- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras v. K. Srinivasan And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a consolidated reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act arising from five assessees who were directors and shareholders of Kasturi and Sons Private Ltd. For the accounting year ended 31 March 1956 (assessment year 1956-57) the assessees received salaries and allowances from the company and maintained "current accounts" in the company's books. During the year each drew amounts from the company's funds for private purposes and also made cash payments into their current accounts; the balances fluctuated in favour of or against the assessees.
The Income-tax Officer assessed the assessees on the net amounts debited to their accounts at the year end, treating those amounts as "dividend" under the definition in section 2(6A)(e) of the Act. The assessees objected, the objections were overruled, and assessments were made. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner failed. The Tribunal, however, set aside the assessments, holding that (a) the debits could not be regarded as loans or advances and (b) on the whole picture the payments were not "deemed dividend" within section 2(6A)(e). The department moved for a reference under section 66(1); the Tribunal referred the question whether the net overdrawings amounted to dividends under section 2(6A)(e). The assessees asked the Tribunal to refer an additional question whether "accumulated profits" include general reserves; the Tribunal also referred that question despite the department's objection.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the net overdrawings of the assessees during the previous year ended March 31, 1956, amount to dividends within the meaning of section 2(6A)(e) of the Income-tax Act?
- Whether "accumulated profits" for the purpose of applying section 2(6A)(e) include general reserves?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessees' Arguments
- The definition in section 2(6A)(e) did not apply to their debits.
- The amounts debited to their current accounts did not constitute loans or advances.
- The dealings were between the company and the assessees as "special customers" and not in their capacity as shareholders.
- There were no accumulated profits of sufficient volume to justify treating the whole of these debits as dividends under section 2(6A)(e).
- On the meaning of "loan", counsel (Mr. Padmanabhan) contended the company was not acting as a banker and relied on Potts' Executors v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (House of Lords) to argue that current account debits did not necessarily equate to a "loan" in the relevant statutory sense.
- As to "advance", counsel argued that it implies a payment made ahead of time against an entitlement (e.g., future salary/dividend), and the accounts did not describe the items as advances against such entitlements.
Revenue (Department) Arguments
- The department contended that the net overdrawings should be treated as deemed dividends under section 2(6A)(e) and therefore moved for the reference under section 66(1).
- The department opposed the assessees' request for a separate reference on the accumulated-reserve question (objecting that assessees had not filed a separate application), but the Tribunal nonetheless referred that question as a question of law arising from its order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| T.C. No. 88 of 1959 (decision of this Court) | Consideration of the converse question whether a credit balance in profit & loss account represents a "reserve" within section 23A. | The Court referred to that decision when discussing the distinction between sums retained in a profit & loss account and sums specifically placed to a reserve; it used the decision to frame the present question (whether sums placed to "General Reserves" cease to be accumulated profits). |
| Rukmani & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax | Whether, when no reserve had been created but amounts remained in profit & loss account, the proviso to section 23A (as then constituted) would apply (i.e., whether unappropriated profits amounted to "reserves"). | The Court discussed this case in relation to the meaning of "reserve" and to show that an accumulation kept merely in the profit & loss account was treated differently; however, the Court held that this decision did not decide the converse question before it (i.e., where profits were specifically transferred to "General Reserves"). |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1953] 24 I.T.R. 499 | Held that a mass of undistributed profits unappropriated under any head of reserve did not amount to "reserves" within Schedule II, rule 2(1) (Business Profits Rules). | The Court relied on the principle from this decision to distinguish unappropriated profits from sums actually placed to reserves, and to explain that Century Spinning does not decide whether sums already appropriated to a general reserve cease to be accumulated profits. |
| Potts' Executors v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (House of Lords) | Interpretation of "loan" / "capital sum" in the context of current account operations and whether debits at year end constituted a loan assessable under the statutory provision considered in that case. | The assessees' counsel relied on this decision to argue that current account debits are not necessarily "loans". The Court noted this authority but observed that even if applied, other heads of section 2(6A)(e) (e.g., payments on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder) could still bring the transactions within the provision. |
| In re Spanish Prospecting Company Ltd. (quoted in Palmer's Company Law) | Definition and explanation of "profits" (comparison of assets between two dates; profits as increase in assets over a period, subject to capital introduced or withdrawn). | The Court quoted the passage to support the company-law principle that sums placed to general reserves remain profits in the legal sense and can be used for payment of dividends unless effectively converted into capital. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the two referred questions in sequence.
