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Periaswami v. State
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a reference by the Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram Division at Madurai concerning S.C. No. 118 of 1959. Accused numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the learned Sessions Judge. Two other accused (5 and 6) had earlier been charged but were acquitted by the Sessions Judge; those acquittals are not before this Court.
The prosecution concerned the murder of one Dhinakara Thevar on the evening of 13 May 1959. The factual background, as recorded, shows a deep-seated enmity with a political character between the deceased (a Congress supporter) and leaders/supporters of the Forward Bloc in the locality. The deceased had engaged in conduct that offended political rivals and had previously been in disputes over land and other incidents; this enmity provided a strong motive for the attack.
The key facts as found by the courts include: on 13-5-1959 the deceased was travelling toward Kamuthi accompanied by Veluswami (P.W.1) and was attacked near Kothukkareddikalam by four persons (allegedly accused 1–4) who rushed from concealment behind palmyrahs. P.W.1 fled but looked back and saw the assailants. Two other witnesses (P.W.2 and P.W.3) were said to have seen part of the occurrence. Medical evidence showed multiple fatal injuries; the autopsy recorded 29 external injuries including many incised wounds to vital parts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution had adduced clear and credible evidence to prove the guilt of accused 1–4 for murder under Section 302, IPC.
- Whether the evidence established a preconcerted plan or common intention such that Section 34, IPC applied in respect of the accused.
- Whether the omission by the trial court to frame a charge under Section 34, IPC was material or prejudicial to the accused.
- What sentence was appropriate — whether the death sentences should be upheld or commuted to a lesser punishment in view of the facts, impossibility of determining individual responsibility for fatal injuries, and the local political background.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants consistently maintained their innocence and denied the alleged prior background of enmity; they contended the entire case was a fabrication arising from political factionalism.
- It was suggested on behalf of the appellants that others besides them had motive and could have committed the crime.
- The defence criticized the timing and veracity of the first information (Ex. P.1), suggesting it was belated and possibly manipulated (i.e., allegations that the hour "6 p.m." had been fabricated to cover delays), and that P.W.1 may have been brought in after the fact to make a complaint.
Appellants' Sentencing Submissions
- Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that a lesser penalty should be imposed rather than death, relying on (a) the political background of the crime, (b) the subsequent restoration of peace in the locality, and (c) the long interval since the occurrence.
- Counsel drew attention to a decision of a Bench of the same court in R.T. No. 7 of 1959, and to the principle in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, as supportive of awarding a lesser sentence where it is not possible to attribute fatal injuries to particular individuals among co-accused.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Srikantiah v. State of Mysore | The omission to frame a charge under Section 34, IPC is not material unless prejudice to the accused is shown. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the lower court's omission to frame a charge under s.34 was not fatal where no prejudice was demonstrated; therefore the appellants could properly be convicted under s.302 read with s.34 despite the omission. |
| Rawalpenta Venkulu v. The State of Hyderabad | Affirmed the principle that omission to add a charge under Section 34, IPC (which creates no substantive offence by itself) is not material unless prejudice is caused. | The Court cited and followed the affirmation of the same principle to support treating the absence of a s.34 charge as immaterial on these facts. |
| Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab | Where it is evident that some among the appellants alone might have inflicted fatal injuries and it is impossible to ascertain who, it may be sound judicial discretion to award the lesser sentence when all are convicted under s.302 read with s.34. | The Court adopted this principle to justify commuting the death sentences to imprisonment for life because individual responsibility for the fatal injuries could not be fixed among the four appellants. |
| R.T. No. 7 of 1959 (Bench of this Court) | A local decision dealing with a brutal murder in the same locality and similar political background, giving reasons in support of imposing a lesser penalty. | The Court noted this local decision and relied on its reasoning as one of the factors supporting the exercise of discretion to impose a lesser sentence in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a structured evaluation of credibility, motive, evidentiary proof and sentencing principles:
- Motive and background: The Court found a powerful motive arising from sustained political enmity and specific disputes (land grievances, prior assaults and prosecutions) between the deceased and supporters/leaders of the Forward Bloc. The background supported the existence of a strong motive to kill the deceased.
