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Arunachalathammal v. Ramachandkan Pillai And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The second appeal concerns succession to the estate of a Hindu unmarried female, Chidambarathammal, who died issueless in or about February 1957. The core statutory provisions in issue were Ss. 6, 9 and 11 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (referred to in the opinion as "the Act").
Relevant facts as stated in the opinion:
- One Shanmugha and his brother's son (the first respondent) had been members of a joint family and effected a partition by a document dated 31 May 1940. Under that partition Shanmugha became entitled to the properties described in Schedules 1 to 3 of the plaint.
- Shanmugha died about two years later, leaving a second wife and a minor daughter, Chidambarathammal, by that second wife. In addition to Schedules 1–3, Shanmugha had properties in Schedules 4 and 5 that he had inherited from his predeceased first wife.
- Shanmugha's second wife succeeded to his properties but survived only about three years; on her death Chidambarathammal inherited all properties in Schedules 1 to 5, and by virtue of S. 14 of the Act her title became absolute. She died shortly thereafter, childless.
- The first respondent, claiming as Chidambarathammal's heir, took possession of the entire properties. The appellant, one of several children of Shanmugha's sister, claimed on behalf of those children a half share in the properties and instituted a suit for partition.
- The trial court upheld the appellant's claim; the lower appellate court held that the first respondent would exclude the appellant. This appeal arises from those differing conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- The true construction of Ss. 6, 9 and 11 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in the context of succession to property of a childless Hindu female who obtained property from her father.
- Whether, under S. 9 and the schedule, the term "entry" refers to each numbered sub-item within a Roman-numeraled group (i.e., whether the first-mentioned relation within a group excludes subsequent relations in that same group), or whether "entry" refers to the entire Roman-numeraled group so that all relations in that group take simultaneously.
- Whether S. 6 of the Act (dealing with devolution of the interest of a Mitakshara coparcener by survivorship) applies to property that a Hindu obtained on partition (specifically, whether the properties in Schedules 1–3, obtained on partition, are "interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property" and thus devolve by survivorship on coparceners).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (one of several children of Shanmugha's sister) claimed, on behalf of his siblings, a half share in the properties inherited by Chidambarathammal and sought partition. The suit as described in the opinion asserted that the sister's children were entitled to such share.
- The opinion records that the trial court upheld the appellant's claim; however the opinion does not provide a detailed enumeration of all legal points advanced by the appellant beyond the claim for a half share.
First Respondent's Arguments
- The first respondent claimed as heir to Chidambarathammal and took possession of the entire properties; he asserted a preferential right to those properties and resisted the appellant's suit for partition.
- It was contended on behalf of the first respondent that S. 9 prescribes a rule of preference inter se among relations: the earlier (first-mentioned) relation in an entry excludes succeeding ones. Applied to Group IV of class II, the "brother's son" (first respondent) occupies the first place and would exclude other relations in that group (for example, the sister's daughter, i.e., the appellant).
- Learned counsel for the first respondent (Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar) argued that the Arabic numerals used to distinguish some relations within groups (e.g., in Groups II–IV) are significant and should be taken to indicate a prescribed priority of succession (supporting the view that the first-mentioned relation excludes others in the same Roman-numeraled group). The counsel relied on the underlying scheme of the Act, including the superiority of agnates over cognates described in S. 8(c), to support this interpretation.
