no express exclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing the nature of S.110 of the Madras Port Trust Act and the interplay between that section and the Indian Limitation Act. Key steps in the reasoning were:

  1. The court treated the plaintiffs' right of suit as arising under the general law (the Limitation Act and substantive law outside the Port Trust Act); S.110 does not itself confer the substantive right but operates as a limiting provision on the period within which suit should be filed.
  2. The plaintiffs sought to rely on S.15(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude the one-month notice period required by S.110 when computing limitation; they invoked S.29(2) to permit application of Limitation Act provisions to a special/local law unless those provisions are "expressly excluded."
  3. The central question became whether S.110 "expressly excludes" the applicability of S.15(2). The court held that an express exclusion requires specific words in the special/local law to that effect; mere emphatic or prohibitory phrases (for example, "nor after six months") amount only to an implication and do not satisfy the requirement of being "expressly excluded" under S.29(2).
  4. To support this construction the court relied on earlier decisions (Sati Prasad George, Chhaganlal, Palna Municipality and the cited Supreme Court treatment in Vidyachamn v. Khubchand) which held that similar statutory language does not, by itself, constitute an express exclusion of Limitation Act provisions.
  5. Applying this principle, the court concluded that S.110 prescribes a different period of limitation but does not expressly exclude S.15(2). Therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to apply S.15(2) in computing limitation, effectively allowing deduction of the one-month notice period and rendering the suit within time.

Holding and Implications

Result: The revision fails and is dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences:

  • The court held that S.110 of the Madras Port Trust Act does not expressly exclude the applicability of S.15(2) of the Indian Limitation Act under S.29(2), and therefore the plaintiffs could exclude the one-month notice period when computing limitation; on that basis the suit was held to be within time.
  • The petitioners' challenge in revision was rejected and the order below (holding defendants liable for Rs. 940) stands as against the petitioners.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authority on the construction of express exclusion under S.29(2) and does not purport to establish a new rule of law beyond that interpretation.


End of summary (based exclusively on the provided opinion).

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT

This revision has been preferred by the Trustees of the Port of Madras, defendants in a suit for the recovery of damages for short delivery of goods. It is a finding of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, not open to challenge in revision, that the goods had been landed and the defendants are liable in damages for the sum of Rs. 940 claimed.

The learned Counsel Mr. V.V Raghavan appearing for the petitioners contends that the suit should not have been entertained at all by the Court below as it was barred under S. 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act (II of 1905). The plaintiffs had been given the C certificate on 2nd July 1958 and on that date, the cause of action for the suit arose. The suit has been actually filed on 22nd January 1959. S. 110 of the Madras Port Trust Act provides:

“No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against any person for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act without giving to such person one month's previous notice in writing of the intended suit or other proceeding, and of the cause thereof, nor after six months from the accrual of the cause of such suit or other proceeding”.

Admittedly, the notice required under the first part of S. 110 has been given in this case. But what the learned Counsel for the defendants contends is that the suit must be filed within six months of the accrual of the cause of action and the language of S. 110 is emphatic that no suit shall be filed afterwards.

The plaintiffs seek to get over this bar pleaded by relying on S. 15 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which enables plaintiffs to exclude the period of say notice which has to be given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment while computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit. There can be no question that if the plaintiffs can exclude this period, the suit will be within time. For taking the benefit of S. 15 (2), the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs relies on S. 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act. S. 29 (2) provides that:

Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as and as to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special er local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply……“

The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that S. 110 of the Port Trust Act by itself provides a complete code and it is not open to the plaintiffs to rely on S. 29 of the Limitation Act to seek the benefit of S. 15 of the Act to exclude the one month period of notice. The learned Counsel lays considerable emphasis on the language of S. 110 that the suit shall not be filed “after six months from the accrual of the cause of action.” In fact, the contention is that the right of suit is given under certain conditions and this period of six months must be taken ata condition for such a suit. This contention to begin with I am unable to agree. The party's right of suit in this case is under the general law outside the Act and by S. 110, only a limitation is placed on the period within which the suit should be filed. It is not the Act that confers the right of suit. But for the specific provision, the plaintiffs would be governed by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. In my view, the plaintiffs would be entitled to rely on S. 29 (2) of the Act and I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that S. 110 provides a complete code itself both in respect of the substantial law as well as the procedural law. It even does not purport to be one.

