Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

M. Thirumalachariar v. S.P Varadappa Chettiar .

Madras High Court
Feb 2, 1961
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was a subscriber to a chit conducted by Commercial Funds Ltd., Kancheepuram. He took in auction a chit for Rs. 5,000 payable in 100 monthly instalments of Rs. 50 each, the first instalment being due on 14 March 1947 and the last on 14 May 1951. The defendant admitted payment of instalments up to 14 September 1949 but failed to pay subsequent instalments. The Funds were directed to be wound up by this Court in O.P. No. 309 of 1949.

The Official Receiver, appointed as Official Liquidator, sold the outstanding dues of the Funds to the plaintiff by a sale deed dated 17 May 1954. The plaintiff, as assignee, confined his claim in the present suit to Rs. 600, representing instalments from 14 December 1950 to 14 May 1951. The suit was instituted on 1 July 1955.

The plaintiff pleaded that the suit was in time by virtue of Madras Ordinance V of 1953 and Madras Act V of 1954 and I of 1955. The defendant's principal defence was that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 75 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. The trial court accepted the defence of limitation and dismissed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court reached a contrary conclusion and allowed the suit, relying on S.K.S. Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther (AIR 1949 Mad 592). The defendant brought this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit on a bond payable by instalments containing a default clause is barred by limitation under Article 75 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, and if so, from which date the period of limitation runs.
  2. Whether the payee's waiver of the benefit of the default provision in such a bond can be presumed (so as to prevent Article 75 from applying) or must be specifically pleaded and proved by the plaintiff.
  3. Whether an alleged acknowledgement of liability in an earlier written statement (in O.S. No. 186 of 1952) operates to save the present suit from the bar of limitation when that ground of exemption was not pleaded in the plaint.
  4. Whether the plaint may be amended at this stage to add a ground of exemption from limitation not originally pleaded.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The lower appellate court erred in presuming waiver for purposes of column 3 of Article 75; waiver cannot be presumed in favour of the plaintiff.
  • If the plaintiff wished to rely on waiver to avoid the limitation bar, the plaintiff must specifically plead waiver and prove it by cogent evidence.
  • The trial court correctly found that Rule 6 of the Fund's bye-laws made the whole debt due on default, and that no waiver was established; accordingly the suit was time-barred.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Reliance was placed on the decision in S.K.S. Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther (AIR 1949 Mad 592) to support the view that Article 75 is attracted only when the plaintiff elects to enforce the default clause, and that waiver or forgoing of the default clause leaves the ordinary three-year period (Article 74) to operate.
  • It was contended that the defendant had, in an earlier written statement (in O.S. No. 186 of 1952), acknowledged liability to the extent of Rs. 600, which if operative would save the suit from the bar of limitation.
  • The plaintiff also pleaded that Ordinance V of 1953 and subsequent Madras Acts rendered the suit within time (as the basis pleaded in the plaint for being within time).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.K.S. Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther, AIR 1949 Mad 592 (1949-1 Mad LJ 112) Held (on its facts) that in a suit on an instalment bond with a default clause Article 75 operates only if the plaintiff elects to enforce the default clause; where the plaintiff treated the account as if there were no default, that conduct demonstrated waiver. The lower appellate court relied on this decision to presume waiver and hold the suit within time. The High Court accepted that Mack J.'s decision was correct on its facts but rejected any general proposition that waiver may be presumed simply because it benefits the plaintiff; the Court found no justification for presuming waiver from Article 75's language.
Ithikat Gopala Menon v. Kallingalakath, 68 Mad LJ 244 : AIR 1935 Mad 303 Approach indicating that waiver should be proved by the plaintiff by proper evidence (as reflected in the judgment of Madhavan Nair J.). The Court cited this decision to support the view that waiver must be specifically pleaded and established by evidence; it found this approach consistent with the language of Article 75.
Palani Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti, 64 Mad LJ 317 : AIR 1933 Mad 395 Application of O. VII R. 6 CPC — where a suit is instituted after expiration of the period of limitation, the plaint must show the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. The Court relied on this authority (along with others) to hold that the plaintiff could not rely on an unpleaded ground (acknowledgement in another suit) to save the plaint from the limitation bar and that an application to amend at this late stage was rightly refused.
Mahadeva Sastrigal v. Marulai Reddiar, AIR 1933 Mad 874 Similar application of the requirement under O. VII R. 6 CPC that exemption grounds be pleaded in the plaint. Used to support the mandatory nature of the rule and to refuse the belated attempt to found the suit's timeliness on an unpleaded ground.
Ramaswami v. Anaiya Padayachi, AIR 1936 Mad 545 Followed the above authorities regarding pleading of exemption from limitation under O. VII R. 6 CPC. Reinforced the Court's conclusion that the plaint must disclose the ground of exemption and that the plaintiff could not rely on a different ground not pleaded; the attempted amendment was too late.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining Article 75 of the Limitation Act, which governs suits on bonds payable by instalments where a default clause provides that, in case of default, the whole becomes due. The Article prescribes a three-year period. Column 3 of Article 75 states that the period runs "when the default is made unless where the payee or the obligee waives the benefit of the provision and then when a fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver."