- As a further contention (described as a new ground in the opinion), Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar argued that the properties in Schedules 1–3 (acquired by Shanmugha under the family partition) were in original ancestral/corresponding family character and should be regarded as the interest of Shanmugha in a Mitakshara coparcenary property within the meaning of S. 6; accordingly, they would devolve by survivorship on the former coparcener (the first respondent). This contention was supported by reference to observations in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi and other authority.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi | Held that the term "separate property" in S. 3(1) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, was to be understood as self-acquired property in that context; Varadachariar, J. observed three senses in which "separate property" had been understood and determined meaning by reference to the statute's scheme. | The Court examined and distinguished the observations in Umayal Achi: it accepted that in that case the words had a limited meaning in light of the 1937 Act, but held that those reasoning principles could not be transplanted automatically to S. 6 of the 1956 Act, which is part of a comprehensive code. |
| Subramania v. Kalyanarama Iyer | Considered whether property obtained by a Hindu on partition could be regarded as an interest in joint family property within the meaning of S. 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937; held in the affirmative (the Bench held that property obtained at partition could still be regarded, in some circumstances, as joint family property for that section). | The Court noted that the decision in Subramania depended on the particular wording of S. 3 of the 1937 Act and that those reasons were not generally applicable to the interpretation of S. 6 of the 1956 Act; thus Subramania could not be followed as authority for treating partition-obtained property as necessarily within S. 6 of the Act under review. |
| Jay v. Joynstone | Referenced as authority for the interpretive principle that where a Legislature uses a legal term that has received judicial interpretation, the term is prima facie to be taken in that judicially-interpreted sense unless a contrary intention appears. | The Court invoked the principle but also explained its limits: where the context and the object of a later statute indicate a different intention, the earlier judicial interpretation need not be imported; thus S. 6 should be understood in light of the Act's scheme and not simply by prior judicial meanings attached elsewhere. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by addressing the main statutory interpretive questions in a stepwise manner, applying textual analysis and the statute's overall scheme as explained in the opinion:
- Statutory framework and approach: The Court identified that Ss. 15 and 16 prescribe rules for succession to property that a female obtained from her father, creating a "fiction" treating such property "as if" it belonged to the father for the purpose of ascertaining heirs, but not converting the property into the father's estate. Hence the estate to be distributed is still that of the female (Chidambarathammal) and succession to it must be determined under the Act.
- Determination of relevant heirs: The Court looked to S. 8 and class II of the schedule to identify the heirs of Shanmugha who would be relevant on the date of Chidambarathammal's death. The Court found no class I heirs and therefore focussed on class II. It set out the groups in class II and noted the factual composition of heirs falling into group IV (brother's son; sister's son/daughter; brother's daughter; sister's daughter), including the appellant and first respondent who represented respective branches.
-
Interpretation of "entry" in S. 9 and S. 11: The Court analysed the language of S. 9 (preferential language among entries) and S. 11 (division "between the heirs specified in any one entry in class II ... so that they share equally"). It considered whether "entry" referred to each Roman-numeraled group only, or to each Arabic-numbered sub-item within such groups. The Court noted:
- Ordinarily "entry" refers to a main item (e.g., an item in a schedule) and not sub-items; legislative practice often treats sub-items as part of the single entry.
- S. 11 would be unnecessary if each sub-item within a group were meant to exclude subsequent sub-items: S. 11 contemplates multiple persons within "any one entry" sharing equally.
- The inconsistent use of Arabic numerals in some groups but not others suggested mere enumeration rather than a substantive priority scheme; if the legislature intended separate "entries" for each Arabic-numbered sub-item it could have used Roman numerals consistently.
- Consideration of the agnate/cognate argument: The first respondent's counsel argued that the ordering and Arabic numerals reflected a preference scheme favouring agnates over cognates. The Court rejected this, noting that the Act's overall scheme gives weight to two principles: (1) nearness of relationship (and presumed natural affection); and (2) no distinction between persons of the same degree of relationship by reason of sex or by virtue of birth through male vs female. The Court observed that agnates are not always placed before cognates in class II and that the arrangement of groups reflects the twin principles rather than a simple agnate-superiority rule.
-
Treatment of S. 6 and the "survivorship" contention: The Court then addressed the attempt to treat Schedules 1–3 (property obtained by Shanmugha on partition) as an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property within S. 6 so as to invoke survivorship in favour of the first respondent. The Court's reasoning included:
- Reiteration that the property in dispute was that of Chidambarathammal and succession to it must be governed by Ss. 15 and 16 read with the rest of the Act.
