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M.A And Sons v. Madras Oil And Seeds Exchange Ltd. And Another

Madras High Court
Aug 11, 1964
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was instituted by M.A. and Sons (appellants) from an order and decree of the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing O.P. No. 478 of 1961. The dispute arose from forward contracts for supplies of groundnut oil between the appellants and Kilachand and Devchand and Co. Pte. Ltd. (the second respondent). The appellants failed to deliver the contracted oil, allegedly because of bursting of boiler apparatus, and the second respondent treated the contracts as subsisting and later claimed damages.

The parties' contract incorporated an arbitration clause subject to the by-laws of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange (Pte.) Ltd. (the first respondent). The second respondent filed a claim before the Exchange on 18-9-1956; the arbitration hearing occurred on 18–19 April 1957 and an award was made on 13-7-1957 against the appellants for Rs. 8,000. On 15-10-1956 (after the claim was filed), the Exchange amended its by-laws to add by-law 202, which created an Appellate Tribunal procedure.

The second respondent filed an appeal under by-law 202 on 13-8-1957. The parties also agreed to state a special case under Section 13(b) of the Arbitration Act for the opinion of the City Civil Court on three legal points. The City Civil Court gave its opinion on 11-4-1959 against the appellants; the appellants' civil revision (C.R.P. 1263 of 1959) in this court was dismissed. The Appellate Tribunal then made an award on 19-4-1961 in favour of the second respondent for Rs. 15,000 and costs of Rs. 500. The appellants filed O.P. No. 478 of 1961 under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act to set aside that award; the petition was dismissed and a decree passed in accordance with the appellate award. The present civil miscellaneous appeal challenges that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction, given that by-law 202 was enacted after the dates of the contracts and after the claim had been filed.
  2. Whether the provision for an Appellate Tribunal under by-law 202 was ultra vires, because, under the Arbitration Act, an award given in the first instance is final and binding.
  3. Whether an appeal under by-law 202 could be prosecuted where the appellants had earlier filed a petition in the City Civil Court to have the initial award filed into court (i.e., a conflict arising from concurrent remedies or proceedings).
  4. Relatedly, whether a right of appeal could be conferred retrospectively by by-law 202 in respect of an existing lis (i.e., whether a by-law enacted after the commencement of the dispute could create an appeal right in favour of a party to that dispute).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • No right of appeal is conferred under by-law 202: appeal is a creature of statute or rule and cannot be supplied by implication where by-law language does not expressly confer such a right.
  • Even if a right of appeal is arguably provided, it cannot apply to the second respondent because the arbitration lis commenced before the amendment of by-law 202 (claim filed 18-9-1956; by-law amended 15-10-1956), and a subsequent by-law cannot confer a right of appeal on parties to an earlier lis.
  • The appeal procedure under by-law 202 is ultra vires the Indian Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940, because the Act makes an arbitration award final and binding except on specified grounds.
  • An argument as to res judicata (whether the earlier judgment in C.R.P. 1263 of 1959 prevents disputing the final award) was available in the pleadings, but the court records the second respondent conceded that this argument could not be seriously pressed.

Second Respondent's Position

  • The second respondent invoked the appellate procedure under by-law 202 and filed the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal; it also had earlier instituted proceedings to have the initial award filed in the City Civil Court but subsequently withdrew that proceeding.
  • The second respondent accepted, according to the judgment, that the res judicata argument could not be strongly pressed against it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramanatha Chetti v. Lakashmanan Chetti, AIR 1963 Mad 175 (FB); (1963-1 Mad LJ 46 at p. 48) Supports the proposition that appeal is a creature of statute and must be provided by express language or necessary implication. The court cited it to underscore that an appellate remedy does not arise automatically and normally requires statutory or rule-based authority; but the court nevertheless examined whether by-law 202 could be read as creating such a right by necessary implication.
Attorney-General v. Sillem, (1864) 10 HLC 704 Authority for the view that creation of a new right of appeal requires distinct legislative authority; courts should not infer a new appeal right without clear language. The court relied on this dictum to acknowledge the strong textual requirement for appeal rights, but balanced that rule against practical construction principles where imperfect draftsmanship would otherwise render a provision unworkable.
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Others, AIR 1957 SC 540 Principle that a right of appeal is vested as on the date when the lis commences and that subsequent legislation ordinarily cannot confer an appeal right on parties to an earlier lis. The court acknowledged this as the ordinary rule, but distinguished it: here the dispute arose from a contract expressly made subject to the Exchange's by-laws "from time to time," so modification of by-laws could validly alter the dispute-resolution procedure agreed by the parties.
Heeralal Agarwalla & Co. v. Joakim Nahapiet & Co. Ltd., AIR 1927 Cal 647 Holds that a contract may contain a "submission within a submission" (i.e., parties may validly agree to multi-stage arbitration including appeal to a committee). The court treated this decision as direct authority that parties can agree to incorporate an appeal stage within a contractual arbitration procedure, supporting the validity of by-law 202 as an agreed procedural stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in several steps, each grounded in the language of the contract and by-law, and the guiding canons of statutory and contractual construction expressly cited in the opinion.