- Eyewitness and contemporaneous report: The Court examined the account of P.W.1 (Veluswami), who made a first report (Ex. P.1) at the police station said to be at about 6 p.m. The defence suggested the report was belated and possibly manufactured. The Court found it unlikely that the Sub-Inspector (P.W.19) would fabricate an earlier hour and observed there was no cross-examination materially impugning P.W.1's presence with the deceased. P.W.1's production at the police station of a cloth bag containing a post-card from the deceased's son (M.O.3) was treated as strong support that P.W.1 had accompanied the deceased.
- Corroboration by other eyewitnesses: The Court treated P.Ws.2 and 3 as credible eye-witnesses whose presence was corroborated by the internal evidence of Ex. P.1. Cross-examination did not persuade the Court to reject their testimony.
- Circumstantial evidence: Testimony by P.Ws.4 and 5 placed accused 1–4 in the locality with weapons (aruvals) shortly before the killing, showing they had concealed themselves near the path taken by the deceased. Although one witness (P.W.6) had earlier said he had not seen the accused before the occurrence, the Court found sufficient circumstantial support when combined with the eyewitness evidence.
- Medical evidence and character of the attack: The autopsy (Ex. P.2) showed 29 external injuries, including at least 10 necessarily fatal injuries involving vital organs. The injuries were of a brutal character caused by sharp heavy instruments, consistent with a preconcerted plan to kill.
- On the charge framing under Section 34: The trial court had not framed a charge under s.34, IPC. Applying the principle from Srikantiah (and Rawalpenta Venkulu), the Court held the omission immaterial because no prejudice to the accused was shown. The Court accordingly considered whether conviction under s.302 read with s.34 was appropriate.
- Allocation of responsibility and application of s.34: Because the record did not allow the Court to assign responsibility for the fatal injuries to particular individuals among the four accused (some injuries were fatal, others non-fatal, and individual actions could not be isolated), the facts pointed to a common preconcerted plan. The Court therefore concluded that Section 34 applied and it was appropriate to convict under s.302 read with s.34.
- Sentencing analysis: Although the Sessions Judge imposed death, the appellate Court carefully considered sentencing. Applying the doctrine in Dalip Singh — that when it is impossible to ascertain which co-accused inflicted fatal injuries among several convicted under s.302 read with s.34, it can be proper to impose a lesser sentence — and having regard to the political background, restoration of peace in the locality, and the elapsed time, the Court exercised discretion to commute the death sentences to imprisonment for life.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The convictions of the four appellants are affirmed, and they are convicted under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC; their sentences of death were commuted and each was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The direct effect is that the appellants remain convicted of murder, but the appellate Court has altered the punitive consequence from death to life imprisonment in light of legal principle and the specific facts (particularly the impossibility of ascribing fatal acts to particular individuals and the local political context).
- The Court applied and relied upon established precedents (Srikantiah; Rawalpenta Venkulu; Dalip Singh) to justify both the treatment of omission to frame a s.34 charge and the exercise of sentencing discretion; the decision does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents.
N.T.R
(Anantanarayanan, J.)— This is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Ramanathapuram Division at Madurai convicting accused 1, 2, 3 and 4 in S.C No. 118 of 1959 before him under S. 302, I.P.C and sentencing each of the accused to death. Originally there were two other accused also in the case, and the charges included a charge under s. 120-B.I.P.C read with s. 302, I.P.C against accused 1, 2, 5 and 6 and an alternative charge under s. 302 I.P.C read with s. 109, I.P.C against accused 5 and 6. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted accused 5 and 6 and that matter is not before us.
