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Arumoorthi Chettiar v. Secondary Education Committee Of Vallala Sangam Of Vadugupatti Opponent.

Madras High Court
Oct 12, 1961
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Case Summary — Second Appeal arising from O.S. No. 8 of 1957

Factual and Procedural Background

The following narrative is compiled strictly from the provided opinion.

Sankaranarayana Pillai was the recorded owner of a block of land comprising several survey numbers totaling 111 acres and 34 cents (patta No. 1349). By a sale deed dated 22-7-1943 (Ex. B.23) he purportedly sold 87 acres and 28 cents of that block to two vendees (referred to as S. Palamandi Thevar and S. Palaniandi Thevar). On 23-8-1949 a further document (Ex. B.4) was executed which described itself as a rectification deed: it stated that the entire block of about 111 acres had been agreed to be sold under Ex. B.23, that approximately 24 acres had been omitted from Ex. B.23 by mutual mistake, and that Ex. B.4 was executed to rectify that omission and to effect transfer of the omitted land to the vendees.

Ex. B.4 remained unregistered. The two vendees maintained that they had been in possession of the entire 111 acres and paid kist (instalments/dues) for the whole area since the date of the sale. Subsequently, parts of the lands changed hands: one of the vendees sold his interest to third parties, and the defendant before the court ultimately received title from transfers taking place in 1951–1952. Sankaranarayana Pillai later purported to deal with part of the 24 acres: he gifted 5 acres and 13 cents to the Bhoodan Committee and by a settlement deed dated 22-11-1954 (Ex. A.1) purported to settle the remaining about 18 acres 93 cents in favour of the Secondary Education Committee of the Vellala Sangam, who is the plaintiff in the suit.

The plaintiff (claiming under Ex. A.1) filed suit on 20-7-1955 for declaration of title and recovery of possession, alleging the defendant had trespassed on about ten acres and raised crops thereon. After the suit was filed, the two Thevars executed a sale of the 24 acres and 6 cents to the defendant on 12-12-1956 (Ex. B-30).

At trial the court held Ex. B.4 valid despite being unregistered (on the basis that it purported to rectify a mutual mistake) and found the two Thevars had title to the disputed land; the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Judge (first appeal), which court reached the opposite conclusion: it accepted the plaintiff's account that Ex. B.4 did not reflect the true transaction and that the plaintiff’s title under Ex. A.1 should be upheld; the appeal succeeded and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant then filed the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is precluded by the recitals in Ex. B.4 and by Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act from proving that the real contract between the parties was different from the contract described in Ex. B.4 (i.e., whether Sections 91 and 92 bar the plaintiff's case).
  2. Whether the finding of fact by the lower appellate court (in favour of the plaintiff) could properly be interfered with in the second appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant / Appellant's Arguments

  • The original sale (and Ex. B.4) effectively included the 24 acres and odd — Ex. B.4 was a rectification deed correcting a mutual mistake in Ex. B.23.
  • The vendees (the two Thevars) had title and possession of the 24 acres; the defendant obtained valid title from them by subsequent transfers.
  • The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to assert title under the later settlement (Ex. A.1) as it is inconsistent with the recitals of Ex. B.4, and Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar the plaintiff from contradicting or varying the terms of the written document.