  1. The court accepted the general principle (citing Ramanatha Chetti and Attorney-General v. Sillem) that an appeal is ordinarily a creature of statute or rule and must be provided for by clear language or necessary implication.
  2. Recognising "imperfect draftsmanship" in by-law 202 (which did not expressly state who may prefer an appeal or include time-limits), the court nevertheless held that certain phrases in the by-law — e.g., "Whenever an appeal is preferred" and "the award against which such appeal is preferred" — necessarily imply that a party to an initial arbitration award has the right to appeal. The court applied the construction principle that statutes and rules should, if possible, be read so as to make them sensible and operative rather than unworkable.
  3. The court confronted the established principle from Garikapati Veeraya that rights of appeal are ordinarily governed by the law prevailing when the lis commences. It distinguished that rule on the ground that the dispute here arose from a private contract that expressly made the contract subject to the Exchange's by-laws "in force from time to time." Because the contractual submission incorporated future by-law modifications, the parties had consented in advance to be governed by later changes to the by-laws, including the introduction of an appeal stage.
  4. The court relied on Heeralal Agarwalla (AIR 1927 Cal 647) and commentary (Russell on Arbitration) to support the proposition that parties are free to agree to multi-stage arbitration procedures (a "submission within a submission") and that an award made in a later stage is the final award between the parties for the purposes of the Arbitration Act.
  5. On the question whether an award under the Arbitration Act is "final and binding," the court construed the Act's language (Condition No. 7 of the First Schedule and Section 2(b)'s definition of "award") as subject to any contractual right of appeal. Where the parties' agreed procedure provides for an appellate stage, the award emerging from that appellate stage is the award which becomes final and binding and is subject to the limited grounds of challenge specified in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that by-law 202 did confer a right of appeal (by necessary implication and by virtue of the parties' contractual acceptance of "by-laws in force from time to time"), that such provision was not ultra vires the Arbitration Act, and that the appellate award (of 19-4-1961) was the final award for the parties insofar as the Arbitration Act's scheme permits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed.

Implications and Direct Effect:

  • The Appellate Tribunal's award dated 19-4-1961 in favour of the second respondent (damages of Rs. 15,000 and costs of Rs. 500) is upheld and was properly made the subject of a decree when the appellants' O.P. No. 478 of 1961 was dismissed by the lower court.
  • The court held that by-law 202, properly construed and read against the background of the parties' agreement to be bound by Exchange by-laws "from time to time," did confer a right of appeal and was not ultra vires the Indian Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940. Consequently, where a contract provides for subsequent by-law modifications and those by-laws add an appellate stage, the appellate award is the award which becomes final between the parties, subject only to the statutory grounds of challenge (e.g., Section 30).
  • The immediate consequence for the parties is that the appellants' challenge to the appellate award fails and the decree based on that award stands; the court ordered dismissal of the appeal with costs.
  • The opinion resolves the specific controversy between these parties and explains the legal basis for permitting contractual incorporation of subsequent arbitration-procedure changes; the court did not purport to lay down any broader novel principle beyond the application of established construction rules and the cited authorities to these facts.
Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Anantanarayanan, J.:— This appeal instituted by M.A and Sons (appellants) from the order and decree of the learned Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing O.P No. 478 of 1961, involves certain questions of interest with regard to a reference to arbitration, as provided for by the by-laws of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange (Pte.) Ltd. (first respondent). The essential facts and dates are as follows:

2. There were certain contracts, which were of the character of forward contracts, as between the appellants and the second respondent firm (Kilachand and Devchand and Co. Pte Ltd.) for supplies of groundnut oil on differing dates. It is not in dispute that, owing to the alleged bursting of the boiler apparatus, the appellants were unable to deliver, and reported the inability; in brief, the contracts were broken. On the principle of Section 60 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, the second respondent chose to treat the contract as subsisting, and waited till the date of delivery. As there was no delivery, there was a claim in damages arising out of the contracts, Ex. A.1 to A.4 While upon this topic, it is of importance to note a term of the contract, expressed in the following form:

“The contract entered into subject to the bylaws in force from time to time of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Ltd., of which the parties admit that they have knowledge and notice. In the event of any dispute of or differences of opinion in respect of any point under this contract, the same shall be settled by arbitration by and under the rules of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Ltd., and the decision of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Ltd., shall be final and binding on both the parties. This clause shall be considered as an arbitration agreement within the meaning of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940……”

3. We may now proceed to scrutinize the further events. On 18-9-1956, there was a claim statement filed by the second respondent before the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange (Pte.) Ltd., first respondent, claiming damages against the appellants to the tune of Rs. 24,200. The appellants filed a written statement on 30-10-1956, the second respondent filed a reply statement on 29-11-1956, and the arbitration proceedings were heard on the 18th and 19th April, 1957. Ultimately, oil 13-7-1957 the committee or Board of Arbitrators gave an award against the appellants for damages, computed to Rs. 8000. In the meantime, on 15-10-1956, that is, after the claim was filed by the second respondent, there was an amendment of the by-laws of the first respondent firm, and by-law 202 came into existence. Since the interpretation of this by-law is a cardinal ground of controversy, we shall set forth by-law 202, the essential part of it, as follows:

“Wherever an appeal is preferred, the Board shall appoint an appellate Tribunal for deciding such appeal consisting of the president or the Vice President and four other directors none of whom was a member of the Arbitration Tribunal in that particular matter, which had given the award against which such appeal is preferred……The minimum number of members of the appellate Tribunal who shall form a quorum and who shall be deemed to be duly appointed appellate Tribunal for the matter and who shall hear and decide the appeal shall be three.

The decision of the appellate Tribunal shall be final and binding on the parties concerned”.

4. Two characteristics of this unfortunately framed provision are immediately apparent. The first is that the provision does not, by the ipsissima verba thereof, provide that either party to the dispute referred to arbitration, in the first instance, may institute an appeal. In other words, the right of the party to appeal, as distinguished from the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal, is not expressly stated. The second is an equally obvious defect, that no limitation is provided for. We shall leave that matter there for the present and observe the further events of the dispute.

5. On 13-8-1957, the second respondent firm filed an appeal under this by-law 202, though objection was taken thereto by the appellant firm. The second respondent firm also instituted S.R 29768 of 1957 in the City Civil Court, Madras, to have the original award filed into court. On 8-11-1957, the parties filed a consent memorandum before the appellate tribunal, for the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Pte. Ltd., to state a special case for the opinion of the City Civil Court, Madras under Section 13(b) of the Arbitration Act. The three points of law referred were:

1. Whether the appellate Tribunal have jurisdiction, since the instant by-law was passed after the dates of the contracts?

2. Whether the rule providing for an appellate Tribunal to function was ultra vires, since the award given by the Arbitrators even in the first instance was final and binding under the Indian Arbitration Act 10 of 1940?

3. Whether the appeal could be prosecuted, when the appellants had filed a petition in the City Civil Court, Madras to have the initial award filed into court?

6. O.P 182 of 1958 was a proceeding in the City Civil Court, Madras, stating a case for opinion. On 11-4-1959 the court furnished its opinion, on all the three points, against the appellants.

7. The second respondent firm then withdrew the proceeding in the City Civil Court, Madras, to have the initial award filed into court, and the appellants instituted C.R.P 1263 of 1959 in this court. The learned Judge who disposed of the civil revision petition (Venkatadri J.) held that the opinion of the City Civil Court, upon the three points of reference, was correct, he dismissed the civil revision.

