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South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd. v. Elumalai

Madras High Court
Mar 5, 1959
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 1 June 1957 the Government of Madras took over the undertaking of the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. under the powers conferred by Madras Act XXIX of 1954. By operation of Section 6 of that Act the company's properties and rights, liabilities and obligations as on the vesting date vested in the Government, and the undertaking was subsequently transferred to the Madras State Electricity Board.

A substantial number of employees of the undertaking claimed retrenchment compensation and other benefits under Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act (in the context of changes to Section 25-FF and later amendments) and filed petitions before the Labour Court, Madras. The South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., the State of Madras and the Madras State Electricity Board were parties to those proceedings.

Before the Labour Court, the Company, the Government and the Electricity Board raised a preliminary objection that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to enquire into the claims. By an order dated 3 October 1958 the Labour Court overruled that objection and posted the petitions for further inquiry. The present writ petitions were filed seeking to quash the Labour Court's order overruling the jurisdictional objection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Labour Court, under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, has jurisdiction to determine claims for monetary benefits such as wages for the notice period and retrenchment compensation (monetary claims) made by individual workmen.
  2. Whether Section 33-C(1) empowers the appropriate Government to conduct an inquiry into the legal liability of an employer to pay compensation, or whether its function is limited to recovery (execution) once an amount is already due.
  3. Whether Section 33-C(2) is confined only to benefits that are non-monetary (requiring computation into money), or whether it also covers monetary benefits.
  4. Whether the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is ousted because retrenchment matters are listed in the Third Schedule (and therefore within the exclusive domain of Industrial Tribunals) — i.e., whether the absence of an industrial dispute affects which forum has jurisdiction.
  5. What is the proper construction of the word “entitled” in Section 33-C(2): does it require a prior adjudication of title before a Labour Court may determine the amount?

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced for the Company (summarised from Mr. Rajah Aiyar's submissions)

  • Benefits fall into two broad categories: monetary benefits (e.g., arrears of pay, wages for notice, retrenchment compensation) and non-monetary benefits (e.g., sickness, injury benefits, loss of facilities).
  • Section 33-C(1) applies to monetary benefits (recovery/execution stage) while Section 33-C(2) applies to non-monetary benefits requiring computation; the present claims are monetary and thus fall under S.33-C(1), not S.33-C(2), so the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction under S.33-C(2).
  • Reliance on Behariji Mills v. State (Patna High Court) for the proposition that S.33-C(1) grants the appropriate Government power to enquire into the employer's legal liability.
  • Rejected reading of S.20(1)/(2) (Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act) should not be extended; where computation is needed S.20(2) applies but that does not limit S.20(2) to non-monetary benefits only (argument used to support restriction).
  • Sub-section 3 of S.33-C (power to appoint a Commissioner) indicates S.33-C(2) is meant for non-monetary benefits requiring valuation, supporting a restrictive view of S.33-C(2).
  • Alternate argument: the word “entitled” in S.33-C(2) implies the workman's title must already be established — otherwise the Labour Court could not proceed; thus prior decision on entitlement would be necessary.
  • Jurisdiction argument based on schedules: retrenchment is in the Third Schedule (item 10), and matters in the Third Schedule are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals; therefore the Labour Court (a different forum) should not have jurisdiction.

Government and Madras State Electricity Board (as summarised by the Court)

