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Muhammad Kaliba Rowther v. Muhammad Abdullah Rowther.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal concerning limitation in a suit for partition and separate possession of fractional shares of immovable property. The property originally belonged to Kadar Mohideen Rowther, who died in 1915 leaving a widow, two sons (one of whom is the defendant-appellant) and two daughters. It was common ground in the courts below that the appellant is entitled to 7/24 shares. The respondent purchased the remaining 17/24 shares from the relative co-owners on 18 October 1945 and instituted the suit that gave rise to this appeal on 20 January 1958.
The appellant resisted the suit primarily on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The appellant additionally claimed that, since 18 October 1945, he had erected certain buildings on the suit property and had effected repairs. The trial court found that the appellant was entitled to Rs. 194-14-0 for repairs effected at his expense; the lower appellate court did not disturb the trial court's finding concerning repairs (para. 7 of the opinion records the defendant had incurred an expense of Rs. 195-14-0). The lower appellate court held the suit to be within time. The second appeal raised a question of law about limitation which was posted to a Division Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a suit filed by a purchaser (alienee) of undivided shares in common property more than 12 years after the purchase, for partition and separate possession of those shares, is barred by limitation in the absence of proof of ouster by the co-sharer in possession of the whole property.
- Whether Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act applies to a suit of this character (i.e., a suit for partition and delivery of separate possession of purchased undivided shares).
- Whether an alienee of a co-sharer's interest is to be treated differently from his alienor (the original co-sharer) for the purposes of limitation and adverse possession.
- What constitutes the starting point of limitation and what facts constitute adverse possession in a suit of this character.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant advanced that Article 142 of the Limitation Act applied and that, because the respondent failed to prove possession within 12 years of his purchase, the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial court under that Article.
- The appellant argued that, if Article 142 did not apply, Article 144 would govern and that the alienee's cause of action to recover possession began at the moment of his purchase; consequently possession by the other co-sharers from that moment should be treated as adverse to the alienee and the suit would be barred after 12 years.
- The appellant pressed that an alienee does not, by mere purchase, become a co-sharer on the same footing as his alienor and therefore should be treated for limitation purposes differently from his alienor (relying on authority such as Udi v. Maru Mal).
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's separate legal arguments beyond the fact of purchase and the institution of the suit for partition and separate possession. The respondent did not plead or prove ouster; that factual absence is noted by the Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thani Chetti v. Dakshinamurthi Mudaliar | Holds that a suit by a purchaser of a share of family property claiming to be put in possession of a definite piece is properly governed by Article 144 because the essence is for actual delivery of possession which follows a division. | The court agreed with this principle and held that Article 144 applies to the instant suit for partition and separate possession of purchased undivided shares. |
| Udi v. Maru Mal, AIR 1924 Lah 682 | A single Judge held that a transferee/assignee who has not been put in possession must sue within 12 years from the date of assignment; otherwise the suit is barred. | The court rejected this differentiation between an alienee and his alienor for purposes of limitation and did not accept the reasoning of this single-Judge decision as applicable in the present circumstances. |
| Fateh Md. v. Ghulam Md., AIR 1928 Lah 957 | Held that on similar facts an alienee stands in the shoes of his transferor and, where the transferor's exclusive possession could not, without an overt act, extinguish the rights of the other co-sharer, the alienee's suit beyond 12 years would not be barred in absence of ouster. | The court expressed agreement with this view and treated it as the correct approach for the present case. |
| Subah Lal v. Fateh Mahomed, ILR 54 All 628 (AIR 1932 All 393) | Discussed in the opinion in relation to earlier authorities on alienee/alienor distinction. | The court stated that it did not understand Subah Lal as expressing a different view from that adopted by Tek Chand, J., in Fateh Md.; it did not treat Subah Lal as dictating a contrary result for the present facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded step-by-step and applied statutory interpretation and established principles of co-ownership and adverse possession as follows:
- Article 142 of the Limitation Act was held inapplicable because it contemplates a suit in which the claimant alleges possession and dispossession; here the respondent did not allege that, after purchase in 1945, he took possession of the undivided shares and was subsequently dispossessed.
- Article 144 was held to be the appropriate article governing the suit. The court accepted the reasoning of Thani Chetti that a suit by a purchaser seeking delivery of a definite piece (actual delivery of possession following division) falls within Article 144: the suit, though composite (for partition and separate possession), is in substance a claim for delivery of possession of the purchased shares after division.
