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A. Ramaswami Aiyangar v. State Of Madras
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, A. Ramaswami Aiyangar, claimed appointment as Headmaster of St. Andrews Higher Elementary School, Manapparai (the third respondent) on 9 June 1947. Charges were originally framed against him on disciplinary grounds on 9 January 1956; some charges were cancelled and recast, with fresh charges issued on 3 March 1956. The petitioner was reduced to the position of Assistant in the same school effective 8 March 1956. He appealed to the District Educational Officer, Tirchi on 20 March 1956.
On 10 July 1956 the Manager of the institution framed further charges and requested an explanation by 15 July 1956. The petitioner wrote on 13 July 1956 requesting more time, which was refused. The management gave the petitioner notice for three months with effect from 10 July 1950 and terminated his services, apparently concluding the charges were proved in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The petitioner appealed to the District Educational Officer, Tiruchi on 31 July 1956 and later to the Divisional Inspector of Schools, Coimbatoie. The Divisional Inspector of Schools rejected the appeal by Disposal No. 1185 of 1958 (dated in the text as 17 June 1956).
The petitioner sought relief by way of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the management terminating his services and the departmental confirmations of that action. The petitioner's challenge relied primarily on alleged non‑compliance with rules relating to elementary schools published by the Government of Madras, specifically Rule 13(2)(ii)(b) and its provisos.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the management's termination of the petitioner's services (by notice for three months) complied with the procedural requirements and the provisos to Rule 13(2)(ii)(b) of the rules relating to elementary schools, including giving the teacher a reasonable opportunity to state his case and obtaining the Deputy Inspector's prior approval.
- Whether the administrative rules relied upon (including Rule 13(2)(ii)(b) and its provisos) are of a statutory character such that a private employee (teacher) of an aided private institution may invoke them in proceedings under Article 226 to obtain relief against the management.
- Whether the orders of the District Educational Officer and the Divisional Inspector of Schools confirming the management's action were manifestly erroneous, unjust or opposed to principles of natural justice so as to justify interference by certiorari.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — Sri Venugopalachariar
- The petitioner contended that the management failed to comply with the provisos to Rule 13(2)(ii)(b): specifically, he was not given a reasonable opportunity to state his case in writing or in person because only five days were allowed to prepare explanations involving accounting matters.
- He also argued that the second proviso was breached because the Deputy Inspector of Schools' approval for disciplinary action was obtained months earlier (in May) in respect of other matters and was not specifically obtained for the charges formulated in July; thus the management did not properly secure the necessary departmental approval for the particular action taken.
- The petitioner sought quashing of both the management's terminating order and the subsequent confirmations by the District Educational Officer and Divisional Inspector of Schools under Article 226.
Respondent / State (via Learned Additional Government Pleader)
- The Additional Government Pleader argued that the rules relied upon are administrative in character and not statutory in effect; he relied upon a judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 802 of 1958 to support that view.
- Implicitly, the State's position as presented to the Court was that the contractual terms in the service register — which required three months' notice from either party — governed the contractual relationship between the private management and the teacher, and that administrative rules governing aided institutions did not enlarge private contractual rights available to the employee.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkataswami v. Correspondent K.G.B. Sr. School (Andhra Pradesh High Court) | The Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that where statutory rules were disregarded the termination of service was improper; rules are binding on the Government as on any other party. | The Court distinguished this authority: the Andhra decision involved government action (intervention to restore a management decision) and thus different considerations applied as compared with the present case where the dispute was essentially between a private management and its employee. |
| Subba Rao v. Divisional Inspector of Schools (Andhra Pradesh High Court) | Addresses rules relating to elementary schools and relief under Article 226 where the grievance was against a government servant (Divisional Inspector). | The Court noted this case to show that different considerations arise when the grievance is against the Government; it was not directly applicable to a dispute principally between a private management and its employee. |
| W.P. No. 802 of 1958 (Judgment of this Court) | Relied upon by the Additional Government Pleader to support the submission that the elementary school rules are administrative rather than statutory in character. | The Court recorded that the Additional Government Pleader relied on this authority; the Court's reasoning proceeded on the basis that the rules are administrative and do not enlarge the private contractual relationship between management and teacher. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the nature of the contractual relationship between the private management and the teacher, and the legal character of the Government's elementary school rules relied upon by the petitioner.
