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Appai Goundan v. Perichi Gounder.
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (C.R.P. Nos. 204 & 670 of 1957)
Factual and Procedural Background
The summary concerns two civil revision petitions arising from proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Coimbatore.
In C.R.P. No. 204 of 1957 the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent the tenant. For the Fasli year 1954–1955 the tenant entered into a tenancy for agricultural purposes and paid Re. 500 in advance as rent. On termination of that lease year the tenant remained in occupation, did not deliver possession for 1955–1956, and did not pay rent for that year. Without paying rent for 1955–1956 the tenant constructed a salai on the leased land.
The landlord filed O.P. No. 41 of 1955 for eviction. That original petition was compromised by a joint memorandum (Ex. A.1) in terms that included: the tenant delivering possession on 15 July 1956 without raising crops and paying electricity charges; the landlord remitting the Rs. 500 lease amount for 1955–1956 upon delivery; payment to the tenant of Rs. 125 on 15 July 1956 for loss incurred; and permission for the tenant to remove the tiled roof of the salai. Clause 5 provided that if the tenant defaulted in delivering possession, he would not be entitled to the benefits; the landlord agreed that if he defaulted in paying Rs. 125 by the due date the tenant could re-enter.
The compromise was recorded and an order in terms of it was made by the RDO on 2 March 1956. Later, on 30 July 1956 the landlord petitioned the RDO alleging non-compliance and sought eviction; the RDO passed an ex parte order of eviction on 8 August 1956. The tenant then applied (filed 16 August 1956) to stay execution and to set aside the eviction order on the ground that the landlord had not fulfilled the conditions of the compromise. In consequence the RDO revoked his earlier eviction order and dismissed the landlord's original application for eviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction under Act XXV of 1955 and the rules framed thereunder (including Rule 8 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants' Protection Rules) to recall or set aside an ex parte order of eviction previously passed by him.
- In the related petition (C.R.P. No. 670 of 1957), whether the RDO's order directing the tenant to pay Rs. 500 for the year 1955–1956 should be sustained in light of the outcome of C.R.P. No. 204 of 1957.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (landlord) — as presented by Mr. K. S. Naidu
- The RDO, having passed an ex parte eviction order (dated 8 August 1956), had no jurisdiction to recall or set aside that order thereafter.
- The RDO's powers are defined by Act XXV of 1955 and rules framed thereunder; Rule 8 prescribes that proceedings are summary and governed "as far as possible" by specified provisions of the Civil Procedure Code limited to service, examination of parties and witnesses, and production of documents.
- There is no rule or provision that confers on the RDO a general power to set aside ex parte orders; because the RDO is not a Court of inherent jurisdiction, such recall power cannot be inferred.
- If the RDO could recall ex parte orders, it would allow such a process to be repeated indefinitely, contrary to legislative intent and the summary character of the RDO's jurisdiction.
Respondent's Arguments (tenant) — as summarized in the opinion
- The RDO's subsequent recall of the eviction order was a rectification of an original order that was, according to the respondent, passed without jurisdiction; therefore the RDO was competent to recall and set it aside.