- The court reiterated the settled legal principle that possession by a co-sharer is possession on behalf of all co-sharers; mere non-participation in receipts or inaction does not constitute ouster or convert possession into an adverse possession capable of barring other co-sharers.
- The appellant's contention that the rules applicable to co-sharers should not extend to an alienee (who should, according to the appellant, suffer limitation from the date of purchase) was rejected. The court reasoned that an alienee acquires the right, title and interest of the alienor including the right to sue for partition and separate possession; absent proof of ouster on the part of the co-sharer in possession, there is no basis to treat the alienee less favourably than his alienor.
- The court examined contrary authority (Udi v. Maru Mal) where a single Judge held that a transferee must sue within 12 years from assignment; the court declined to follow that approach and preferred the reasoning in Fateh Md. v. Ghulam Md., which held that the transferee stands in the shoes of the transferor and is not barred in the absence of any overt act of ouster.
- The court drew a clear distinction between the Hindu coparcenary context (where some authorities have taken a different view because of the peculiar nature of coparcenary rights) and a tenancy-in-common among Muslim co-sharers, explaining that coparcenary concepts bear no analogy to tenancy-in-common for the purposes of limitation and adverse possession in this case.
- Because the appellant had neither pleaded nor adduced evidence of ouster, possession by the appellant never assumed an adverse character vis-à-vis the respondent. On that basis the Court concluded that the suit was not barred by limitation and affirmed the lower appellate court's view.
- On the discrete issue of repairs and expenses: the trial court had awarded a sum for repairs (recorded as Rs. 194-14-0 in the earlier finding), and the lower appellate court did not disturb that finding (para. 7 records the defendant had incurred Rs. 195-14-0). The lower appellate court had directed the respondent to pay the appellant his proportionate share amounting to Rs. 142; the Division Bench directed the respondent to pay that sum with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the Division Bench's order, payable within one month.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The Division Bench held that the suit for partition and separate possession brought by the respondent was not barred by limitation; accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed except for the specific direction relating to payment for repairs.
Direct Consequences / Orders
- The Court held Article 144 of the Limitation Act to be the proper article governing the suit and rejected the contention that Article 142 applied.
- The Court held that, in the absence of proof of ouster, possession of the appellant (a co-sharer in possession) was not adverse to the respondent (the alienee), and therefore the respondent's suit was within time.
- The respondent is directed to pay the appellant the proportionate share of the repairs amounting to Rs. 142 with interest at six percent per annum from the date of the court's order; payment is to be made within one month.
- The second appeal is dismissed otherwise, and it is dismissed without costs.
Broader Implications
The opinion applies and affirms the principle that an alienee of a co-sharer's undivided interest is not, for limitation purposes, put on a worse footing than his alienor where the co-sharers hold as tenants-in-common (here, Muslim co-sharers), and that mere inaction or non-participation by co-sharers does not constitute ouster or give rise to adverse possession. The Court preferred the view in Fateh Md. over the contrary reasoning in Udi v. Maru Mal and applied Thani Chetti to conclude that Article 144 governs suits of this character. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond applying and reconciling these authorities to the facts before it.
1. The question in this second appeal is whether the suit filed by the respondent, beyond 12 years of his purchase of 17/24 shares out of the suit property from all but one co-sharer, for partition and separate possession of such shares is, in the absence of any proof of ouster by the co-sharer in possession of the entirety of the property, barred by limitation. The property originally belonged to one Kadar Mohideen Rowther, who died in 1915 leaving his widow, two sons of whom the defendant who is the appellant in this court was one, and two daughters. It is common ground that the appellant is entitled to 7/24 shares. The respondent purchased the remaining 17/24 shares from the relative co-owners on 18th October 1945. He instituted the instant suit, out of which this second appeal arises on 20th January 1958. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the main ground that it was out of time. On that question the courts below were disagreed, the lower appellate court expressing the view that the suit was within time. The appellant made a further plea claiming that he had since 18th October 1945, put up certain buildings on the suit property and had also effected repairs. Both the courts below have not accepted this claim except that in regard to repairs the first court found that the appellant was entitled to a sum of Rs. 194-14-0 on account of repairs effected at his expense. The lower appellate court did not specifically find on the point but had sufficiently expressed itself by stating that, if at all, the appellant had only effected certain repairs in the building that was already in existence at the time of his father's death. When the second appeal by the defendant-appellant came before Kailasam, J. the learned Judge felt that a difficult question of law arose for decision and it was desirable that it was posted Before a Division Bench.