8. On 19-4-1961 the Appellate Tribunal made an award in favour of the second respondent awarding total damages of Rs. 15000 and costs Rs. 500. There was a further proceeding by the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Pte. Ltd., filing this award. The appellants filed O.P No. 478 of 1961 to set aside the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. The court dismissed this petition and passed a decree in accordance with the appellate award. That is the history of this civil miscellaneous appeal.

9. The grounds of law, or mixed questions of law and fact, that have been pressed before us by learned counsel for the appellants (Sri G.N Chari) may be tersely stated as follows. Firstly, learned counsel argues that there is no right of appeal conferred under by-law 202, which the second respondent firm could have availed of. Appeal is creature of rule or statute, and is neither a principle of natural justice, nor a remedy available at common law. A statute or rule ought to be interpreted, upon the manifest purport and languge employed; where no provision for appeal expressly appears, it ought not to be construed as a mere inference, or as a matter of implication. The second ground is that, even assuming that a right of appeal is provided for, the right is not available to the second respondent firm, since the proceeding or lis was instituted earlier in point of time to the introduction of this by-law. As will be clear from the dates that we have furnished, the claim statement in arbitration case No. 8 of 1956 was filed on 18-9-1956; the amendment of by-law 202 was only on 15-10-1956 and it could confer no right of appeal.

10. The third ground is an independent one that the appeal itself is ultra vires, as it is opposed to provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. The other ground which appears in the case stated under S. 13(b) of the Act, namely, whether the second respondent firm had a right to prosecute the appeal from the award, since they had filed a petition in the City Civil Court, Madras (S.R 9768 of 1957) to have the initial award filed into court, cannot be seriously pressed; for, in any event, this proceeding was withdrawn on a subsequent date. There is a ground in favour of the second respondent firm, whether the judgment of the learned Judge (Venkafadri J.) in C.R.P 1263 of 1959 is res judicata, and thereby prevents the appellants from disputing the final award. But the learned counsel for the second respondent conceded, with fairness, that this argument could not be seriously pressed. We shall now proceed to determine the grounds of law urged in this case by the learned counsel for the appellant's.

11. There can be no doubt whatever that appeal is a creature of statute, and is a remedy that does not merely or automatically flow in favour of a party upon any principle of natural justice, or as part of the incidents of common law. The authorities on this point are well known, and it is sufficient to refer the dicta of the learned Chief Justice in Ramanatha Chetti v. Lakashmanan Chetti, 1963-1 Mad LJ 46 at p. 48 : (AIR 1963 Mad 175 (FB) at p. 176). Nor can it be doubted that, being a right dependent upon statute or rule, it must be provided for, either by express language or by necessary implication. On this aspect, the following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edn. page 78 is significant.

‘One of these presumptions is that he legislature does not intend to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by clear implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute’

12. Again, learned counsel cites the passage in Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn, page 122, quoting the dictum of Lord Westbury. This was in Attorney-General v. Sillem, (1864) 10 HLC 704 and the House of Lords held that the court of Exchequer had no right of appeal, there being no express mention in the Act of any such right. Lord Westbury observed that. ‘The creation of a new right of appeal is plainly an act which requires (distinct) legislative authority’.

13. But, obviously, in applying these principles to the interpretation of by-law 202, we must make every allowance for imperfect draftsmanship. Where the language used is unmeaning, unless a right of appeal is presumed to exist in favour of the concerned parties by necessary implication, the court must not hesitate to draw such an inference; for, otherwise, no interpretation of the by-law could prevail, which could make any sense at all. It is not disputed before us that an intendment may be express, or necessarily implied. Such words in the by-law 202 as “Whenever an appeal is preferred” and “the award against which such appeal is preferred” render impossible any interpretation other than that the parties to the initial award, provided for by the earlier by-laws 193 and the following, have a right of appeal to the appellate Tribunal. No doubt, there is no limitation provided. But there is a limitation under the Arbitration Act for making the award a decree of court, and, indisputably, the appeal will have to be preferred and determined before that date. We are, therefore, of the view that the right of appeal exists.

