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A.L Parthasarathi Mudaliar v. Venkata Kondiah Chettiar .

Madras High Court
Jul 30, 1962
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Concise Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, in O.S. No. 901 of 1957, a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property.

Relevant factual background, as stated in the opinion:

  • One Loganatha Mudaliar purchased two parcels of land (plaint schedule items 1 and 2). Item 1 was held in his name and item 2 in the name of his wife Rathanammal. Loganatha died in 1955; Rathanammal died in 1947.
  • By a will dated 1-3-1954 (Ex. B-1) Loganatha gave item 1 (2 acres and 85 cents in Kodur village, Rajampet taluk, Cuddappah district) to his son Parthasarthi Mudaliar (the first defendant), item 2 (1 acre and 41 cents) to his daughters (who were not parties to the suit), and other property to his daughter-in-law, Nagarathnammal (the second defendant).
  • The plaintiff alleged that the first and second defendants executed an agreement (Ex. A-1, dated 14-2-1957) to sell both items for Rs. 5,750, with Rs. 1,000 paid immediately and the balance payable within three months; a penalty of Rs. 5,000 was provided for default.
  • The plaintiff sued for specific performance after the defendants allegedly defaulted in executing sale deeds despite the plaintiff's willingness to pay the balance. The plaintiff's reliefs sought conveyance of both items on payment of Rs. 4,750 (balance), or alternatively conveyance of item 1 on payment of Rs. 3,000 with compensation for item 2, or alternatively Rs. 5,000 as compensation.
  • The first defendant pleaded that he was in Madras, could speak Telugu but could not read or write it, and that he had signed the document believing it was for raising a loan (arranged by his brother-in-law Jagadesa Mudaliar). He alleged fraud/misrepresentation and said the Rs. 1,000 advance had been returned. The second defendant said she signed after seeing the first defendant's signature and had no interest in the properties.
  • The trial court found the agreement valid and binding on the first defendant, held that only item 1 belonged to the first defendant while item 2 belonged to his sisters, applied Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, valued item 2 at Rs. 850 (per plaint), fixed item 1 at Rs. 4,900, deducted the Rs. 1,000 advance and directed the first defendant to receive Rs. 3,900 and convey item 1. The suit against the second defendant was dismissed without costs.
  • The first defendant appealed from that decision. Before the appellate court the main contention pressed was that the proved contract differed from the pleaded contract and that Section 14 should not have been applied; the appellant also sought to rely on his plea of signing under misrepresentation (loan) and inability to read Telugu.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit agreement had been executed by the first defendant without knowing its contents and in the circumstances of fraud and misrepresentation as pleaded by the first defendant.
  2. If the first defendant (the promisor) did not have title to item 2, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement (in whole or in part).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (First Defendant)'s Arguments

  • The first defendant could speak Telugu but could not read or write it; he signed the agreement believing it was a document to raise a loan on item 1 to arrange money for his daughter's marriage.
  • His brother-in-law, Jagadesa Mudaliar (a retired sub-inspector), arranged the transaction and misrepresented its nature; the Rs. 1,000 advanced was received by Jagadesa and returned to the plaintiff.
  • Consequently, the first defendant asserted he was induced by fraud/misrepresentation and was not bound to execute the sale deed.
  • On appeal he also contended that the contract proved was different from that pleaded and hence specific performance should not be granted under Section 14 (this was a principal point pressed before the appellate court).

Second Defendant's Arguments

  • The second defendant said she signed the agreement only after seeing the first defendant's signature and asserted she had no interest in both items.