2. As we mentioned at the outset, the sole point is whether the suit was barred by limitation. For the appellant the contention is that Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies and that since the respondent failed to prove possession within 12 years of the suit, it was rightly dismissed by the trial court. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention. Article 142 contemplates a suit in which the claimant alleges possession and dispossession. Obviously this is not such a suit. It is nobody's case that the respondent, pursuant to his purchase in 1945, took possession of the undivided shares conveyed to him and he was dispossessed of the same subsequently. If that Article is ruled out as being inapplicable, can it be said that Article 144 governs the suit? The Article contemplates a suit for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not otherwise specifically provided for. The starting point of limitation for the purpose of this Article is the date when possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The suit in this case was not one for possession simpliciter but for partition and separate possession of the fractional shares which the plaintiff had purchased. None of the articles of the limitation act seems to directly take within it a suit of that nature. It is, however, obvious that the suit is also in a sense for recovery of immoveable property, though in order to grant that relief something has to precede that, It is only when the relief of partition is granted that it will be possible to divide the shares by metes and bounds and the shares conveyed to the plaintiff could be delivered to him. In asmuch as the prayers for partition and separate possession of an undivided share are composite in nature, we should confess that we would have felt some hesitation in holding that Article 144 would apply to the suit had it not been for Thani Chetti v. Dakshinamurthi Mudaliar, . That was a case arising out of a suit instituted by a purchaser of a share of some of the coparceners of a Hindu Joint family claiming to be put in possession of a definite piece of the family property. One of the questions was what was the proper article applicable to such a suit. Rajamannar, C. J. and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. were of the view that it was wrong to consider such a suit as one for mere partition and that the essence of the claim was for actual delivery of possession which of course would follow a division. In that sense they held that Article 144 would govern the suit. On a careful consideration of the question, with respect, we find ourselves in agreement with this view, and the principle of the decision, in our opinion, will with equal force apply to this suit. We shall presently deal with the question as to what will be the starting point of limitation and what will constitute adverse possession in a suit of the character such as in question here. So far as the applicability of the proper Article to the suit is concerned, we can find no distinction between the nature of a suit as in and the instant suit.
3. If Article 144 is the proper Article applicable, as we hold it is, the question then arises as to whether under that Article the suit is out of time. It is well settled law, and we think no citation of authority is necessary that possession in the hands of a co-sharer of a property owned in common is possession on behalf of all the co-sharers. Implicit in this proposition is the further position in law that mere non-participation in the receipts from such immoveable property or mere inaction in respect of it for any length of time on the part of one or more of the co-sharers is not regarded as amounting to ouster or as investing the possession in the hands of one of the co-sharers with an adverse character so as to enable him to prescribe against the other co-sharers. It is only when acts are clearly proved on the part of the co-sharer in possession which would be inconsistent with any other co-sharer being entitled to any possession of interest in any part of the property, it can be said that any question of ouster of the co-sharers not in possession can arise. In the absence of such ouster there will be no room for adverse possession or prescription in favour of the co-sharer in possession. The contention for the appellant, however, is that these principles applicable to a co-sharer cannot extend to his alienee. Sri K. S. Naidu for the appellant urges that the alienee does not by reason of his purchase of a share become a co-sharer or a tenant-in-common along with the other sharers of co-tenants. According to the learned counsel, the cause of action for an alienee to recover possession commences at the moment of his purchase and possession in the hands of the other co-sharers of the share purchased by him should be regarded as adverse from that time onwards. We are unable to uphold the contention. It seems to us that, neither on principle nor on authority can an alienee from a co-sharer, more especially when he is a Mohammadan, be regarded as standing on a special footing different from the position of his alienor. It is clear that what the co-sharer conveyed to his alienee is his right, title and interest in his share which will take with it also the right to sue for partition and recover separate possession of such share. If the co-sharer who was the alienor is not barred by time because for over 12 years he took no action either to share possession of the property or income therefrom or sue for partition we fail to see any principle or reason why his alienee should be placed on a different, footing. In our opinion, in the absence of the defendant establishing ouster of the plaintiff, the defendant's plea that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that the defendant neither pleaded ouster nor directed any evidence on the question. In such circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that the mere fact of alienation to the plaintiff of the interest of the alienor-co-sharer will amount to either ouster or impress possession of the defendant with the character of adverse possession.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Udi v. Maru Mal, AIR 1924 Lah 682, where a single learned Judge of the Lahore High Court was of the opinion, that in the circumstances such as in this case, a suit filed by an alienee beyond 12 years of his purchase would be out of time. The co-sharers there, as here, were Muslims. Dealing with the question the reasoning of the learned Judge was this:
"It is true that in the case of co-sharers the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all and that if one of them sets up a prescriptive title against the others, he must prove that his possession was openly hostile and that it could not be lawfully referred to a legal title as co-sharer; but I fail to understand how a transferee or an assignee can, by the mere fact of transfer or assignment, become a co-sharer if his rights as such are denied by the other co-sharers. It is beyond doubt that, if the assignor has not transferred possession of the property assigned to his assignee the latter in order to succeed in a suit for possession must sue within 12 years from the date of his assignment and that a suit against his assignor would be barred if he comes into court after that period."
