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Management Of The Ti... v. Industrial Tribunal,...

Madras High Court
Oct 31, 1961
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Art. 226 petition concerning Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 concerns the interpretation of Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The State Government, exercising powers under Section 10(1)(c), referred a number of issues to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras by order dated 4-4-1957; the present petition focuses on the issue of fixation of the rate of increments for all workers from the year 1953.

The Tribunal passed an award in November 1957. The Management challenged that award in W.P. No. 48 of 1958. The Court (Balakrishna Aiyar, J.) quashed the Tribunal's award in part and directed the Tribunal to decide the increment issue afresh, particularly in light of whether circumstances had changed since the prior Venkataramayya award (1948), which had ceased to be in force by efflux of time.

On rehearing, the Tribunal issued a revised award holding that workmen of the establishment other than those who were parties to an agreement dated 29-5-1956 would be entitled to increments at the rates fixed in Venkataramayya's award. The management pressed objections before the Tribunal and reiterated some of them in this court (including reliance on an earlier award under Section 33-A). The Tribunal rejected the contention that the settlement of 29-5-1956 (arrived at in conciliation with one union) barred adjudication of the identical dispute raised by another union; this ruling is the principal subject of debate on this petition.

Relevant workplace facts: the company was a public transport company with 163 workmen in May 1956; two unions were involved — the Trichi District Motor Workers Union (84 members) and the Motor Transport and General Workers Union (60 members). Both unions separately raised the identical dispute about rate of increments from 1953. The Motor Transport and General Workers Union reached a settlement with management on 29-5-1956 (covering drivers and conductors and affecting eligibility for increments for drivers above Rs. 60). The conciliation of the identical dispute raised by the Trichi District Motor Workers Union before the same conciliation officer failed and was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 12(3) / Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, between the management and one union of workmen, is binding upon other workmen (members of a different union) of the same establishment when an identical dispute raised by that other union is pending conciliation before the same conciliation officer.
  2. Whether an earlier award passed by a competent labour court under Section 33-A, on the identical question of the rate of increment, operates as a bar to the Tribunal adjudicating the identical question afresh.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Management's) Arguments

  • The settlement dated 29-5-1956, arrived at in conciliation between the management and the Motor Transport and General Workers Union, is binding on the workmen who are members of the Trichi District Motor Workers Union by virtue of Section 18(3)(d) of the Act.
  • By analogy with case law interpreting "substantial or appreciable section" (cited case: Associated Cement Co. Ltd.), an industrial dispute need not be raised by all workmen; therefore a settlement reached with a substantial section should bind the rest.
  • There was an earlier award under Section 33-A on the same question; that earlier award operates as a bar to the Tribunal adjudicating the identical question again.

Respondents' / Workmen's Arguments

  • The Tribunal found that the settlement of 29-5-1956 covered only drivers and conductors and did not refer to the other union or to other categories of workmen; thus it could not be invoked to bar adjudication for the Trichi District Motor Workers Union members.
  • The settlement was detrimental to certain drivers (those drawing above Rs. 60) who were members of the Trichi District Motor Workers Union and therefore could not be treated as settling the identical dispute for all workmen of the establishment.
  • The objection based on an alleged Section 33-A award raised by the management was taken late and involved factual questions (whether present employees were members of the union at the time of that award / whether complaint under Sec. 33-A was filed on their behalf); the Tribunal declined to entertain that objection at the late stage and that approach was upheld in this petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Burn and Co. v. Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38 Referenced in relation to continuation of obligations under a prior award and to points that could not be successfully challenged in the petition. The opinion notes that, in view of decisions including this case, a particular point (relating to obligations flowing from an award that had ceased to be in force by efflux of time) could not be successfully challenged in the petition. The court did not overturn the Tribunal's factual finding on change of circumstances in consequence.
Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 777 Construction of sub-section (6) of Section 19: the concept that termination (or action) by "any party" can be valid if taken by a substantial or appreciable section of the workmen; interpretation placed in the context of sub-section (3) of Section 18 and the definition of an industrial dispute. The court acknowledged the case was relied upon by the management to support that a settlement with one union might bind other workmen because disputes may be raised by a substantial section. The court considered but ultimately distinguished the present situation, concluding that the statutory scheme and the circumstances of two identical disputes pending conciliation require a different result.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by close textual and purposive analysis of the statutory scheme relating to conciliation and the effect of settlements under Sections 12 and 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

