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Kairum Bi v. Mariam Bi

Madras High Court
Dec 16, 1959
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Judgment Summary — Balakrishna Aiyar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The 10th defendant, Katheeja Bi, had three sons: Abdul Razack (died 1944), Abdul Subhan (died 1947) and Abdul Shukoor. Under Mohammedan law Katheeja Bi inherited a one-sixth share in the estates of Abdul Razack and Abdul Subhan. On 17-6-1948 she executed a deed of settlement (Ex. A.1) by which she gave the one-sixth shares she had inherited in the estates of Abdul Razack and Abdul Subhan jointly to the first and second plaintiffs.

The first plaintiff, Mariam Bi, is Katheeja Bi's daughter; the second plaintiff is Mariam Bi's husband. Relying on Ex. A.1, the plaintiffs instituted O.S. No. 81 of 1948 in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Vellore for partition of Abdul Razack's estate; that suit was compromised on 23-1-1950 and the plaintiffs obtained properties set out in Ex. B.2. In September/October 1950 the plaintiffs instituted the suit that generated the present appeal, seeking partition and separate possession of the estate of Abdul Subhan and claiming a one-sixth share under Ex. A.1.

The defendants (Nos. 1–9) challenged the truth, validity and due execution of Ex. A.1 and further contended that even if genuine the settlement offended various rules of Mohammedan law. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled those contentions and decreed the plaintiffs' suit as prayed for. Defendants 1–9 appealed. While the trial was pending Katheeja Bi died in 1952 and no specific legal representative was added for her.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the settlement deed Ex. A.1 is genuine and was duly executed by Katheeja Bi.
  2. Whether Katheeja Bi, a pardanashin (secluded) lady, had complete comprehension and full understanding of the nature and effect of Ex. A.1 when she executed it (i.e., whether the deed resulted from her independent will).
  3. Whether Ex. A.1 is invalid under Mohammedan law because the donor was not in physical possession and therefore could not deliver possession (the relevance of delivery of possession for a gift).
  4. Whether a gift made jointly in favour of two donees is invalid under Mohammedan law.
  5. Whether a gift of an undivided share (musha) is invalid and how the doctrine of musha applies here (including whether the rule should be strictly or flexibly applied).
  6. Whether strangers (those not claiming under the donor) can challenge a gift on the ground of want of delivery of possession when the donor upholds the gift.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • They challenged the truth, validity and due execution of Ex. A.1 and put the plaintiffs to strict proof of the deed's genuineness.
  • They argued that even if Ex. A.1 were genuine it offended various rules of Mohammedan law and so was void.
  • They contended that a gift requires delivery of possession under Mohammedan law; Katheeja Bi was not in physical possession of the properties and so could not give possession.
  • They argued that the settlement was a gift in favour of two persons jointly and that such a joint gift is bad.
  • They asserted that what was given was an undivided share (musha) and that the transaction offended the principles of musha; they relied in part on Mst. Bilkis Bibi v. Wahid Ali.
  • They suggested some fraud or deception had been practiced on Katheeja Bi (pointing to a registered notice, Ex. B.1, which purportedly disavowed the settlement) and argued the thumb impression might have been obtained improperly.

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Position and Evidentiary Case

