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Rishikesavan Naidu v. S. Srinivasa Reddiar And Others.

Madras High Court
Mar 6, 1964
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Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a challenge to the appointment of the village headman (for Vembi Village, South Arcot District) under the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895. The office became vacant in 1936 and successive registered successors were minors who failed to qualify within the statutory periods. The appellant was registered under S.10(5) as successor on 5 May 1950, and the first respondent served as deputy for successive minors. After attaining majority and qualifying by passing the prescribed tests, the appellant applied on 2 December 1959 to enter upon the duties of the office. The first respondent objected to the appellant's application on grounds including alleged poor character, lack of property, and that the application was not filed within the permitted time.

The Revenue Divisional Officer and, on appeal, the District Revenue Officer rejected the respondent's objections and allowed the appellant to enter upon the office. The appellate order was dated 23 October 1960. The first respondent then filed a writ application in this Court seeking certiorari to quash the Revenue Authorities' orders. Srinivasan, J. quashed the orders of the Revenue Authorities on the basis that the appointment had been made on the footing of an overriding hereditary claim, contrary to principles announced by the Supreme Court in Dasarathrama Rao v. State of A.P. The appellant has appealed from that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointment of the appellant to the office of village headman (made after registration and after the appellant attained majority and passed required tests) is invalid because it was made on the basis of hereditary claim in breach of the principle that appointments cannot depend solely on descent under Article 16(1) and (2) of the Constitution, as interpreted in Dasarathrama Rao v. State of A.P.
  2. Whether the first respondent, who held the post only as a deputy and who did not apply for the office, is a person "aggrieved" and thus entitled to seek a writ of certiorari to quash the Revenue Authorities' orders.
  3. Whether failure to object before the Revenue Authorities (to the alleged invalidity based on heredity) barred the first respondent from raising that ground subsequently, given that the Supreme Court's ruling on the point was delivered only after the Revenue Authorities' orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Position

  • The appellant had been registered on 5 May 1950 under S.10(5) as the successor and there was never any challenge to that registration.
  • After attaining majority he passed the prescribed tests and applied (on 2 December 1959) to enter upon the duties of the office; the Revenue Authorities found the respondent's objections to be untenable and affirmed the appellant's right to the office.
  • There was no rival applicant when the appellant applied; therefore the appointment cannot be said to have been made by giving preference on hereditary grounds over any competing claimant.

First Respondent's Position

  • The first respondent filed an application for certiorari to quash the Revenue Authorities' appointments, contending that the appointment contravened the Supreme Court's ruling that heredity cannot be the basis for appointment to village offices.
  • Before the Revenue Authorities he raised objections that the appellant was not entitled to appointment because (a) the appellant had a bad reputation, (b) the appellant had no property, and (c) the application had not been filed within the statutory period.
  • In the Court below he relied on the Supreme Court decision (Dasarathrama Rao) to contend that an appointment made on hereditary grounds was invalid; Srinivasan, J. accepted this view and quashed the appointment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dasarathrama Rao v. State of A. P. (Supreme Court decision delivered 6 December 1960) The office of a village headman under the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act is an "office" under the State for the purposes of Arts. 16(1) & (2); appointments cannot be made to depend on descent alone (heredity as sole basis is discriminatory). The decision also invalidated S.6(1) of the Act (the opinion notes the Court is not concerned with that aspect in the present case). The Court applied the principle that heredity cannot be the sole basis of appointment, but distinguished the present facts: because there was no rival applicant and the appellant had stood registered and later qualified, the appointment could not be characterized as a discriminatory selection made purely on hereditary grounds. The Court also relied on the decision to observe that minors cannot be appointed to village offices and that deputy appointments would not arise in future.
Anantanarayanan J., unreported judgment in W.P. No. 32 of 1959 (referred to by respondent's counsel) An observation (as reported in the opinion) that a Supreme Court view governs instances arising thereafter and is to be presumed always to have been the law. The Court distinguished that judgment on its facts, reading the cited observation in context: it did not intend to invalidate unchallenged appointments made prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncement; the present Court refused to adopt an interpretation that would unsettle pre-existing appointments made after the Constitution and before the Supreme Court decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying the following analytical steps, grounded in the facts shown in the opinion and in the governing legal principles:

  1. Registration under S.10(5) and its legal effect: The Court noted that registration (the appellant's registration dated 5 May 1950) is not equivalent to an appointment. Registration merely declares that the registered person will be entitled to appointment on attaining majority or within three years thereafter provided he qualifies within the prescribed period. The lack of any challenge to that registration was noted but, standing alone, it does not preclude later contestation of the validity of any appointment.
  2. The temporal context of the Supreme Court decision: The Supreme Court's decision in Dasarathrama Rao on 6 December 1960 — that hereditary succession cannot be the sole basis for appointment to village offices under Article 16 — was rendered after the Revenue Authorities had already decided to appoint the appellant. Given this chronology, the Court held it could not reasonably be expected that the first respondent would have raised the new constitutional objection before the Revenue Authorities.
  3. How the Revenue Authorities acted and why that does not invalidate the appointment: The authorities had proceeded on the assumption, prevailing at the time, that heredity constituted a valid claim. Even if the hereditary principle were invalid, the appointing authority under the Act remained the Government (and appointment procedures applicable to non-hereditary offices would be governed by the Board's Standing Orders). The Court reasoned that, had authorities been aware that heredity was inapplicable, they likely would have adopted the normal procedure for non-hereditary appointments; but in the instant case there was only one applicant and no rival claimant, so it cannot be said that anyone had been excluded in favour of the appellant.
  4. On the substantive effect of heredity: The Court accepted the principle from Dasarathrama Rao that heredity cannot by itself support a claim. But it emphasized that heredity is not a disqualification; all else being equal, a person from a family of previous holders may be more competent than a newcomer. Here the appellant had long believed he would be appointed since 1950 and had accordingly acquired qualifications. Because there was no contest between rival applicants, the appointment was not selection "purely on the basis of heredity."
  5. On the respondent's locus/standing to seek certiorari: The first respondent had held the office only as a deputy and had not applied for the substantive office. The Court held that, since the deputy's position would in any event give way to the appointed substantive holder and because the Supreme Court's decision bars appointment of minors and deputy appointments in future, the first respondent could not be regarded as a person aggrieved by the appointment. Thus he lacked the necessary legal grievance to invoke writ jurisdiction in these circumstances.
  6. Distinguishing prior judicial observations: The Court considered an unreported judgment of Anantanarayanan J. which emphasized that Supreme Court views apply retrospectively. The Court read that observation in context and rejected a broad application that would invalidate unchallenged, pre-decision appointments, noting the disruptive effect such an approach would have had.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Taken together, the lack of any rival applicant, the appellant's valid registration and subsequent qualification, the nature of the first respondent's position (deputy), and the temporal context of the Supreme Court decision led the Court to conclude there was no justification for interfering with the Revenue Authorities' appointment of the appellant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court upheld the orders of the Revenue Authorities appointing the appellant to the office of village headman and disagreed with Srinivasan, J.'s order quashing those appointments.

DISPOSITION: The appeal is allowed with costs against the first respondent (both in this Court and before the learned Judge).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's appointment to the office of village headman is sustained; the first respondent's writ challenge fails and he is not regarded as a person aggrieved entitled to maintain certiorari in these circumstances.
  • No broad retrospective invalidation: The Court declined to adopt an approach that would treat unchallenged, heredity-based appointments made prior to the Supreme Court pronouncement as automatically invalid; it emphasized the contextual limits of applying the Supreme Court decision retrospectively and avoided unsettling pre-existing appointments made after the Constitution and before the Supreme Court's ruling.
  • On precedent: The opinion applies and distinguishes the Supreme Court's decision in Dasarathrama Rao; it does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond its application to the facts at hand.
V.C.S

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, precedents and reasoning contained in the provided opinion text. No additional facts or inferences have been introduced.