Plaintiff / Respondent's Arguments

  • The sale of 22-7-1943 (Ex. B.23) was intended to convey only 87 acres and odd; the additional document Ex. B.4 was written up with a different purpose (to save stamp duty) and was never truly acted upon as a sale; it remained unregistered and was not the real contract.
  • The parties in fact intended a sale of about 24 acres for Rs. 1,000 (as part of another transaction), but that sale did not materialise and Ex. B.4 was not acted upon. Hence Sankaranarayana Pillai retained the disputed 24 acres and later settled part of it in favour of the plaintiff by Ex. A.1.
  • The plaintiff relied on evidence (including P.W.1 and corroborating witnesses, and a panchayat statement Ex. A.2) to show that Ex. B.4 did not represent the true agreement and that the Thevars lacked independent possession as owners.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cites the following case law in support of its legal analysis.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thyagaraja Mudaljar v. Vedathanni, ILR 59 Mad 446; AIR 1936 PC 70 Distinction between (a) excluding oral evidence to vary the terms of a written contract (Section 92) and (b) whether the parties had actually agreed to the terms set forth in the document (Section 91). The decision holds that Section 92 excludes evidence to vary written terms but does not bar evidence on whether the parties in fact contracted on the terms set out. The court relied on this authority to explain that Section 91 bars evidence as to the terms of a written contract once the actual contract is admitted to be in writing, but it does not preclude evidence that the document does not record the real contract between the parties. This supported the view that the plaintiff could seek to prove that the contract was different from Ex. B.4's recitals.
Feroz Shah v. Sobhat Khan, 65 Mad LJ 150; AIR 1933 PC 178 Affirmation that oral evidence cannot be admitted to contradict or vary the express terms of a written document where the actual contract has been reduced to writing; Section 92 precludes such attempts to alter the written terms by oral evidence. The court used this authority to frame the correct legal boundary: when the actual contract is admitted to be the written document, Sections 91/92 bar contradictory oral evidence. But where the contention is that the written document does not reflect the real agreement (i.e., the real contract was different), Section 91 does not necessarily preclude evidence to that effect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the dispute by first addressing the principal legal contention under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It identified a critical legal distinction:

  1. Between an attempt to prove that the terms of a contract were different from those recorded in a deed (which is barred by Section 91/92 where the actual contract is admitted to be the written contract) and an attempt to prove that the written document did not record the actual contract at all (i.e., that the real contract was different from the document). The court held that Section 91 applies to prevent proof of different terms of a contract already admitted to be in writing, but it does not prevent a party from proving that the document does not reflect the true contract that the parties in fact made.
  2. The court supported this legal distinction by reference to Privy Council authorities (Thyagaraja Mudaljar v. Vedathanni and Feroz Shah v. Sobhat Khan), concluding that where the plaintiff's contention is that the document was not the true contract (for reasons such as a contrived recitation to save stamp duty or other circumstances), Section 91 does not necessarily preclude oral evidence to prove that the real contract was different.

Having resolved the point of law in favour of permitting the plaintiff to contest the document's accuracy as to the real contract, the court turned to facts. It recognized that many of the remaining contentions traversed findings of fact made by the lower appellate court. The court explained the limits on interference in a second appeal: it is not open to the present court to reverse findings of fact unless there are valid legal grounds for such interference.

The opinion then reviewed the evidentiary basis on which the lower appellate court reached its factual conclusion in favour of the plaintiff. Key factual considerations relied upon by that court (and accepted as sufficient by the present court to refuse interference) included:

  • The lack of patta transfer to the Thevars up to the date of the settlement in favour of the plaintiff (despite assertions of long enjoyment).
  • Acceptance of P.W.1's testimony (Sankaranarayana Pillai) by the lower appellate court as to why Ex. B.4 was not registered and the surrounding circumstances.
  • The existence of a panchayat statement recorded in Ex. A.2, in which the defendant admitted cutting trees on land described as belonging to Sankaranarayana Pillai and being in his enjoyment; the defendant's explanation that he had signed Ex. A.2 without reading it was disbelieved by the lower appellate court.
  • The timing and content of subsequent sales: initially the Thevars sold only 87 acres and odd, and it was only after the suit was filed that they purported to sell the disputed 24 acres to the defendant — a circumstance the lower appellate court treated as significant and probative of knowledge of dispute.

The court acknowledged that there were countervailing doubts — for example, why the Thevars would have paid kist while the patta remained with Sankaranarayana Pillai, and the general difficulty in proving a lease/tenancy vs. ownership — but concluded that the lower appellate court had adequate material and legitimate reasons to arrive at its finding for the plaintiff. Therefore, on the question of fact, interference in the second appeal was not warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE SECOND APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

The court disposed of the appeal by upholding the decision of the lower appellate court which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit in the plaintiff's favour.

Consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's title (as found by the lower appellate court) stands and the defendant's second appeal fails.
  • Costs: there will be no order as to costs in this second appeal.
  • Leave: the opinion records "No leave." (as provided in the judgment text).
  • Precedential effect: the court's ruling applies the established distinction between (a) contradicting the terms of a written contract that is admitted to be the actual contract (barred by Sections 91/92) and (b) proving that the written document does not record the real contract (not necessarily barred). The opinion indicates no new legal principle beyond that application; it does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying cited authorities.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or inferences beyond the court's text.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises from A.S No. 40 of 1957 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul, wihich was filed against O.S No. 8 of 1957, On the file of the District Munsif Court, Dindigul. The defendant is the appellant herein. The facts are briefly as follows: One Sankaranarayana Pillai owned a block of land comprising of several survey numbers and) extending in area, 111 acres and 34 cents. They were entered in patta No. 1349 in his name in the revenue records. On 22-7-1943, under the sale deed, Ex. B. 23, he sols 87 acreg 28 cents out of the said block to two? persons, Si Palamandi Thevar and a Palaniandi Thevar. Subsequently, a document Ex. dated 23-8-1949 was executed by Sankaranarayana Pillai to the two vendees. Since the major controversy in the suit has arisen on account of Ex. B4, its purport has to be given briefly. It states that the entire 111 acres and odd (comprised in the block) were agreed to be sold 10b Rs. 3000 under Ex. B. 23, that by mutual mistake, 24 acres and odd, set out in schedule B to Ex. B4, were omitted to be included in Ex. B- 23, that Sankaranarayana Pillai was executing the rectification deed Ex. B4 to right this mutual mistake and that 24 acres and odd also should be deemed as having been sold under Ex. B. 23. It also recites that the executant has simultaneously applied for transferring the B schedule properties from the patta number of the executant to the patta number of the vendees.

2. This document was non registered it is common ground that purporting as it does, to be rectification deed consequent upon a mutual mistake, the document does not require registration for its validity. The claim of the two Vendees was that ever since the date of the sale under Ex. B. 23, they really got into possession of the entire 111 acres and odd as vendees from Sankaranarayana Filial and that they were paying kist for the entire land including the 24 acres and odd. Sa. Palamandi Thevar soldi his half share in 87 acres and odd to one Kamaswami Naicker on 7-11-1951, who in turn sold it to the defendant on 24-10-1952. Si. Palaniandi Thevar sold his half share in 87 acres and in to the defendant on 1-10-1952. Sankaranarayana Pillai however proceeding on the footing that, he was still entitled to 24 acres and odd gifted 5 acres and 13 cents out of it to the Boodan Committee, and by another deed dated 22-11-1954 settled the remaining 18 acres and 93 cents of the Secondary Education Committee of the Vellala Sangajn who is the plaintiff in the suit. The claim of the plaintiff was that in the sale deed dated 22-7-1943, only 87 acres and odd were sold and it was never intended to convey the balance of 24 acres and odd, that when the two vendees tried to sell their lands to one Knshnaswami Chetti in 1949, the Vendee insisted, on a conveyance of the whole block-Thereupon the two Thevars approached Sankaranarayana Pillai for a sale of 24 acres and odd. In order to save stemp duty a document was written up as if it was a re-certification deed, of was in the contemplation of the parties to have she deed registered, but on account of a sudden calamity in Sankaranarayan Pillai's house, it was not registered. When subsequently Sankaranarayana Pillai asked the Thevars to return the unregistered document, they told Sum that they had mislaid it. What the Thevars intended at the time of the writing of the deed was to take a sale of 24 acres and odd for Rs. 1000 so that the Thevars could sell the entire block to Krishnaswami Chetti, realise the price from him and pay Sankaranarayana Pillai. The sale to Krishnaswami Chetti did not materialise and, therefore, the whole transaction fell through. Ex. B4 was never acted upon. The plaintiff therefore claims to have obtained title to the extent of 18 acres and odd ??? Sankaranarayana Pillai under the settlement deed Ex. A.1 dated 22-11-1954. Since the defendant trespassed upon ten acres and odd of the suit properties, and raised two crops thereon the plaintiff has come forward with the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The, suit was filed in 20-7-1955. After the filing of the suit, on 12-12-1956 under Ex. B- 30 the two Palaniandi Thevars sold the above 24 acres and 6 cents to the defendant.