- Observation that S. 6 is an exception to the general rule of succession (S. 8), and the term "interest in joint family property" in S. 6 carries its ordinary legal meaning — namely, an undivided interest in coparcenary property.
- Using the canon that exceptions are to be strictly construed, S. 6 should apply only where the deceased was undivided (i.e., had an interest in joint family property in the sense of undivided coparcenary interest) and had left no female heirs specified in class I.
- Distinction from prior decisions concerning the 1937 Act: The Court analysed and distinguished Umayal Achi and Subramania v. Kalyanarama Iyer, noting that the reasoning in those cases depended on the particular wording and purpose of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and therefore cannot be adopted wholesale to interpret S. 6 of the 1956 Act (a comprehensive code of succession). In particular, Subramania was said to rest on the peculiar wording of S. 3 of the 1937 Act and the need to avoid a lacuna there.
- Conclusion that S. 6 does not apply to separate property obtained on partition (or property held by a sole surviving coparcener) where the person had no undivided sons; S. 6 applies only where the deceased was undivided and had an undivided coparcenary interest.
- Application to facts and outcome: The Court applied these conclusions to the facts: Schedules 1–3 were the separate properties of Shanmugha (with Schedules 2 and 3 being a half undivided share), and Schedules 4 and 5 were properties obtained from outside the family. None could be regarded as an interest in joint family (undivided coparcenary) property for the purposes of S. 6. Therefore, the first respondent's survivorship argument failed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs.
Immediate consequences and implications as stated in the opinion:
- The Court held that under S. 9 and S. 11 of the Act the term "entry" refers to each Roman-numeraled group in class II; all heirs within such a group take simultaneously and share equally among themselves, excluding only those in succeeding entries. Thus, a brother's son (the first respondent) did not exclude the sister's daughter (the appellant) or other members of the same group by virtue of being first-mentioned.
- The Court held that S. 6 of the Act is to be strictly construed as an exception to the general succession rule: it applies only where the deceased had an undivided interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property (i.e., was an undivided coparcener at death). S. 6 does not apply to separate property obtained on partition or to property held by a sole surviving coparcener who had no undivided sons of his own.
- Applied to the present case, the properties in Schedules 1 to 5 were not governed by survivorship under S. 6; they were the absolute properties of Chidambarathammal and succession to them is to be determined under the Act's general rules (Ss. 8, 9, 11, 15 and 16). The appellant's claim was thus vindicated in the appeal (as the appeal was allowed), and the first respondent could not exclude the appellant on the grounds advanced.
Broader legal impact: The opinion explains statutory interpretation principles applied to Ss. 6, 9 and 11 and distinguishes earlier decisions under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, but the opinion confines its conclusions to the interpretation of the 1956 Act as applied in this case. The direct effect is the reversal in favour of the appellant and the rejection of the first respondent's survivorship and intra-entry exclusion arguments.
Prepared from the supplied opinion text. No information beyond the provided opinion has been added.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by The Chief Justice.)
This second appeal concerns the succession to the estate of a Hindu unmarried female Chidambaratbamtnal who died issueless sometime in February 1957. The question that falls for consideration in the appeal relates to the true construction of Ss. 6, 9 and 11 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, which we shall refer to hereafter as the Act.
The facts giving rise to the appeal are these; One Shanmuga who together with his brother's son, the first respondent to this appeal, constituted a joint family, effected a partition with the latter. The partition arrangement is evidenced by a document dated 31st May 1940 under which Shanmugha became entitled to the properties set cut in the schedules 1 to 3 to the plaint in the present litigation. Shanmugha died about two years after wards leaving behind him his second wife and a miner daughter Chidambarathammal by her. At the time of his death he had in addition to the aforesaid properties, those set out in schedules 4 and 5 to the plaint which he had inherited from his predeceased first wife. His second wife succeeded him but she survived him only for a period of about three years. On her death, the entire properties (i.e, all those described in Sch. 1 to 5) were inherited by Chidambarathammal. By virtue of S. 14 of the Act, which came into force when she was alive, her title thereto became absolute. She died shortly thereafter.