  • The plaintiffs relied on Ex. A.1 and produced witnesses to prove genuineness: P.W.1 (advocate D. Krishnaswami Aiyar) who drafted the document; P.W.2 and other attestors who witnessed and attested the execution; and registration of the document.
  • They presented evidence that the deed was prepared at the advocate's office, typed, corrected by a junior and that the vakil translated/explained the draft to the attestors (P.W.2's testimony that the vakil translated the writing and directed it to be typed).
  • The plaintiffs pointed to Katheeja Bi's subsequent conduct — she repudiated the earlier notice (Ex. B.1), continued with the first suit to compromise it, instituted the present suit on the strength of Ex. A.1 and thereafter remained ex parte — to show she stood by the settlement and had not been coerced or deceived.
  • On the legal issues they relied on authorities and doctrines (cited in the judgment) to show that legal/constructive possession and clear divestiture of interest can validate gifts of undivided shares and joint gifts where the donor has effectively divested herself of the interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Farid Unnissa v. Mukhtar Ahmed, 52 Ind App 342 (AIR 1925 PC 204) Explains the special position of a pardanashin donor: disposition must be substantially understood and be the mental act of the settlor; independent explanation/advice may be required to rebut presumption of want of independent will. The court relied on this authority to frame the test for whether Katheeja Bi had comprehension when executing Ex. A.1 and to evaluate whether the deed was explained to her and formed by her independent will.
Inche Noriah v. Sheik Allie, 56 Mad LJ 349 (AIR 1929 PC 3) Necessity for the donee to prove the gift resulted from the free exercise of independent will; independent explanation by a qualified person is the most obvious method to prove this. The court cited this to support the requirement that the deed be explained and understood by Katheeja Bi; the court assessed the evidence (including translation/explanation by the vakil and attestors' testimony) against this standard.
Mst. Bilkis Bibi v. Wahid Ali, ILR 7 Pat 118 (AIR 1928 Pat 183) Observed that the doctrine of musha is not archaic and while not favored cannot be ignored or repudiated (used by appellants to argue against gifts of undivided shares). The court noted the authority as part of the debate on musha but treated it within the broader set of authorities that have relaxed or confined the musha doctrine in application; it did not accept the appellants' strict application.
Ebrahim v. Bai Asi, ILR 58 Bom 254 (AIR 1934 Bom 21) Considered whether a gift to two donees jointly of property capable of division is invalid; held the authorities (Fatawa Alamgiri and Hidaya) are against the argument that such gifts are invalid. The court expressed respectful agreement with this view and relied on it when addressing the objection that the joint gift to two donees in Ex. A.1 was invalid.
Kaniz Fatima v. Jai Narain, ILR 23 Pat 216 (AIR 1944 Pat 334) Adopted the view in ILR 58 Bom 254 and held that a gift can be valid if the donor has parted with complete possession in favour of the donee; possession by a donee may be joint and valid without partition. The court relied on Manohar Lall, J.'s reasoning to support that validity turns on whether the donor divested possession and that joint possession by donees can sustain a gift.
Kalu Beg v. Gulzer Beg, ILR 1946 Nag 510 (AIR 1946 Nag 357) Held that where delivery of possession occurred under a joint gift and later the donees divided or arranged possession, the doctrine of musha ceases to operate. The court cited this to show that a joint gift accompanied by delivery/transfer of appropriate possession can be validated despite initial irregularity.
Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmed v. Zubaida Jan, ILR 11 All 460 (Privy Council) Observation that the doctrine relating to invalidity of gifts of musha is unadapted to a progressive society and ought to be confined within strict rules. The court invoked this Privy Council remark to temper a rigid application of the musha doctrine and to justify a restrictive application of the rule against gifts of undivided shares.
Zahuran v. Abdus Salam (AIR 1930 Oudh 71) Held that where the donor gives a definite share and thereby has nothing left in the property, the rule of musha aiming to prohibit confusion is inapplicable. The court used this authority to support its conclusion that when the donor parts with her entire interest (as here), the rationale for rejecting a gift of an undivided share (confusion) is absent.
Nazir Din v. Mohammed Shah (AIR 1936 Lah 92) Explains that the rigid rule of musha has been relaxed in British India; courts uphold gifts where intention is unequivocal and the donor has made honest efforts to divest control. The court quoted and relied on this exposition to apply a pragmatic test — whether the donor had done what the law requires to separate herself from the property — in assessing Ex. A.1.
Hamidullah v. Ahmadullah (AIR 1936 All 473) Upheld a gift where the donor had no physical possession but constructive possession and the deed recited transfer of the same sort of possession; noted the donee instituted suit to obtain possession. The court cited this case as analogous: the donor put the donee in a position to obtain possession, and the gift was upheld where the donor had done all she could to divest herself of possession.
Tyabji, Principles of Mohammedan Law (2nd Ed.) States courts are inclined to uphold a gift of musha except where omission to separate the portion indicates an incomplete transfer; emphasizes substance over form. The court approved and relied on this statement (and the cases that applied it) to affirm that a substantive test of divestiture and intention governs validity of gifts of undivided shares.
Mohideen Sahib, in re (reported extract) Illustrates that where the donor’s entire interest is given, the court can direct partition and thereby give effect to the gift; rejects strict necessity that only donor can partition. The court quoted this reasoning to support the proposition that where a donor gives entire interest, the court can direct partition so that the donee obtains the intended possession.
Said Hassan v. Shah Hussein (AIR 1947 Lah 272) Referenced by counsel as an authority relied upon (context: partition/division issues). The judgment notes counsel relied on this Lahore decision in argument; the court treated it in context with other authorities but did not adopt it as determinative against the present trend of authorities cited for validating gifts in appropriate circumstances.
Halimbi v. Rahmatali, ILR 1941 Nag 669 (AIR 1940 Nag 70) Held the question of delivery of possession is relevant only between donor and those claiming under him; if donor upholds the gift, strangers cannot question it on want of delivery. The court adopted this principle to hold that strangers (the defendants) could not successfully impugn the gift on the ground of want of delivery of possession where the donor had themselves upheld the gift.
Mohammed Buksh Khan v. Hossein Bibi, ILR 15 Cal 684 (15 Ind App 81 (PC)) Quoted in Zahuran to question what confusion is introduced if an owner of a definite share makes a gift leaving nothing of that property to himself. The court cited the quotation (via Zahuran) to reinforce that where a donor parts with a definite share leaving nothing, the rationale for musha-based invalidation is absent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the matter in successive stages: (a) authenticity and due execution of Ex. A.1; (b) the mental capacity and comprehension of a pardanashin donor in executing the deed; and (c) the substantive validity of the gift under Mohammedan law (including the rules on delivery of possession, joint gifts and musha).