First, the Court inspected the relevant term in the petitioner's service register: "No teacher shall ordinarily leave a school without giving three months' notice to the management, and no management shall dispense with the services of a teacher without giving three months' notice to him, except for adequate disciplinary reasons approved by the District Educational Officer." The Court interpreted this provision to mean that, ordinarily, either party may terminate the employment by three months' notice, and that a shorter notice by the management is permissible only when adequate disciplinary reasons have been approved by the District Educational Officer.
Second, addressing the petitioner's contention that the administrative rules (including Rule 13(2)(ii)(b) and its provisos) expanded the petitioner's rights beyond those in the contract, the Court held that it could not see how these administrative rules enlarged or qualified the express or implied terms of the private contract between employer and employee. The Court treated the rules as administrative in character (following the position advanced by the Additional Government Pleader and his reliance on W.P. No. 802 of 1958), and observed that while the State may condition recognition or financial aid on observance of such rules, that does not create a tri‑partite contractual relationship between Government, management and teacher that would supersede the private contract.
Third, the Court considered whether there was compliance with the procedural provisos relied upon by the petitioner. It accepted that there had been formal compliance with the provisos (the petitioner was informed in writing of charges; an explanation was requested and an explanation, though belated, was submitted and considered). Whether there was "substantial" compliance was acknowledged as a matter of opinion, but the Court emphasized that the rules being administrative rather than statutory weakened the petitioner's ability to invoke them as grounds for certiorari against his private employer.
Finally, with regard to the departmental orders (District Educational Officer and Divisional Inspector), the Court concluded that those orders were not shown to be manifestly erroneous on the face of the record nor so unjust or opposed to principles of natural justice as to require quashing. The Court noted specifically that the Deputy Inspector had authorised disciplinary action at an earlier stage, that the petitioner had been given time to submit an explanation (even if he considered it insufficient), and that the explanation he later submitted was considered by the authorities.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application for a writ of certiorari is dismissed; the rule nisi is discharged; there will be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the management's termination of the petitioner's services and the confirmations by the Departmental authorities stand; the petitioner is not granted the relief sought under Article 226.
- The Court emphasized that administrative rules governing aided institutions do not, in themselves, convert or enlarge the private contractual rights of an employee so as to enable the employee to invoke those rules against his private employer in proceedings under Article 226. Any sanction on a management for non‑observance of administrative rules (for example, withdrawal of recognition or aid) is a matter between the management and the State, not a mechanism that automatically widens the private contract between management and employee.
- No broader precedent altering the law of contracts between private aided institutions and their employees was established; the decision is confined to the facts and reasoning set out in the opinion.
The application was dismissed by the Court (signed in the text "V.C.S"). There was no order as to costs.