- Implicitly, the respondent also relied on fact-based assertions that he had complied with the compromise terms (including vacating the land) and that the landlord had not fulfilled his agreed obligations (for example, payment of Rs. 125), supporting the request to set aside execution of the eviction order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thirumalai Naidu v. Challapathi Naidu (decision by Ramaswami Gounder, J.) | Held that the Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed by him under Act XXV of 1955. | The court endorsed and followed the reasoning in this decision, stating it entirely agreed with the judgment and relied on it to conclude that the RDO's order under revision could not be sustained and had to be set aside. |
| W.P. No. 560 of 1954 (Balakrishna Ayyar, J.) | Referred to in Thirumalai Naidu; considered analogous treatment of the RDO's powers / rules governing summary proceedings (as in Rule 8). | Referred to by the court (through the citation chain) as supporting authority; the court accepted that the reasoning in these earlier writ matters is applicable to the present statutory and rules framework. |
| W.P. No. 520 of 1954 (Rajagopala Aiyangar, J.) | Considered rules similar in effect and scope to Rule 8 and relevant to the question of the RDO's jurisdiction to recall ex parte orders. | The court referred to the decision as part of the matrix of authorities supporting the proposition that the RDO lacks power to set aside his ex parte orders. |
| Gopalaswami Pillai v. Kuppusami Chettiar (Short Notes) | Contains a ratio considered fully applicable to the facts regarding the limits of the RDO's powers under the Act and rules. | The court noted that the ratio decidendi of this decision seems fully applicable and relied on it in reaching the conclusion that the RDO's revocation of the eviction order could not be sustained. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning centered on the scope of the Revenue Divisional Officer's statutory powers under Act XXV of 1955 and the rules framed thereunder, particularly Rule 8 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants' Protection Rules.
- The court examined Rule 8, noting that proceedings before the RDO are summary and are to be governed "as far as possible" by certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code only in relation to (a) service of summons, (b) examination of parties and witnesses, and (c) production of documents. The court drew attention to the limited and specified nature of CPC applicability.
- From this statutory and rules-based framework the court derived that there is no express or implied grant of power to the RDO to set aside or recall ex parte orders he had himself passed. The absence of such a provision meant that the RDO, not being a court of inherent jurisdiction, could not be treated as having such remedial powers.
- The court rejected the respondent's contention that the RDO was merely rectifying an earlier order that had been passed without jurisdiction. The court explained that if an order were genuinely passed without jurisdiction, the proper remedy is revision to a superior court rather than unilateral recall by the RDO himself.
- The court observed a policy concern: permitting a summary officer to recall his ex parte orders at will would allow repetitive and potentially indefinite revisiting of decisions, undermining finality and exceeding the limited, summary jurisdiction that the Act and rules envisioned for the RDO.
- The court relied on precedents, especially Thirumalai Naidu v. Challapathi Naidu, and other writ decisions, finding them directly on point: those authorities held that the RDO lacks the jurisdiction to set aside ex parte orders made under the statutory scheme. Applying those precedents, the court concluded that the RDO's order revoking his earlier eviction order could not be sustained.
- With respect to C.R.P. No. 670 of 1957 (the related revision concerning an order directing payment of Rs. 500 to the landlord), the court held that the judgment just rendered in C.R.P. No. 204 — which restores the effectiveness of the eviction order — made the subsequent revision unnecessary. The tenant's factual contentions (payment of Rs. 200, construction costs to be adjusted) had been rejected by the RDO below, and in any event the larger procedural ruling rendered immediate appellate action on that point unnecessary.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- C.R.P. No. 204 of 1957: The petition by the landlord is ALLOWED. The court set aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer under revision (the RDO's revocation of his earlier ex parte eviction order) and held that the RDO's revocation could not be sustained under the statutory scheme.
- C.R.P. No. 670 of 1957: The civil revision petition is ALLOWED on the basis that the judgment in C.R.P. No. 204 makes further orders in this revision unnecessary; the parties are left to work out their remedies in regard to the claim for rent for subsequent years.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: In C.R.P. No. 204 the court's decision restores the legal effect of the RDO's earlier ex parte eviction order (that is, the RDO's later revocation is set aside). In C.R.P. No. 670 the tenant's revision is rendered unnecessary by the outcome of C.R.P. No. 204; both parties may pursue available remedies concerning rent for subsequent years.
- The court applied established precedent to construe the limits of the RDO's statutory and rules-based powers; the decision enforces the principle that the RDO is not vested with inherent jurisdiction to set aside ex parte orders in the absence of an express grant.
- No order as to costs was made in either petition.
Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been added or inferred.
C. R. P. No. 204 of 1957: This civil revision petition is against the order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore, in ?. ?. No. 7 of 1956 in ?. ?. No. 41 of 1955.