On genuineness and execution the court found the deed to be beyond question. It relied on testimony that Katheeja Bi went to the advocate P.W.1 (D. Krishnaswami Aiyar), that he drafted the document, it was typed in his office, a junior made corrections, three attestors witnessed it (one attestor was P.W.2 who testified), and that Katheeja Bi presented the document for registration and it was duly registered. The court accepted P.W.2's account that the vakil translated/explained the draft before typing.

On comprehension the court applied the special test applicable to pardanashin donors (as explained in Farid Unnissa and Inche Noriah): the disposition must be substantially understood and be the mental act of the settlor. The court examined the contemporaneous evidence and subsequent conduct of Katheeja Bi:

  • Although there was a registered notice (Ex. B.1) which appeared to repudiate the settlement, the circumstances of its origin were unknown and the court would not give it decisive effect when balanced against other evidence.
  • Katheeja Bi thereafter repudiated Ex. B.1 (sent Ex. A.2 to the advocate), continued with the suit to its compromise on 23-1-1950, later instituted the present suit, and chose to remain ex parte — all conduct indicating she stood by the settlement deed for the remainder of her life.
  • P.W.1's evidence (that the document "must have been read over to her") and P.W.2's clear testimony that the vakil translated the draft and that they were present when it was prepared furnished cogent evidence that the deed was explained and understood.
  • Additional circumstances (time spent in Vellore, absence of haste, presence of advocates of standing, regional purdah practice nuances and advanced age of the donor) supported the conclusion that the deed was not obtained by coercion and that the donor had comprehension.

On the Mohammedan law objections the court proceeded to analyze the musha doctrine, the requirement of delivery of possession and the validity of joint gifts:

  • The court rejected a rigid rule that physical delivery of possession is essential to validate a gift; instead it held that legal or constructive possession (and the transfer of such possession as the matter is capable of) suffices. When Katheeja Bi became a co-heir on the deaths of her sons, the possession of co-heirs was possession on behalf of all and, at the time of Ex. A.1, her claim as heir had not been challenged.
  • The court observed that Ex. A.1 explicitly empowered the donees to "work out the settlor's rights in the properties described below by taking appropriate proceedings." Thus the donor gave the donees such possession as the property was capable of — for example by enabling them to sue for partition — and had done all that could be expected to divest herself of control.
  • Addressing the objection that a gift to two donees jointly is bad, the court agreed with the reasoning in Ebrahim v. Bai Asi and Kaniz Fatima v. Jai Narain: a joint gift may be valid provided the donor has parted with complete possession in favour of the donees; the courts have accepted that joint possession by donees can be permitted and that the law requires only that the donor divest control.
  • Concerning musha, the court recognized the historical purpose of the rule — avoidance of confusion — but held that where the donor parts with her entire interest such confusion cannot arise; thus the rationale for rejecting such gifts is absent (citing Zahuran and other authorities). The court also relied on authorities showing a trend of relaxing the rigid application of musha in British India where intention and divestiture are clear.
  • Finally the court adopted the principle (from Halimbi v. Rahmatali and other authorities) that questions of delivery of possession are relevant primarily between donor and those claiming under the donor; where the donor upholds the gift, strangers cannot successfully challenge it on want of delivery of possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge in favour of the plaintiffs is upheld. (Appeal dismissed with costs.)

Implications:

  • The court held Ex. A.1 to be genuine and binding: Katheeja Bi executed the settlement with full understanding and intention and thereby divested herself of the interest she purported to give.
  • The court concluded that under the circumstances legal or constructive possession and a clear divestiture of interest suffice to validate gifts that might otherwise be challenged under the musha doctrine or for want of physical delivery; a joint gift can be valid where the donor has effectively divested herself.
  • As to practical effect, the judgment affirms the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs; the defendants' challenge based on lack of physical delivery, musha and joint-gift objections failed.
  • The opinion applies and synthesizes existing authorities to the facts of this case; it does not announce a novel legal principle beyond its application of settled lines of authority to uphold the deed in the circumstances before the court.

Prepared from the text of the judgment of Balakrishna Aiyar, J. All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

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JUDGMENT Balakrishna Aiyar, J.

(1) Defendants 1 to 9 are the appellants. Katheeja Bi, the 10th defendant, had three sons, Abdul Razack, Abdul Subhan and Abdul Shukoor. Abdul Razack died in 1944. Abdul Subhan died in 1947. Under the Mohammedan law on the death of these sons Katheeja Bi became entitled to a one-sixth share in their estates. On 17-6-1948 she executed a deed of settlement, Ex. A. 1 whereby she gave the one-sixth share which she inherited in the estate of Abdul Razack as also the one-sixth share which she inherited in the estate of Abdul Subhan jointly to plaintiffs 1 and 2.

The first plaintiff, Mariam Bi, it may be stated, is the only daughter of Katheeja Bi and the second plaintiff is the husband of Mariam Bi. On the strength of this settlement deed the plaintiffs instituted O. S. No. 81 of 1948 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vellore, for the partition of the estate of Abdul Razack. That suit was compromised on 23-1-1950 and the plaintiffs obtained for themselves the properties set out in Ex. B. 2. In September or October 1950, the plaintiffs instituted the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for partition and separate possession of the estate of Abdul Subhan wherein they claimed a one-sixth share on the basis of Ex. A. 1.

(2) The defendants put the plaintiffs to strict proof of the truth, validity and due execution of the settlement deed, Ex. A. 1. They took the further plea that even if Ex. A. 1 is proved to be genuine and to have been executed by Katheeja Bi with complete comprehension of its contents still the settlement deed is void since it offends against various rules of Mohammedan law. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled these contentions and decreed the suit as prayed for. Defendants 1 to 9 have therefore appealed.

(3) It may be mentioned here that Katheeja Bi died in 1952 while the suit was pending in the trial court and that no one has been specifically added as her legal representative.

(4) It seems to us that the genuineness of the settlement deed is beyond question. The evidence shows that Katheeja Bi went to the house of P.W. 1, a leading advocate of Vellore, and told him what she wanted to be done. He thereupon drafted the document Ex. A. 1 and it was typed in his office. A junior of his, who has subsequently become a Judicial Magistrate, made certain corrections in the document. Thereafter it was attested by three persons one of whom was P.W. 2 P.W. 2 deposed that at the time he gave evidence both the other attestors were dead. Katheeja Bi herself presented the document for registration and it was duly registered.

