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S.V Krishnier v. A.R Ramchandra Iyer And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant is an assignee (from the 39th creditor) of rights in respect of a sum payable under an agreement reached during proceedings under the Debt Conciliation Act. The assignment was registered in accordance with Section 14(2) of the Debt Conciliation Act and was recognised by the Sub‑Court, Kumbakonam. The appellant instituted several petitions for transmission of the decree to the court of the District Munsif of Melur, where the charged properties were situated. The last relevant order of the Sub‑Court, Kumbakonam, directing transmission of the decree to the Sub‑Court, Madurai, was dated 12‑12‑1947 in E.A. No. 268 of 1947.
Subsequently, the appellant filed R.P. No. 238 of 1948 in the court below for sale of the charged properties; that petition was dismissed and the matter proceeded on appeal to the District Court. The matter ultimately reached this court (earlier considered before Mack J. in A.A.O. No. 415 of 1951) and was the subject of a Bench decision reported as Ramasami Aiyar v. Krishna Aiyar (1957-2 Mad LJ 116; AIR 1957 Mad 431). The Bench decision addressed related limitation questions and remitted the execution petition to the Subordinate Judge for further disposal on account of issues including good faith and forum‑proper concerns.
The learned Subordinate Judge later held (1) that the petitioner had prosecuted proceedings in good faith in the Kumbakonam Sub Court, and (2) that even allowing the application of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in conjunction with the normal three‑year period under Art. 182, the execution petition was time‑barred. The Subordinate Judge computed that the actual days of pendency of four petitions in the Sub Court, Kumbakonam, totalled 158 days, which, when added to three years, left the execution petition out of time.
Legal Issues Presented
- How should Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act be interpreted and applied to the facts of this case?
- Does Section 14(2) permit exclusion of the entire span covering successive, misconceived petitions (including the intervals between those petitions), or only the actual days during which distinct proceedings were pending and being prosecuted with due diligence?
- Whether prosecution of proceedings in a court that lacks jurisdiction, but done in good faith, will permit exclusion of the relevant period under Section 14(2) for the purposes of computing limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent (through counsel Sri Kuppuswami Iyer) supported the dismissal of the execution petition and contended that the petitioner lacked bona fides in instituting multiple proceedings in a court that lacked jurisdiction.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's distinct legal arguments beyond factual assertions about assignment, registration and the petitions instituted for transmission and execution; accordingly no detailed appellant argument is summarized here.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramasami Aiyar v. Krishna Aiyar, 1957-2 Mad LJ 116; AIR 1957 Mad 431 | Consideration of whether the Limitation Act could be extended by analogy to include agreements registered under Section 14(2) of the Debt Conciliation Act; treatment of Art. 182 clause (2) and the applicable limitation period. | The Bench held the Limitation Act could not be extended by analogy to include that category (so Art. 182(2) would not apply and the six‑year period was not available); the normal period of three years applied. The Bench further observed Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act would prima facie apply but remitted the execution petition because good faith was not admitted below. The present court relied on that discussion as background to the present limitation and good faith issues. |
| Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, 68 Mad LJ 665 at p.671; AIR 1935 PC 85 | Application of Section 14(2) Limitation Act: days excluded must be added to the prescribed period; only days when proceedings were actually pending and prosecuted in that court are to be excluded. | The court relied on this Privy Council decision to support the proposition that only the actual days of pendency of proceedings in the (misconceived) court may be excluded; the intervals between successive petitions are not to be treated as excluded time. |
| Parankusam Jagannadham v. Gada Govinda Rao Pantulu, C.M.S.A. No. 76 of 1923 (unreported, Jackson J.) | Each distinct application filed in a misconceived forum should be treated as a separate entity rather than treating the entire span as a continuous period for Section 14(2) purposes. | The opinion noted the unreported Jackson J. decision as taking the same view that successive distinct applications are separate and not to be aggregated to exclude intervals; it was cited to bolster the court's interpretation of Section 14(2). |
| Akkal Nayakar v. Kumaraswami Reddiar, 1949-1 Mad LJ 432; AIR 1949 Mad 849 | The proposition that each distinct application is separate and cannot be treated as a continuation of earlier applications for purposes of exclusion under Section 14(2). | The court relied on Govinda Menon J.'s clear statement in this case—quoting that the multiple applications were "distinct and separate"—to support its conclusion that only the actual days of each distinct application should be excluded from limitation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by observing that the appeal could be disposed of on the limitation point and that the governing provision at issue was Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The court quoted the operative language of S. 14(2) which excludes "time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding ... where the proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it." The court also noted Explanation 2 to S.14(2), which deems a plaintiff or applicant resisting an appeal to be a person prosecuting the proceeding, and took these textual features as indicating a legislative intent to exempt bona fide litigious activity.