  • The Government’s and Electricity Board's position at the stage of these proceedings was that they are not bound to pay the sums claimed by the workmen; and even if it is found that the Company is bound to pay, they (the Government/Board) are not presently liable to make good the payments to the Company.
  • Thus the Government/Board asserted they have no present liability to the claimants; any question whether liability of the Company fastens on the Government under Section 6 of Madras Act XXIX of 1954 was a separate controversy which, the Court observed, would have to be resolved outside the Industrial Disputes Act machinery.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Behariji Mills v. State (Patna High Court) Held that the newly-inserted S.33-C(1) expressly grants the appropriate Government power to make an enquiry about the legal liability of the employer to pay compensation under Chapter V-A. The Court disagreed with the Patna High Court's statement. The Court held that S.33-C(1) does not contain words expressly granting the Government power to make such an enquiry; rather S.33-C(1) concerns recovery once the amount is due.
S.S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd. (Supreme Court) Interpreted S.20(1) and S.20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act: recovery by appropriate Government and computation under S.20(2) where awarded benefits are not expressed in money. The Court treated the decision as not limiting S.20(2) to non-monetary benefits; it held the observation that computation is necessary applies equally to both monetary and non-monetary benefits where computation is required.
Rajamani Transports Ltd. v. Collector of Tiruchirapalli (Rajagopalan, J.) Construction of S.20(2): “benefit” should be understood broadly to include pecuniary benefits; S.20(2) speaks of “computation” and is not confined to non-pecuniary benefits. The Court respectfully agreed with Rajagopalan, J.'s wider construction and adopted the view that “benefit” in the provision is wide enough to include monetary benefits.
Kasturi & Sons v. Salivateeswaran (Supreme Court) Interpretation of provision similar to S.33-C(1) (S.17 of the Working Journalists Act): section provides a recovery (execution) procedure and presupposes prior determination of amount due; the State's role is limited to a narrow summary inquiry into whether the amount remains due. The Court relied on this reasoning to support the distinction that S.33-C(1) contemplates recovery after determination, while S.33-C(2) contemplates determination of amount (trial-stage functions).
C.B.R. Ratnam & Co. v. Ekambaram (Rajagopala Aiyangar, J.) Addressed S.25-I (a repealed section enabling recovery as arrear of land revenue) and commented on the absence of machinery in the Act to determine disputes on retrenchment or computation of compensation. The Court observed that the legislature remedied such omission by introducing S.33-C in 1956; it found the case did not assist the Company's contention that S.33-C(2) should be narrowly construed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from a close textual reading of Section 33-C (set out in full in the opinion) and an analogy to civil execution and trial stages. The reasoning follows these principal steps:

  1. Distinction between stages: The Court identified two distinct stages addressed by S.33-C — (a) determination/ascertainment of the amount due (analogous to trial), covered by S.33-C(2), and (b) recovery/execution of the amount once it is due (analogous to execution), covered by S.33-C(1). The concluding words of S.33-C(2) ("The amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S. (1).") reinforce that S.33-C(2) is for determination and S.33-C(1) for recovery.
  2. Scope of S.33-C(1): The Court rejected the view that S.33-C(1) expressly grants the Government power to inquire into the legal liability of the employer to pay compensation under Chapter V-A. Instead, S.33-C(1) presupposes that money is already due and payable (i.e., has been quantified). The Government's function under S.33-C(1) is similar to that of an executing court: it may satisfy itself (for example, on documents) that the money is due and, if so, issue a certificate for recovery; its investigatory remit is limited to execution-stage issues (e.g., whether payment has been made).
  3. Scope of S.33-C(2): The Court held that S.33-C(2) relates to the earlier stage where the amount must be determined and that this can include computing benefits which are capable of being expressed in money. The Court rejected a restrictive construction that would confine S.33-C(2) only to non-monetary benefits. The existence of S.33-C(3) (power to appoint a Commissioner to compute money value) shows that non-monetary benefits can be assessed, but does not limit S.33-C(2) to them.
  4. Precedential support and distinctions: The Court engaged with prior authorities. It treated S.S. Shetty as not deciding that only non-monetary benefits fall under the computation provision; Rajamani Transports was followed for its broad construction of “benefit.” Kasturi & Sons was used to reinforce that provisions like S.33-C(1) provide for recovery after prior determination. The Court expressly disagreed with the Patna High Court's comment in Behariji Mills to the extent that it asserted an express power in S.33-C(1) for the Government to enquire into legal liability.
  5. Interpretation of “entitled”: The Court rejected the Company's argument that the term “entitled” in S.33-C(2) requires a prior adjudication of title before the Labour Court can determine the amount. The Court observed that adopting such a construction would produce impractical and counter‑schematic consequences (forcing claimants into industrial dispute procedures or civil suits for initial determination and then back to the Labour Court only for computation), which would run counter to the remedial design of the Industrial Disputes Act intended to provide expeditious special machinery for workmen's claims.
  6. Jurisdictional contention based on Schedules: The Court found the Company's reliance on the Third Schedule (which lists retrenchment and closure as items within the exclusive jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals) to be fallacious in the present context because the schedules and associated jurisdictional allocations become relevant only when there is an industrial dispute. In this case, the claims were individual applications and there was no industrial dispute; therefore the Third Schedule did not oust the Labour Court's jurisdiction. Under Section 7 the Labour Court may adjudicate matters in the Second Schedule if an industrial dispute arises, and may also perform other functions assigned under the Act; S.33-C(2) expressly empowers Labour Courts to determine amounts, so the Labour Court had jurisdiction.
  7. Scope limitation as to inter se disputes: The Court clarified that disputes between the Company and the Government (i.e., whether the Government must make good any payments the Company is held to owe by virtue of Section 6 of Madras Act XXIX of 1954) are not matters for the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act; those inter se disputes must be resolved outside that Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petitions seeking to quash the Labour Court's order overruling the preliminary objection to jurisdiction are DISMISSED. The dismissal was ordered without costs.