(5) The next question is whether when Katheeja Bi executed the settlement deed she had a complete comprehension and full understanding of the nature of the document and the effect of the dispositions she was making.

(6) Here it must be borne in mind that a gift deed executed by a pardanashin lady stands in a peculiar position. As explained in Farid Unnissa v. Mukhtar Ahmed, 52 Ind App 342:(AIR 1925 PC 204):

"The real point is, that the disposition made must be substantially understood and must really be the mental act, as its execution is the physical act, of the person who makes it;................ If, however, the settlor's freedom and comprehension can be otherwise established, or if, as is the respondents' case here, the scheme and substance of the deed were themselves originally and clearly conceived and desired by the settlor, and were then substantially embodied in the deed, there would be nothing further to be gained by independence advice.......... They must satisfy the court that the deed has been explained to and understood by the party thus under disability, either before execution, or after it under circumstances which establish adoption of it with full knowledge and comprehension."

See also Inche Noriah v. sheik Allie, 56 Mad LJ 349:(AIR 1929 PC 3), where their Lordships observed:

"It is necessary for the donee to prove that the gift was the result of the free exercise of independent will. The most obvious way to prove this is by establishing that the gift was made after the nature and effect of the transaction had been fully explained to the donor by some independent and qualified person so completely as to satisfy the court that the donor was acting independently of any influence from the donee and with the full appreciation of what he was doing; and in cases where there are no other circumstances this may be the only means by which the donee can rebut the presumption."

(7) Katheeja Bi was the first plaintiff in O. S. No. 81 of 1948 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vellore, and, P.W. 1, Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar was her advocate. While that suit was pending Katheeja Bi sent a registered notice to Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar which as shown by Ex. B. 1 was received on 29-8-1949 at his residence. That notice is said to have been mislaid and Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar could not produce the original. But D.W. 2 deposed that he had attested that notice and that so far as he could recollect it was to this effect. Katheeja Bi did not know the contents of the settlement deed.

It was in English. She was asked to sign in it and so she signed in it. She desired one-sixth share to go to her son's sons. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar was asked not to go on with the case against the son's sons. The settlement deed appeared to be in favour of her daughter. She did not want her advocate to go on with the case on her behalf.

(8) On the strength of this notice the argument was advanced that Ex. A. 1 must have been even if genuine in the sense that Katheeja Bi actually executed it, obtained from her under circumstances that would not make it binding on her. Some fraud or deception must have been practiced on her and her thumb mark obtained to Ex. A. 1 Otherwise, it was contended, such a notice would not have been issued at all.

(9) Now, if the matter had rested just here and there were no other circumstances throwing light on the mind and conduct of Katheeja Bi one might probably have accepted the contention of the appellants or their part of the case. However, there are quite a number of circumstances pointing, and decisively pointing, to a difference conclusion. It must be borne in mind that we do not know the circumstances under which the notice referred to in Ex. B. 1 came to be sent by Katheeja Bi to Krishnaswami Aiyar.

All that we know is that about that time she was apparently living in the house of Abdul Shukoor. According to D.W. 2 it was Abdul Shukoor who sent for him to attest that notice. D.W. 2 saw Abdul Shukoor in the house in which Katheeja Bi was staying at the time she affixed her thumb mark to the notice referred to in Ex. B. 1. What influence had been brought to bear upon her at the time one does not know. But, it is perfectly clear that less than two months later Katheeja Bi sent Ex. A-2 to Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer completely repudiating her earlier notice.

Besides she went on with the suit till it was compromised on 23-1-1950. Thereafter the present suit was instituted and Katheeja Bi chose to remain ex parte, which means in the context that she wanted the plaintiffs to succeed in their action. The subsequent conduct of Katheeja Bi constitutes a complete repudiation of the notice referred to in Ex. B. 1. Be it recalled that the deed of settlement was executed in 1948 and that Katheeja Bi died only in 1952, that is, some four years later. Except for the solitary notice evidenced by Ex. B. 1-and as we already stated, we do not know the circumstances under which the notice came to be issued--the conduct of Katheeja Bi shows that for the remaining years of her life, she stood by the settlement deed.

