Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

A. St. Arunachalam P... v. Messrs. Southern Roa...

Madras High Court
Jul 17, 1957
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, proprietor of Sri Vinayagar Transports, held a permit to operate a bus on a specified route in Tiruchirapalli. On 19th July 1954, he applied to the Regional Transport Officer (RTO), Tiruchirapalli, for a variation of the route to provide direct transport facilities from Golden Rock to Tiruchirapalli Railway Junction. The RTO notified the application and called for representations. The respondent, Southern Roadways Ltd., along with three other transport operators, objected to the variation on public interest grounds. The RTO rejected the appellant's application by order dated 17th July 1955.

The appellant then filed a revision petition under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Government of Madras, seeking to set aside the RTO's order and grant the variation. The Government set aside the RTO's order and directed the grant of the variation by order dated 28th December 1955. The respondent challenged this Government order by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking certiorari to quash the Government's order. During the writ petition proceedings, a new plea was raised that the RTO and consequently the Government had no jurisdiction to grant the variation. The learned Judge, Rajagopalan J., held that the RTO had no jurisdiction and the Government likewise had no jurisdiction to grant the variation on revision, and set aside the Government's order. The appellant appealed against this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Regional Transport Officer had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appellant's application for variation of the bus route.
  2. Whether the Government, in exercise of revisional powers under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, could grant the variation when the subordinate authority (RTO) had no jurisdiction to entertain the original application.
  3. Whether the respondent, having participated in the proceedings before the RTO, could later challenge the jurisdiction of the RTO and seek writ relief on that ground.
  4. Whether the Government’s order granting variation in revision was valid or void for want of jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Officer by participating in the proceedings and therefore could not later challenge the RTO’s jurisdiction and seek certiorari on that ground.
  • The Government had valid revisional jurisdiction under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and could grant the variation even if the RTO lacked jurisdiction.
  • The learned Judge erred in allowing the respondent to raise a new plea of lack of jurisdiction which was not raised in the original affidavit in support of the writ petition.
  • The Government’s order was not without jurisdiction since Section 64-A empowers the Government to call for records and pass appropriate orders after examining them.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Pannalal Binirai v. Union of India to support the principle that acquiescence in jurisdiction disentitles a party from later challenging it.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The RTO had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for variation, as held in a Division Bench decision (W.A No. 107 of 1955) affirmed by a Full Bench.
  • Consequently, the Government had no jurisdiction to grant the variation in revision, because it could not grant what the subordinate authority had no power to grant.
  • The respondent was entitled to raise the new plea of lack of jurisdiction despite not raising it in the original affidavit, given the clarification of law by the Division Bench decision after the writ petition was filed.
  • If the original order was void for want of jurisdiction, the revisional order confirming or substituting that order would also be void.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pannalal Binirai v. Union of India Doctrine of acquiescence: a party submitting to jurisdiction cannot later challenge it. The court applied this principle but held it did not apply here because all parties, including the court, were ignorant of the true legal position regarding jurisdiction.
Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India Clarification on jurisdiction and acquiescence in transferred cases. Referenced in support of the principle that acquiescence disentitles relief.
O.A.O.K Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Corporation of Madras Support for the principle that submission to jurisdiction precludes later challenge. Referred to bolster the appellant's argument on acquiescence.
Madhava Rao v. Suryarao Consideration of whether acquiescence applies in cases of initial lack of jurisdiction. The court noted it was unnecessary to decide this point but acknowledged the principle.
Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board If original order is nullity, revisional authority cannot make a valid order substituting it. The court relied on this to hold that the Government's revisional order was void because the original order was without jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming the binding nature of the Division Bench and Full Bench decisions holding that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain applications for variation of routes. Since the RTO lacked jurisdiction, any order passed by it was void. The court analyzed the scope of Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which empowers the Government to call for records and pass orders after examining them, but only for the purpose of revising orders passed by subordinate authorities that had jurisdiction.