From the language of Article 75 the Court concluded that the period of limitation commences at the moment of default; a suit beyond three years from that date is prima facie time-barred. The only circumstance in which the period will not run from the original default is if the payee has waived the benefit of the default provision; whether such waiver exists is a question of fact.

The Court analysed the argument that waiver could be presumed in favour of the plaintiff (an approach taken by the lower appellate court relying on the 1949 Madras decision). It held that the mere fact that waiver would advantage the plaintiff does not justify presuming waiver or shifting to the defendant the burden of proving the negative (i.e., proving that the plaintiff did not waive). The Court held, consistently with the earlier decision in Ithikat Gopala Menon, that if a plaintiff intends to rely on waiver to escape the limitation bar under column 3 of Article 75, waiver must be specifically pleaded and proved by the plaintiff like any other material fact.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted there was no plea of waiver in the plaint and no evidence adduced to establish waiver. Therefore the plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proof required to show an exception to the limitation bar. The trial court's finding that no waiver was shown was upheld on that ground.

The Court further considered the respondent's contention that an acknowledgement of liability in an earlier written statement (in O.S. No. 186 of 1952) saved the suit from limitation. It observed that the plaint sought to rely on a different ground (the Madras Ordinance and subsequent Acts) for timeliness, and that Order VII Rule 6 CPC requires a plaint instituted after the expiry of limitation to state the ground upon which exemption is claimed. The authorities cited (Palani Chetti; Mahadeva Sastrigal; Ramaswami) were applied to hold that a plaintiff cannot later support exemption on a ground not pleaded. The respondent's late oral application to amend the plaint was refused as belated.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Second appeal allowed; the suit is dismissed as barred by limitation.

Direct consequences (as applied to the parties in this case):

  • The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside.
  • The suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed as time-barred under Article 75 of the Limitation Act.
  • The defendant is entitled to his costs throughout.

Legal holdings of broader application stated by the Court (as contained in the opinion):

  • Article 75 operates from the date of default and prescribes a three-year period; a plaintiff seeking to escape that bar by asserting that the payee waived the benefit of the default clause must specifically plead and prove such waiver.
  • Waiver cannot be presumed merely because it would benefit the plaintiff; the plaintiff carries the burden of proof on waiver as a factual matter.
  • Where a plaint is filed after the limitation period, Order VII Rule 6 CPC requires the plaint to disclose the ground for exemption; a plaintiff may not support exemption on an unpleaded ground and a belated amendment to add such a ground may be refused as too late.

The Court did not announce that it was establishing a rule broader than those stated above; it applied existing principles of pleading, burden of proof, and the language of Article 75 to decide the appeal.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a defendant's second appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 600 alleged to be due from him to the Commercial Funds Ltd. Kancheepuram. The defendant was a subscriber to a chit conducted by the funds. He took in auction a chit for Rs. 5000 payable in 100 monthly instalments of Rs. 50 each. The first instalment was due on March 14, 1947, and the last was payable on May 14, 1951. Admittedly, the defendant paid all the instalments, due upto September 14, 1949; but he failed to pay the subsequent instalments. The funds were directed by this court in O.P No. 309 of 1949 to be wound up.