Respondent (Plaintiff)'s Position

  • The plaintiff maintained that the agreement (Ex. A-1) was true, valid and binding and that the defendants defaulted in conveying the properties despite the plaintiff's willingness to pay the balance.
  • At the appellate stage the plaintiff petitioned to relinquish his claim in respect of item 2 and offered to purchase item 1 for the contract price (stated as Rs. 5,750) so as to obtain relief under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rutherford v. Acton Adams, 1915 AC 866 (AIR 1915 PC 113) Statement of English law summarized by the Privy Council: where a vendor can convey substantially what the purchaser contracted to get, court may decree specific performance with compensation for small and immaterial deficiency, provided vendor has not disentitled himself by misrepresentation. Used to explain the principle underlying Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act and to assess whether item 2 constituted a "small and immaterial deficiency" permitting a Section 14 remedy; the court concluded item 2 was not such a deficiency.
Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 165 (1954-1 Mad LJ 305) Authority that relinquishment of claim to further performance can be made at any stage of litigation, enabling a party to claim relief under Section 15. Relied upon to support the proposition that the plaintiff could relinquish the claim to item 2 at the appellate stage and seek specific performance limited to item 1 under Section 15.
Dwijendra Kumar v. Monmohan De, AIR 1957 Cal 209 Decision following the principle that relinquishment can be made even in a second appeal. Followed to reinforce that the plaintiff's relinquishment at this stage (first appeal) was legally permissible.
Pramathnath Mitra v. Gosthabhiari Sen, ILR 59 Cal 1025 (AIR 1932 PC 43) Privy Council holding that specific performance of a part cannot be granted where the plaintiff has not relinquished all other claims as required by Section 15. Used to state the requirement of relinquishment under Section 15; the court noted the Privy Council did not consider the stage at which relinquishment could be made but relied on later authorities to permit relinquishment at appellate stages.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded in two principal analytical stages corresponding to the issues framed.

1. Whether the first defendant was induced by fraud/misrepresentation and signed without knowing contents

  • The trial court had found the first defendant failed to discharge the onus of proving fraud or misrepresentation. The appellate court reviewed the evidence and concurred with the trial court's finding.
  • The appellate court relied upon the plaintiff's witnesses and a contemporaneous postcard (Ex. A-6) written by the first defendant to the plaintiff, which stated that the first defendant was not selling the garden because his sisters would not give consent, that the advance money had not been received by him but was deposited in the bank and would be returned if not settled, and that further dealings could be with his brother-in-law at Cuddapah.
  • The appellate court concluded that the postcard "shows conclusively" that the first defendant withdrew because his sisters would not consent to the sale of item 2, that he knew of the advance, and thus it was idle for him to deny the agreement and receipt of the advance. Accordingly, the court found no established fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to vitiate the document.

2. Whether specific performance could be decreed given the first defendant's lack of title in item 2

  • The court considered Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Specific Relief Act, which were invoked in argument and by the trial court. It set out the text of Section 14 and quoted the Privy Council in Rutherford to explain the English antecedent of Section 14.
  • The court found that item 2 (1.41 acres, valued in the plaint at Rs. 850) could not be treated as a "small and immaterial deficiency" when compared with item 1 (2.85 acres) for the purposes of Section 14. Therefore Section 14 was not appropriate in the appellate court's view for granting specific performance of the whole contract with compensation for the deficiency.
  • The court held Section 15 to be more applicable. Section 15 prevents a party who cannot perform a considerable portion from obtaining a decree for specific performance of the whole, but allows the other party (the plaintiff) to obtain specific performance of that part which can be performed provided the plaintiff relinquishes further claims and rights to compensation.
  • Section 16 was held inapplicable because the conveyance of item 2 did not stand on a separate and independent footing from item 1; both were given a common valuation and were dealt with in a single contract.
  • The court therefore concluded that specific performance limited to item 1 could be granted if the plaintiff relinquished all claims as required by Section 15 and waived compensation for deficiency or loss.
  • The plaintiff filed, during the appeal, a petition to relinquish the claim to item 2 and to purchase item 1 at the contract price (Rs. 5,750). The first defendant opposed on grounds of appreciation of value (claiming item 1 worth substantially more now). The court analyzed delay and timing, noting the suit was filed within two months of the agreement and that any five-year delay thereafter was not attributable to the plaintiff. The court held that relinquishment at the stage of a first appeal is permissible, relying on Kalyanpur and Dwijendra Kumar.
  • In equity, the court also observed that the brother-in-law (Jagadesa) had represented that the defendants had title to item 2; as the first defendant had earlier acknowledged (in the postcard) that his sisters would not consent, the plaintiff would have priced the contract having regard to item 2 as well. These equitable considerations supported granting the limited relief.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED. The appellate court allowed the plaintiff to relinquish his claim in respect of item 2 and modified the trial court's decree so that the plaintiff obtains specific performance in respect of item 1 only, on payment of the adjusted balance.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as set out in the opinion):

  • The plaintiff is permitted to relinquish his relief in regard to item 2.
  • In modification of the trial court's decree, the plaintiff gets a decree directing the first defendant to receive Rs. 4,750 (described in the judgment parenthetically as "i.e, Rs. 3/50 less advance of Rs. 1000 paid") and to effect conveyance of item 1 of the plaint schedule property. (The judgment text so states.)
  • Time to pay the balance: 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the appellate order by the lower court.
  • The rest of the trial court's decree is confirmed in other respects; the remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
  • Costs: the appellants shall pay three-fourths of the costs of this appeal to the respondent; costs in the suit to be as directed.
  • Final summary disposition in the opinion: "Appeal partly allowed."