Learned Counsel next contends that it must be considered en the language of S. 110 that the applicability of S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act is expressly excluded. Learned Counsel submits that on the emphatic language (nor after six months) it is a compelling inference that the suit must be filed within six months and that there can be no extension of the period. It is pointed out that S. 110 does not say that'the suit must be filed within six months. It goes further and says that it shall not be filed after six months. But the question for consideration is whether in the circumstances, it can be said that the applicability of S. 15 (2) is “expressly excluded “in the language of the section. In my view, a particular section can be considered to be expressly excluded only if there are specific words to the effect excluding the applicability of the section. The language and the meaning of the words “expressly excluded “in S. 15 (2) cannot be whittled down. However imperative the time limit may be under S. 110, it is still only inferentially or by implication, it may be necessary implication, one has to say that S. 15 (2) of the Limitation Act is excluded, and an outer limit fixed.

In Sati Prasad George v. Govinda Chandra Shah(1), Cuming, J., observes:

“By the expression ‘expressly’ I think, it is meant that express reference is made to the specific section in the Act; and that, unless such reference is made to the sections and by that reference they are expressly excluded, then they would apply.”

Language similar to, if not more emphatic than the language employed in S. 110 has been the subject of consideration in several cases. In Chhaganlal v. Thana Municipality(2) S. 167 of the Bombay District Municipal Act came up for eonsideration. There also, there was a provision for one month's previous notice and the section provided that the suit shall not be commenced after six months from the date of the act complained of. The learned Judges held that if this language excludes the provisions of the Limitation Act, it excluded them by implication only and not expressly. They followed the decision of the High Court in Rewachand v. Karachi Municipality(3) on the identical question.

Mr. V.V Raghavan learned Counsel for the respondents, placed before me the decision of the Sind High Court reported in Rewachand v. Karachi Municipality(4) where the single Judge held with reference to S. 167 itself that the section in plain and unambiguous terms prevented the claimant from commencing his suit after six months from the date of the act complained of, and thereby expressly excluded the time being extended under S. 15 Cl. 2 of the Limitation Act. But this case was reversed on appeal by the decision in Rewachand v. Karachi Municipality (3) earlier cited followed by the Bombay High Court in Chhaganlal v. Thana Municipality (2),

The Calcutta High Court has also taken a similar view in Palna Municipality v. Nirode Sundari(5). The language to be construed there was “within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards “in the Bengal Municipal Act, certainly more emphatic than the language in S. 110 of the Port Trust Act. There also, there was a period of one month's notice provided and the plaintiff sought to deduct the period of notice. The contention was strongly urged there, that no effect could be given to the words “and not afterwards” if exclusion was granted of the notice period. After observing that there was a good deal of force in the contention, Biswas, J., observed:

It may well be that the Legislature by adding the words ‘and not afterwards’ did intend to exclude the applicability of those provisions of the Limitation Act which would operate to extend the time in various contingencies. Unfortunately, however, if that was the intention of the Legislature, they failed to carry itout by using appropriate language for that purpose. The language they used “and not afterwards” might possibly operate in the way intended, but by reason of the terms used in S. 29 (2) (a). Limitation Act, I think it fell short of what was thereby required. The words ‘expressly excluded’ mean what they say. In order that the exclusion may be express, I think that the particular sections of the Limitation Act which are intended to be excluded must be specifically indicated by the special or local law in question. So far as the words ‘and not afterwards’ are concerned the utmost that can be said is that the exclusion of these sections of the Limitation Act may be easily spelt out therefrom, but, in my opinion they will not amount to an express exclusion”.

Reference in this connection may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Vidyachamn v. Khubchand as to the scope of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act in reference to S, 116-A of the Representation of the People Act. The learned Judge Subba Rao, J. observes at page 1112:

The contention is that Sub-S. (3) of S. 116-A of the Act not only provides a period of limitation for such an appeal, but also the circumstances under which the delay can be excused, indicating thereby that the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are excluded. There are two answers to this argu ment. Firstly, S. 29 (2) (a) of the Limitation Act speaks of express exclusion, but there is no express exclusion in Sub-S. (3) of S. 116-A of the Act……“

In my view, S. 110 only provides a period of limitation different from that indicated under the Indian Limitation Act and it will be open to the plaintiffs in the absence of express exclusion of the applicability of S. 15 (2) of the Limitation Act to rely upon the provisions of S. 15 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act in computing the period. Thus viewed, the suit is within time.

In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.

V.C.S