  1. The court first accepted the general proposition that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation is, by the language of Section 18(3), binding on all parties described in that subsection — including, on its face, "all persons who were employed in the establishment on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed" where a party is "composed of workmen." The court acknowledged this binding effect and the textual parity between a conciliation settlement and an enforceable award.
  2. The critical question was whether that general rule applies where there are two separate but identical industrial disputes raised by different sets of workmen (represented by rival unions) and both disputes are pending conciliation before the same conciliation officer, but only one union reaches a settlement with management.
  3. The court reasoned that the Act contains no warrant for treating two identical disputes, pending conciliation before the same officer, as allowing a settlement with one set of workmen to automatically terminate or bind adjudication or conciliation with respect to the other set of workmen. Instead, where the disputes are identical in substance and before the same officer, the proper approach is to regard them substantively as one dispute — implying that any settlement under Section 12(3) should be between the management and the entirety of the workmen who are before the conciliation officer in connection with the identical issue.
  4. The court placed weight on the language and scheme of Section 12(3) (which contemplates conciliation settlements between parties to a dispute) and Section 18(3), particularly clause (d) ("where a party ... is composed of workmen") — reading these together to conclude that Sub-section (3) was intended to make a conciliation settlement binding on non-parties only in the context where those non-parties were properly part of the dispute (i.e., the dispute properly involved them, or they were summoned as parties).
  5. The opinion also identified practical and policy considerations: interpreting Section 18(3) to allow a settlement with one union to bind rival-union members (even while their conciliation was pending before the same officer) could lead to unhealthy consequences, including enabling rival unions to undercut collective bargaining or produce unfair results where one union sided with management.
  6. The court therefore concluded that in the particular factual situation — a settlement concluded between management and one union while an identical dispute raised by another union was pending conciliation before the same officer — the settlement is not binding on the workmen of the other union who were not parties to that settlement.
  7. On the Section 33-A point, the court accepted the Tribunal's approach: the Section 33-A objection was raised late, involved factual questions (membership at the time and whether complaint was filed on their behalf), and the Tribunal was justified in declining to entertain that objection at the late stage. The court found no error in that factual and procedural approach.
  8. The court accepted the Tribunal's factual findings (after reviewing evidence) that the management remained profitable in most years and that one year of loss did not justify altering wage structure; it treated those findings of fact as binding for the purposes of this petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court held that a settlement reached in the course of conciliation between the management and one union is not binding upon the workmen who are members of another union when an identical dispute raised by that other union is pending conciliation before the same conciliation officer.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Industrial Tribunal was correct in refusing to treat the settlement dated 29-5-1956 (between management and the Motor Transport and General Workers Union) as a bar to adjudicating the dispute raised by the Trichi District Motor Workers Union.
  • The petition under Article 226 was dismissed; the court awarded the costs of the second respondent against the petitioner and specifically stated that the Tribunal had taken the right view on the principal point in issue.

Broader implications: The opinion explains and applies the statutory scheme (Sections 12 and 18) to clarify the limits of the binding effect of conciliation settlements where rival unions raise identical disputes and conciliation is pending; the decision reasons from statutory text and policy considerations. The opinion does not expressly state that it establishes a binding precedent beyond the decision rendered in this petition.

Disposition: Petition dismissed (with costs awarded to the second respondent).

Show all summary ...