The first respondent claiming as her heir took possession of the entire properties. The appellant, one among the several children of Shanmugha's sister, claimed on behalf of them all a half share in the properties and instituted the suit for partition out of which this appeal arises. The suit was resisted by the first respondent who claimed a preferential right to Chidambarathammal's properties. If that defence were to fail, he will have not merely to part with half a share in favour of the sister's children of Shanmugha, but share the other half along with his own brothers or sisters If any.
The rights between the contesting claimants have to be decided on the terms of S. 15 read with S. 9 of the Act. The Courts below have taken different Views, the trial Court upholding the claim of the appellant and the lower appellate Court holding that as between the first respondent and the appellant, the former would exclude the latter.
Under Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act, where a Hindu female dies leaving property which she had obtained from her father (as in the present case) such property will, in the absence of her own issue, devolve on the heirs of her father, the order and manner of succession thereto being regulated as if the property belonged to him. In other words, the section creates a fiction for ascertaining the heirs of the female; it does not however mean that the property reverts to the estate of her father and that succession is traced to his property.
It is now necessary to find out who Shanmugha's heirs would have been on the date when Chidambarathammal died.
Succession to the estate of a male is prescribed by S. 8 which says that in the absence of any of the preferential heirs set out in class 1 to the schedule, those relations specified in class II will inherit, failing the agates within a certain degree; and in the absence of agnates, cognates. When Chidambarathammal died there were no heirs to Shanmuja coming under class I. There were however Shanmugha's relations coming under class II. It will be convenient at this stage to set out the list of heirs specified under class II as the argument in the case turns mainly on it.
Class II.
I. Father.
II. (1) Son's daughter's son, (2) Son's daughter's daughter; (3) Brothers; (4) Sisters.
III. (1) daughter's son's son. (2) daughter's son's daughter, (3) daughter's daughter's son, (4) daughter's daughter.
IV. (1) Brother's son. (2) sister's son, (3) brother's daughter (4) sister's daughter.
V. Father's father; father's mother.
VI. Father's widow, brother's widow.
VII. Father's brother, father's sister.
VIII. Mother's father, mother's mother.
IX. Mother's brother, mother's sister.
Explanation: In this schedule, references to a brother or sister do not include references to a brother or sister by uterine blood.
on the date of death of Chidambarathammal, there were no heirs of Shanmugha falling under the first three groups in class II. There were however (1) the brother's son, the first respondent, (2) first respondent's two sisters, (3) six sons of his sister (4) two daughters of his sister, of whom the appellant was one. We shall however refer hereafter only to the appellant) and the first respondent as representing their respective branches. All of them come under group IV. In that group, the appellant is given the first place. The question is whether he thereby excludes the rest in the same group, that is those who are given a place subsequent to him or whether all of them simultaneously succeed.
Sec. 9 prescribes the order of succession among the heirs mentioned in the schedule. It says,
“Those in class I shall take simultaneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs, those in the first entry in class II shall be preferred to those in the second entry; those in the second entry shall be preferred to those in the third entry; and so on in succession.”
If the word “entry” is taken to mean each one of the nine groups set out in class II, the section does not in so many words say that as among them they take simultaneously, nor does it say that they take one after the other. The obscurity is enhanced by the use of Arabic numerals with respect to some of the members in the group (Groups II to IV) while in regard to others (groups V to IX) such numerals are not used.
It is contended on behalf of the first respondent that S. 9 prescribes a rule of preference inter se between the relations mentioned therein, the earlier excluding the succeeding ones, and that the brother's son, who occupies the first place in group IV, will exclude the rest, e.g, the sister's daughter who is given a fourth place in that group. This argument will not avail in regard to the relations coming under groups V to IX, when no numbers have at all been used; learned Counsel concedes that in their case all the heirs mentioned in each one of the groups will take together.