The court reasoned that the Government cannot exercise original jurisdiction under Section 64-A or treat a revision petition as an original application. Therefore, the Government could not validly grant the variation when the subordinate authority itself had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The Government's order was effectively an original order, which was beyond its jurisdiction and hence void.

The court also addressed the appellant's contention on acquiescence, clarifying that since the true legal position was unknown to all parties and the court at the time of the proceedings, the principle of acquiescence did not apply. The court found that the learned Judge properly exercised discretion in allowing the respondent to raise the new plea of lack of jurisdiction after the clarifying decision.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, affirming the decision of Rajagopalan J. that the Government's order granting variation of the bus route was void for want of jurisdiction.

This decision means that the variation sought by the appellant cannot be granted by the Government in revision when the subordinate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The proper course is to approach the competent statutory authority vested with jurisdiction. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing jurisdictional principles and the proper scope of Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT

(Delivered by the Chief Justice.)

This is an appeal againt the judgment of Rajagopalan J. in W.P No. 2 of 1956. The appellant is the proprietor of Sri Vinayagar Transports, Woriyur, Tiruchirapalli. He held a permit to ply his bus MSP. 1519 on the route Tiruchirapalli Mairguard Gate to Tiruchirapalli Railway Junction via Palakarai and Round Tana. On the 19th July 1954, he applied to the Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirapalli, for variation of the route so as to ply between Mainguard Gate and Golden Rock via. Falakkarai. Round Tana, Tiruchirapalli Railway Junction and retrace again to Round Tana and thence to Golden Rock. The variation was sought mainly on the ground that it would provide direct transport facilities from Golden Rock to Tiruchirapalli Railway Junction. The Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirapalli, notified this application for variation and called for representation, Messrs Southern Roadways Ltd., a limited company doing motor transport business on a large scale, the contesting respondent before us, objected to the variation on the ground that it was not in public interest. Three other transport operators also objected to the grant of the variation. The Regional Transport Officer, Tiruchirapalli, after hearing the applicant and the objectors, rejected the application of the appellant by his order dated 17th July 1955. It is not necessary to set out the reasons for his decision which are contained in the order. Against this order, the appellant presented a revision petition to the Government of Madras under S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, praying that the order of the Regional Transport Officer may be set aside and the variation granted. The respondent-company filed a statement before the Government maintaining the legality, regularity and justice of the order sought to be revised’ The Government, by their Order G.O No. 3702 (Home) dated 28th December 1955, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Officer and directed the grant of the variation sought by the appellant. Thereupon, the respondent filed in this Court a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution out of which this appeal arises, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the said order of the Government. This petition was filed on 2nd January 1956. It may be mentioned that the grounds on which the writ was sought, all related to the merits. The petition was opposed by the appellant.

When the petition came up for hearing before Rajagopalan J. learned Counsel for the respondent raised a new plea, viz., that Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to grant the variation asked for by the appellant and the Government had likewise no jurisdiction to grant, in revision, what the Regional Transport Officer himself could not have granted. This contention was put forward obviously because subsequent to the filing of the petition, a Division Bench of this Court held in W.A No. 107 of 1955 that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for variation of a route. The appellant's learned Counsel urged before. Rajagopalan J. that the respondent should not be permitted to put forward a new plea not disclosed in the affidavit. He also contended that as the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Officer, he should not be permitted at that stage, and in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Officer. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the respondent's failure to raise the plea of jurisdiction in the affidavit in support of the writ petition could be easily condoned because the legal position was cleared up only when the decision in W.A No. 107 of 1955 was rendered by the dicision Bench and till then everyone concerned proceeded on the assumption that the Regional Transport Officer had jurisdiction. He also considered that in the circumstances of the case the respondent could not be held to have disabled himself from seeking the discretionary relief of a writ of certiorari by his participation in the enquiry by the Regional Transport Officer without objecting to his jurisdiction. Following the decision in W.A No. 107 of 1955, the learned Judge held that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's application for variation, and that it followed that the Government had equally no jurisdiction to grant the variation on a revision petition filed against the order of the Regional Transport Officer. On this ground, he set aside the order of the Government dated 28th December 1955, without going into the other contentions put forward by the respondent because

“that might embarrass the competent statutory authority should an application be made to it hereafter for the variation.”