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(Delivered by the Chief Justice)

This appeal against the judgment of Srinivasan J., concerns the validity of an appointment to the office of a village headman for Vembi Village in South Arcot Dt. The appointment to the office was regulated by the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895, The office became vacant sometime during the year 1936, when one Pattabhirama Naidu, then a minor, was registered as the person lawfully entitled to hold the office. The first respondent herein was appointed as his deputy to do the duties pertaining to the office. Pattabhirama Naidu did not eventually acquire the necessary qualifications for becoming a village headman within the time allowed to him under the statute. The next to succeed him was one Munuswami Naidu. He also happened to be a minor; he was registered and the first respondent was then appointed to function as his deputy. History repeated itself, as Munuswami: failed to qualify himself for iihe post. The next in line of succession was the appellant, who was a minor at the time when Munuswami forfeited his right to the office. The appellant was recognised by the authorities as a person lawfully entitled to the post on 5th May, 1950, that is, after the Constitution of India came into being. The first respondent was allowed to be his deputy. Contrary, perhaps, to the expectations of the first respondent, the appellant passed the prescribed tests within the time allowed to him, after attaining the age of majority. He applied on 2nd December 1959, to enter upon the duties of his office. His attempt was countered by the first respondent, who made frivolous and false averments about the appellant's character and financial status. It was objected that the application itself had not been filed within the time permitted under the law.

Both the Revenue Divisional Officer, in the first instance, and the District Revenue Officer, on appeal, found the objections of the first respondent to be untenable and they affirmed the appellant's right to the office and allowed him to enter upon his duties. The order of the appellate authority was passed on 23th October 1960.

On 6th December 1960, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in a case from the Andhra Pradesh holdiug that the office of a village headman under the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, was an “office” under the State within the meaning of that term in Art. 16 (1) and (2) of the Constitution and appointments thereto could not be made to depend on the basis of descent alone; for, then it would be discriminatory. The Supreme Court also invalidated S. 6(1), of that enactment. We are not however, concerned in this case about the latter aspect of the matter. The decision of the Supreme Court has been reported in Dasarathrama Rao v. State of A. P.(1).

The first respondent appears to have thought that he could challenge the appellant's appointment on a more substantial ground than those put forward by him before the Revenue Authorities. He then filed an application to this Court towards the end of March 1961, for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the Revenue Authorities, appointing the appellant to the office of village headman.

Having regard to the fact that the invalidity of the application of the principle of heredity to the appointment of village officers was for the first time decided by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, it could not reasonably be expected of the first respondent to have taken any objection as to the invalidity of the appellant's appointment before the Revenue Authorities. It cannot therefore be said that his application for the issue of a writ of certiorari should be rejected on the short ground that he had not taken the appropriate objection before the Revenue Authorities.

Srinivasan, J., before whom the writ application came up for final disposal, held that inasmuch as the Revenue Authorities made the appointment of the appellant on the basis that the appellant had an overriding claim to be appointed to the office by virtue of his relationship to the previous holder it could not be said that there was a proper appointment to the office. The learned Judge, therefore, issued a writ quashing the order of the Revenue Authorities. The appellant has now appealed.

It will be noticed that although the appellant has registered under S. 10 (5) of the Act as the successor to the last holder as early as 5th May, 1950, there has been no challenge to the registration then or at any later time. But registration by itself is not equivalent to an appointment to the office. It can only amount to a declaration that the person registered will be entitled, on attaining the age of majority or within 3 years thereafter, to be appointed to the office, provided he qualified himself for the post within the prescribed period. Failure to object to the registration will not, therefore, disentitle the first respondent from contesting the validity of the appointment of the appellant.

It is true, as the learned Judge has pointed out, that the authorities proceeded on the footing that the person registered will be entitled to get himself appointed when he came forward with his application after passing the necessary tests. That was due to the fact that the prevailing opinion then was that the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, in so far as it recognised heredity as a claim to certain village offices, was a valid piece of legislation. Even if one were to hold that the Act in that respect is invalid, the appointing authority will still be the Government.

The Board's Standing Orders, which govern the appointment to non-hereditary village offices and this case must in the light of the Supreme Court's decision be treated as one such as to invest the power of appointment in the very authorities who would be competent to make such appointment under the Act.