1. Whether "accumulated profits" include general reserves
- The Court accepted the Tribunal's view that the natural meaning of "accumulated profits" is not altered by transferring a profit to the reserve account. The major portion of the company's profits had been transferred year after year into a general reserve. The Court observed that it is open to the company to utilise sums in a reserve for any purpose, including payment of dividends, and open to the shareholders to re-appropriate reserve sums back to profit for distribution.
- The Court examined prior authorities and company-law principles (including a passage quoted from In re Spanish Prospecting Company Ltd.) to explain that "profits available for dividend" is a distinct concept from "accumulated profits possessed by the company," and that general reserves are generally regarded as part of divisible profits in the legal sense unless specifically capitalised or otherwise restricted.
- Conclusion: unless profits are capitalised in some form, mere transfer to a reserve account does not remove their character as accumulated profits. The Court therefore answered the question in the affirmative.
2. Whether the net overdrawings amounted to dividends within section 2(6A)(e)
- The Court began by noting the Tribunal's view that the debits did not amount to loans or advances but observed the Tribunal had not considered all parts of the statutory definition in section 2(6A)(e).
- The Court set out the statutory wording: the definition contemplates payments by a company (not being one in which the public are substantially interested) by way of (1) advance; (2) loan; (3) any payment on behalf of a shareholder; and (4) any payment for the individual benefit of a shareholder, to the extent of available accumulated profits.
- The Court examined a representative current account: the company paid for the assessee's personal expenses, met income-tax demands, paid life-insurance premia payable by the assessee, and met other personal commitments on behalf of the assessee; these payments were debited to the assessee's account. Although the assessee made cash payments into the current account, the overall transaction prima facie showed that the company made payments on behalf of the shareholder, with an understanding of repayment or adjustment.
- The Court noted factual indicia consistent with a loan or advance: interest was debited to the assessee at year end; the company could have adjusted the debit against salary/allowances; and there was an implied understanding that the amounts stood to the company's right of reimbursement. The Court observed that "loan" and "advance" were not used as technical terms of art in the provision but to cover cases where company funds were used for or on behalf of a shareholder with a right of reimbursement.
- The Court concluded that at least parts of the payments (for example, income-tax and life insurance paid by the company on the assessee's behalf) clearly fell within "payments on behalf of the shareholder," and, taking into account the implied understanding and other indicia, the payments could be regarded as loans or advances or as payments for the individual benefit of the shareholder and therefore fall within section 2(6A)(e).
- Finally, the Court observed there were accumulated profits adequate to cover these payments. On that basis the debits were to be regarded as deemed dividends within the meaning of section 2(6A)(e).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- Question 1: Answered in the affirmative — "accumulated profits" for the purpose of section 2(6A)(e) do include sums placed to general reserves (unless such profits have been effectively capitalised or otherwise removed from the character of accumulated profits).
- Question 2: Answered in favour of the department — the net overdrawings (debits against the assessees' current accounts) must be regarded as payments of deemed dividends within the meaning of section 2(6A)(e), given the nature of the payments and the existence of adequate accumulated profits.
Costs and ancillary directions recorded in the opinion: the department is entitled to its costs; counsel's fee awarded is Rs. 250.
