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A. Abdul Rahim v. State (Accommodation Deputy Tahsildar)

Madras High Court
Mar 14, 1961
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from a conviction under S. 16(1) read with S. 6(2)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949, and the imposition of a fine of Rs. 200 with simple imprisonment for three weeks in default. The petitioner was the landlord who, by a lease deed dated 1-1-1958, let out the front portion of premises No. 129-A, Arcot Road, Kodambakkam, to Dr. M.P. Ganesh Rao at a monthly rent of Rs. 45.

Clauses 4 and 5 of the lease deed provided that the tenant paid the petitioner a sum of Rs. 500, the receipt of which was acknowledged, and that this amount was to be returned without interest when the tenant vacated the premises. The central factual dispute before the trial authority concerned the nature of the Rs. 500 payment (whether it was an advance for amenities, additional rent, loan, deposit, or a premium). The Chief Presidency Magistrate concluded that the payment fell within the mischief of S. 6(2)(a) and convicted and sentenced the petitioner accordingly.

The present court heard revision proceedings challenging that conviction. After considering the lease terms, the evidence, statutory provisions and relevant authorities, the court allowed the revision, acquitted the petitioner, and ordered refund of any fine paid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provision in the lease that required the tenant to pay Rs. 500, repayable without interest on vacation, falls within the scope of "any premium or other like sum" prohibited by S. 6(2)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949.
  2. Whether a deposit, repayable on the happening of a stipulated event (here, vacation of the premises), can be characterized as a "premium" or as an "other like sum" within the meaning of S. 6(2)(a).
  3. Whether the proviso to S. 6(2)(a) (allowing receipt or stipulation for an amount not exceeding two months' rent by way of advance) bears upon the classification of the Rs. 500 deposit and whether it enlarges the scope of the main prohibition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Contentions

  • The Rs. 500 payment was acknowledged as an "advance" in clause 4 of the lease; it did not amount to additional rent or rent paid in advance.
  • The payment was not a loan (it was not repayable on demand) but was a deposit repayable only upon the happening of a stipulated contingency (vacation by the tenant).
  • Implicitly, such a refundable deposit should not be treated as a premium or as an "other like sum" within S. 6(2)(a).
  • In alternative factual presentation, it was asserted in evidence that the amount was paid for the petitioner to provide certain amenities, but the trial court rejected that version and the revision court found no reason to differ from the trial court's finding.

Respondent's (Public Prosecutor / State) Contentions

  • The deposit was received as a condition for the grant of the lease and therefore formed part of the consideration for the lease; such a receipt is within the prohibition of S. 6(2)(a).
  • The fact that the deposit was free of interest conferred an advantage on the petitioner and, according to the public prosecutor, that circumstance should bring the receipt within the scope of "other like sum".
  • The public prosecutor relied on authorities (in particular Woods v. Wise) to support the proposition that payments made as conditions for the grant of a tenancy can be caught by prohibitions against premiums.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
King v. Cadogan (Earl) (Warrington, L.J.) Explained "premium" as a cash payment representing or approximating the capital value; "premium" is purchase money paid for the benefit under the lease; expenditure on house was held not to be a premium in that case. Cited to illustrate the ordinary legal meaning of "premium" and to support the conclusion that a refundable deposit repayable on a contingency does not equate to a premium as understood by Warrington, L.J.
W.H. Brakspear & Sons Ltd. v. Barton (McCardie, J.) Held that a tied covenant and discount for goods supplied under a tie did not fall within words such as "fine or premium or other like sum" in the relevant rent-restricting statute. Referred to as an authority showing that certain contractual stipulations that confer commercial advantage may nonetheless be outside the scope of statutory language aimed at premiums; used to indicate limited assistance for the present question.
Roger Estates Ltd. v. Wright Dealt with S. 2(1) of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949; held that a stipulation and payment of a premium prior to the Act coming into force was not illegal and was recoverable. Noted by the court as one of several authorities on related statutory language; the court observed these cases did not directly decide the present point on refundable deposits.
Woods v. Wise (Court of Appeal; Evershed M.R.) The Court did not define "premium" under that Act but observed the distinction between money required as a condition precedent to grant of a tenancy and a lump sum paid as compounding of rent in addition to periodic rent; only the former was prohibited by the statute addressed there. The public prosecutor relied on this case to argue the deposit was a condition for grant and thus prohibited; the revising court held that even if the deposit was a condition it does not ipso facto make it a premium, and noted that Woods v. Wise did not decide the precise question before the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by close textual and contextual analysis of the nature of the Rs. 500 payment and of the statutory language in S. 6(2)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949.