We are unable to see on what principle the learned Judge differentiated, for purposes of limitation, the case of an alienee from his alienor co-sharer. In fact on similar facts another learned Judge of that court took a contrary view in Fateh Md. v. Ghulam Md., AIR 1928 Lah 957. Tek Chand, J. gave his reason:
Now as stated above Hayat and Allah Dad were two brothers, who jointly owned the house, and they being co-sharers Hayat's exclusive possession of it could not, without any overt act, have extinguished the rights of Allah Dad. Therefore, if Allah Dad had been alive he, or if he were dead and his share had descended to his legal heirs, they would still be co-sharers in the house and in the absence of any denial of their title at a time beyond twelve years from the suit, their rights would not have become barred. If this be so, I fail to see how the position of a transferee for valuable consideration of Allah Dad's undivided half share should in the circumstances disclosed on the record be different. From the moment of the sale he stood in the shoes of his transferor and became a co-sharer in the house with Hayat.
It was held that the suit filed by the alienee beyond 12 years in the absence of proof of ouster was in time. In our opinion, if we may say so with respect, the correct view to take is that expressed by Tek Chand, J. and we are in entire agreement with him. We do not understand Subah Lal v. Fateh Mahomed, ILR 54 All 628: (AIR 1932 All 393) as expressing a different view.
5. Sri K. S. Naidu pressed upon us that in view of , we should hold that limitation should not be approached from the standpoint of ouster by the appellant but on the basis of absence of acknowledgment of the right of the alienee or participation in the enjoyment of the property owned in common by the alienee. Learned counsel says that absence of those facts would point to adverse possession of the property on the part of the appellant. It is true that in that case the learned Judges held that in the case of an alienation by a coparcener of a Hindu joint family of his undivided interest, so to speak, in the coparcenary, possession of the non-alienating coparceners would be adverse to the alienee from the date on which he became entitled to sue for general partition and possession of his alienor's share on the view that coparcenary being a peculiar concept, so different from the concept of a tenancy-in-common, the alienee of such a share cannot possibly be regarded as coparcener or co-sharer and in such peculiar circumstances absence of a clear acknowledgment of the right of the alienee or participation in the enjoyment of the family property by the alienee would point to the nature of the possession of the non-alienating coparceners to be adverse. We are unable to see how that principle has application to the alienee from a Muslim co-sharer of his share in a tenancy-in common. A coparcenary and the concept of the nature of the interest in a coparcenary bear no analogy whatever to a tenancy-in-common and a co-sharer in respect thereto, especially when the co-sharers are Muslims, who, when they inherit immoveable property, own the same not as joint tenants but as tenants-in-common.
6. The appellant having at no time denied the alienee's title to or his right to sue for partition and recover separate possession of his share, and having also not pleaded or attempted to prove ouster of the respondent, we must hold that possession of the property in the hands of the appellant never became adverse to the respondent. On this view it follows that the suit was in time. That was the view which the lower appellate court rightly took and we accept it.
7. As regards the expenses for repairs, inasmuch as the lower appellate court has not disturbed the finding of the trial court, to wit, the defendant had incurred an expense of Rs. 195-14-0, the lower appellate court have directed the respondent to pay the appellant his proportionate share of liability, which amounts to Rs. 142. We direct the respondent to pay this amount to the appellant with interest at six per cent per annum from today. The respondent will have one month to pay the amount.
8. In the result, except for the said direction, the second appeal fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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