Implications (direct effects stated in the opinion):

  • The Labour Court has jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to determine the amounts claimed by individual workmen when the benefits claimed are capable of being computed in terms of money; S.33-C(2) is not limited to non-monetary benefits only and can encompass monetary claims where determination/ computation is required.
  • S.33-C(1) is a recovery/execution provision that presupposes the amount due has been determined; the appropriate Government's role under S.33-C(1) is essentially to facilitate recovery (and to satisfy itself, at an execution-stage, whether money remains due), not to conduct a broad trial into entitlement.
  • Where questions of liability between the Company and the Government arise (for example, whether liability imposed on the Company by virtue of Section 6 of Madras Act XXIX of 1954 fastens on the Government), those inter se disputes fall outside the Labour Court's jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act and must be resolved by other fora.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel principle beyond its textual and precedential analysis; its direct effect is to confirm the Labour Court's jurisdiction to entertain the petitions in the circumstances before it and to dismiss the writ petitions seeking to quash the Labour Court's order. The opinion does not explicitly state that a new binding precedent is being created.

Signed: V.C.S (as appearing at the conclusion of the opinion)

Show all summary ...

The questions for determination in all these writ petitions are the same, and, I shall, therefore, deal with them together.

With effect from 1st June 1957, the Government of Madras took over the undertaking of the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. They did so in exercise of the powers conferred on them by Madras Act XXIX of 1954. One consequence of this taking over was that by virtue of Sec. 6 of the Act all the properties of the company and all its rights, liabilities and obligations as on the vesting date, subject to certain provisions, vested in the Government. Sometime after they took over the undertaking the Government transferred it to the Madras, State Electricity Board. The taking over of the undertaking of the company by the Government had another consequence which was probably not anticipated. S. 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it stood in 1956, that is to say, before it was amended by Central Act 18. of 1957, provided that no workman would be entitled to compensation by reason merely of the fact that there had been a change of employers in any case, where the ownership or management of the undertaking in which he was employed was transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law from one employer to another, provided certain conditions referred to later on in the section were satisfied. Central Act XVIII 1957 recasts the section and provides in positive terms that while the ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law, from one employer to another, every workman who had a continuous service of not less than one year shall be entitled to notice and compensation as if he had been retrenched, unless certain conditions are satisfied. A large number of the employees of the undertaking which the Government took over from the S.A.E.D Co. Ltd. considered that they were entitled to retrenchment compensation and certain other benefits referred to in Sec. 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and, to enforce their claims they filed petitions before the Labour Court Madras. To these proceedings the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., The State of Madras and the Madras State Electricity Board were made parties.

Before the Labour Court, the Company, the Government and the Electricity Board, took the preliminary objection that the Labour court had no jurisdiction to enquire into the claims. By an order pronounced on 3rd October 1958, the Labour Court overruled the objection and posted the petitions for further inquiry. The present writ petitions have been filed to quash this order of the Labour Court.

A substantial portion of the arguments before me turned on the scope, design and purposes of Sec. 33-C of the Isdustrial Disputes Act, and, it will therefore be convenient if I were to set it out in full.

“Section 33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer:

(1) Where any money Is due to workman from an employer under settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such labour Court, as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S. (1).

(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be neeessary, submit a report to the labour Court and the labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.”