Implications: The direct effect is that the department's reference succeeds on both questions referred: general reserves count as accumulated profits for s.2(6A)(e) purposes, and the particular debits examined are to be treated as deemed dividends under that provision. The opinion does not elaborate broader precedential policy beyond these holdings.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Srinivasan, J.:— This is a consolidated reference and a common statement of the case has been submitted by the Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Act. The five assessees whose cases have given rise to the question are directors and shareholders in Kasturi and Sons Private Ltd. During the account year ended on 31st of March, 1956, relevant to the assessment year 1956-57, the assessees were employed in various capacities in the company for which they were paid salaries and allowances. These assessees had each what is called a current account in the books of the company. It is common ground that they used to draw from the funds of the company various amounts for their private purposes and also pay into this current account amounts by way of cash. During the year, the balance was fluctuating either in favour of or against the assessees. The company is not one in which the public is substantially interested within the meaning of section 23 A. In the orders of assessment, the Income-tax Officer proceeded to assess the assessees on the amounts debited against the assessees as at the end of the year, purporting to do so by reason of the definition of “dividend” as it occurs in section 2(6A)(e). This was objected to by the assessees on the ground that that provision did not apply, that the amounts to the debit of the assessees in the books of the company did not constitute either loans or advances, that the assessee's dealings with the company were not in their capacity of shareholders but as “special customers” and that in any event there were no accumulated profits of sufficient volume to justify the inclusion of the whole of these debits as dividends within the meaning of section 2(6A)(e). These contentions were overruled and assessments were made treating the net overdrawings on the current account as payments made by the company which would be dividend within the meaning of the section. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner failed. In the further appeals to the Tribunal while the Tribunal accepted the view that the expression “accumulated profits” would include the general reserves and that the mere creation of a general reserve, to which the major part of the profits stood transferred, would not affect the character of the sum as accumulated profits, it nevertheless held that the payments could not be regarded either as loans or advances; and taking the picture as a whole, so the Tribunal said, the payments could not be treated as “deemed dividend” within the meaning of the section. Accordingly, the assessments were set aside.
2. The department moved for a reference under section 66(1) of the Act and the question it sought to be referred to this court: “Whether the net overdrawings of the assessees during the previous year ended March 31, 1956, for the assessment year amount to dividends within the meaning of section 2(6A)(e) of the Act?” was referred by the Tribunal. At the same time the assessees made a request to the Tribunal to refer a further question: “Whether accumulated profits for the purpose of applying section 2(6A)(e) would include general reserves?”
3. The reference of this question was objected to by the department as the assessees did not file any separate application in that regard. But the Tribunal held that it was a question of law arising from out of the Tribunal's order and referred that question as well.
4. We shall deal with the question of accumulated profits in the first instance. It is common ground that the major portion of the profits of the concern has been transferred to the general reserve year after year. What is claimed on behalf of the assessees is that where a reserve has been created, it can no longer be regarded as representing accumulated profits. The expression “accumulated profits” has not been defined anywhere. The Tribunal took the view that adopting the natural meaning of that expression, the mere transfer of the profit from the profit account to the reserve account does not alter the character of the amount as a profit. It is open to the company to utilise the amount in the reserve account for any purposes, including the payment of dividend. It is open to the general body of shareholders to withdraw any sum from any reserve to the profit account and enable the distribution of dividend. It would accordingly follow, so held the Tribunal, that the sum transferred to the reserve account did not cease to possess the character of accumulated profit.
5. We are satisfied that this view is correct. In a case decided by us in T.C No. 88 of 19591, the converse question arose. It was whether a credit balance in the profit and loss account of the company would represent a reserve within the meaning of section 23A of the Income-tax Act. That was a case where the first proviso to section 23A, as it stood before the amendment, came to be considered. That proviso read thus:
“Provided that when the reserves representing accumulations of past profits which have not been the subject of an order under this sub-section exceed the paid up capital of the company…. this section shall apply as if instead of the words ‘sixty per cent.’ ‘the words’ one hundred per cent.’ were substituted.”