  1. Characterisation of the payment:

    The court accepted the trial court's finding that the Rs. 500 was actually paid and was to be refunded at termination of the tenancy. The lease described it as an "advance" but the court held that the payment was not additional rent, not rent in advance, and not a loan (since it was not repayable on demand). The court described it as more akin to a deposit repayable only upon the happening of a specified contingency (vacation by the tenant).

  2. Interpretation of "premium":

    The court referred to S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act to explain the ordinary legal meaning of "premium" as the price paid for a lease and cited King v. Cadogan for a judicial exposition of that concept. It reasoned that a premium is generally a lump sum payment made outright as price for a lease and which is not refundable.

  3. Application of the statutory text:

    The court examined S. 6(2)(a), which prohibits the landlord from claiming, receiving or stipulating for payment of "any premium or other like sum in addition to the agreed rent." The court emphasized the phrase "in addition to the agreed rent" to indicate that what is contemplated is a payment in the nature of price for the lease. Because the Rs. 500 was refundable on a stipulated event, the court held it did not fall within the ordinary notion of "premium."

  4. Doctrine of ejusdem generis applied to "other like sum":

    To decide whether the deposit fell under "other like sum," the court invoked the doctrine of ejusdem generis. It concluded that only sums resembling a premium would come within "other like sum." A refundable deposit of the kind in question did not bear the requisite resemblance to the premium concept and therefore did not fall within those words.

  5. Addressing ancillary arguments:

    The court rejected the public prosecutor's contention that the absence of interest on the deposit made it an advantage equivalent to a prohibited sum; the court found no basis to convert the character of the payment into a premium or like sum by reason of its being interest-free. The court also held that the proviso to S. 6(2)(a), which permits receipt or stipulation of an amount not exceeding two months' rent by way of advance, is concerned with advance rent and does not expand the substantive prohibition in the body of the section.

  6. Weight of authorities:

    The court observed that the authorities relied upon (English and other rent-control cases) did not directly decide whether a refundable deposit repayable on a contingency is a premium. The court therefore treated those cases as of limited assistance and declined to treat the deposit as a premium merely because it formed part of the consideration for grant of the lease.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the payment of Rs. 500, repayable on vacation, was not within the prohibition contained in S. 6(2)(a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949. Accordingly, the court allowed the revision and acquitted the petitioner.

Core Ruling: The revision is allowed and the petitioner is acquitted.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the conviction and sentence imposed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate are set aside; the petitioner is acquitted and any fine paid is to be refunded.
  • The opinion reasons that a refundable deposit payable on a stipulated contingency does not amount to a "premium" or an "other like sum" as contemplated by S. 6(2)(a). The court applied ordinary definitions of "premium," the doctrine of ejusdem generis for construing "other like sum," and rejected ancillary arguments based on absence of interest or on the proviso to the section.
  • The opinion does not assert that it establishes a broad new precedent beyond its application to the facts; it states that the cited authorities were of limited assistance and the court reached its conclusion on statutory interpretation and the particular character of the payment involved.
Show all summary ...

This revision is directed against a conviction under S. 16 (1) read with S. 6 (2) (a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act 1949, and imposition of a fine of Rs. 200 with a provision for simple imprisonment for three weeks in case of default. The petitioner who was the landlord, by a lease deed dated 1-1-1958, let out to one Dr. M.P Ganesh Rao the front side of premises No. 129-A in Arcot Road, Kodampakkam, on a monthly rent of Rs. 45. Clauses 4 and 5 of the lease deed provided for the payment by the tenant to the petitioner a sum of Rs. 500 as advance, the receipt of which was acknowledged by the petitioner, and for return of the advance without interest on the tenant vacating the premises in his occupation. The question is whether this provision for payment of the amount and refund of the same on the contingency contemplated is within the mischief of S. 6 (2) (a) of the Act. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate thought that it was, and in that view convicted and sentenced the petitioner as aforesaid.