The arguments of Mr. Rajah Aiyar the learned Advocate for company, so far as they related to this section, may be thus summarised. The benefits which a workman or employee is entitled to, may be placed in two broad categories monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits. Into the former category would fall claims like those relating to arrears of pay, differences between scales of pay and the like. Into the latter category would fall claims relating to, or arising out of say, sickness, injuries suffered during the course of the employment, loss of various facilities and conveniences and the like. Sub-sec, (I) of Sec. 33-C applies to monetary benefits. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 33-C applies to non-monetary benefits. The claims made in the present case are wages for the period of the notice to which the petitioners say they are entitled, and compensation computed at the rate of fifteen days' average pay for every year of completed service. These are monetary benefits and therefore fall within the scope of the first sub-section and not of the second sub-section of Sec, 33-C. The labour court has, therofore, no jurisdiction in the matter.

If if be replied that Sub Sec. (1) of Sec. 33-C does not contemplate any enquiry by Government then such a reply must be held to be unsound because in Behariji Mills v. State(1) it was held by the Patna High Court.

“The newly-inserted S. 33-C(1) expressly grants power to the appropriate Government to make an enquiry about the legal liability of the employer to pay compensation under any provisions of Chapter V-A.”

Mr. Rajah Aiyar also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd. (2) where their Lordships had to consider the scope of S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 the language of which is substantially similar to the language of S. 33-C(1) and (2). On page 17 the following observations appear:

“Any money which is due from an employer under the award can by virtue of the provisions of S. 20(1) of the Act be recovered by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the workman. Where, however, any benefit which is not expressed in terms of money is awarded to the workman under the terms of the award it will be necessary to compute in terms of money the value of that benefit before the workman can ask the appropriate Government to help him in such recovery S. 20 Sub-S. (2) provides for the computation in terms of money of the value of such benefit and the amount at which such benefit should be computed is to be determined by the Industrial Tribunal to which reference would be made by the appropriate Government for the purpose.”

In respect of this decision it is enough to say that their Lordships did not decide that only claims realating to benefits which are non-monetary in character can be investigated under S. 20(2). What they said was that when a computation has to be made, it has to be done under S. 20(2), and these observations would apply with equal force both to benefits which are monetary in character and to benefits which are non-monetary in character.

So far as the observations of the Patna High Court are concerned, with respect I find it difficult to agree. I am unable to find in S. 33-C(1) words which expressly grant power to the appropriate Government to make any enquiry “about the legal liability of the employer to pay compensation under any of the provisions of Chapter V-A”.

What Sub-S. (1) to S. 33(C) provides for is this: Money may be due to a workman from an employer in pursuance of a settlement reached in the course of conciliation proceedings. Money may be due to him in pursuance of an award made by a Tribunal. Money may also be due to him f or lay off and retrenchment. Now, if any money is due to a workman in respect of any of these claims then the workman concerned is given leave to make an application to the Government for the recovery of the money due to him. Then if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the money is due, an obligation is imposed on it to issue a certificate to the Collector who would thereafter proceed to recover the money as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Before S. 33-C(1) can take effect the money must be due; that is to say, it must have become payable. Obviously no money can become due or payable before the amount of it is ascertained. This sub-section therefore relates to a stage in the proceedings where the amount due to the employee or workman has been quantified and determined. No doubt the appropriate Government has to be satisfied that the money is due to the workman. But then, this sub-section does not say that the satisfaction is to be reached as a result of any enquiry conducted by the Government itself. If on the documents produced before it the Government is satisfied that the money is due, it can take action. If I may use an analogy drawn from civil proceedings, the position of the Government at this stage would be that of an executing Court. The amount due to the workman must have been determined previously. The only questions that Government could investigate at this stage would be questions arising from pleas like payment or satisfaction. Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C however refers to a stage anterior to that provided for in S. 33. C(1). Again, to borrow the analogy from civil proceedings, the stage referred to here is the stage of enquiry or trail at the end of which alone would it be possible to say whether any sum is due to a workman and if so how much. Under Sub-S. (2) when any workman claims that any money is due to him the value of which can be computed in terms of money then he can go to the Labour Court and apply that the amount be determined. After the Labour Court has ascertained the amount, the workman, armed with the order of the Labour Court, may go to the Government and ask the Government to recover the money through the Collector as if it were an arrear of land revenue. The distinction between the two Sub-Sections is to say the distinction between determination of the amount and the recovery of the amount is brought out by the concluding words of Sub-S. (2) which runs,

The amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S. (1).”