The petitioner is the landlord, and the respondent in this petition is the tenant. For the Fasli year 1954-1955 the respondent entered into a tenancy agreement in respect of the land belonging to the petitioner for agricultural purpose, agreeing to pay a sum of Re. 500 in advance by way of rent towards the tenancy. This amount was duly paid and on the termination of the year of the lease, the respondent did not deliver possession of the land to the petitioner but he continued to be in occupation. He did not pay any rent for this year, viz., 1955-1956. Without paying the rent for that fasli year he had also constructed a salai on the land leased to him by the petitioner. According to the original agreement under which the respondent held over the land in his occupation, the stipulated rent of Re. 500 was payable in advance. Since this rent was not paid in December, the petitioner filed ?. P. No. 41 of 1955 for eviction. This O. P. however was compromised by a joint memo filed by both the parties and marked as Ex. A. 1.
In that memo it was agreed that the respondent will deliver peaceful possession of the demised land on the 15th July 1956 without raising crops and pay his share of electricity charges. The petitioner agreed on delivery of possession of the demised land by the respondent to remit the lease amount of Rs. 500 for 1955-1956. The petitioner further agreed to pay the respondent a sum of Rs. 125 on 15th July 1956 for the loss incurred by the respondent in constructing the walls and flooring of the salai. There was also a further agreement by the petitioner that he should allow the respondent to remove the tiled roof of the salai constructed by the respondent without interfering with the walls. Clause 5 of the agreement was to the effect that in default of delivery of possession the respondent will not be entitled to any of the above mentioned benefits. On the part of the petitioner it was agreed further that if the petitioner committed default in paying the sum of Rs. 125 on or before 15th July 1956 the respondent will be at liberty to re-enter the demised land. This compromise was recorded and the O. P. was closed. According to the order under revision after the filing of this joint memo, an order was passed on 2nd March 1956 by the Revenue Divisional Officer in terms of the agreement.
Subsequent to this on 30th July 1956, the petitioner filed a petition before the learned Revenue Divisional Officer alleging that the conditions of the agreement were not acted upon by the respondents that delivery of possession was not given and so he asked for eviction. The Revenue Divisional Officer thereupon passed an order of eviction on 8th August 1956. The Order is said to be an ex part order paseed on the petition of the petitioner.
The respondent thereupon filed a petition requesting the learned Revenue Divisional Officer to stay the execution of that eviction order on the ground that the petitioner had not fulfilled the conditions and also that the order of eviction should be set aside. This application was filed on 16th August 1956. But no separate number appears to have been given to the application of the respondent wherein the order now under revision has been passed. The order under revision is to the effect that the petitioner did not pay the amount agreed to be paid by him before the first of Adi, that the respondent had done what he was called upon to do under the terms of the agreement, and that the allegation of the respondent that he had vacated the land was true and stood proved. In consequence the learned Revenue Divisional Officer revoked the order of eviction passed already in favour of the petitioner and withdrew the same, while dismissing the original application of the petitioner for evicttion.