3. The plea of the defendant was that the actual sale to Palaniandi Thevars comprised 24 acres and odd also, that it was a mutual mistake to have omitted that extent in the sale deed that Ex. B.4 was really a rectification deed regarding this document, that the title and possession remained with the two Palaniandi Thevars, that the defendant had obtained a valid title from them, and that the plaintiff had no title under the settlement deed in his favour.

4. The trial court found that Ex. B. 4 was not invalid for want of registration, that the two Palaniandi Thevars had title to the disputed property and that therefore the plaintiff's title had to fail. The suit was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the oral agreement between the parties at the time of Ex. B. 4 was-to convey the 24 acres and odd for consideration to the Palamandi Thevars, that this agreement: was not fulfilled for the reasons given by Sankaranarayana Pillai, that the Thevars were enjoying the lands as waramdars under Sankaranarayana Pillai, and that they had no independent possession. The plaintiff's title was therefore affirmed, the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. The second appeal was filed by the defendant.

5. The question of law that was urged before me in the second appeal was that the plaintiff was not entitled to put forward a plea contrary to the recitals in Ex. B.4 and that Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act would be-attracted. As mentioned above, Ex. B.4 purports to be a rectification deed stating that what was really sold under Ex. B. 23 was 111 acres and odd, that 24 acres and odd were left out by mutual mistake, that this fact was being recorded in Ex. B-4 and that at the same time the vendor was applying to the authority for transfer of patta for the 24 acres and odd in the names of the vendees. In other words the purport of the document is an agreement add netting the title of the two Palaniandi Thevars in 24 acres and odd on the basis of Ex. B. 23 itself and for the consideration stated in Ex. B.23, and admitting that the omission to include these properties in Ex. B.23 was due to mutual mistake. It is not a point of dispute raised before me that this document is defective for want of registration. The point of law urged before me was that the plaintiff in attempting to make out that the agreement between the parties at the time of Ex. B.4 was really one-for the sale of 24 acres and odd for a consideration of Rs. 1000 would be debarred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.

6. I consider that there is no substance in this, contention. There is material difference between an attempt to show that the terms of a contract were different from those recorded in a deed, and an attempt to show that the contract as mentioned in the deed was not the real contract between the parties hut it was something different. It is the former that is hit by Section 91 of the Evidence Act but the latter is not so hit. There is authority for this view. The Privy Council in Thyagaraja Mudaljar v. Vedathanni, ILR 59 Mad 446 at p. 457 : (AIR 1936 PC 70 at p. 73), observed:

“Section 92 Only excludes oral evidence to vary the terms of the written contract, and has no reference to the question whether the parties had agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the document. The objection must therefore be based on S. 91 which only excludes oral evidence as to the terms of a written contract. Clearly under that section, a defendant sued, as in the present case) upon a written contract purporting to be signed by him, could, not be precluded in disproof of such agreement from giving oral evidence that his signature was a forgery.”