1. This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution raises an interesting and important question as to the interpretation of the scope of Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question for decision is whether, where there are two separate conciliation proceedings started at the instance of two Unions of different workmen but all belonging to the same establishment and one of such conciliation proceedings ends in a settlement, such a settlement is binding upon the workmen who are members of the other union. In exercise of their power under Sec. 10(1)(c), the State Government, by an order dated 4-4-1957, referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras for adjudication a number of issues, of which this petition is concerned with only one, namely, fixation of the rate of increments to all the workers from the year 1953. The Tribunal passed an award in November 1957, which was challenged by the Management in W.P No. 48 of 1958. So far as the issue relating to the fixation of the rate of increment to all the workers from the year 1953 was concerned, it was quashed by Balakrishna Aiyar, J. with a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the issue afresh. The Tribunal has now passed a revised award, holding that the workmen of the establishment other than those who were parties to an agreement dated 29-5-1956, would be entitled to increment at. The rates fixed in what is known as Venkataramayya's award of the year 1948. It may be mentioned, that, even in the first award, the Tribunal had so found. But Balakrishna Aiyar, J. took the view that, inasmuch as Venkataramayya's award had ceased to be in force from 1949 by efflux of time, the question of the rate of increment, which the workmen might be entitled to would have to be decided afresh in the light of the alleged subsequent change of circumstances in the financial position of the management. But, when the Tribunal took up the issue afresh, while it naturally felt bound by the view expressed by this court, it considered that, notwithstanding the fact that Venkataramayya's award had ceased to be in force by efflux of time, the obligations under the Award would still continue to be binding upon the workmen and management concerned in terms of that award.

2. This position was canvassed before the Tribunal and has open repeated here. But it may be mentioned, in fairness to the argument on behalf of the petitioner, that, in view of certain decisions, including the one in Burn and Co. v. Their Employees, (S) AIR 1957 SC 38, this point could not be successfully challenged in this petition. On the question of change of circumstances, the Tribunal after reviewing the relevant evidence, came to the conclusion that the Management was making profit throughout except during the solitary year ending with March 31, 1954, and that, in view of this, the stability of the company could in no view be said to be diminished to any extent. The Tribunal further expressed the opinion that the fact the company worked at a loss only in one year could not furnish a proper justification for altering the structure and scales of wages. Though this finding is sought to be canvassed in this petition, inasmuch as it is one of fact, the finding has to be accepted. On behalf of the company, it was further urged before the Tribunal that there was an earlier award of a competent labour court passed under Sec. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act on the identical question of rate of increment and that this worked as a bar to the Tribunal once again adjudicating upon the identical question. But the Tribunal states in its revised award that this objection was taken at the fag-end of the enquiry before it, and expressed the doubt whether the present employees of the company were members of the union at the time of the alleged award under S. 33-A and whether a complaint under Sec. 33-A was filed on their behalf. The Tribunal apparently thought that this question would involve an investigation into facts and eventually declined to entertain the objection at the late stage. I can find no error in this approach of the Tribunal to the said objection. Though this objection was reiterated on behalf of the petitioner in this court, I find myself in agreement with the observations of the Tribunal on the question. The more important question which Balakrishna Aiyar, J. directed the Tribunal to decide while considering the matter afresh, is whether the settlement, dated 29-5-1956, and arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding, would not bar a second revised award on the question of rate of increment of wages to the workers from the year 1953. In order to appreciate this question, it is necessary to notice a few more facts. The company is doing business as a public transport company. In May 1956, it appears, there were 163 workmen employed by the company, of whom 54 were drivers 4 were conductors and the remaining 55 belonged to the staff. There were two Unions called the Trici District Motor Workers union and the Motor Transport and General Workers Union, the latter consisting of 60 workmen and the former 84 workmen as members out of the total strength of 163 workmen. But the Unions separately raised an industrial dispute on the issue of the rate of increments to be given to the workmen from 1953 and they were taken up for conciliation. It would appear, however, that the dispute sponsored by the Motor Transport and General Workers Union was settled between the management and that Union in terms of the agreement dated 29-5-1956. On the basis of this agreement, the Conciliation Officer passed an order under Sec. 12(3) of the Act. It may be mentioned that the settlement so arrived at was without reference to the other Union and the dispute raised by it and pending conciliation at the time before the same officer. The settlement aforesaid also covered not all the workmen, but only drivers and conductors, and fixed the rate of increment in such a way that the drivers drawing a salary above Rs. 60 would not be eligible for any increment. Of the 84 workers who were members of the Tiruchi District Motor Workers Union, 21 happened to be drivers who had reached the level of Rs. 60 as salary at the time of the agreement. The Tribunal noted that, in the circumstances, the settlement was detrimental to the interest of those drivers drawing at the time above Rs. 60 as salary. No settlement was as I said arrived at in respect, of workers other than drivers and conductors. The conciliation in respect of the identical dispute raised by the Trichi District Motor Workers' Union before the same officer seems to have failed, and, in such circumstances, therefore, the dispute was eventually referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, for adjudication.