There was some argument in the light of the evidence adduced before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate as to the precise nature of the payment of Rs. 500. Clause 4 of the lease deed states that the tenant of his own accord paid the sum to the petitioner as advance but it was sought to be made out in the evidence that this amount was paid by the tenant with a view for the petitioner to provide for certain amenities asked for by the tenant. But this case of the petitioner has not been accepted by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate and I can find no reason to differ from him. The actual payment of the sum of Rs. 500 and the refund thereof at the termination of the tenancy are not disputed. Though clause 4 of the lease deed mentions that this amount of Rs. 500 was paid as advance, it is clear from the lease deed that the so called advance did not represent additional rent or rent paid in advance. Nor does the payment appear to be of the nature of a loan because it was not repayable on demand. It is more like a deposit repayable only on the happening of a certain stipulated event. Sub-section (2) clause (a) of S. 6 of the Act reads: —

“ (2) Where she fair rent of a building has not been so determined —

(a) the landlord shall not, after the commencement of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1951, claim, receive or stipulate for the payment of, any premium or other like sum in addition to the agreed rent.”

In view of the argument in this court it may also be necessary to set out the proviso to the section which is

“Provided that the landlord may receive, or stipulate for the payment of, an amount not exceeding two months' rent, by way of advance.”

Whether such a deposit as mentioned above is within the scope of “any premium or other like sum” is the question. The word ‘premium’ is a well understood expression used in contradistinction to rent normally payable either periodically or on specific occasions. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines that the price paid or promised in consideration of a lease is called the premium and that the money, share of crops, service or other thing paid periodically or on specific occasions or to be rendered at such times by the tenant is called the rent. Sometimes a premium paid in certain circumstances may almost resemble a loan, when of course, the amount is repayable. But in this case I have already said that the amount paid in the circumstances was, having regard to the terms not a loan. Where the deposit repayable as in this case was in consideration of the grant of the lease, can it be said that it is premium paid for the lease? If the amount paid is not refundable, it will present no difficulty for that will undoubtedly be premium. But the payment being on condition that the amount is refundable on the happening of a certain event, it is necessary to determine whether the amount can be said to be “premium”.

No direct decided case on the point has been brought to my notice. The cases cited at the bar relate to the English Rent Control Act using different phraseology in particular contexts. In King v. Cadogan (Earl)(1) Warrington, L.J while discussing the relative provisions in the English Finance Act, stated:

“Now the Legislature in expressing its intention has chosen to use two words — “rent” and “premium” — both of which in connection with leases have perfectly well known legal meanings. I need not say anything about the meaning of the word rent, but “premium,” as I understand it, used as it frequently is in legal documents, means a cash payment made to the lessor, and representing, or supposed to represent, the capital value of the difference between the actual rent and the best rent that might otherwise be obtained. It is a very familiar expression to everybody who knows the forms and powers of granting leases. It is in fact the purchase money which the tenant “pays for the benefit which he gets under the lease.”