This would never have happened if Ex. A. I had been obtained from her by coercion or by the exercise of undue or improper influence. It is also reasonably clear that at the time the document was prepared its contents must have been fully explained to her. She went to P.W. 1 and consulted him. He then prepared a draft in accordance with her instructions. It was typed in his office. A junior of his made certain corrections and amendments and it was thereafter that Katheeja Bi executed the document. P.W. 1 was asked whether Katheeja Bi was "capable of understanding her actions at the time she executed Ex. A. 1" and whether it was read over to her and he then gave this answer: "Yes. It must have read over to her." An Advocate in the position of P.W. 1 could hardly say more than this. It is impossible to expect a person in his position to have specific recollection whether a particular document was read over to the person concerned.

(10) The evidence of P.W. 2, an attestor of the document, however makes the matter very much clearer:

"The document Ex. A. 1 was typed in Sri D. Krishnaswami Aiyar's office.....Vakil D. Krishnaswami Iyer wrote the draft. We four were present then. At that time no one else was present. The vakil after drafting, translated the writing to us and then handed the same to his clerk and directed him to type."

There is no reason why the evidence of P.W. 2 should not be believed.

(11) Another important circumstance here is that the document was not prepared in a rush or hurry. Form the village where Katheeja Bi lived with her son-in-law they went to Vellore in connection with this document. They appear to have spent at least two or three days at Vellore. It is also useful to bear in mind that if there had been any grounds for suspecting anything wrong or improper it is hardly likely that an Advocate of the standing of P.W. 1 would have proceeded further in the matter.

One other circumstance which is not wholly devoid of significance is this. In Tamil districts Muslims do not observe purdha with the same rigidity and strictness as in some other parts of the country. Very often the purdha is a matter of form. In addition it must be remembered that at the time she executed Ex. A. 1 Katheeja Bi was advanced in years, and in the case of such elderly persons there would not be the same insistence on the observance of purdha as in the case of girls and of young women.

(11a) Taking all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Katheeja Bi executed Ex. A. 1 with full understanding and comprehension of its contents and that the document did not incorporate anything which was not in accordance with her intentions.

(12) Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar for the appellants argued that even so the settlement must fail for these reasons. Delivery of possession is essential to validate a gift of property under the Mohammedan law. Katheeja Bi the donor was not in possession of any part of the property at the time she purported to make the gift deed, Ex. A. 1. Since she was not in possession she could not naturally have given possession. besides, Ex. A. 1 is a gift in favour of two persons jointly and such a gift is bad.

What Katheeja Bi purported to make a gift of, was an undivided share in the estate of each of her sons and the gift of an undivided share is bad. The transaction offends against every principle of Mohammedan law relating to musha. Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar reinforced his arguments by referring to Mst. Bilkis Bibi v Wahid Ali, ILR 7 Pat 118:(AIR 1928 Pat 183), where it was observed that the doctrine of musha is not an archaic rule of law and although not favored, cannot be ignored or repudiated.

(13) In dealing with these arguments it is well to bear in mind the following observations of the Privy Council in Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmed v Zubaida Jan, ILR 11 All 460 at p. 475.

"The doctrine relating to the invalidity of gifts of musha is wholly unadopted to a progressive state of society, and ought to be confined within the strictest rules."

The question whether a gift to two donees jointly is bad was considered in Ebrahim v. Bai Asi, ILR 58 Bom 254:(AIR 1934 Bom 21). We quote the relevant passage:

"There was a second argument placed before me, to the effect that 'A gift of property, which is capable of division, to two or more persons without dividing it, is invalid; but it may be rendered valid if separate possession is taken by each donee of the portion of the property given to him................. I cannot accept this argument. The authority of the Fatawa Alamgiri and Hidaya is directly against it."