6. Section 23A, it is well known, was intended to deal with cases of evasion of tax by the device of non-distribution of a reasonable portion of the profits of the company and accumulating such profits in the shape of reserves. While the main part of the section laid down that where less than 60% of the assessable income of the company, as reduced in the manner specified, has been distributed as dividends, it was open to the Income-tax Officer to make an order of deemed distribution of a further amount by way of dividend and to bring to tax such deemed distribution in the hands of the shareholder. The proviso enhanced the limit of this deemed distribution in a case where the company had reserves representing accumulations of past profits which exceeded the paid-up capital together with any loan capital. The question that arose in Rukmani & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax was whether when no reserve had been created but the amounts were merely accumulated in the profit and loss account, the proviso would apply. It was held, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1953] 24 I.T.R 499, that a mass of undistributed profits which was available for distribution and not earmarked as reserve did not amount to reserve within the meaning of Schedule II, rule 2(1) of the Business Profits Rules. In the case before the Supreme Court, the question that arose was what was the capital of the company on the relevant date and according to the mode of computation of capital set out in the rules in the Schedule to the Business Profits Tax Act of 1947. The rule relevant to the computation specified that the capital shall be the sum of the amounts of the paid up share capital and its reserves. Their Lordships held that where the profits of the company remained unappropriated under any head of reserve, general or specific, the mass of such unappropriated profits could not be reserves within the meaning of the Schedule. It seems to us that this decision cannot help the determination of the question, which is whether where the profits are placed under the head of “General Reserves”, they cease to be accumulated profits. The view taken by the Tribunal in this regard that a sum transferred to the credit of general reserve is no less available to the company for distribution of dividend as a sum kept under the head “profits” seems to us to be supported by general principles of company law. The only limitation placed upon the company, which is a cardinal principle of company law, is that dividends can only be paid out of profits in the legal sense. Palmer in his Company Law, at page 635, quotes a classic passage from In re Spanish Prospecting Company Ltd.:
“‘Profits’ implies a comparison between the state of a business at two specific dates usually separated by an interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is the amount of gain made by the business during the year. This can only be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of the business at the two dates….If the total assets of the business at the two dates be compared, the increase which they shew at the later date as compared with the earlier date (due allowance of course being made for any capital introduced into or taken out of the business in the meanwhile) represents in strictness the profits of the business during the period in question.”
7. The author also defines “profits available for dividend” as meaning profits which the directors consider should be distributed after making provision for past losses, for reserves or for other purposes. It would be noticed that this definition of “profits available for dividend”is in sharp contrast with the expression “accumulated profits possessed by the company.” There is nothing in the company law which prevents the re-transfer of any amount placed to the head of any reserve, general or special, to the head of profits and the distribution of dividend from out of such amounts. The only restriction upon the company is that it should not be a dividend paid out of its capital, and there is no proposition of law that solely for the reason that the profits have been transferred to the head of a reserve they cease to be accumulated profits. The principle that the company might pay the dividend out of divisible profits has been understood to mean that they may not be profits in the business sense. At page 637 it is noticed: “The connotation of divisible profits or profits in the legal sense is much wider than that of profits in the business sense. The former term includes, for example, reserves accumulated from past profits, from realised capital profits….” Though these items may not be regarded by the businessman or accountant as trading profits, the only restriction on the large power of the company would be that before ascertaining the divisible profits, loss or depreciation of circulating capital has to be deducted. It is possible, therefore, to say that any special reserves created for the purpose of meeting this charge may be regarded as profits taken out of the category of divisible profits or accumulated profits.
8. The result of this discussion seems to us to be that unless the profit is capitalised in some form or other, the mere transfer of the profits to any reserve account will not take away from the profits the character of accumulated profits. It follows that question No. 1 has to be answered in the affirmative.
9. The more important question is question No. 2. The Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the debit against the shareholder-director did not amount to either a loan or advance and for that reason it took the view that section 2(6A)(e) did not apply. The Tribunal however did not consider the other aspects of the definition of “dividend” occurring in that provision. This provision states:
“‘Dividend’ includes—… (e) any payment by a company, not being a company, in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of section 23A, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) by way of advance or loan to a shareholder or any payment by any such company on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits.”