The central interpretive question was whether the exclusion contemplated by S.14(2) should extend to the entire chronological span during which successive petitions were brought in a misconceived forum (including intervals when no proceedings were actively pending) or whether it should be confined to the actual days on which distinct proceedings were pending and being prosecuted with due diligence. The court held the statutory language is plain and unambiguous and that it was impossible to sustain the broader interpretation that would include idle intervals between distinct proceedings.
The court reinforced this textual interpretation with authority. It relied on the Privy Council decision in Maqbul Ahmad, which treated excluded days as those actually occupied by pending proceedings; further support came from Jackson J.'s (unreported) decision in Parankusam Jagannadham and Govinda Menon J.'s reasoning in Akkal Nayakar, both of which treated each distinct application filed in a misconceived forum as a separate entity for the purpose of excluding time under S.14(2).
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that only the actual days of pendency of each of the distinct applications filed by the assignee in the Sub Court, Kumbakonam, could be excluded. Calculating those days produced a total of 158 days to be excluded. Even after adding those 158 days to the normal three‑year limitation period under Art. 182, the execution petition remained time‑barred by a significant margin. Because the limitation ground was decisive and clear, the court did not need to resolve the contested issue of bona fides in further detail.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court's final decision was Appeal dismissed.
Implications:
- The execution petition is time‑barred. The court concluded that only the actual days during which distinct petitions were pending and being prosecuted in the misconceived forum may be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act; intervals between such petitions are not excluded.
- The court applied existing precedents (including Maqbul Ahmad and Akkal Nayakar) to support the interpretation and did not purport to lay down a new principle of law beyond those authorities.
- Direct effect on the parties: the civil miscellaneous appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs (noting the lower court had not awarded costs).
- No broader novel precedent was announced by this opinion; the decision follows and applies previously established authorities to the facts presented.
AE/M.K.S
1. This is an appeal by the petitioner in the lower court, who was the assignee from the 39th creditor in certain proceedings under the Debt Conciliation Act, and who filed an execution petition for sale of properties. The petition was dismissed upon the main ground that it was barred by limitation. The actual question involved turns upon the interpretation and application of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act to the facts of this case. The broad facts which are required for our present purpose are as follows:
During the pendency of certain proceedings under the Debt Conciliation Act, an agreement was reached with regard to a sum of money payable to the appellant's predecessor-in-interest, the creditor upon a charge of certain properties. This assignment was registered in accordance with Section 14(2) of the Debt Conciliation Act, and the petitioner. In the lower court (appellant) is an assignee from the creditor, the assignment in his favour having been recognised by the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam. Subsequent to this recognition, the appellant instituted several petitions for transmission of the decree to the court of the District Munsif of Melur, within whose jurisdiction the charged properties were situate. The last order of the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam, ordering transmission of the decree to the Sub-Court, Madurai, was on 12-12-1947 in E.A No. 268 of 1947.
2. Subsequently, the appellant filed R.P No. 238 of 1948 in the Court below for sale of the charged properties. This petition was dismissed, and the matter was taken up in appeal to the District Court. We are not now concerned with the details of further proceedings at that stage. It is sufficient to note that the matter came up to this court before Mack J. in A.A.O No. 415 of 1951. The decision of Mack J. and the grounds upon which the learned Judge based that decision, will be found stated and discussed in the Bench decision of this court in Ramasami Aiyar v. Krishna Aiyar, 1957-2 Mad LJ 116 : ((S) AIR 1957 Mad 431), which was a Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of Mack J. The learned Chief Justice (delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench) held that the provisions of the Limitation Act could not be extended by analogy or principle to include the case of an agreement before the Debt Conciliation Board registered under Section 14(2) of the Debt Conciliation Act. Hence Art. 182 clause (2) would not apply, and the period of limitation of six years was not available to the party; the normal period of three years will alone be operative. But upon the second ground of the decision of Mack J., the learned Judges agreed with him that this was a case to which Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act would prima facie apply, though the Sub Court of Kunrbakonam where the present appellant had been prosecuting his applications for transmission of the decree, was not the proper forum but a misconceived one. However, as S. 14(2) further required that the party seeking to avail himself of this exemption should prosecute the execution proceedings in good faith, and) good faith was not admitted, the learned Judges remitted the execution petition to the court of the Subordinate Judge for further disposal.