These words make it fairly plain that Sub-S. (2) provides for the determination of the amount and Sub-S. (1) for the collection of the amount. All that is excluded from the scope of Sub-S. (2) are benefits which are not capable of of being computed laterals in terms of money.

I have already said that S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is in substantially similar terms to Ss. 33-C(1) and 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question whether Sub S. 20 of that Act related only to benefits which are not monetary in character, or whether it comprehended monetary benefits also was considered by Rajagopalan, J. in Rajamani Transports Ltd. v. Collector of Tiruchirapalli . The Learned Judge observed:

“The further contention was that the statutory provision, (i.e, S. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, necessarily implied only evaluation of a benefit other than a pecuniary benefit to which a worker was entitled under the terms of the award. I am unable to accept such a restricted construction of the language of S. 20(2) The section speaks of “computation” and not merely of a commutation of a benefit, commutation might imply that it was a benefit other than a pecuniary benefit that was contemplated. The expression ‘benefit’ in S. 20(2) of the Act is, in my opinion, wide enough to include within its ambit any benefit which has accrued to the worker under the terms of a valid and enforceable award.”

With this conclusion I am in respectful agreement. I would at this stage refer to the decision of the Supeeme Court in Kasturi & Sons v. Salivateeswaran . That case arose under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. 1955. S. 17 of that Act is, to the extent now material, similar in terms to Sub-S. (1) of S. 33-C, and it provided,

“Where any money is due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions of this Act,… … … the newspaper employee may … … … make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the State Government or such authority as the State Government may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate. …..”

Dealing with that the Court observed,

“On the other hand, the case for the petitioner is that the section provides for a procedure to recover the amount due from an employer, not for the determination of the question as to what amount is due. The condition precedent for the application of S. 17 is a prior determination by a competent authority or the Court of the amount due to the employee from his employer. It is only if and after the amount due to the employee has been duly determined that the stage is reached of recovering that amount and it is at this stage that the employee is given the additional advantage provided by S. 17 without prejudice to any other mode of recovery available to him. According to this view, the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government has to hold a summary inquiry on a very narrow and limited point: Is the amount which was found due to the employee still due when the employee makes an application under S. 17, or, has any amount been paid, and, if yes, how much still remains to be paid? It is only a limited enquiry of this type which is contemplated by S. 17. Within the scope of the enquiry permitted by this section are not included the examination and decision of the merits of the claim made by the employee. When the section refers to the application made by the employee for the recovery of the money due to him, it really contemplates the stage of execution which follows the passing of the decree or the making of an award or order by an appropriate Court or authority. In our opinion the construction suggested by the petitioner should be accepted because we feel that this construction is more reasonable and more consistent with the scheme of the Act.”

Mr. Rajah Aiyar finally referred to Sub-S. (3) of S. 33-C which empowers the Labour Court, if it thinks fit, to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit claimed by an employee. This provision, said Mr. Rajah Aiyar, suggests that the scope of S. 33-C(2) is limited to non-monetary benefits. I am unable to agree. The existence of this provision only shows that under S. 33-C(2), the Labour Court may be called upon to investigate non-monetary benefits also. It does not suggest that only claims to monetary benefits cam be investigated under this subsection. As I said before, the line of division between S. 33-C(1) and S. 33(C)(2) would be analogous to that between execution proceedings and trial proceedings. Under S. 33-C(2) the amount due has to be determined and under S. 33-C(1) the amount so determined, may be recovered.

Mr. Rajah Aiyar also referred to the decision of Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. in C.B.R Ratnam and Co. v. Ekambaram (3). I do not think that this case helps the contention of Mr. Rajah Aiyar at all. There the learned Judge was dealing with S. 25-1 of the Act, which enabled money due from an employer to be recovered as an arrear of land revenue by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money.

That section has been repealed. The learned Judge then commented on the absence in the Act.

“Of any machinery for determining the questions which would obviously arise in cases of dispute: (i) was the workman who makes the claim ‘retrenched’ so as to give rise to the statutory liability (ii) the determination of the facts which underlie the computation of the amount of compensation under S. 25 F(b). There might be disputes between the employer and the workman as regards both these matters.”