With respect to class II heirs, the Statute provides a preference to the heirs mentioned in one entry over the succeeding one. We have therefore to ascertain the meaning of the term “entry”. Does it mean only the group of heirs denoted by the Roman numeral? Or does it also mean the sub-heads under that group, which in some instance are indicated by Arabic numerals?
The word “entry” has not been defined in the Act. In its ordinary concept it means an item entered in a book, record, statute etc. A familiar instance of the use of that word is in reference to the legislative limits appended to Sch. VII to the Constitution, that is, those that fall under the respective legislative competence of the Union State etc. The list contains several items; sometimes each item contains more than one subject. But the Courts in our country have referred to the main item only as an entry, although it contains more than one subject. The sub-items have never been regarded as an entry.
This familiar use of the word will appear to indicate, that the word entry can only refer to the groups, i.e, those classified under the Roman numeral and not to the several relations denoted by the Arabic numerals.
We have however to see whether under the Act, the word “entry” has a different significance.
Sec. 11 deals with the distribution of the property of the deceased in a case where succession is to fall on relations coming under class II. It says
“The property of an intestate shall be divided between the heirs specified in any one entry in class II of the schedule so that they share equally.”
This section would be wholly unnecessary if each one of the heirs mentioned in each group of class II were to take in preference to the next one in the same group. It is contended that as there may be plurality of persons under the same category (e.g, there may be more than one brother's son) the section provides for an equal distribution among them. But such a case will be covered by S. 19. Therefore S. 11 must refer only to the entire group indicated by the Roman numeral if so much is clear, the word entry can only refer to each one of the nine group denoted by the Roman numerals.
If the legislature intended that the relations distinguished by the Arabic numerals should constitute distinct entries, it would have employed the Roman numerals for each one of them and there was really no need for the use of the Arabic ones.
But Mr. R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar contends that some significance must be attached to the use of the Arabic numerals, particularly when they have not been used with reference to certain other groups; the numbers must therefore to held to be not intended for the mere purpose of enumeration; they should therefore be taken as prescribed a priority of succession. In support of the contention learned Counsel has referred to what he called the underlying scheme of succession prescribed by the Act, of the superiority of the agnate over cognate [vide S. 8(c)]. It is contended that cognatic relations have been designedly put in after the agnates in each group so that the latter may have a priority in the matter of succession.
There can be little doubt that Arabic numerals employed to distinguish between the relations set out in each group: the groups themselves being indicated by Roman figures, are as much part of the statute as the Roman numerals. Numbers are generally employed in a statute for the purpose of easy reference. If any other significance is to attach to them one should search the substantive part of the enactment to see whether the numerals have any special purpose. There is no reference in the Act to any number, Roman or Arabic. Ss. 9 and 11 speak only of an entry. Therefore, the use of numerals for indication of particular relations cannot import anything; nor the absence of such numeric in groups V to IX give them any significance beyond showing an indifference on the part of the draftsman.
It is then said that if the legislature had intended all those mentioned in Entry IV to take together it would have collectively referred to them as children of the brother and sister, instead of individually referring to them. But this argument ignores that under the law of succession it is the practice to enumerate separately different relations even though they inherit simultaneously. Nor can we argue that there is any superiority of agnates over cognates under class II. For example, agnates like father's father and father's brother are postponed to certain cognatic relations like son's daughter's daughter, sister's daughter etc. The preference of agnates over cognates is only in the contingency of there being no heirs under class I and class II. But the Act does manifest a distinct principle which underlies the scheme of distribution prescribed by it, off is two-fold, viz. (1) Nearness of relationship and presumed natural affection of the deceased. (2) There should be no distinction between persons standing in the same degree of relationship merely by reason of sex or by any principle of superiority of one born through a male to one born through a female. Generally speaking, the heirs in class II have been arranged in group in accordance with that scheme. Applying these two tests we find that the various groups are classified under one or both the principles. Taking group IV, the relations are of the same degree to the deceased and normally his affection to them would have been the same; there is therefore no reason why a brother's son should supersede a sister's son. The intendment of the Act must be taken to be in favour of the view that the heirs in each group under class II take simultaneously. In other words, the word entry in Ss. 9 and 11 can refer only to all that goes under a Roman numeral and not one that is denoted by the Arabic one. The groups of heirs specified in the various entries under class II will therefore simultaneously succeed excluding only those in the succeeding entry or entries.
Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar then made an attempt to salvage for the first respondent at least the properties set out in Schedules I to 3 to the plaint (i e., those that Shanmugha obtained under a partition in his family) as a new ground. The contention was that as these properties were in original ancestral, they should be regarded as the interest of Shanmugha in a Mitakshara coparcenary property within the meaning of S. 6 of the Act and that they would devolve exclusively on the first respondent, his former coparcener. This somewhat surprising argument, namely, that the separate property of a divided member of a Hindu joint family would still be governed by the principle of survivorship was sought to be supported by certain observations of Varadachariar, J., in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi(1). We shall examine the contention after dispelling the erroneous assumption on which the entire argument is based.
It must be remembered that the entire properties which form the subject matter of this litigation were the absolute properties of Chidambarathammal, to whom alone succession has to he traded. Inheritance to a female will be governed by Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act, which enact certain rules relating thereto and prescribe the order in which the heirs would become entitled to the property. Succession to a childless female, who died leaving properties obtained from her own father would be governed by the same rules as if the property had been her father's. Thus, as we pointed out earlier, the statute creates a fiction for ascertaining her heir by treating it as her father's property; but that cannot make the property her father's; so to treat it, will amount to an unwarranted extension of the fiction. The property being that of the female, no question of any coparcenary can at all arise. S. 6 cannot therefore apply to the present case at all.
But we shall however show that there is no substance in the argument even if one were to treat the property as Shanmugha's. It is our view that S. 6 cannot apply to the separate property of a Hindu who obtained the same on partition from his coparceners; on the other hand, succession to it will be governed by S. 8 of the Act. In Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, the Federal Court was considering a claim that a share made by the widow of a predeceased son of a sole surviving coparcener in the estate of her father-in-law. She claimed to be entitled to a share by virtue of the proviso to S. 3(1) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937 which dealt with succession to the separate property of a Hindu male. It was held that the term “separate property” in that section only meant self acquired property and that property held by a sole surviving coparcener would be outside that section. Varadachariar, J., pointed out that three different senses in which the term “separate property” was understood, sometimes as denoting purely self acquired property sometimes as joint family property obtained on partition or joint family property by a sole surviving coparcener, and held that the particular sense in which the term was used in the enactment has to be determined by referring to the scheme of the statute in which those words occurred.
Recently a Bench of this Court in Subramania v. Kalyanarama Iyer(2), had to consider whether property obtained by a Hindu on partition could be regarded as an interest in the joint family property within the meaning of S. 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937, and that question was answered in the affirmative. The material words of that section ‘having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property are almost identical to those occurring in S. 6 of the present Act. Prima facie those words can only refer to a case where the person dies undivided with respect to the property; for a property which a coparcener obtains on partition can hardly be regarded as constituting an interest in a joint family property, the joint family itself having been extinguished, unless, it be that the coparceners obtaining the property has sons of his own with whom there would be another joint family.
But the learned Judges held that even in a case where there was no son, the property would still be coparcenary property. This is clear from the following passage in the judgment of Rajaman-nar, C.J:
“Likewise, it should be held that the property which a coparcener obtains at a partition is joint family property, though the coparcener may after the partition have absolute powers of alienation so long of course there is no son born to him after the partition, who would, on birth, be entitled to a share in such property.”
It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to examine all the reasons which persuaded the Court to arrive at that conclusion, as we are satisfied that the decision in that case depended on the view that S. 3(1) would not apply to separate property other than self acquired property. This is clear from this passage in the judgment, namely,
“If the property which a coparcener obtains at a family partition is not separate property within the meaning of S. 3(1) of the Act, it must be deemed to be an interest in the Hindu joint family property within the meaning of Sub-S. (2) of S. 3.” (Italics ours)
To hold otherwise in that case would have meant that there is a lacuna in that enactment, which made provision for widows of individuals who left property obtained by them at partition in their family.