Again at the time when the appellant made his application to the Revenue Divisional Officer, for his being appointed to the office, there was no rival applicant. Even the first respondent, who objected to the proposals made by the Tahsildar of Villupuram, did not claim before the Revenue Divisional Officer that he should be considered for such an appointment. The only objection raised by him was that the appellant was not entitled to be appointed to the office, because he had a bad reputation, had no property, and had not applied within the period permitted by the Act. If those objections were unfounded, it being now conceded they were unfounded, it must be taken that the first respondent himself had no objection to the appointment of the appellant. Indeed, in one of his petitions he stated that the Government should appoint the next heir to the last holder of the office. Under the circumstances, the utmost that can be said in this case is that if the authorities were aware that the application of the heredity principle in the matter of making appointment to village offices was invalid, they would have apdopted a different procedure and if there were more than one applicant for the post, they would have considered the application. But it is too much to speculate now whether, if they had followed the normal procedure applicable to the appointment to a non-hereditary office, they would have got other applications. It cannot therefore be said that the non-observance of the procedure, if any, prescribed for the selection of non-hereditary village offices, have vitiated the fresh appointment.

While heredity by itself cannot support a claim to the office, it has never been regarded as a disqualification. It can be conceded that to an office like the present one, where other things are equal, an applicant whose father or ancestor was a village officer, would be more competent to hold the post than a new comer. We cannot also forget that in the instant case since the year 1950 the appellant, in the belief that he would be ultimately appointed as the village headman, had acquired the necessary qualification. In Dasaratha Ram Rao v. State of A. P., there was a conflict for the office between two persons, one with hereditary qualification and the other without it. In such a case, on the principles, there laid down by the Supreme Court, it was obvius that selection to the office could not be made purely on the basis of heredity. In the instant case, there was only one person who applied for appointment to the office. It cannot be said that anybody had been excluded in favour of the appellant.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has invited our attention to an unreported judgment of Anantanarayanan J. in W. P. 32 of 1959 who held:

“However, this might be, it cannot be denied that the judicial canon is that the view enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision just referred to not merely govern instances arising hereafter, but also instances brought to the notice of the Court since it must be presumed always to have been the law.” But this observation must be read in the context of opposing claims to an office, the vacancy to which arose before the judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered. As we read j the judgment, the learned Judge did not, for instance, intend to law down that even unchallenged appointments, based on the principle of heredity but made prior to the pronouncement by the Supreme Court, could be regarded as invalid. To accept such a principle would be to unsettle several appointments made by the Government after the Constitution and prior to the year 1961. As we indicated, above, what all Arts. 14 and 16 prescribes that there can be discrimination only where there is rival claims to the office.

Srinivasan, J., has held that as the entire matter has been dealt with by the revenue authorities only on the basis that the appellant had an overriding claim to be appointed to the office, the appointment should be held to contravene the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. We are unable to share that view. In the absence of a claim by any other person, it cannot be said the appellant was chosen on any overriding considerations e.g heredity.

The first respondent's objection to the order of the revenue authorities has to fail on another ground as well. He was holding the post of village headman only as a deputy. As we said, he never applied for the post. It cannot, therefore, be said that when the revenue authorities overruled his objection, he was a person aggrieved by the order. It would have made little difference to him, whether the appellant or any other person was appointed to the office. The learned Judge has said that as the first respondent has been deprived of his office by the recognition accorded to the appellant, it would be competent for him to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. With respect, we are unable to agree. His office was only that of a deputy who will have to give way to the person appointed. It will be too much to speculate now that if the appellant's appointment were to be set aside and some other were to be chosen in his place, the first respondent would also have right to continue his office as deputy. In view of the decision in Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of A. P.(2), there could be no appointment of a minor to a village office. No question of appointing a deputy can at all arise hereafter. There could, therefore, be no office the holding of which by the first respondent could be said to have been imperilled so as to make him feel aggrieved with the appointment of the appellant. We are therefore of the opinion that there is no justification for interfering with the order of the revenue authorities appointing the appellant to the office of village headman. Further, the first respondent not being a person with a legal grievance, could not move this Court for the issue of a writ.

The appeal will therefore be allowed with costs against the first respondent here and before the learned Judge.

V.C.S