14. There is another rule of construction upon which the same interpretation could be sustained. This is expressed in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. vol. 36, p. 389 in the following form. After observing that, if the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they themselves indicate what should have been the intention of the legislature and that there was no need to look elsewhere; this authority states:

“If it is possible, the words of statute must be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them. A statute must, if possible, be construed in the sense which makes it operative, and nothing short of the impossibility so as to construe it should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable”

15. This dictum necessarily implies that either by-law 202 should be taken out of the rule-book as unworkable and unmeaning, or we should hold that it provides a right of appeal to parties situated like the appellants and he second respondent.

16. The next ground presents a title more difficulty. In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Others, (S) AIR 1957 SC 540 the Supreme Court laid down that the right of appeal was a vested right and accrues to the litigant as on and from the date the lis commences, that cause would be governed by the rights then prevailing, and a subsequent legislation providing for a right of appeal could not clothe either party to the earlier I is with that right. This proposition is not seriously in dispute. That would certainly be the ordinary rule of law, and the Supreme Court observed in the cited case that,

“such a right (of appeal) is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding, and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal”

17. But, there are two answers to this objection. Firstly, we are not here dealing with a piece of litigation per se and a right of appeal provided by any enactment. We are dealing with a private dispute, and the obligation to refer the dispute to arbitration results from the contract between the parties, and not because of any law. Secondly, and more importantly the contract itself provides that if, at any time after the contract has come into existence and is in dispute, the by-laws of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Pte. Ltd. undergo modifications or alterations, and the parties will abide by those by-laws subject to such modification. This is manifest from the language of the contract.

“This contract is entered into subject to the by-laws in force from time to time of the Madras Oil and Seeds Exchange Ltd., of which the parties admit that they have knowledge and notice”.

18. Hence, it cannot be said that the introduction of a right of appeal in the by-laws after the claim was submitted to arbitration takes away this remedy from either party. Upon the effect of a contract of this kind, Heeralal Agarwalla and Co. v. Joakim Nahapiet and Co. Ltd., AIR 1927 Cal 647 is of particular significance. That was a case in which according to the contract between the parties, a dispute was referred firstly to Arbitrators, then to an umpire, and then to a committee of appeal from him. The learned Judge observed, on this aspect:

“In other words, the contract contains as it were two submissions or a submission within a submission”.

19. The learned Judges held that there was nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing to a submission containing in it a further submission to arbitration. Equally, Russel on Arbitration, 17th Edn. page 302 contains a passage to the effect that ‘the agreement may provide for an appeal.’ An award made pursuant to a proper arbitration agreement is final, subject, of course, to the consequences-of any such term of the contract. Here, the agreement provided that the parties would abide by any modification or alteration in the by-laws as governing the contract when it subsisted or was in issue between the parties. We must, therefore, hold that the second respondent had a right of appeal.

20. The third point may be quite briefly disposed of. Actually it largely depends upon the interpretation to be placed upon the words in condition No. 7 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act, that “the award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively”. Naturally, these words have to be construed as subject to any right of appeal, which might be provided for either by the contract itself, or by any by-law governing the parties; AIR 1927 Cal 647 is clear authority for this view. No doubt, except upon grounds specified in S. 30 of the Act, an award is not liable to be set aside, and is final between the parties. But, what is the award that is final between the parties, when the procedure governing the parties itself makes provision for an initial award on arbitration, and an appeal which may be instituted by either party aggrieved? An “award” is defined in S. 2(b) of the Act as an “arbitration award”.

21. As observed by the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1957 SC 540 the legal pursuit of successive remedies will make them all proceedings ‘connected by an intrinsic unity’ and ‘to be regarded as one legal proceeding’. In that sense, it is the award by the appellate Tribunal, if an appeal is preferred which becomes the final award that governs the parties. The passage from Russell on Arbitration that we set forth earlier, as well as the decision of the Calcutta High Court in AIR 1927 Cal 647 make it clear that it is perfectly legal to provide for different stages of arbitration, such as, from a single Arbitrator to a committee of appeal, etc. It is the award which finally emerges from this procedure, which is conclusive, 3S/between the parties, and not liable to be set aside, except as provided for in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 10 of 1940. For these reasons, we must hold that the provision for appeal is not ultra vires the law of Arbitration enacted in Act 10 of 1940. On this ground also the appellants will have to fail. The civil miscellaneous appeal, in result, fails and is dismissed with costs.

EI/VRB/D.V.C

22. Appeal dismissed.