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The State Of Madras,... v. The Urumu Seshachala...

Madras High Court
Jul 26, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was preferred by the State against the judgment of Balakrishna Ayyar, J. The learned Judge held that the charitable trusts founded by Urumu Seshachalam Chettiar did not constitute Hindu Public Charitable Endowments within the scope of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951). He directed the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside a Government Notification dated 20th September, 1957, issued under Section 3 of that Act which extended the provisions of the Act to those charities.

The Trust deed dated 12th November, 1952 (settlor: Urumu Seshachalam Chettiar) listed the main objects of the Trust, including running educational and industrial institutions, providing facilities for poor and deserving Hindu boys and girls, training young people for service of the country, inculcating ancient culture into young people, and other actions for social and educational advancement. Paragraph 7(a) authorised trustees to acquire and conduct named institutions (Urumu Dhanalakshmi Vidyalayam and Urumu Seshachalam Chetty Hindu Orphanage) and similar institutions.

Balakrishna Ayyar, J. found that the Vidyalayam was not wholly Hindu and was open to members of other communities; he concluded that the settlor intended to benefit communities other than Hindus alone. That finding as to the non-exclusivity of beneficiaries was not challenged by the Advocate-General for the State. The Act (XIX of 1951) has since been repealed and replaced by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XXII of 1959), but the relevant statutory provisions considered in this appeal remained the same, and the court referred to the provisions of Act XIX of 1951 in its judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charities (endowments) founded by Urumu Seshachalam Chettiar amounted to "Hindu Public Charitable Endowments" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951).
  2. Whether, for an institution or endowment to qualify as a Hindu public charitable endowment under Section 3 of the Act, the benefits of the endowment must be confined exclusively to Hindus (the "test of exclusiveness").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (State's) Arguments — as presented by the Advocate-General

  • The terms "Hindu charitable endowments" and "Hindu religious endowments" were well-known before Act XIX of 1951; they appeared in earlier legislation such as Madras Act II of 1927 and in later references (Limitation Act amendments and articles 134-a and 134-b).
  • The concept of a Hindu charitable endowment should be determined by established factors rather than strict exclusiveness of beneficiaries. The factors advanced were: (i) the endowment was founded by a Hindu (a person governed by Hindu personal law); (ii) the trust or endowment is valid when tested by the Hindu personal law applicable to the founder; and (iii) the management and the devolution of the right to manage the trust are regulated by Hindu law.
  • It was not necessary, Advocate-General argued, that benefits be confined exclusively to Hindus; it was sufficient if Hindus benefited from the endowment even if they shared benefits with others.
  • The Advocate-General relied on authorities and learned treatises: passages in Mukherjea's "Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust," passages in Chapter XI of Mulla's "Hindu Law" (12th ed.), and observations in the case Manohar Mukherji v. Bhubendranath Mukherji (referenced in the opinion).
  • The Advocate-General warned of anomalous results if exclusiveness were required in all cases (example given: a Water Pandal charity that Hindus would not contemplate restricting to Hindus alone), urging a more flexible approach.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments on behalf of the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Ramanasramam v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 452 Approved and applied a "test of exclusiveness" for Hindu religious endowments (temples): a religious institution is a Hindu religious institution only if exclusively Hindu in character. The court treated the Division Bench decision as binding authority and relied upon it in affirming that the word "Hindu" must have the same connotation in relation to religious and charitable endowments and that exclusiveness is the appropriate test for temples and, by extension, for public charitable endowments under the Act.
Manohar Mukherji v. Bhubendranath Mukherji (referenced: (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 452 at 473 (KB)) Observations of Mukherji, J., concerning essentials of valid religious or charitable trusts founded by a Hindu (as referred to by the Advocate-General). The court recorded that the Advocate-General referred to the observations in this case. The opinion does not indicate that the court placed decisive reliance on this case to displace the exclusiveness test; rather, it noted the reference as part of the Advocate-General's submissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded incrementally and closely followed the statutory language of Act XIX of 1951, particularly the definitions in Section 6. The court emphasized fidelity to the statutory text and prior Division Bench authority:

  1. Agreement with the learned Judge below that the word "Hindu" must be given the same connotation when used in connection with both religious and charitable endowments. The court accepted that a religious institution (for example, a temple) cannot coherently be partly Hindu and partly of another religion.
  2. Examination of the statutory definitions: Section 6(4) defines "charitable endowment" as property given for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, for specified objects (schools, colleges, institutions for advancement of education, etc.). Section 6(14) defines "religious endowment," and Section 6(17) defines "temple" as a place of public religious worship dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof.
  3. The court read these definitions together and concluded that the statutory definition of "temple" (Section 6(17)) postulates exclusiveness: a place used as of right by members of all communities cannot be a "temple" as defined. The court held that the phrases "for the benefit of" and "used as of right by the Hindu community" should carry the same meaning in construing charitable endowments as in construing temples.
  4. Applying that reasoning to Section 6(4), the court concluded that the definition of charitable endowment also postulates the test of exclusiveness. The court explained that if, for example, the benefit of an endowment is not confined wholly to Hindus, it would not fall within the definition in Section 6(4).
  5. The court directly addressed the Advocate-General's contention that exclusiveness should not be determinative. It rejected the submission that the founder's Hindu status, validity under Hindu personal law, and management regulated by Hindu law were alone sufficient to characterize an endowment as a "Hindu charitable endowment" within Section 3. The court reasoned that the statutory definition makes who the beneficiaries are a decisive statutory feature, and there was no scope to read the Act so as to ignore that decisive statutory feature.
  6. The court noted the existence of a binding Division Bench decision (Ramanasramam) that accepted the exclusiveness test for religious endowments, and it declined to disturb that authority. Although the court stated it would examine the question as if res integra, it ultimately upheld the exclusiveness test.
  7. Applying these principles to the facts, the court agreed with Balakrishna Ayyar, J.'s finding that the institutions established under the Trust deed were not exclusively Hindu in character because they were open to members of other communities; consequently, Section 3 of the Act could not be invoked in relation to those institutions.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The appellate court agreed with Balakrishna Ayyar, J., that the institutions and endowments created under the Trust deed were not exclusively Hindu in character and therefore did not fall within the scope of Section 3 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951).
  • Accordingly, the State's appeal failed and was dismissed. The costs of the first respondent were awarded, with a counsel fee of Rs. 250 specified.

Broader implications:

The court affirmed the application of an exclusiveness test (as applied in the context of temples by a binding Division Bench decision) to the statutory definitions in the Act and applied that test to charitable endowments under Section 6(4). The opinion did not purport to lay down an exhaustive or final rule beyond construing the Act's statutory definitions in this case; the court explicitly declined to express concluded views on what constitutes a Hindu charitable or religious endowment under Article 134-A or 134-B or under common law or Hindu law concepts beyond the statutory question before it.

End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal preferred by the State against the judgment of our learned brother Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in which he held that the charitable trusts founded by Urumu Seshachlam Chettiar did not constitute Hindu Public Charitable Endowments within the scope of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951). The learned Judge directed the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the Notification, dated 20th September, 1957, issued by the Government under Section 3 of that Act, extending the provisions of that Act to these charities. That Act has since been repealed and has been replaced by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XXII of 1959). There has been no change in the relevant statutory provisions we have to consider in this appeal. We shall refer to the statutory provisions of Act XIX of 1951, and we shall refer to it as the Act in the rest of this judgment.

2. Paragraph 4 of the Trust deed, dated 12th November, 1952, executed by Urumu Seshachalam Chettiar provided:

The main objects of the Trust are:

(a) To run Educational and Industrial Institutions.

(b) To provide facilities for poor, helpless, and deserving Hindu boys and girls to get thfemselves equipped physically, mentally and morally for leading a good life and be of service to themselves and to society.

(c) To train young people for the service of the country.

(d) To imbibe our ancient culture rdto inculcate the same into the minds of our young boys and girls; and

(e) To do such other things as may in the discretion of the trustees be good and beneficial for the social and educational advancement of the boys and girls.

3. The provision in paragraph 7 (a) of the Trust deed was :

The trustees may for the purpose of carrying»on the trust:

acquire the Urumu Dhanalakshmi Vidyalayam and the Urumu Seshachalam Chetty Hindu Orphanage and similar other institutions, conduct those institutions and make all necessary additions alterations and improvements for the all round expansion of the trust.

4. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., pointed out that the Vidyalayam referred to in paragraph 7 (a) of the Trust deed was not a wholly Hindu institution, but it was open to members of other communities as well. The learned Judge referred in particular to Clauses (a), (e), and (e) of paragraph 4 of the Trust deed, and his finding was:

It is clear that the settlor intended to bene fit communities other than Hindus alone.

5. The correctness of the finding of the learned Judge, that the benefits of the charities founded by Seshachala under the Trust deed were not confined exclusively to Hindus, could not be assailed, and we did not understand the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the State (appellant), to challenge the correctness of that finding.

6. After pointing out that the Act applied to (1) Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments, and (2) Hindu Public Charitable Institutions and Endowments the learned Judge observed:

The word 'Hindu' must be given the same connotation whether it is read in connection with religious institutions and endowments or whether it is read in connection with charitable institutions and endowments. Now, we can have a Hindu religious institution or a Christian religious institution or a Muslim religious institution. But I do not see how we can have a religious institution which is at one and the same time partly Hindu and partly Christian or partly Muslim.