The appeal before us is against this order of Rajagopalan J.

At the outset it may be pointed out that though there was an attempt to question the correctness of the decision in W.A No. 107 of 1955, that attempt was abandoned at the hearing of this appeal, because that decision was affirmed by a Full Bench of this Court in W.A Nos. 56 and 57 of 1956 on 12th April 1957. Before us the argument proceeded on the footing that the Reginal Transport Officer, Tiruchirapalli, had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's application for variation.

Mr. G.R Jagadisa Aiyar, learned Counsel for the appellant, pressed upon us two main contentions. The first contention was that the respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Officer, and therefore, he could not at a later stage, obtain the discretionary writ of certiorari on the ground that there was lack of jurisdiction. In support of this contention, he relied on the following passage in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Binirai v. Union of India (1),

“There is moreover another feature which is common to both these groups and it is that none of the petitioners raised any objection to their oases being transferred in the manner stated above and in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases had been transferred. It was only after our decision in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India(2) was pronounced on 20th March 1956, that these petitioners woke up and asserted their alleged rights, the Amritsar group on 20th April 1956, and the Raichur group on 5th November 1956. If they acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their oases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would dissentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court—Vide Halsbury's laws of England, Vol. II., 3rd Edn. p. 140 para 265; Rex v. Tabram. ex parte Dash (3), O.A.O.K Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Corporation of Madras (4).”

He also referred us to two decisions of Subba Rao J. as he then was in W.P No. 806 of 1951 and Nannarglal Union Motor Services Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Malabar and others.

The above rule merely enunciates the principle which should be applied in exercising the discretion vested in the Court to grant or not an extraordinary remedy like the writ of certiorari. The rule is founded on the conduct of a party, which should be such as to disentitle him to the discretionary relief. The rule is really an instance of the doctrine of “acquiescence”. Now it is well-established that before a person aggrieved is refused a relief to which he would otherwise be entited on the ground of acquiescence in the wrong complained of, it is necessary to establish that he knew, or ought to have known, his right, which he is alleged to have omitted to assert. A person who has no knowledge of his right and is not guilty of culpable negligence in being ignorant, will not be denied a relief to which he is entitled on the ground that he omitted assert that right. In this case, as the learned Judge has pointed out,

“the ignorance of the true legal position was virtually shared by every one concerned, the operators, the statutory authorities and the Government themselves and even this Court,”

In such circumstances, it is not just to apply the rule of acquiescence.

In this view it is not necessary to decide if the rule will not apply to cases where there is an initial want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal, the act of which is complained against; Vide Madhava Rao v. Suryarao (5).

Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar for the appellant took objection to the permission granted by the learned Judge to the respondent to raise this new plea which was not raised in the original affidavit in support of the petition. Reliance was placed by him on certain obiter dicta in an unreported judgment of a Division Bench in W.A No. 97 of 1955. There the new plea was not raised before the learned Judge who dealt with the Writ Petition, but it was raised for the first time in appeal before the Division Bench, and the new plea was not allowed to be raised at that stage. Different considerations would apply at the stage of the first hearing of the petition. We think that the learned Judge exercised his discretion most properly in allowing the plea to be raised.

Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar's nest contention on behalf of the appellant was that even if the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellant's application for variation, the order of the Government which was sought to be quashed could not be said to be one passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because the Government had undoubtedly powers to pass the order in question under S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. S. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act runs thus:

“The Provincial Government may, of its own motion or on application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under this Chapter by any auhority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.”