This prosecution related to the murder of one Dhinakara Thevar at about 5 p.m on 13-5-1959, in consequence of certain greatly strained feelings and of enmity between the respective parties. The evidence very clearly shows that this enmity had a political complexion, and orginated in a local struggle for power between the leaders of the Forward Bloc and the Congress in this locality. During the last two general Elections in the area as well as the bye-election from Mudukulathur constituency, Dinakara Thevar (deceased) had been tactlessly criticising the activities and personalities of the Forward Bloc leaders, the major leader of that movement in the locality being one Muthuramalinga Thevar. In 1959, the deceased, who was a Congressman and who had suffered for his political affiliation, had been given 7 acres of punja and 1½ acres of nanja lands in Muthukulathur area under a Government scheme. This led to very bitter feeling between the deceased and the supporters of the Forward Bloc, and even in 1951 accused 1, 2, 4 and 6 and others are alleged to have destroyed certain crops on this property, and the deceased filed a complaint in consequence. A month before this occurrence (April 1959), accused 1 to accused 6 and others are alleged to have cut away ridges in the property, and Dhinakara filed a complaint against the accused and 61 others which was actually pending at the time of this occurrence. In addition to this, there are other strands of enmity also appearing in the evidence. Accused 1 and 2 and accused 3's brother and others are alleged to have assaulted one Sankaralingam, Dhinakara's nephew, and a complaint was preferred about this which led to sentences of imprisonment upon certain of the accused in that case. Dhinakara's son, Sankaralingam, had himself been convicted of a murder in 1958, and he was undergoing a life imprisonment in consequence. Accused 4 and 6 gave evidence in that case, and accused 1 was helping the prosecution. We would also like to state here, from our scrutiny of the record, that it appears that the deceased Dhinakara, was himself by no means a particularly blameless or law-abiding person. In addition to the highly objectionable lampooning of political opponents, the suggestion is that he was himself associated with carrying on political vendettas by means of crimes. The evidence leaves us in no doubt that these accused had a very powerful motive of enmity to murder the deceased.
There was considerable evidence in the lower court with regard to the alleged criminal conspiracy. It was discussed by the learned Judge, who has rejected the evidence as inconclusive and insufficient to support a finding of guilt upon this charge. It is hence not necessary for us to proceed into the particulars of this aspect. We might here merely note that the suggestion of learned Counsel for the appellants is that others besides these appellants also had motives to commit a crime of this kind against the deceased Dhinakara Thevar. That may very well be so and the evidence contains indications that the present appellants, if we may so phrase it, do not exhaust the persons with a motive of enmity to do away with the deceased. But the question is not this. The question is whether, assuming that the appellants had such powerful motive, there is clear and credible evidence about the actual occurrence, which will be adequate to prove the guilt of the appellants upon the charge of murder.
The evidence is to the effect that on the afternoon of 13-5-1959 Dhinakara Thevar left Mushtakurichi for Kamuthi accompanied by Veluswami (P.W 1) who was proceeding in that direction to see a cinema show at Kamuthi. As these persons were going along a foot path across the fields, which is near a place known as Kothukkareddikalam, accused 1 to accused 4 are alleged to have rushed up from a cluster of Palmyrahs nearby, behind which they had concealed themselves. Accused 1 abused the deceased and ordered him to stop, and inflicted two cuts with an aruval on the neck of the victim. Dhinakara collapsed, and Velusami (P.W 1) ran away. After he ran a little distance, P.W 1 turned round to see what was happening, and he then saw that all the four assailants were cutting Dhinakara who had fallen on the ground. P.W 1 then also saw Karuppiah (P.W 3) and Muthu (P.W 2) who were coming towards that locality from Kamuthi side, and who also apparently saw a part of the occurrence. All the four accused then ran away south-west towards a Kanmoi, leaving the deceased at the spot. The medical evidence makes it clear that the deceased sustained a number of fatal injuries, and he must have died practically instantaneously. Veluswami (P.W 1), Karuppiah (P.W 3) and Muthu (P.W 2) met each other, and P.W 1 then proceeded to Kamuthi police station, after directing P.Ws 2 and 3 to go the village and inform the relatives of the victim.
In addition to this, there is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence. This consists of the testimonies of Perumal (P.W 4), Guruswami (P.W 5) and Kumarayya (P.W 6). Perumal (P.W 4) deposed that he saw four persons with aruvals at about 3 p.m in that locality, two of whom he recognised as accused 1 and accused 3. Guruswami (P.W 5) and Kumarayya (P.W 6) said that they were grazing sheep near that locality and saw accused 1 to accused 4 coming up with aruvals and concealing themselves behind the row of palmyrahs at the spot of occurrence.