This omission the legislature apparently sought to make good by introducing S. 33-C in 1956.

Mr. Rajah Aiyar next put forward an argument in the alternative. He pointed out that S. 33-C(2) begins

“Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit” etc.,

and he said that the use of the word “entitled” indicates that the Sub-Section relates to the stage when the title of the workman to receive the money has been already established. Where there is a controversy about the claim of the workman some competent authority must have decided that his claim is good. It is only thereafter that the Labour Court can proceed to determine how much the amount due is. This construction which Mr. Rajah Aiyar invited me to put on the section would produce some very surprising results. If a workman for instance were to claim retrenchment compensation and his claims were to be disputed then only two courses would be open to him to recover his money. He must persuade the other employees to take up his cause and raise an industrial dispute, and, after such a dispute is raised, the Government must be moved to refer the dispute to the appropriate Labour Court or Tribunal. Alternatively he must go to a regular Civil Court and file a suit. If an industrial dispute is raised and the matter is referred to the appropriate Labour Court or Tribunal, then, that Court or Tribunal could determine how much money is payable to the workman, and there would be no need to refer the issue back to the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2). Again, if the workman has got to go to a Civil Court that Court can also determine the amount of compensation due to the workman—assuming of course that he is entitled to compensation. The arguments of Mr. Rajah Aiyar would require that after having obtained a decision from the Civil Court to the effect that he is entitled to compensation the workman must go to the Labour Court and ask that Court to determine how much the amount is. Now, one purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to set up a special machinery which would expeditiously dispose of disputes between employers and employees and also the claims of workmen. It will be noticed that the numerous amendments made to the Act subsequent to 1947 have progressively increased the rights and facilities conferred on workmen. The arguments of Mr. Rajah Aiyar would, it seems to me, run counter to the whole scheme of the Act and the various amendments incorporated in it from time to time.

The next important contention of Mr. Rajah Aiyar was along these lines. S. 7 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to constitute one or more Labour Courts. Such Labour Courts have jurisdiction to adjudicats industrial disputes relating to mattere specified in the Second Schedule to the Act. Labour Courts can also perform such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Then there is S. 7-A which empowers the appropriatate Government to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals. These Tribunals would have jurisdiction to decide industrial disputes whether they relate to matters specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. The point is that if matter falls in the Third Schedule it is only the Industrial Tribunal that would have jurisdiction and not the Labour Court. If we turn to the Third Schedule we find there “retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment” enumerated as the tenth item. So questions of retrenchment are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals. The Labonr Court, which is the Court referred to in S. 33-C(2), has, therfore, no jurisdiction in the matter.

It appears to me that a fallacy is involved in this reasoning. The second and third schedules to the Act would become relevant and the jurisdiction connected with the matters enumerated in those schedules would spring into existence only when there is an industrial dispute. Where there is no industrial dispute at all, there is no scope for referring either to the second schedule or to the third schedule. That being so, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is ousted by reason of the fact that retrenchment of workmen is referred to as the tenth item in the third schedule. There is no industrial dispute in the present case. Every individual workman has made his own application, and there being no industrial dispute, the third schedule does not come into consideration at all.

Under S. 7 Labour courts are empowered to adjudicate on matters referred to in the second schedule should an industrial dispute arise in relation to any of those matters; in addition they are given power to perform “such other junctions as may be assigned to them under this Act.” Under S. 33-C(2) the Labour Court is expressly empowered to deal with claims of the kind that have been preferred before it. This objection also fails.

The labour Court therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the petitions filed by the workmen.

One thing, however, I must make clear. As I understand their case to be the position of the Government and of the Electricity Board at this stage is that they are not bound to pay to the workmen any sum in pursuance of their present claims and that even if it be found that the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. is bound to do so, they would not be liable to make good the amount of such payments to the company, On the other hand, the case of the company is merely that they are not bound to pay these amounts to the workmen, but that in case it is eventually held that they are bound to pay them by virtue of S. 6 of Madras Act XXIX of 1954, that liability would fasten on the Government. The disputes between the company and the Government inter se would not be within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. That controversy will have to be disposed of outside the Industrial Disputes Act.

In the result, these petitions are dismissed but without costs.

V.C.S