Broader implications: The court applied established principles under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Specific Relief Act and relied on precedent for the proposition that a plaintiff may relinquish claims at appellate stages so as to obtain specific performance of a portion of a contract. The opinion modifies the lower court's relief to conform to Section 15 requirements. The judgment does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying these established authorities to the facts; its direct effect is to grant specific performance limited to item 1 on the conditions stated.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree of the learned IV Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court in O.S No. 901 of 1957, a suit filed for specific performance of an agreement to sell Immoveable property. One Loganatha Mudaliar purchased the plaint schedule item 1 in his name and the plaint schedule item 2 in the name of his wife, Rathanammal. Loganatha Mudaliar died in 1955 and Rathanammal died in 1947. Loganatha Mudaliar executed the will Ex. B-1, dated 1-3-2954 under which he gave the plaint schedule item 1 (two acres and 85 cents) in Kodur village in Rajampet taluk in Cuddappah Dt. to his son, Parthasarthi Mudaliar, the first defendant in the suit, he gave item 2 of the plaint schedule (1 acre and 41 cents) land in Kodur village to his daughters who are not parties to this suit; he gave some other property to his daughter-in-law, Nagarathnammal, who had, at that time, lost her husband and who is the second defendant in the suit. It is alleged by the plaintiff, in the suit, that the first and the second defendants had executed the agreement marked as Ex. A-1 in the case to sell the plaint schedule items 1 and 2 for a consideration of Rs. 5750. Rs. one thousand was paid Immediately and the balance was agreed to be paid within three months. There was also a provision that in case of default, the promisor would pay Rs. 5000 as penalty. On the ground that the defendants defaulted in executing the sale deeds as promised by them even though the plaintiff was willing to pay the balance of the sale price, the plaintiff filed the suit praying for the following reliefs:

“that the defendants may be directed to receive Rs. 4750 being the balance of the sale price and effect a conveyance of both the items of the schedule described properties getting Sivakamiammal, Nithyanandammal and Jeevarathnammal the sisters of the first defendant to join in the sale deed; or in the alternative the defendants may the directed to receive Rs. 3000 and effect a conveyance of item 1 of the schedule described properties and pay such compensation for the non-conveyance of item 2 of the schedule described properties as this Hon'ble Court may fix, or in the alternative that the defendants may be decreed to pay Rs. 5000 to the plaintiff as compensation.”

The first defendant pleaded that he was in Madras while the second defendant, his sister-in-law was at Vellore. The agreement of sale dated 14-2-1957 is in telugu. The first defendant can speak telugu and does not know to read and write the language. He wanted to raise a loan against the first item of the properties which alone he got, as per the will of his father. He told his brother-in-law, Jagadesa Mudaliar, retired sub-inspector of police to arrange for the loan. He was informed that the agreement was only for purpose of raising a loan and therefore he signed it. Subsequently, he came to know of the fraud played upon him. It was Jagadesa Mudaliar who received the thousand rupees as advance and if was returned to the plaintiff. In the above circumstances, he was not bound to execute the sale deed. The second defendant said that she signed the agreement on seeing the first defendant's signature thereon, and she had no interest in both the items.

2. The lower court found that the suit agreement was true, valid, and binding on the first defendant and that it was not executed in the circumstances alleged by the first defendant which amounted to fraud and mis-representation played upon him. It was signed by the first defendant with full knowledge of the contents. The lower court then held that only item 1 belonged to the first defendant, and he had no right to convey item 2 which belonged to his sisters. Then, the trial court applied Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. It took the value of item 2 at Rs. 850 relying upon the valuation in the plaint for the purpose. Deducting this amount, it fixed the value of item 1 at Rs. 4900. From this one thousand rupees paid as advance was deducted, and the first defendant was directed by the decree to receive Rs. 3900, and convey item 1. The suit against the second defendant was dismissed without costs. From the above decision, the present appeal is filed by the first defendant. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court should have found that the first defendant did not know to read or write Telugu and that he signed the document without knowing its nature and on the misrepresentation that it was a document to raise a loan. There was a contention, in the grounds of appeal, that the court at Madras had no jurisdiction to try the suit; but it was not pressed at the time of the hearing of the appeal. What was urged before me was the plea that the plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed because the contract found proved was different from the contract pleaded by the plaintiff, and therefore, specific performance was not possible. This was not a, case where Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act should have been applied.