3. Before that Tribunal, it was pressed on behalf of the management that the said settlement arrived at between the management and the Motor Transport and General Workers Union would, in view of Sec. 18(3)(d) of the Act, be binding on the workmen who were members of the Trichi District Motor Workers Union as well, and that, therefore, it was a bar to the same issue covered by the settlement being once again adjudicated upon. The Tribunal negatived this contention, and it is this point which has been considerably debated before me at the Bar.

4. Before dealing with the argument, it will be essential to set out the relative statutory provisions. Section 12 lays down the duties of conciliation officers. Sub-section (1) deals with the duties of a conciliation officer in relation to a public utility concern, and states that, where the dispute relates to such a concern and a notice under Sec. 22 has been given, he shall hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Rules have been accordingly framed, prescribing the manner in which the proceedings should take place. Sub-section (3) provides that, if a settlement of a dispute or any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceedings, the conciliation officer shall send a report to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. The word “settlement” itself has been defined by the Act in Sec. 2(p) as a settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding. In 1956, an inclusive clause has been added, to the definition of “settlement” so as to bring within its scope a settlement arrived at between management and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings.

5. Section 18 proceeds to set out the effect of a settlement, both in the case of one arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding and in the case of a settlement arrived at oilier wise. Where She settlement has been arrived at not in the course of a conciliation proceeding, sub-section (1) of that section enjoins that it will be binding on the parties to the agreement. Sub-section (3) which is important in the instant case, reads,

“A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act, or (an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal Which has become enforceable) shall be binding on—

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal), as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;

(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part”

The argument with reference to these provisions is that, where a settlement is arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding, its effect is the same as an award of a labour court, namely, that just like an award the settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding will be binding not only on the parties to the agreement, but the entirely of the rest of the workmen of the establishment as well. It is further contended that, in the case of a settlement proceeding as in the case of a reference for adjudication, there should be an industrial dispute existing or apprehended, but that an industrial dispute may have the collective backing of not all but only a substantial or appreciable number of the workmen employed in the concern or establishment. Notwithstanding that the rest of the workmen may not participate in it or remain at the background, an award which may result upon a reference of the dispute for adjudication will be binding on all the workmen. Likewise, a settlement arrived at under Sec. 12(3) will have the same effect. It is this effect that has been set out in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 18 of the Act. The workmen of the Motor Transport and General Workers Union, so ran the argument, would, therefore, be bound by the settlement arrived at between the management and the Tiruchi District Motor Workers Union, (sic)

6. In support of the contention, reference was made to Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 777 in which the Supreme Court construed the scope and ambit of sub-sec. (6) of section 19. It was held in that case, that, although one out of the two unions only had given notice of termination of an award, it would, nevertheless, be a valid termination and that the words “by any party” in sub-section (6) should be understood not in the sense of all workmen of the relative management but only of substantial or appreciable section of the workmen in the concern. This interpretation was placed in the context of the provisions in sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 and on the very definition and concept of an industrial dispute, namely, as one raised not necessarily by all the workmen of an establishment, but by a substantial or appreciable section thereof.