3. The learned Subordinate Judge has now held (1) that the petitioner prosecuted the proceedings in good faith in the Kumbakonam Sub Court, and (2) that even, so, the execution petition was clearly time barred, even upon the application of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act in conjunction with the normal period of limitation of three years under Art. 182. That is because, upon the relevant dates, the total period occupied by the four petitions. In the Sub Court, Kumbakonam, comes to 158 days, and adding this to the normal limitation of three years, the execution petition is still time-barred by quite an appreciable interval or period. The execution petition would be in time only if the entire period during which successive petitions were instituted by the petitioner in the Sub Court, Kuxnbakonam, is to be taken into account in excluding this periods for the purpose of limitation, and not merely the actual days spent; in the prosecution of these several proceedings.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents (Sri Kuppuswami Iyer) would attempt to Support the decision of the lower court also upon the question of bona fides. According to him, the lower gourt is in error upon this point, and the appellant had no bona fides, in launching these several proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction. However this might be, it is really not necessary for me to proceed into a discussion of this aspect for it seems to me that this appeal can very adequately be disposed of upon the matter of limitation, regarding which the authorities are perfectly clear and explicit.
5. Even apart from authorities, and if the matter were res integra the language of S. 14(2) appears to me to be plain and unambiguous. The language used is
“time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding………shall be excluded, where the proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it”
6. Apart from these specific words, it is interesting to note that explanation 2 to S. 14(2) throws some further light upon the words used, in the sense that a plaintiff or applicant resisting the appeal is also deemed to be a person prosecuting the proceeding.
7. It is very clear that the legislature intended to exempt a certain period covered by bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used it is impossible to sustain the interpretation that the period forming the intervals between these successive petitions, when the party merely stood by allowing limitation to run, should also be considered as period of “prosecuting” proceedings within the ambit of the rule.
8. The point is actually concluded by authority. In the Privy Council decision in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, 68 Mad LJ 665 at p. 671 : (AIR 1935 PC 85 at p. 88), the Privy Council has applied S. 14(2) to certain facts, and, as observed by the Judicial Committee, “the days excluded from operating by way of limitation have to be added to what is primarily the prescribed period”. It is clear that, in that case, the court took into account only the actual days when proceedings were pending in court and were being prosecuted in that court.
9. My attention has also been drawn to an unreported judgment of Jackson J. in Parankusam Jagannadham v. Gada Govinda Rao Pantulu, C.M.S.A No. 76 of 1923 in which the learned Judge also took the same view, but upon a somewhat different ground, that each of such distinct applications in a misconceived forum ought to be considered as a separate entity, instead of taking the entire period covered by such proceedings as a continuous period of activity for the purposes of S. 14(2). Though this unreported decision is not referred to in his judgment, Govinda Menon J. took the very same view in Akkal Nayakar v. Kumaraswami Reddiar, 1949-1 Mad LJ 432 : (AIR 1949 Mad 849). It is in this case that the present argument seems to have been put before the court in a form more or less identical. The learned Judge had no hesitation in negativing it, and he observed:
“It seems to me that each of these three applications were distinct and separate and ought to be treated as such and the later ones cannot be treated as a continuation of the earlier applications.”
10. This involves the logical consequence that we can only exclude for purposes of limitation, the actual days relating to the pendency of each of the distinct applications filed by the assignee. So excluded, it is beyond doubt or dispute that the period comes to only 158 days to be added to the normal period of limitation, and that this application is hopelessly time barred judged by this data.
11. This civil miscellaneous appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, (the lower court also did not award costs) I direct that the parties should bear their own costs.
AE/M.K.S
12. Appeal dismissed.
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