This application for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing certain orders under which the services of the petitioner (A. Ramaswami Aiyangar) were dismissed with by the management of the St. Andrews Higher Elementary School, Manapparai (third respondent), involves certain issue of interest. The petitioner claims that he was appointed as a Headmaster of the third respondent school on 9th June 1947. Charges were first framed against him on certain disciplinary grounds, on 9th January 1956. Certain of these charges were cancelled and recast, and fresh charges were issued on 3rd March 1956. Subsequently, the petitioner was reduced as an Assistant in the same school with effect from 8th March 1956. The petitioner appealed to the District Educational Officer, Tirchi, on 20th March 1956. On 10th July 1956, the Manager of the institution framed charges upon other facts, and asked the petitioner to submit an explanation to them on or before 15th July 1956. Admittedly, the petitioner wrote on 13th July 1956 wanting some further time, but this request was refused. Finally, the management gave the petitioner notice for three months with effect from 10th July 1950 and terminated his services, apparently holding the charges proved in the absence of any satisfactory or adequate explanation. The petitioner appealed to the District Educational Officer, Tiruchi, on 31st July 1956, and later to the Divisional Inspector of Schools, Coimbatoie. On 17th June 1956, by Disposal No. 1185 of 1958, the Divisional Inspector of Schools rejected this appeal. In other words, the petitioner sought to appeal, under the rule governing such aided institution, to certain officers of Government, such as the District Educational Officer and the Divisional Inspector of Schools who had power to review the proceedings of the management and to grant the petitioner redress. But he pursued those remedies in vain, and he failed.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner (Sri Venugopalachariar) has urged two grounds, only, as the basis of his argument that this Court should now interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the proceedings dispensing with the services of the petitioner. Both these grounds are founded upon certain rules in the rules relating to the elementary schools published by the Government of Madras. Under Rule 13(2) (ii)(b) the class of teachers referred to it those rules could be dismissed “with three months” notice, or three months salary in lieu thereof, for any of the following reasons, namely, “wilful neglect of duty; serious misconduct, gross insubordination, mental unfitness, incompetence, retrenchment, physical unfitness or any other good cause.”
It is now submitted before me that the petitioner was denied redress in two matters, coming within the first and second provisos to R. 13(2)(ii)(b) extracted above. Under the first proviso, the teacher has to be informed in writing of the charges against him, and this was undoubtedly done in the present case. The proviso further specifies that “the statement made by the teacher, if any, shall be taken into consideration before a final decision is taken by the management” This also seems to have been done, in the absense that a belated explanation from the petitioner was taken into consideration before the notice dispensing with his services was given. But there is another part of this proviso that “the teacher shall be given a reasonable opportunity for stating his case In writing or in person.” The argument is that this rule was not complied with, since the petitioner was given time for only five days for the preparation and submission of his full explanation on the charges, which involved one or two matters of accounting, and it is stressed that this was not in consonance with principles of natural justice. The second proviso, which is the other ground of the application, enunciates that before the issue of the notice of the Deputy Inspector of Schools should be consulted and his approval obtained by the management about the propriety of such an action.” In the present case, the this proviso was also formally complied with in the sense that, as early as the preceding May, the approval of the Deputy Inspector of Schools had been obtained for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner upon two charges. The grievance of the petitioner is that this was a long time prior to the actual formulation of the present charges in July, and that permission was not specifically obtained from that officer forsaking disciplinary action with regard to the matters which formed the subject of the subsequent charges.
In this connection, two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court have been placed before me, in both of which that Court took action for the alleged violation of certain rules framed under the Madras Elementary Education Act (Act VIII of 1920), One such case was Venkataswami v. Correspondent K.G.B Sr. School (1). Basi Reddy, J. observed that where the statutory rules were disregarded, the termination of the service was improper. The rules are as much binding on the Government as on any one else. They cannot be abrogated at will, by an executive fiat. But there is one important fact distinguishing this case from the present matter, with regard to the entire question of the applicability of Art. 226 of the Contitution. That was a case in which the termination of the services of the teacher was set aside in appeal by certain authorities in the Education department, and the Government subsequentty intervened, in order to restore the action of the management. Hence what was essentially in issue in that case, was the actioo of the Government in interfering with against the principles of natural justice to set aside a proper action of one of its own officers, which benefited a private individual.
The other decision Subba Rao v. Divisional Inspector of Schools (2) again refers to certain rules relating to elementary schools, but the very head-note shows that the proceedings under Art. 226 were between the aggrieved petitioner and the Divisional Inspector of Schools, a servant of Government. Obviously, different considerations apply where the grievance of an individual is against the Government, for non-compliance with the spirit of its own rules, which were definitely acknowledged as binding by Government.