It is not in dispute that P.W 1 proceeded to the Police station, and that he made a first report of the occurrence (Ex. P. 1) which is a fairly clear and detailed account, and which also refers to the presence of the others and the two eye witnesses, P. Ws. 2 and 3. We shall later note the criticisms which have been levelled against this report, but, for the time being, we would like to stress that if it was really given at 6 p.m by P.W 1, it did amount to as detailed and categorical an account of the crime as we might reasonably except. But what is urged on behalf of the defence is that this report was given belatedly by Veluswami (P.W 1) that the hour of 6 p.m was entered by the Sub-Inspector (P.W 19) deliberately in order to cover his own delay in coming to the police station, and that P.W 1 must have been brought from the village after the news of the murder had spread; in order to act as an instrument for making a complaint. Hence, upon this aspect we have two related questions to analyse. The first is whether there is any adequate reason for believing that Ex. P. 1 was belated, and that it was actually made much later, only at about 7-30 p.m or 8 p.m The second is whether there are any grounds to show that P.W 1 did not accompany the deceased that day, and could not have been an eye-witness to the occurrences, as he claims. It is true that this crime was committed in a highly factious area, and that the crime itself springs from a background of bitter political and personal enmities. Hence, it is certainly essential, in the interest of justice, that this aspect should be scrutinised carefully by us. We have also to analyse the evidence of the other eye-witnesses (P. Ws. 2 and 3) and the support afforded by the circumstantial evidence that we have already referred to.
Here, we would like to stress that it appears to us to be most unlikely that the Sub-Inspector (P.W 19) was guilty of fabricating the hour in Ex. P. 1 by writing an hour which was actually earlier by two or three hours to the time of actual report. The Sub-Inspector (P.W 19) has denied the suggestion in this respect, and it is not the case for the accused that he had any previous knowledge of the circumstances of this crime. If he came much later, as suggested, then it could only be that he wrote an earlier hour in order to cover up the fact that the complainant (P.W 1) was waiting for his arrival. But this, in fact, would destroy the point of criticism that it was the complainant (P.W 1) who arrived there belatedly. In any event, confronted with a crime of which he had no previous knowledge, we think it most unlikely that the Sub-Inspector would have committed the gross folly of writing some earlier hour, which might not fit in with the actual circumstances of investigation. We must hence conclude that P.W 19 had no motive whatever to fabricate any hour, and that he did not do so. As regards P.W 1 we are compelled to note that the cross examination was not at all directed to shake the credit of this witness as an eye-witness who actually accompanied the deceased, and there is nothing in the record which would probabilise such an inference. It is true that there are certain differences between the first report (Ex. P. 1) and P.W 1's own testimony in court. They relate to very minor particulars, such as the exact manner in which A-1 and the others came to assault the deceased, who surrounded him first etc. They are extremely natural discrepancies of the kind necessarily incidental to the witnessing of a brutal crime of this character, by a helpless or terrified spectator within a period of a few minutes. We are unable to accept the criticism that, because of these discrepancies it must necessarily follow that P.W 1 is not a reliable witness, that he did not accompany the deceased, and that he was not an eye-witness to the occurrence. We would further stress that P.W 1 admittedly produced at the police station a cloth bag (M.O 1) which contained a post-card (M.O 3) from the son of the deceased, and there was not even a suggestion that these articles did not belong to the deceased, or that the deceased was not then journeying to Madurai in response to the request in the post-card (M.O 3) from his son. The fact that P.W 1 appeared at the police station by about 6 p.m with these articles, is most powerful support for the inference that he did accompany the deceased, and did witness what had happened.
As regards P.Ws 2 and 3, we think it is sufficient to state that their presence is testi fied from the internal evidence of Ex. P. 1 itself, a report made shortly after the occurrence. We have carefully scrutinised the alleged grounds upon which the credibility of this evidence has been assailed, and we are unable to see any sufficient justification for the view that P.Ws 2 and 3 are not speaking to the truth of what they saw, and that they were not eye-witnesses. On the contrary, at least as far as the cross-examination of P.W 2 is concerned, it actually seems to proceed on the basis that he was an eye-witness to some extent. Where the offence itself has thus been proved by the clear and credible testimony of the three eye-witnesses, the circumstantial evidence is not of great importance. But leaving aside the evidence of P.W 6 who stated in the lower court (Ex. D. 12) that he had not seen accused 1 to accused 4 previously to the occurrence, we have the clear evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 5. This, if believed, would prove that accused 1 to accused 4 were concealing themselves at the spot, some time before the deceased came there.