10. Payments of the following classes are accordingly contemplated: (1) an advance; (2) a loan; (3) any payment on behalf of a shareholder; and (4) any payment for the individual benefit of a shareholder. Examining one of the current accounts which the assessee had in the books of the company, it is found that the assessee drew moneys for his personal expenses and drawings, that income-tax demands of the assessee were met, life insurance premia payable by the assessee were paid and certain other payments which the assessee had to make to other persons were also paid by the company and debited to the assessee's account. It is true that the assessee paid in amounts by way of cash. The prima facie view of a transaction of this kind cannot but be that the company made these payments on behalf of the shareholder, certainly not without an understanding that the moneys were to be repaid or adjusted. Though factually it was not done, the company could well have adjusted its debits against amounts due to the assessee by way of salary and allowances. It is not denied that at the end of the year the assessee was debited with the interest payable by him on the amounts standing to his debit. Undoubtedly, the payments were made by the company on behalf of the shareholder in so far as income-tax demands upon the assessee or the life insurance premia payable by him are concerned. To a certain extent, at any rate, that part of the definition appears to be attracted. Even otherwise, taking note of the implied understanding between the parties, that the shareholder had to pay interest upon the amounts and that he was bound to refund the drawals in some manner or other, one can very well say that these amounts were given to the shareholder by way of loans or advances. The two expressions have not been used, as far as we can see, as any terms of art and are intended only to cover cases where the company's funds are utilised on behalf of or for the benefit of the shareholder with the right in the company to be reimbursed such amounts. It seems to us, therefore, that these payments may be regarded as coming under one or other of the heads referred to in the provision.
11. On behalf of the assessee, his learned counsel, Mr. Padmanabhan, contends that the payments cannot be regarded as loans, as the company was not acting as a banker as popularly understood. Nor, according to him, can they be regarded as advances, for that very expression must mean something which is due to the assessee but which is paid to him ahead of the time when it is due to be paid. It is true that in so far as the expression “advance” is concerned, it does have such a meaning. The accounts do not show that these amounts were paid by the company as advances against the salary, allowances or dividends which the shareholder might be entitled to. At any rate, the accounts do not so describe them. But there can be no doubt that in so far as the company purported to discharge any commitments of the assessees, the payment was undoubtedly made on behalf of the shareholder. That expression as it finds place in the provision does not involve any idea that the payment was to be gratuitous. On the meaning of the expression “loan”, the learned counsel relies upon Potts' Executors v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, a decision of the House of Lords. That was a case where the interpretation of section 40 of the Finance Act, 1938, had to be considered. That section purported to bring to tax any capital sum paid directly or indirectly by the trustees of a settlement, to which that section applied, to the settlor. The expression “capital sum” was defined to mean any sum paid by way of loan or repayment of loan. The question, therefore, arose whether an operation upon a current account with a company by Potts, resulting in debits against him at the end of the year, represented a loan which brought it within the expression “capital sum” as defined and thereby assessable under section 40. It is worthy of note that there were divergent views upon this question. While in the King's Bench Division, Singleton J. took the view that the payments were not loans in the ordinary meaning of the word, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the amount was taxable. The House of Lords however reversed this decision by a majority. Even assuming that this decision can be taken to apply to the expression “loan” as it occurs in section 2(6A)(e), that does not really dispose of the question, for there are undoubtedly other categories of payments referred to in that provision within the meaning of one or the other of which the payments in the present case undoubtedly fall.
12. We are accordingly of the view that the payments in the present case come within the mischief of section 2(6A)(e) of the Act since there were accumulated profits adequate to cover these payments. The debits against the assessees must be regarded as payments of deemed dividends within the meaning of the provision. The second question is answered in favour of the department, which will be entitled to its costs.
13. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.
Alert