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Coimb Tore Municipality v. K.L. Narayanan
Factual and Procedural Background
The central question before the court was whether, when there is a delay beyond 60 days in preferring an application under S. 417(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code for granting special leave to appeal, the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act will apply. The opinion sets out Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and describes prior decisions bearing on the issue. The applicant in the present matter was the Municipality, which filed an application for excusing a delay of 31 days in filing the appeal and supported that application with an affidavit. After hearing learned counsel for both sides, the court found the affidavit showed sufficient reasons for excusing the delay, allowed the application and directed that the appeal be taken on file and disposed of according to law.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for special leave to appeal under S. 417(4) Cr.P.C where there is a delay beyond the 60-day period prescribed by that provision.
- Whether the Code of Criminal Procedure is a "special or local law" within the meaning of S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act (such that the special-law treatment in S. 29(2) would exclude the application of certain provisions of the Limitation Act).
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Visvanathan Chettiar1 | Held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications of this nature (special leave against acquittal) on the ground that where the schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period, S. 29(2) would not be applicable and S. 5 would be available. | The court stated it did not wish to express disagreement with this view and treated the decision as supporting the applicability of S. 5 in the present context. |
| Venkata v. Duvvuru 1957 A.I.R A.P 406 | Umamaheshwaram, J. held that the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general law relating to procedure and not a special law within the meaning of S. 29 Limitation Act; therefore S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for leave to appeal whether or not the schedule prescribes a period. The decision also relied on A.I.R 1952 Mad. 183 for permissibility of a beneficent construction of limitation rules. | The court relied on this decision as a stronger basis for applying S. 5 to special leave applications under S. 417(4) Cr.P.C and for permitting extension of the prescribed period in appropriate cases. |
| A.I.R 1952 Mad. 183 | Relied upon as authority that it is permissible to adopt a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible. | The court noted this authority was relied upon in Venkata v. Duvvuru and accepted the principle in support of applying S. 5 and construing limitation rules benevolently where appropriate. |
| in re Parchuri Adeseshamma3 | The Andhra Pradesh High Court Bench (Subba Rao, C.J. and Basi Reddy, J.) followed Venkata v. Duvvuru in holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a special law and that S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for special leave made after the period prescribed by S. 417(4) Cr.P.C; the High Court can, in an appropriate case, extend that period. | The court treated this decision as follow-on authority confirming that S. 5 applies and that the High Court may extend time in appropriate cases; it applied that principle in allowing the present application to excuse a 31-day delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court started from the textual issue whether S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to delayed applications under S. 417(4) Cr.P.C. It quoted S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act and reviewed earlier authorities. The court observed that Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. in In re Visvanathan Chettiar held S. 5 applies because where the Limitation Act's schedule does not prescribe a period there is no difference between the schedule and the special law, making S. 29(2) inapplicable and leaving S. 5 available.
The court then indicated it preferred to rest the applicability of S. 5 on the Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions. In Venkata v. Duvvuru, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held the Cr.P.C. is a general law of procedure and not a "special law" under S. 29, and therefore S. 5 (which applies to appeals) equally applies to applications for leave to appeal; that decision also endorsed adopting a beneficent construction of limitation rules where alternatives exist. The bench decision in in re Parchuri Adeseshamma followed Venkata and held that S. 5 applies and that the High Court can extend the prescribed period in appropriate cases.
Applying those principles to the present application, the court examined the affidavit filed by the applicant-Municipality, found that it showed sufficient reasons to excuse the 31-day delay, and concluded that there were no impediments to granting leave to appeal where the reasons for delay had merit.
Holding and Implications
Application for excusing the delay is allowed.
Direct effect on the parties: The court allowed the application to excuse a delay of 31 days and directed that the appeal be taken on file and disposed of according to law.
No broader implications are discussed in the opinion beyond the court's reliance on prior authorities to hold that S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications for special leave under S. 417(4) Cr.P.C and that time may be extended in an appropriate case.
The point that arises for determination is whether when there is a delay beyond 60 days in preferring under S. 417 (4) Cr.P.C an application for granting special leave to appeal, the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act will apply.
Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act runs as follows :
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
This question has been the subject matter of a decision in this court by Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. and in two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by Umamaheshwaram, J. and a Bench of that court composed of the learned Chief Justice and Basi Reddy, J. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. in In re Visvanathan Chettiar1 held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications of this nature on the ground that only where there is difference between the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and the period prescribed by the special law, S. 29 (2) would be applicable and S. 5 would not be available, and that in the case of special leave against acquittal the schedule to the Limitation Act not prescribing any period and thereby no difference between the period prescribed by the schedule and the period prescribed by the special law, S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would not be applicable. Therefore, he held that S. 5 can be applied.
I do not wish to express any disagreement with this view, but we are on stronger ground on the basis on which this application of S. 5 has been rested by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In Venkata v. Duvvuru 1957 A.I.R A.P 406, Umamaheshwaram, J. held that the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general law relating to procedure and not a special law within the meaning of S. 29 Limitation Act. As S. 5, Limitation Act applies to appeals, it equally applies to all applications for leave to appeal whether provided under schedule 1 of the Limitation Act or not. It is only in respect of applications other than applications for leave to appeal or for review of judgment that the terms of S. 5 should be specially made applicable. Hence the terms of S. 5 are applicable to applications for special leave to appeal under the new S. 417 (4) Cr.P.C It is permissible to adopt a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible. For this purpose A.I.R 1952 Mad. 183 was relied on.
This decision of Umamaheshwaram, J. has been followed by the Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court composed of Subba Rao, C.J and Basi Reddy, J. in in re Parchuri Adeseshamma3. The Bench also held that Page: HC44the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a special law but is a general law relating to procedure, and that therefore S. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an application for special leave made after the period prescribed by sub sec. 4 of S. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the High Court can, in an appropriate case, extend that period.
Therefore, there are no impediments in granting leave to appeal provided there are merits in regard to the reasons put forward for excusing the delay of 31 days in filing the appeal. I heard the learned Advocates on both sides and I find the affidavit filed by the applicant-Municipality in support of the application shows sufficient reasons for excusing the delay. The application for excusing the delay is allowed and this appeal is directed to be taken on file and disposed of according to law.
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