2. The Official Receiver who was appointed as the Official liquidator for realizing the oustandings of the funds sold the outstanding due to funds, to the plaintiff, the respondent in the present second appeal by means of a sale deed date May 17, 1954. The plaintiff, as such assignee, claimed to be entitled to realise the amount claimed in the suit. According to him, although he was entitled to a larger amount, he confined his claim to the sum of Rs. 600 being the instalments payable for the period from December 14, 1950 to May 14, 1951. The suit was actually instituted on July 1, 1955. The plaintiff pleaded that the suit was in time by virtue of Madras Ordinance V of 1953 and Madras Act V of 1954 and I of 1955. The main defence to the suit was one of limitation. The contention on behalf of the defendant was that the suit was governed by Art. 75 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. This defence found favour with the trial court, with the result that the suit was dismissed. The argument on behalf of the defendant in this court was confined to the question of limitation. The trial court found that under rule 6 of the Fund's bye-laws the consequence of default in payment of any of the instalments was that the entire debt would become due from the date of the default; and that no waiver of the benefit of this rule having been established by the plaintiff, the suit would be out of time under Art. 75. A further argument was advanced before the trial court that the suit would be within time by reason of an admission of liability on the part of the defendant in an earlier written statement filed by him in O.S No. 186 of 1952 on the file of he District Munsif of Conjeevaram.

3. That was a suit in which one Swaminatha Mudaliar, claiming to be an assignee of the debt, sought to recover the sum from the present defendant; and in defence the defendant's plea was, inter alia, that the assignment itself was void and that he was, therefore, not liable for the debt. There was an alternative plea in the written statement that if the assignment were to be held to be good and valid his liability would only extend to a sum of Rs. 600 and not to any larger sum. Actually this written statement was not filed all the trial court, but a reference to the alleged admission was found in the judgment, Ex. B-3, in that suit. There was also a reference to the alleged admission in Ex. A-5, another written statement, said to have been filed by the defendant therefore the Official Receiver ???. The trial court, on a consideration of Ex. B-3 and A-5, was of the view that the acknowledgement pleaded by the plaintiff to save the bar of limitation was not established.

4. On appeal by the plaintiff the lower appellate court took a different view on the question of limitation. In effect, it considered that waiver on the part of the plaintiff would, in such circumstances be presumed, and that the suit would, therefore be in time under Art. 75 of the Limitation Act. In support of this view, the lower appellate court relied on the decision of Mack J. in S.K.S. Ayyathurai Mudaliar v. Ibramsa Rowther, AIR 1949 Mad 592 : 1949-1 Mad LJ 112 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. The aggrieved defendant has therefore, come up to this court in second appeal.

5. The main point urged by Sri K.S Champakesa Aiyangar, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the lower appellate Court was in error in supposing that waiver for purposes of the third column of Art. 75 could be presumed in favour of the plaintiff. His contention is that the plaintiff if he wanted to rely on it, must clearly plead waiver for purposes of the third column of that Article and prove the same just like any other fact by cogent evidence. His contention further is that the mere fact, that waiver might be to the benefit of the plaintiff, is not sufficient justification for the view that waiver can be presumed in favour of the plaintiffs and that the defendant should prove that there is no waiver. I think the learned counsel is right in his contention. Art. 75 of the Limitation Act governs a suit inter alia, on a bond payable by instalments, which provides, that if default be made in payment of one or more instalments, the whole shall be due. The period prescribed for such a suit is three years. The starting point as provided in column 3 is stated thus;

“When the default is made unless where the payee or the obligee waives the benefit of the provision and then when a fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver.”