We have not referred in detail to the subsequent facts of the investigation, and we are not placing great reliance on the alleged absconding of these accused, though that, of course, is a relevant circumstance. But we must note that the medical evidence in this case also proves that the deceased was done very brutally to death at that spot, by means of sharp-edged heavy instruments like aruvals. The autopsy certificate, Ex. P-2, proves that there are as many as 29 external injuries on the body, most of which were of the character of incised wounds, two being also punctured wounds. The evidence of the Medical Officer (P.W 11) shows that the larynx and trachea were cut, and the hyoid bone broken, in addition to fracture of the skull etc., and that injuries Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13, namely, as many as 10 injuries, were all of a necessarily fatal character, involving internal injuries to vital organs. There can be no doubt that this was a very brutal murder, and the circumstances also render it clear beyond doubt that it was carried out in execution of a preconcerted plan to kill the deceased.
The four appellants before us have been convicted under s. 302, I.P.C and the learned Sessions Judge apparently did not think it necessary to frame a charge under s. 34, I.P.C But certainly he would have been well advised to have done so, in the circumstances of this particular case. Though there were as many as 10 injuries that were necessarily fatal, there were also a large number of non-fatal injuries inflicted with sharp weapons on non-vital portions of the body. As the record stands, it is quite impossible for us to fix the responsibility for the fatal injuries upon the individual accused, and it may very well be that certain alone of the four appellants, and not others, were responsible for the fatal injuries. But the locality of the offence, the circumstances of the offence, and the prior background of enmity all evidence a preconcerted plan. This was essentially a case in which the principle of s. 34, I.P.C would apply to the facts. We have carefully considered whether, in the event of our confirming the convictions of these appellants, we ought to convict them under s. 302, I.P.C read with S. 34, I.P.C and not under s. 302, I.P.C alone. The fact that a charge was not framed by the lower court, does not appeal to us to be material, and the principle, as stated by the Supreme Court in Srikantiah v. State of Mysore(1), is that an omission to frame such a charge at the trial is not material, unless it has been actually shown that prejudice was occasioned to the appellants in consequence thereof. We must here state that, throughout, the appellants have affirmed that they are innocent, that even the prior background of enmity alleged is not true, and that the entire case is a fabrication resulting from political faction. The suggestion is that others who had motive to do away with the deceased, were responsible for this crime, and not the appellants. That being so, we are quite unable to see how the omission to frame a charge under s. 34, I.P.C should have occasioned a prejudice, and we may here pertinently observe that there was also a charge under 120-B, I.P.C against these accused (though there was no conviction thereon). The decision in Srikantiah v. State of Mysore refers to the previous decision of the Supreme Court in Rawalpenta Venkulu v. The State of Hyderabad(2) where the same principle was affirmed, and it was laid down that the omission to add the charge under S. 34, I.P.C which does not create any substantive offence by itself, was not material, unless prejudice had been occasioned.
As regards the guilt of the appellants, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that it has been conclusively brought home to them beyond any shadow or element of reasonable doubt. We have no doubt whatever that P.W 1 did accompany the deceased that day, that P. Ws. 2 and 3 were also eye-witnesses, and that P.Ws 4 and 5 and 6 are speaking the truth about the circumstantial evidence appearing in their depositions. Consequently, we must affirm the convictions of the appellants for the charge of murder, but we convict them under S. 302, I.P.C read with S. 34, I.P.C as the common intention to kill the deceased is undeniably evident from the facts on record.
We have considered the matter of the sentences with great care, and indeed bestowed some anxious consideration upon this aspect. Learned Counsel for the appellants urges that it would be proper to award lesser penalty alone in this case, taking into account the political background of this crime, the circumstances that have since supervened by way of restoration of peace in this locality, and the interval that has elapsed since the crime. He draws our attention to the judgment of a Bench of this Court in R.T No. 7 of 1959 dealing with a brutal case of murder from this very locality, which occurred practically against the same background of factious politics, in which this Court has given several reasons for the view that the lesser penalty would be the proper punishment to be awarded in that case. Our attention is also drawn to Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab(3), where the Supreme Court has laid down that where it is evident that some alone among the appellants might have inflicted fatal injuries, and it is impossible to ascertain who had done so, it will be a sound exercise of judicial discretion to award the lesser sentence, in a case in which each is convicted for murder under S. 302, I.P.C read with S. 34, I.P.C We adopt the principle of this decision, for the purpose of dealing with the facts before us, and we also consider that, in view of the political and factious background of this entire area and the subsequent restoration of amity and peace in the locality, particularly between the rival groups where faction was originally rife, it would be expedient in the interests of justice to award lesser sentence alone. Accordingly, we sentence each of the accused to imprisonment for life, and otherwise dismiss the appeals.
N.T.R
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