Mr. K. S. Naidu appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends in the first place that even though the order dated 8th August, 1956, was an ex parte order passed against the respondent in his application, E. P. No. 7 of 1956, there was no jurisdiction for the Revenue Divisional Officer to recall that order and revoke the same and dismiss the ?. ?. when once he had passed the order of eviction. The Revenue Divisional Officer's powers are defined by the provisions of the Act, Act XXV of 1955, and also the rules framed thereurder. R. 8 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants' Protection Rules framed under the Act, provides that the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer shall be summary and shall be governed as far as possible by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code having regard to (a) the issue of service of summons, (b) and examination of parties and witnesses, and (c) the production of documents. There is no further power vested in the Revenue Divisional Officer under this rule to set aside any ex parte order passed by him. It is also clear that the rules of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to the proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer in extenso. Unless there is a special provision in the Act or under the rules vesting the Revenue Divisional Officer with such power as to set aside ex parte orders, it cannot be contended that the Revenue Divisional Officer has jurisdiction to set aside any ex parte orders, whether it be wrong or right, The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the effect of the order under revision in this civil revision petition is that the Revenue Divisional Officer having passed an order without jurisdiction originally, viz., in having ordered eviction of the respondent was only rectifying the situation by recalling the order and dismissing the petition. I do not think that this position is tenable. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had originally passed an order without jurisdiction, which however is not correct in the present context, the remedy open to the respondent was to seek revision of that order before the superior Court. The respondent not having taken any steps in that direction, it is not open to the respondent to contend now that the action of the Revenue Divisional Officer in having recalled the original otder of eviction, and dismissing it, is competent and is in the exercise of his jurisdiction. It has to be observed that the Revenue Divisional Officer is not a Court of any inherent jurisdiction in order to enable it to have power to set aside ex parte orders passed by it. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is to be upheld, if one order is passed without jurisdiction and if it is open to the Revenue Divisional Officer to have it recalled and set aside without of course having any jurisdiction to do so then such process can be repeated ad nauseum. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature, especially when power is given to the Revenue Divisional Officer to deal with matters only in a summary fashion and within the four corners of the Act and under the rules framed thereunder.
Mr. Naidu, appearing for the petitioner has invited my attention to a decision of Ramaswami Gounder J. in Thirumalai Naidu v. Challapathi Naidu(1). The learned Judge has held in very similar circumstances that the Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed by him under the provisions of Act XXV of 1955. I entirely agree with the reasonings found in this short judgment of the learned Judge. The learned Judge has also referred in his judgment to the judgments of two other learned Judges of this Court, namely, Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in W. P. No. 560 of 1954 and Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., in W.P No. 520 of 1954. The rules which had to be considered by Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., in W. P. No. 520 of 1954 seem to be more or less similar in effect and scope to the rule No. 8 framed under the provisions of Act XXV of 1955 and the ratio decidendi of the decision in Gopalaswami Pillai v. Kuppusami Chettiar, (Short Notes) seem to be fully applicable to the facts of the present case before me. I am, therefore, of the view on a consideration of the facts and the citations made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer under revision could not be sustained and it has to be set aside.
Learned Counsel for the respondent however urged that in view of the fact that the order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer under revision has the effect of setting aside a previous order passed by him, which was ex porte and which was passed in O. P. No. 41 of 1955 where the compromise entered into between the parties had been recorded, this Court would not be justified in setting aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer under revision. I do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. I have already dealt with this aspect in the earlier part of this judgment. When the compromise memo was entered into between the parties and was filed in Court, there was an order in terms of that compromise, and that order had to be given effect to and in seeking to give effect to that order at the instance of the petitioner, the learned Revenue Divisional Officer passed the order for eviction ex parte. It cannot be said that the Revenue Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to pass that order of eviction, even though it might be ex parte. I do not see any force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent to the contrary.
This petition is, therefore, allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.
C. R. P. No. 670 of 1957:—This petition arises out of an order passed by the same Revenue Divisional Officer in a subsequent application filed by the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 204 of 1957 against the same respondent. The tenant is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. This order under revision is one directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 500 to the respondent-landlord representing the lease amount for the year 1955-1956. The contentions of the tenant that he had paid a sum of Rs. 200 as advance, and had also erected a sale at a cost of Rs. 750 and that amount had to be adjusted towards the rent payable to the landlord were all rejected by the learned Revenue Divisional Officer Apart from this, the judgment I have just now pronounced in C. R. P. Na. 204 of 195 which has the effect of upholding the order of eviction makes the petition out of which the present civil revision petition arises quite unnecessary, and therefore, I do not think it is necesssry for me to pass any orders in this revision petition. This civil revision petition will be allowed and the parties will be entitled to work out their remedies in regard to the claim for rent for the subsequent years. There will be no order as to costs.
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