Actually in that case the Lord Justice was concerned with an item of expenditure on the house and he held that such an expenditure was not in any sense a premium. But it is equally obvious that a deposit such as in this case, which is repayable on the happening of the specific contingency, is not premium as the expression was understood by Warrington, L.J It certainly does not represent the capital value of the difference between the actual rent and the best rent W.H Brakspear & Sons Ltd. v. Barton(2) is a case under the Increase of Rent and Mongage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. The lease deed in that case contained what is familiarly known as the tied clause namely that the tenant should make purchases from the landlord who would give a discount of a certain percentage on the turnover. In an action by the landlord to recover rent and price due for the goods sold and delivered the tenant made a counter claim alleging that the discount of 10 per cent was due to him on the price of goods paid. McCardie, J. disallowed the counter claim and held that the tied covenant in the lease and the discount for goods supplied under the tie must be disregarded for the purposes of the Rent Restrictions Acts. The learned Judge, with reference to the words “fine or premium or other like sum for the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy” occurring in S. 2 (3) of the Rent Restrictions Act, 1920, observed that the tie and discount in question did not fall within the scope of those words. Reference was next made to Roger Estates Ltd. v. Wright(3). That case was concerned with S. 2 (1) of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949 which made it illegal to require the payment of a premium as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a “tenancy” of a dwelling house to which the Rent Restrictions Act applied. The tenancy, therefore, was entered into prior to the Act coming into force and provided for the payment of £ 300 as premium in respect of the lease, the payment to be in instalments. The tenant having defaulted to pay the instalments of the premium, in an action to recover the same, the tenant contended that the premium was not recoverable in as much as the same was within the prohibition enjoined by S. 2 (1) of the 1949 Act. It was held by the Court of Appeal that prior to the 1949 Act coming into force, a stipulation for and payment of a premium like that was not illegal and that, therefore, the landlord was entitled to recover the arrears of instalments of the premium. The Court of Appeal had to do with the same section in Woods v. Wise(4). That was again a case in which prior to the coming into force of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949 a lease agreement had been entered into for which part of the consideration was a lump sum of £ 850, paid by the tenant to the landlord in addition to the payment of rent stipulated and other covenants. Actually the Court of Appeal did not decide what constituted “premium” within the meaning of that Act but it negatived the tenant's defence that the payment of £ 850 was hit by S. 2 of the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949. Evershed M.R in the course of the judgment observed:

“the conception of requiring some money payment as a ‘condition’ of the grant of a tenancy is welt understood. To my mind, there is a real distinction between such a requirement as a condition precedent to the grant of a tenancy (on any terms) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the provision in the lease or contract of tenancy for payment of some lump sum by way (as in the present case) of compounding of rent and in addition to the periodic rent. It is the former, and the former only, which is prohibited, and made the subject of criminal proceedings.”

It may be seen that none of the above cases cited is of much assistance in deciding the scope of the words “any premium or other like sum” in subsection 2 (a) of S. 6 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. But the last mentioned case was cited by the learned public prosecutor in support of his contention that in this case the deposit received by the petitioner was as a condition for the grant of the lease and that, therefore, its receipt was within the prohibition of sub-section 2 (a) of S. 6. It may be that the deposit was received as a condition for the grant of the lease and in that sense the receipt formed part of the consideration of the lease. But that does not necessarily mean that ipso facto the deposit was in the nature of a premium or a like sum. That question was not decided by the Court of Appeal in Woods v. Wise.

An amount which is received but not as a price but as money refundable on the happening of a stipulated event cannot in my opinion be held to be premium. Premium as ordinarily understood is a lump sum payment made outright as price for a lease. In the context of the words “in addition to the agreed rent” in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S. 6, it appears clear that what is contemplated by “premium” is something other than the agreed rent. The premium in the context of the words used, it seems tome, involves the idea that what is paid should be in the nature of a price for the lease and a payment of money which is refundable is, in this case, therefore not within the scope of premium.

The question then is whether such an amount is within the scope of “other like sum”. The scope of those words has to be understood in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Only a sum which has some resemblance to what is comprehended by the word “premium” that will come within the scope of the words “other like sum”. It seems to me therefore, that the deposit in this case is not comprehended by the words “other like sum” either.

But the learned public prosecutor contended that inasmuch as the deposit was free of interest, the petitioner had the advantage of it and that fact would comprehend the receipt of the deposit within the scope of “other like sum” I am unable to accept this argument. When the amount paid on the terms mentioned is held to be not within the scope of “premium” or “other like sum”. I do not see how the fact that it is to be free of interest will nevertheless bring the amount within the scope of these words.

The learned public prosecutor then relied on the proviso to S. 6 (2) (a). But obviously the proviso is concerned with advance rent. Moreover, the proviso does not have the effect of enlarging the scope of the body of the section.

In the result I hold that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence he has been charged with. The revision case is allowed and the petitioner is acquitted. The fine if any paid will refunded.