Again another decision, of the Privy Council reported in Feroz Shah v. Sobhat Khan, 65 Mad LJ 150 : (AIR 1933 PC 178) forbade the admission or consideration of evidence as to the intention of the parties or to contradict the express terms of the document.. When there is no dispute that the actual contract between the parties was the one recorded in the deed, it will not be thereafter open to the parties to let in oral evidence to prove that its terms were different from what is contained in the deed. Section 92 precludes such a course. When it is admitted that the actual contract between the parties has been reduced to writing, oral evidence cannot be given to show that its terms were different from those found in the deed. Section 91 of the Evidence Act forbids such a course. But here the contention of the plaintiff is that the actual contract itself was different, and that for certain reasons it was made to appeal in the document that it was a rectification deed. Section 91 does not preclude the plaintiff from proving that the real contract was different from what is found in the deed. X therefore answer the question of law raised accordingly.

7. The rest of the allegations in the memorandum of appeal traverse;he findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court. It is not open to me in the second appeal to reverse this finding of fact. I have carefully gone through the evidence as well as the arguments of the teamed counsel on both sides. I find that the trial court rejected the plaintiff's version about the Oral agreement between the parties and accepted the version of the agreement as recited in Ex. B. 4. For this purpose it relied mainly on the continued enjoyment of the properties by the Thevars, and payment of last by them and also found that the evidence given by Sankaranarayana Pillai as P.W 1 that the Thevars enjoyed the disputed land as tenants under him was unsatisfactory. The lower appellate court, however, was prepared to accept the evidence of Sankaranarayana Pillai which was also corroborated by the other witnesses on the plaintiff's side for accepting the version of the plaintiff about the real nature of the agreement. It referred to the fact that though Ex. B. 4 recites that simultaneously a patta transfer application was being made, upto the date of settlement in favour of the plaintiff the patta remained with Sankaranarayana Pilllai. It accepted P.W 1's evidence as to why Ex. B. 4 was not registered. It relied on a statement given by the Thevars before a panchayat and recorded in Ex. A- 2, for the purpose of upholding the plaintiff's version. The Panchayat arose because of a complaint to the police about cutting down trees on some of the disputed land by the defendant.

8. In Ex. A. 2, the defendant admitted that without correctly ascertaining the boundaries or his lands he had cut the trees on land belonging to Sankaranarayana pillai and in his enjoyment. To explain away Ex. A-2, the defendant put forward a theory that Sankaranarayana Pillai a literate and wordly wise man, had obtained the defendant's signature in Ex. A. 2 without reading out the contents to him. This version was disbelieved by the lower appellate court. It also relied on the circumstances that when the Thevars sold the properties subsequently, they purported to transfer only 87 acres and odd, and it was only after the present suit was filed that they sold the disputed property to the defendant who, in the circumstances, must be presumed to have purchased the property knowing of the dispute over it.

9. On a careful consideration of the evidence I am of the opinion that it is a case where it will not be possible to hold that the conclusion of the lower appellate court as one on a point of fact, should be interfered with as an improper judgment of reversal for any of the reasons which the law considers appropriate in such circumstances. There was material on which the lower appellate court could base its finding. While on the one hand, a doubt may be entertained why the Thevars should pay the lost though patta is with Sankaranarayana Pillai and whether the version of the lease has been properly proved, on the other, there is equally a grave doubt about the claim of the Thevars to have obtained possession of the land even though they never attempted to get patta transferred to their names during a long period of 12 years, It is also doubtful if Sankaranarayana Pillai a wordly wise man, would have meekly agreed to part with 21 acres and odd in 1949, six years after the date of the original sale deed, acceding to a claim of mutual mistake, and whether he would not have, in the above circumstances, tried to make a bargain, if the Thevars were to make a profit to themselves by selling not merely 87 acres and odd but also 24 acres and odd. That he agreed to a rectification without ??? for any pecuniary benefit for himself after such a long time had elapsed from the date of original sale deed, is a point on which reasonable doubt could arise.

10. In view of the above, I do not think that interference with the finding of fact by the lower appellate court is called for.

11. The appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in this second appeal. No leave.

EF/V.S.B

12. Appeal dismissed.