7. Where a dispute has ended in a settlement in the coarse of a conciliation of the dispute raised by some members of the workmen belonging to a particular union, I think it cannot be doubted that it will be binding on all the workmen of the establishment, notwithstanding the fact that the other workmen belonging to the other Union or Unions were not parties to the agreement forming the basis of the settlement in the course of conciliar, lion. So much is clearly stated in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 18. In the binding effect of a settlement under that sub-section, there is no difference between a settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation and an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, which has become enforceable. But the question is whether a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation between the workmen of a particular Union of the establishment and the management is binding upon another set of workmen belonging to another Union, the settlement arrived at being without any reference whatever to the latter workmen or union and at a time when the identical dispute raised by them is pending conciliation before the same officer. The question so raised is not free from difficulty; but I have come to the conclusion that such a settlement will not be binding on the workmen of the other Union which is not a party to the settlement. This result, in my opinion, appears to be irresistible from the scheme of the Act with reference to a settlement in the course of conciliation and adjudication of industrial disputes, particularly the scheme of Sec. 18 itself.

8. Once an industrial dispute has been raised by a substantial or appreciable section of the workmen concerned, it has to end in a conciliation or an adjudication, as the case may be. But, where there are two identical industrial disputes which are the subject-matter of conciliation before the same officer, there appears to be no warrant in the provisions of the Act to hold that the settlement reached in the course of the conciliation between the management and one set of workmen or their Union will automatically bring to an end the conciliation pending with reference to the other, but identical, dispute before the same officer. Where there are two identical disputes raised by two sets of workmen or their relative Unions before the same conciliation officer it sterns to me that they should be regarded as one dispute and looking into the substance of the matter all the workmen belonging to both the Unions will in effect and substantially be the parties to the industrial dispute, so that any settlement in such a situation will have to be arrived at not between the management and some only of such workmen, but between the management and the entirety of the workmen who are parties to the dispute either by themselves or through their Unions before the same officer, so as to make the settlement come within the ambit of Sec. 18(3). Suppose the same situation is present before a labour court and two disputes on the identical issue are referred to it for adjudication at the instance of two sets of workmen or their unions. In such a case it is obvious the labour court will have to deal with both the disputes together which are but identical, hear all the workmen or their relative unions and pass an award. That is what is visualised by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 18.

9. It is of the essence of the matter, that though factually, two disputes have been raised by different workmen or their relative Unions, they are identical in substance and in issue, so that the entire body of workmen, at whose instance the disputes have been raised, will be party to the industrial dispute, with the result that any settlement under Sec. 12(3) would not be permissible or possible only as between a party or section of the workmen, be it that they all belong to one union on the one hand and the management on the other. Section 12(3) postulates that it should be a settlement between parties to the dispute, which would include not merely one section of the workmen, but all the workmen who are before the conciliation officer in connection with the conciliation proceedings on the identical issue. The same result is also reflected by Sec. 18 itself. As I said, sub-section (1) deals with the effect of a settlement arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. In such a case, the settlement will only be binding on the parties to the agreement. The object of sub-sec. (3) is to make the settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding binding on those not parties to the conciliation as well. This provision does not postulate or cover a case where two industrial disputes, but of an identical nature on an identical issue, are raised by two different sets of workmen by themselves or through their relative or rival Unions and pending conciliation and a settlement arrived at only as between one set of workmen of one of such Union on the one hand and the management on the other. The reason is that clause (d) of sub-section (3) is concerned with making the settlement binding on those who were not parties thereto. This interpretation, in my opinion, is in keeping with the language of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 particularly, the words “is composed of workmen” used in that clause.

10. To interpret sub-sec. (3) in such a way as to make the settlement in question binding on the other workmen belonging to the other Union would also involve undesirable and unhealthy consequences, especially where there are rival workmen or rival Unions, one or more of which may possibly take sides with the management. A different interpretation may also result in conclusion and mischief in relation to the object of the Act, namely, to conserve and promote industrial relations and peace.

11. But my view of the scope of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 is not entirely based on the result which a different interpretation may produce, though such a result would, in my opinion, be also taken into account as it has a bearing too on the interpretation especially as it touches' industrial conciliation and adjudication. I hold, therefore, that the Tribunal has taken the right view in finding that the settlement in question is not a bar to its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the outstanding issue relating to the rate of increment to the workmen who were members of the Trichi District Motor Workers Union.

12. The petition is dismissed with the costs of the second respondent.

JF/D.H.Z

13. Petition dismissed.