It is clear from this that the period of limitation commences the moment there is a default made in payment of the instalment due. A suit beyond three years from the date of such default would prima facie be out of time. It would be within time only if the plaintiff has waived the benefit of the default provision. Whether there is a waiver or not is a question of fact. Obviously it will have to be pleaded and established, if it is to be relied upon as a ground for the exemption from the bar of limitation provided by Art. 75. The mere fact that a waiver will be to the advantage of the plaintiff inasmuch as that will save him from the bar of limitation, will not ipso facto be a proper basis for the view that he should be assumed to have waived the benefit and that on that basis the defendant who pleads to the contrary, should be called upon to establish the negative namely, that the plaintiff has not waived.

6. Sri T.V Balakrishnan, the learned counsel for the respondent however, relies on the decision in AIR 1949 Mad 592 and contends that only in cases where the plaintiff wanted to elect to enforce the default clause in the bond, Art. 75 would be attracted. Mack J. held on the facts in that case that in a suit on an instalment bond with a default clause, Art. 75 will only operate if the plaintiff elects to enforce the default clause which it is always open to him to waive or forgo; and that in such cases his right to recover the instalments as on an ordinary instalment bond within three years prescribed by Art. 74 of the Limitation Act remains unaffected. In that case the stake-holder kept an account of the moneys owed by the subscribers; it was found in the account that he had credited the commission due to the defendant on the basis that he had committed no default. That clearly showed that the case for the plaintiff in that case was that the instalments had been paid and there was no default. In view of the fact that actually the commission was credited to the defendant on the basis that there was no default, it was apparent there was a waiver on the part of the plaintiff.

7. On that basis the actual decision of Mack, J. in that case if I may say so with due respect, was correct. But there are no doubt observations in his judgment which possibly lend some support to the view that waiver may be assumed in favour of the plaintiff as it would be to his benefit in such a case as this. But with great respect to the learned Judge, I can find no justification for that view in the language of Art. 75, particularly that of column 3 thereof. On the other hand, my attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellant to the decision in Ithikat Gopala Menon v. Kallingalakath, 68 Mad LJ 244 : (AIR 1935 Mad 303), in which Madhavan Nair J. was evidently of the view that waiver should be proved by the plaintiff by proper evidence. It is true that the learned Judge has not laid down such a proposition in so many terms, but the approach of the learned Judge to the question was obviously on that basis. On the language of Art. 75 I am clearly of the view that if the plaintiff wants get the benefit of waiver in order to save time, hg must specifically plead and establish the same by evidence. I can see no support in the language of that Article for the assumption that waiver will be presumed in favour of the plaintiff and that it is for the defendant to plead the negative and prove the same for purposes of column 3 of Art. 75.

8. On that view, there is no difficulty in holding in this case that the plaintiff has not established waiver. There is not even a plea of waiver in the plaint; much less has there been any evidence directed on the plaint. It follows, therefore, that the suit was out of time and was rightly dismissed by the trial court.

9. Sri T.V Balakrishnan urges that the suit should be held to be in time on the ground that the defendant had acknowledged his liability to the extent of Rs. 600 in the written statement filed by him in O.S No. 186 of 1952. But this ground of exemption from the bar of limitation was not specifically taken in the plaint. It is true that in the plaint it was pleaded that the suit was within time but that was on a different ground namely that Ordinance V of 1953 and the subsequent Acts already referred to saved the bar. O. VII R. 6 of the CPC require, that where a suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation the plaint shall show the ground upon which the exemption from such law is claimed. The rule appears to be mandatory. It is not sufficient that a plea of exemption is made on a certain ground in order to permit the plaintiff to support the exemption on another ground not pleaded. So much appears to have been held by Cornish J. in Palani Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti, 64 Mad LJ 317 : (AIR 1933 Mad 395), and by Walsh J., in Mahadeva Sastrigal v. Marulai Reddiar, AIR 1933 Mad 874. These two decisions have been followed by Venkataramana Rao J. in Ramaswami v. Anaiya Padayachi, AIR 1936 Mad 545. In view of these decisions Sri Balakrishnan made an oral application to this court for leave to amend the plaint. Obviously this request is too belated and cannot be allowed.

10. The result is the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the suit will stand dismissed.

11. The defendant will be entitled to his costs throughout.

IE/I/D.V.C

12. Appeal allowed.