(14) This view was adopted in Kaniz Fatima v. Jai Narain, ILR 23 Pat 216 on pages 221 and 222: (AIR 1944 Pat 334 at pp. 336, 337), Manoher Lall, J., observed, "In the case of ILR 58 Bom 254:(AIR 1934 Bom 21), Tyabji, J. has examined the subject at great length and I respectfully agree with his observations. I do not see why a donee of musha who has taken joint possession of the subject of a gift, and who finds it convenient and practicable to continue to hold that property without partition, should not be allowed to do so. All that the law is concerned to find is that before the validity of such a gift is declared, the donor must have parted with complete possession in favour of the donee, and then it is the lookout of the donee as to whether he wants a partition or not.

If the donor had partitioned the property and given it to a donee in a definite share, the donee could still hold the property as a tenant in common with his co-sharers and no question could have been raised regarding the validity of the gift. The same result, in my opinion, should follow provided the donee has been found to be in possession."

(14a) In Kalu Beg v. Gulzer Beg., ILR 1946 Nag 510:(AIR 1946 Nag 357), it was held,

"When there is delivery of possession under a gift made jointly to two persons and the donee at some subsequent date either divide the property among themselves or arrange that one should have the entire gifted property, the doctrine of musha ceases to operate and that which was irregular in the beginning becomes valid."

(15) So far as we are aware there is no decision of this court directly in point. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the views of Tyabji, J. in ILR 58 Bom 254:(AIR 1934 Bom 21) and of Manohar Lall, J. in ILR 23 Pat 216:(AIR 1944 Pat 334).

(16) We would best observe that the rules of Mohammedan law do not require that to make a gift valid the donor must have physical possession of the property and must hand over that physical possession to the donee. It is enough if he has got legal possession of the property and transfers to the donee such possession as the matter is susceptible of. In the present case when Abdul Razack died Katheeja Bi became a co-heir along with the widow and children of Abdul Razack. Similarly when Abdul Subhan died Katheeja Bi became a co-heir along with the widow and children of Abdul Subhan.

The possession of one co-heir is ordinarily possession on behalf of all. It must also be emphasized that in June 1948 when Katheeja Bi executed Ex. A.1 her claim is to be the heir of her sons Abdul Razack and Abdul Subhan had not been challenged or called in question by any one. The possession of the other heirs was possession on her behalf also. And, we may properly say that she was actually in possession of the estate. It was explained in ILR 23 Pat 216:(AIR 1944 Pat 334):

"Possession of a co-owner or a co-tenant is a possession which has to be recognised by the law."

In Ex. A. 1 Katheeja Bi distinctly stated that thereafter she ceased to have any interest in the schedule mentioned properties and she expressly declared that the settlee,

"will be entitled to work out the settlor's rights in the properties described below by taking appropriate proceedings."

The only manner in which Katheeja Bi could have got physical possession of any part of the property was by instituting a suit for partition, and, under Ex.A. 1 she armed the donees with the requisite power. In effect, therefore, she gave the donees such possession as the property was capable of.

(17) One other observation must be made. The reason for the rule that the gift of an undivided share is bad is to be found in the desire to avoid what has been described as confusion. If the property is capable of separate possession but nevertheless the donor does not separate what he intends to give from his other possessions, how is one to find out what he intended to give? And if we do not know what he intended to give, but still try to give something there is bound to be confusion. The reason of the rule is wholly absent in a case like the present where the donor gave away the entirety of her interest in the estate. It was held in Zahuran v. Abdus Salam, AIR 1930 Oudh 71:

"A definite share in immovable property, zamindari, houses or shops, is a separate estate with separate and defined rents. The rule of musha, therefore, which aims at prohibiting confusion between estates gifted and not gifted is wholly inapplicable to such an estate............ We may legitimately ask as was asked by Lord Macnaughten in the case of Mohammed Buksh Khan v. Hossein Bibi, ILR 15 Cal 684: 15 Ind App 81(PC), what confusion can it introduce if the owner of a definite share in immovable property makes a gift of that share in favour of another person and has himself nothing left in that property after the gift? It seems to us that the only answer that can be given to this question is in the negative."