In the present case also, it is true that the petitioner desires the issue of a writ of certiorari not merely to quash the orders by the management terminating his services, but also the orders of the Divisional Inspector of Schools, Coimbatore and of the District Educational Officer, Pudukottai (respondents 1 and 2) confirming the order of the management. But there is one aspect of the matter, which, in my view, makes a vital difference, and which does not appear to have been considered in the authorities to which I have been referred. That aspect can be simply expressed as follows. The petitioner admits that he is an employee of the private institution alone and that, as regards the management and himself, the terms of the contract are those appearing in his service register. The relevant condition or term runs as follows:
“No teacher shall ordinarily leave a school without giving three months' notice to the management, and no management shall dispense with the services of a teacher without giving three months' notice to him, except for adequate disciplinary reasons approved by the District Educational Officer.”
The prima facie interpretation of this rule must certainly be that a teacher could leave the service of a school giving three months' notice to the management, but that the management can dispense with his services only after giving three months' notice ordinarily, and that if it does not give that notice but less there must be adequate disciplinary reasons approved by the District Educational Officer.
Now, I am unable to see how these terms of the contract between the teacher and the management are enlarged or qualified by the rules already referred to. The learned Additional Government Pleader claims that the rules are not statutory, but administrative in character; he also relies upon the judgment of this Court in W.P No. 802 of 1958 in support of this view. The difficulty is obvious that, as between the employer (the management) and the employee (the teacher), the implied or express terms of the contract will alone govern their mutual relationship. If the State steps into the picture at all, as an agency recognising the institution and giving it financial aid, it may very well be that this aid is hedged around with certain conditions, which the management will have to observe, if it requires the continuance of the recognition or of the aid. But from a strictly legal point of view, I am quite unable to see how a private individual who is an employee of this private institution can invoke those conditions, in support of redress claimed by him against his employer (the school) of a scope wider than the implied and express terms of the contract of employment. In other words, the management may have to pay the penalty of withdrawal of recognition or financial aid, if the management does not choose to abide by these administrative rules promulgated for its benefit. But as far as I can ascertain from the actual contract, the management is entitled to dispense with the service of the employee (teacher) after three months' notice. It is only if notice is for a lesser period is given, that any special considerations would govern the case. Similarly the employee (teacher) can leave the services of the school after giving three months' notice.
In the present case, no doubt, the management desired to comply with the rules framed by the Government for its guidance in dealing with teachers. Actually, there was formal compliance with both the provisions that I have referred to earlier, Whether there was substantial compliance or otherwise, is a matter of opinion. However this might be, when the rules are administrative and not statutory in their effect, and when the management can dispense with the services of its employee (the teacher) after giving three months' notice in the usual course, without assigning any special reasons therefor, I am unable to see how such an employee could invoke the aid of this Court in order to quash the proceedings of the management dispensing with his services. In the two authorities of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which I have referred to, this aspect does not appear to have been considered at all. Nor can learned Counsel for the petitioner (Sri Venugopalachariar) draw my attention to any other authority of this Court or of any other Court, which would justify the interpretation that the scope of the contract between a private institution and its employee could be widened, because that private institution has chosen to accept certain terms of conditions upon which Government has granted the institution recognition of financial aid. For instance, a case could be conceived where the teacher Was entertained by the private institution a little before it was recognised by Government. Are we to hold, In such a case, that the recognition by the Government has transformed the terms of the contract or widened its scope ? In other words, is there a tripartite agreement between the Government, the management and the teacher, superseding the original agreement between the management and the teacher? I have no reason to think so, and none as been shown.
Apart from this, even with regard to the orders of the two departmental authorities, I am unable to come to the conclusion that they were manifestly erroneous upon the face of the record, or so unjust and opposed to the principles of natural justice, as to necessitate interference. It is clear enough that, at one stage, the Deputy Inspector did authorise disciplinary action against this petitioner, whether upon the same material or material or lesser scope, It is again, clear that the petitioner was granted sometime for submitting his explanation, though he might have thought that it was not sufficient time, and that, at any rate, the explanation subsequently submitted by him was considered by the authorities in arriving at their decision.
For these reasons, I do not think it would be a proper exercise of the powers vested in this Court to interfere by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The application is accordingly dismissed, and the rule nisi will be discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
V.C.S
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