7. The learned Judge observed further:

There can be no doubt whatever that so far as religious institutions are concerned, the Act is intended to apply only to religious institutions and endowments which are exclusively Hindu in character.

8. With reference to the endowments created by Seshachala the final conclusion of the learned Judge was thus expressed:

After having read the entire document and examined the various considerations urged by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, I am clear in my mind that it would not be right to say that the institution or endowment set up by the deed of trust is exclusively Hindu in character. That means that Section 3 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act cannot be invoked in relation, to this institution.

9. We are in respectful agreement with Balakrishna Ayyar, J., when he stated that the word "Hindu" should be accorded the same significance in relation to both religious and charitable endowments in construing the scope of the Act and. its provisions. The principle laid down by the learned Judge, that a religious institution like a temple would not be a Hindu religious institution or a Hindu religious endowment unless it was exclusively Hindu in. character, was approved of by a Division Bench with reference to a temple in Sri Ramanasramam v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras . Rarnaswami, J., expressed his agreement with the test of exclusiveness at pages 370-371 of the report and Anantanarayanan, J., expressed his agreement with the test formulated by Balakrishna Ayyar, J., at page 378 of the report. That decision of a Division Bench is authority binding on us. Even had we been convinced that the test of exclusiveness formulated by Balakrishna Ayyar, J., with reference to both Hindu charitable endowments and Hindu religious endowments was not correct, we could only have referred the question for determination by a Full Bench, as the determination of that question necessarily involves an examination of the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench in Ramanasramam v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Choritable Endowments, Madras (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 452 at 473 (KB.), which accepted that test as correct. We are not convinced that that decision requires reconsideration by a Full Bench. Normally that should have sufficed to reject this appeal. We shall, however, examine the question at issue, as if it were res Integra. Was the test of exclusiveness formulated and applied by Balakrishna Ayyar, J., correct? To constitute a Hindu public charitable endowment within the scope of Act XIX of 1951 is it necessary that the benefits of the endowment should be confined exclusively to Hindus?

10. The Act did not define what a Hindu public charitable endowment was. Nor did it define a Hindu religious endowment. The Act, however, defined a charitable endowment in Section 6(4) and a religious endowment in Section 6(14). Section 6(4) runs :

Charitable endowment' means all property given or endowed for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu or the Jain community or any section thereof, for the support or maintenance of objects of utility to the said community or section, such as rest-houses, choultries, patasalas, schools i)hd colleges, houses for feeding the poor and institutions for the advancement of education, medical telief and public health or other objects of a like nature and includes the institution concerned.

11. Section 6(14) is:

'Religious endowment' or ' endowment' means all property belonging to or given or endowed for the support of maths or temples, or given or endowed for the performance of any service or charity of a public nature connected therewith or of any other religious charity; and includes the institution concerned and also the premises thereof, but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts to the archaka, service-holder or other employee of a religious institution.

12. Temple, which itself is a religious endowment as defined by Section 6(14), was defined in Section 6(17) :

'temple' means a place by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship.

13. The learned Advocate-General contended that such concepts as Hindu charitable endowments and Hindu Religious Endowments were well-known before these expressions were employed in Act XIX of 1951. They had been used in Madras Act II of 1927, which was repealed and replaced by Act XIX of 1951. These expressions were used when the Limitation Act was amended in 1929 and when articles 134-a and 134-b were introduced. articles 134-a and 134-b referred to Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowments. The Limitation Act did not define either what a Hindu or Muhammadan charitable endowment was. But, the learned Advocate-General contended, the concept was clear enough. The further submission of the learned Advocate-General was, that the factors to. be taken into account in deciding what constituted a Hindu charitable endowment were: (i) was the endowment founded by a Hindu, that is, by a person who was governed by the personal law applicable to Hindus; (2) was the trust or endowment valid tested by the personal law, the Hindu Law, applicable to the founder; and (3) were the management and the devolution of the right to manage the trust regulated by the Hindu Law. The learned Advocate-General contended that to constitute a Hindu charitable endowment, or for the matter of that a Hindu religious endowment, it was not necessary that the benefits should be confined exclusively to Hindus. Even if the question, who the beneficiaries were, came into the picture at all in deciding whether a given endowment was a Hindu charitable endowment, it was enough if it was shown that the Hindus benefited by that endowment, even if it be that they shared those benefits with members of other communities. The learned Advocate-General referred to the passage at page 52 of Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust where the learned author set out the essentials of a valid religious or charitable trust that could be founded by a Hindu. The learned Advocate-General also referred to the passages in Chapter XI of Mulla's Hindu Law, 12th edition, which explained the factors necessary to establish the validity of a trust, that is, a public charitable endowment founded by a Hindu. The observations of Mukherji, J., in Manohar Mukherji v. Bhubendranath Mukherji (1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 452 at 473 (KB.), were also referred to.