In Nazir Din v. Mohammed Shah, AIR 1936 Lah 92 at pp. 95, 96, Din Mohammed, J. observed:

"It will be manifest from the above that the original rigidity of the rule of Musha has been considerably relaxed in its application to British India and in almost all cases, which have come up before the courts here as well as before the Privy Council, an effort has been made to adapt the rule to its new environments and so to interpret it as to make it consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

The courts in this country have given effect rather to the spirit of the rule than to its letter and have upheld gifts in all cases in which the intention to give on the part of the donor had been expressed in most unequivocal terms, and had further been attended by all honest efforts on his part to complete the gift by divesting himself of the control over the property in such a manner as would clearly imply his divestiture in the eye of the law of the land.

The raison d'etre of this rule was the avoidance of gifts that were vague, indefinite or incomplete, and the only test that should be applied in such cases is whether the gift in question is open to any of these objections; or in other words, whether the donor has still reserved to himself a loop-hole of escape or not. If this is not so and if the donor has done all that the law of the land requires to be done to separate himself from the property, a gift of Musha will be as valid as that of property which can be physically handed over to the donee."

(18) The case in Hamidullah v. Ahmadullah, AIR 1936 All 473, is also in point. The subject-matter of the gift there was an undivided 7/32 share in six houses and three parcels of land. The donor was not in physical possession but only in constructive possession of the property. She executed a deed of gift and had it registered. The document recited that the donor was conveying to the donee the same sort of possession which she had. The gift was upheld. The court observed,

"She admittedly had no physical possession but was in constructive possession through the plaintiff.......................... She however put the donee in a position to obtain possession and it is fact as stated in the plaint that the defendant donee instituted a suit for his share of the rents on the basis of this deed of gift.............. Mst. Haliman did practically all that she was able to do in a way of divesting herself of possession and giving to the donee-defendant the same possession as she had herself."

In Tyabji's Principles of Mohammedan Law, 2nd Ed. page 423, the following passage appears:

"The courts are inclined to uphold a gift of Musha, i.e., of an undivided part of property, except where the omission to separate the portion of the property which is the subject of gift from the rest of it, is taken as an indication that there has been, in effect, an incomplete transfer, which the donor would have completed by partition, had he intended to complete the gift."

This statement of the law was approved in ILR 7 Pat 118:(AIR 1928 Pat 183) and ILR 58 Bom 254: (AIR 1934 Bom 21).

(19) It will be appreciated that in the present case Katheeja Bi could not have done anything more whatever to complete the gift. There are certain observations in Mohideen Sahib, in re, , which are directly in point:

"Two points were raised by Mr. Parthasarathi Aiyangar, learned counsel for the appellant in this case. One is that the learned Judge, Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. erred in law in holding that the gift by the second defendant to the plaintiff of his share in the suit property was valid. The contention was that as the donee was entitled only to an undivided share, the gift was invalid, because of the doctrine of musha under the Mohammedan law. As the learned Judge observed, the prevailing view is that a gift of an undivided share which is capable of division is not void.

Learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute this but argued that such a division could be made only by the donor himself and relied on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Said Hassan v. Shah Hussein, AIR 1947 Lah 272.................. In the case before us the facts are entirely different. The donor has made a gift of his entire interest to the plaintiff. That interest was a share in a property. It will not be possible for the second defendant to voluntarily effect a division and then deliver his share to the plaintiff.

In our opinion, if the gift is otherwise valid, in a case like this, there can be no impediment to the court directing a partition between the donee in the right of the donor and the other sharer, the first defendant in this case."

(20) One final observation must be made and it is this. The question whether possession has been delivered is relevant only when an issue is raised between the donee or those claiming under him on the one side and the donor or those claiming under him on the other. Where a gift is otherwise proper a stranger cannot invoke the rule that the gift is bad because there has been no delivery of possession. In ILR 1946 Nag 510:(AIR 1946 Nag 357), Bose, J. observed:

"I have decided in Halimbi v. Rahmatali, ILR 1941 Nag 669, 672:( AIR 1940 Nag 70 at p. 72), that the question of delivery of possession is only relevant as between the donor and those who claim under him or her and the donee. If the donor upholds the gift then it is not open to strangers like the present defendants to question it on the ground of want of delivery of possession."

We think that this is the proper way of looking into the matter.

(21) All the contentions raised by Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar fail. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

(22). Appeal dismissed.