Thus it will be seen that the view taken in Subramania v. Kalyanarama Iyer, was occasioned by reason of the peculiar wording of S. 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937. They cannot be taken as affording a guidance generally to the interpretation of the corresponding words of S. 6 of the present Act. In Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi, Varadachariar J. recognised that the words “separate property” might be the antithesis of “ancestral property, coparcenary property, or joint family property” and proceeded to ascertain which of the meanings was appropriate to the interpretation of S. 3(1) by ascertaining the intent and purpose of the statute in question. The learned Judges held that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937, not being a “codifying Act” or even by a general amendment of the Hindu Law of Inheritance, but intended purely to remedy a particular deficiency unnder the existing law, there was no need to give a larger interpretation to the words “separate property” than the circumstances surrounding the legislation warranted. Under the then existing law the widow could not inherit where her husband had left sons. By their presence there would be no separate property except the self-acquired one. S. 3(1) was therefore held to apply to that kind of property alone. As other kinds of property would, in the presence of sons, be joint family property; S. 3(2) provided for it. There was no need to provide for a case where a man died sonless, as the widow could inherit under the ordinary law every kind of separate property, enactment in that case being only supplementary to the general law of inheritance.
But these principles cannot and do not apply in the interpretation of S. 6 of the present Act. This is a code which lays down a comprehensive rule of succession based on principles of justice and also on the basis of natural love and affection of the deceased. S. 8 deals with the property of a male Hindu who dies. The term “property”, though not defined under the Act, is a word of wide import including prima facie every kind of property over which he has a right of disposal. S. 8 it will be seen, does rot use the words like separate or self acquired property, even in regard to joint family property S. 30 confers a power on a member to dispose of his interest by means of a will.
S. 6 states:
“When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and rot in accordance with this Act;
Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the schedule or a male relative specified in that, class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.
Explanation I. For the purpose of this section the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not;
Explanation II: Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenery before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein.”
In our opinion, S. 6 can be regarded only as an exception to the general rule of succession prescribed by S. 8. Even to that exception there is a proviso which enables succession to the interest of the deceased member of a joint family in favour of his wife's daughter etc.
The cardinal rule of interpretation is, that words in an Act are prima facie used in their correct sense and not in any loose form. The term “interest in joint family property” has a definite significance in law, namely, that the person concerned is undivided. Prima facie these words in S. 6 have to be understood in that Sense. It is true that where a Legislature uses in any enactment a legal term which has received a judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that such term, unless a contrary intention appears, has been used in any subsequent enactment in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted: Vide Jay v. Joynstone. This rule cannot obviously apply to a case where the words used in a distinctive sense in a previous statute, should be attributed the same meaning in any subsequent s atute, whose object and terms indicate that the legislature did not intend to use the words in the restricted sense attributed to it by Courts with reference to the special legislation. Judged in the light of the context and the limited extent to which the statute preserves the rule of survivorship, it must be taken that S. 8 is intended to apply to all kinds of separate property possessed by a Hindu, whether it be self acquired or not obtained on partition from his family when he has no sons himself. S. 6 being in the nature of an exception, should be strictly construed and will only apply to a case where a member thereof dies undivided and without leaving any female heirs mentioned in class I. We are therefore of opinion that S. 6 will not apply to property held by a person as a sole surviving coparcener or to a separate property obtained at a partition in the amity, when that person has left no undivided sons of his own.
In the present case the properties in schedules 1 to 3 were the separate properties of Shanmugha, though in regard to Schedules 2 and 3 it was only a half undivided share. Schedules 4 and 5 were properties which he obtained from outside the family. None of them can be regarded as an interest in joint family property. The appeal therefore succeeds and is allowed with costs.
V.C.S
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