3. The point for determination, in this appeal, are (1) whether the suit agreement had been executed by the first defendant without knowing its contents and in the circumstances of fraud and misrepresentation pleaded by the first defendant; and (2) (Sic) it is found that item 2 did not belong to the promisor, namely, the first defendant is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement.

4. Taking up point (1), the first defendant admittedly is an educated person. He is a M.B.B.S, and is a doctor employed in the Corporation of Madras. His father was employed in the telugu districts, and purchased the suit property in Cuddappah Dt. The first defendant admits that he knows to speak telugu but he is not able to read or write telugu. The suit agreement is written in telugu. The specific case of the first defendant is that he requested his brother-in-law one Jagadesan Mudaliar, a retired Sud-inspector of Police, to arrange for a loan on the security of the suit item 1 for the marriage of his daughter. His brother-in-law sent a letter with the suit agreement. It was after seeing that letter that he signed the suit agreement believing that it was for securing a loan, and not an agreement to sell the property.

(His Lordship reviewed the evidence on this point and proceeded:)

5. The evidence in the case clearly supports the finding of the trial court that the first defendant had not discharged the onus of proving fraud and misrepresentation practised upon him for executing the document, and that, on the other hand, the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses about the circumstances of the execution of the document has to be relied upon as true. This inference is supported further by the post card, Ex. A-6, written by the first defendant to the plaintiff and which is in the following terms:

“I wish to inform you that I am not selling the garden as my sisters are not willing to give me their consent. So I request you to leave the idea of buying it and do not trouble me for the same. If you want anything more, you better contact my brother-in-law at Cuddapah and proceed as you like. I have not received your advance money a pie and it is deposited in the bank and if you do not settle, it will be paid in court….. You can do anything and settle with my brother-in-law at Cuddapah………

Sd. A.L Parthasaratnt.”

This post card would show conclusively that the first defendant backed out from the sale because his sisters were not willing to give consent for selling item 2 of the property. It also shows that the first defendant knew of the advance paid by the plaintiff, and asserted that it was kept in the bank and that he was willing to return it to the plaintiff. It is therefore idle for the first defendant to deny the suit agreement and the receipt of the advance therefor.

6. The further question is how far specific performance of the suit agreement could be decreed when it is found that the promisor had not title in regard to item 2. Out of the three sections of the Specific Relief Act which were referred to in this connection viz., Ss. 14, 15 and 16, S. 14 has been held by the lower court as applicable to the present case. That section reads:

“Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must be left unperformed bears only a small portion of the whole in value and admits of compensation in money, the court may at the suit of either party direct the specific performance of so much of the contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency.”

Now the part of the contract which could not be performed, in this case, is the conveyance of item 2 which measures 1.41 acres as against item 1 which could be conveyed, and which measures 2.85 acres. The contention of the first defendant is that item 1 being a land planted with fruit bearing trees is much more valuable than item 2. It is also admitted by the plaintiff in the plaint, that item 2 is valued at Rs. 850 as against the value of item 1 which will be the remainder, that is, Rs. 4900. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act is based upon the English law on the subject, which has been summed up by the Privy Council in Rutherford v. Acton Adams, 1915 AC 866 : (AIR 1915 PC 113):

“If a vendor sues and is in a position to convey substantially what the purchaser has contracted to get, the court will decree specific performance with compensation for any small and immaterial deficiency provided that the vendor has not, by misrepresentation or otherwise, disentitled himself to his remedy.”

But, in the present case, one cannot consider item 2 as amounting to a small and immaterial deficiency in the contract, which will entitle the plaintiff to get a decree for specific performance subject to the payment of compensation to the vendee by equating the amount of compensation to the price of item 2. On the other hand, Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act seems to be more in point. It reads:

“Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which must be left unperformed forms a considerable portion of the whole or does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance. But the court may at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part or the contract as he can perform, provided that the plaintiff relinquishes all claim to further performance, and all right to compensation either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default on the defendant”

Illustration (a) to that section is also relevant to this case:

“A contracts to sell to B a piece of land consisting of 100 bighas. It turns out that 50 bighas of the land belong to A and the other 50 bighas to a stranger, who refuses to part with them. A cannot obtain a decree against B for the specific performance of the contract; but if B is willing to pay the price agreed upon, and to take the 50 bighas which belong to A, waiving all right to compensation either for the deficiency or for loss sustained by him through A's neglect or default, B is entitled to as decree directing A to convey those 50 bighas to him on payment of the purchase-money.”

Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act refers to a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed and stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed. In the present case, the conveyance of item 2 does not stand on a separate and independent footing from the conveyance of item 1. A common valuation is given to both the items and they are dealt with in a single contract. There can therefore be no question of the application of S. 16. As held before this is a case where specific relief by performance of to agreement could be granted to the plaintiff by conveyance of item 1 provided he pays the full amount of consideration and waives all right to compensation for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him through default of the first defendant.

7. At the time when the appeal was heard, the plaintiff filed a petition saying that he was willing to purchase item 1 of the suit property for the contract price of Rs. 5750 and give up the claim for compensation so as to obtain relief under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act. That application was opposed by the respondent first defendant on the ground that the price of the land had increased many fold and that item 1 would be at least worth Rs. 8000 for the land portion of it, and that if the time and orange trees which had begun to yield are taken into account, it would be worth much more than Rs. 12,000.

8. It has been pointed out in several decisions of courts that the giving up of the relief of compensation could be made by the promisor at any stage in the action. In Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1954-1 Mad LJ 305 : (AIR 1954 SC 165), the Supreme Court had observed that relinquishment of the claim to further performance can be made at any stage of the litigation and the plaintiff can claim relief under Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act. This has been followed by the Calcutta High-Court in Dwijendra Kumar v. Monmohan De, AIR 1957 Cal 209, where it observed that the relinquishment can be made even in second appeal. In Pramathnath Mitra v. Gosthabhiari Sen, ILR 59 Cal 1025 : (AIR 1932 PC 43) it was held by the Privy Council that the specific performance of a part could not be granted where the plaintiff had not relinquished all other claims as required by Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act. But the Privy Council did not consider the question about the stage at which the promisee could relinquish his claim. That question has been dealt with only in the two former decisions above cited.

9. As regards the contention in the counter to the application, that the lands have appreciated in value since the filing of the suit, it is pointed out that the suit agreement is dated 14-2-1957 and the suit was filed on 304-1957, that is, within 2 months thereafter. The plaintiff has, therefore, come to the court at the earliest opportunity. The law permits the plaintiff to relinquish his claim to compensation at any stage of the action, even at the stage of the second appeal. We are now at the stage of the first appeal. No doubt, five years had passed from the date of the plaint, but that is not due to the default of the plaintiff, but is due to other causes. Therefore, any possible appreciation of the price in the interval, that has elapsed between the date of the plaint and the date of the present application, will not be an adequate ground for refusing specific performance, after permitting the plaintiff to relinquish a portion of the property on which the promisor had no title to sell. It must also be borne in mind when granting this relief on an equitable basis, that Jagadesa Mudaliar, the first defendant's brother-in-law who represented him in this transaction, has been responsible for making the representation that the defendants had title to item 2, or, in any event, that a valid title would be conveyed in regard to that item also. In the post card above referred to, the first defendant had stated that his sisters would not agree to sell their property. In other words, the first defendant knew even earlier that the plaintiff had agreed to buy item 2 and that a representation had been made that the assent of the first defendant's sisters would be obtained; consequently in fixing the sale price item 2 also would have been taken into account. In these circumstances. I am of the opinion that the equitable relief of specific performance within the terms of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, can be granted to the plaintiff.

10. Consequently, I allow this petition and permit the plaintiff to relinquish his relief in regard to item 2. The appeal is allowed in part, and in modification of the decree of the lower court, the plaintiff will get a decree directing the first defendant to receive Rs. 4750 (i.e, Rs. 3/50 less advance of Rs. 1000 paid) and effect the conveyance of item 1 of the plaint schedule property with costs in the suit; the decree of the trial court will be confirmed in other respects. Time to pay the balance of the condition (sic) 4 weeks from the date of receipt of this order by the lower court. The rest of the appeal is dismissed.

11. The appellants will pay three-fourths of the costs of this appeal to the respondent.

KF/R.G.D

12. Appeal partly allowed.