14. We do not propose to express any concluded opinion of ours on the question, what constitutes a Hindu charitable endowment or a Hindu religious endowment within the meaning of Article 134-A or Article 134-B. Nor is it necessary for us to decide what the common law concept or the Hindu Law concept of a Hindu public charitable endowment should be. We have to address ourselves to the question before us, what constitute a Hindu public charitable endowment within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act, Act XIX of 1951. As we have pointed out, that expression was not defined by the Act. Obviously it has to be a charitable endowment, before it can be a Hindu public charitable endowment within the scope of Section 3. Charitable endowment was defined by Section 6(4) of the Act. We shall leave out of account the reference to the J ain community in Section 6(4) and confine ourselves to the Hindu community. If we split up Section 6(4) into some of its cornponent parts the resultant position is : (1) charitable endowment means all property given or endowed for the benefit of the Hindu community or any section thereof; (2) charitable endowment means all property given or endowed for the support or maintenance of objects of the utility to the Hindu community or any section thereof; and (3) charitable endowment means all property used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof. The institutions themselves in each of these cases are included in the statutory expression " charitable endowment." Of course the word "exclusively" is not to be found in the definition. If that word can be read with this clause, that has to be read with reference to each of the three clauses we have mentioned above, that is, the endowment should be for the exclusive benefit of the Hindu community, or it should be used as of right exclusively by the Hindu community, or it should be for the support or maintenance of the objects of utility exclusively to the Hindu community. The use of the prefix "Hindu" should have the same significance with reference to charitable and religious endowments for the purposes of the Act. We have already pointed out that a temple is a religious endowment. Temple has been defined in Section 6(17) of the Act:

'temple ' means a place by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedication to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship.

15. It seems clear to us that the very definition of temple in Section 6(17) of the Act postulates the test of exclusiveness. It will not be a temple at all as defined in Section 6(17) of the Act, if it is not dedicated for the benefit exclusively of the Hindu community or if it is not used as of right exclusively by the Hindu community. A place of public worship used as of right by members of all communities including the Hindus cannot be a temple as defined by Section 6(17); much less can it be viewed as a Hindu temple or a Hindu religious endowment. The expressions " for the benefit of" and " used as of right by the Hindu community" should, in our opinion, have the same significance in relation to charitable endowments, as they have in relation to temples which are religious endowments. They should have the same meaning in construing either Section 6(4) or Section 6(17). In our opinion, even apart from the prefix "Hindu" in relation to public charitable endowments in Section 3, the very definition of charitable endowments in Section 6(4) postulates the test of exclusiveness. Unless, for example, the benefit of the endowment is confined wholly to Hindus it would not be a charitable endowment as defined by Section 6(4). The prefix "Hindu" to the expression "public charitable endowment" in Section 3 tends, if anything, to emphasise that feature. When the benefit of the endowments is made such a decisive feature of the statutory concept of a charitable endowment by the definition in Section 6(4) of the Act, we can see no scope for accepting the contention of the learned Advocate-General, that who the beneficiaries'of the trust are is not determinative of the question, what constitutes a Hindu public charitable endowment for purposes of Section 3 of the Act.

16. The learned Advocate-General submitted that anomalous results might follow if the test of exclusiveness were adopted in determining what constitutes a Hindu public charitable endowment within the scope of Section 3 of the Act. The learned Advocate-General pointed out that normally no Hindu would contemplate exclusion of members of other communities from the benefit of the public charity familiarly known as a Water Pandal, if he were founding such a public charity. That was given only as an example. Establishment of a Water Pandal charity may be establishment of a public charitable endowment. But it is not every public charitable endowment that is brought within the scope of Act XIX of 1951. Every public charitable endowment founded by a Hindu does not become a Hindu charitable endowment. The mere fact that the founder was a Hindu is not enough even to make a trust or endowment a charitable endowment as defined by Section 6(4) of the Act. Certainly it is not enough to make it a Hindu public charitable endowment. To bring a public charitable endowment within the scope of Section 3 of the Act it is necessary to establish first that it is a Hindu charitable endowment. It will not be a Hindu charitable endowment, if the benefit of the endowment can be shared as of right by members of the public other than Hindus.

17. We are in entire agreement with the conclusion of Balakrishna Ayyar, J:

...I am clear in my mind that it would not be right to say that the institution or endowment set up by the deed of trust (by Seshachala) is exclusively Hindu in character. That means that Section 3 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act cannot be invoked in relation to this institution.

18. The appeal fails and is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. Counsel fee Rs. 250.