It cannot be denied that the Government could suo motu or on application made to them, call for the records of any order passed by any authority, or officer, subordinate to them; and the Regional Transport Officer would be an officer subordinate to the Government. But that could be only for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality, regularity, or propriety of such order. And, after examining the records, the Government could pass such order in reference thereto as they thought fit. In the present case, the Government should have found that the order passed by the Regional Transport Officer was not legal because he had no jurisdiction to pass the order he did. Once the Government came to that conclusion, there was nothing further which they could do than to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Officer and refer the applicant to the proper authority. There is nothing in the Act, or in the Rules, which empowers the Government to deal originally with an application, for variation. They cannot therefore treat the revision petition of the appellant as an application made to them for variation and proceed to dispose of it in the first instance. The fact that the Government is the final revising authority, does not carry with it the implication that the Government has original jurisdiction to deal with applications which properly should be dealt with, in the first instance, by one or other of the several transport authorities. Of course if the subordinate authority or officer had jurisdiction to entertain an application and had passed an order thereon, it would be open to the Government to set aside that order and pass, instead, the proper order which that authority or officer should have passed.

The learned Advocate General who appeared for the respondent put forward his objection to Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar's contention from another aspect. If the original order of the Regional Transpart Officer was without jurisdiction and therefore void ab initio it followed that the order of the Government purporting to be in exercise of the revisional powers under S. 64-A of the Act, would be equally without jurisdiction. Put so broadly, the proposition may not be correct in its application to all orders of Government passed in revision. If a revision petition is filed to the Government against an order of a subordinate officer on the ground that that officer had no jurisdiction to pass the order, the Government can certainly pass a valid order under S. 64-A of the Act holding that the order of the subordinate officer is illegal end therefore should be set aside. In that case the argument that if the original order was without jurisdiction, the order of the Government passed in revision would equally be without jurisdiction will not hold good. If, however, the Government purport to pass an order confirming or modifying the order the Subordinate Officer, or if the Government pass an order in substitution of the order of the subordinate officer, on the ground that that was the proper order which be should have made, then the order of the Government would be void if the original order of the subordinate officer was void, It is sufficient to refer to the following observations of Denning, L.J, in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board .

“So far as the decision of the Appeal Tribunal is concerned, it seems to me that, once the port manager's order is found to be a nullity, it follows that the order of the Appeal Tribunal is also a nullity. The Appeal Tribunal has no original jurisdiction of its own; it cannot itself make a suspension order; it can only affirm or disaffirm a suspension order which has already been made. If none has been made because it is a nullity, the Tribunal can do nothing. It cannot make something out of nothing any more than anybody else can.”

In the case before us the Government, as the revising Tribunal, had no original jurisdiction of their own. They could not themselves make an order of variation.

Mr. Jagadisa Aiyar relied on an unreported decision of this Court in L.P.A No. 200 of 1952. But when the facts of that case are examined, it will be clear that there is nothing in that decision which would materially assist him. In that case on operator who had two stage carriage permits in respect of a particular routes applied to The Regional Transport Authority for extension of the route. The application for variation of the condition of the permit was referred to the Central Road Traffic Board which did not accept the request for extension. The Regional Transport Authority followed the procedure laid down in S. 57 of the Act treating the application as an original application for a permit. The Regional Transport Authority eventually rejected the application mainly on the ground that the Central Road Traffic Board had not approved the proposal. There was an appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board against this order of The Regional Transport Authority; but the Board dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. The applicant thereupon invoked the powers of the Government under S. 64-A of the Act. The Government passed an order directing the extension of the route. It was inter alia contended that the only body which had the authority to vary any of the conditions of a permit was the Central Road Traffic Board and that The Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for variation, and that therefore the Government had equally no jurisdiction under S. 64-A of the Act to pass the order sought to be quashed. The answer to this contention was two-fold: (i) that it could not be said That the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to deal with the application for variation of a condition as an application for the grant of a pucca permit; and (2) assuming the Central Road Traffic Board was the proper authority to deal with an application for variation of a condition, it had in effect refused to grant it and therefore the Government had power to interfere with the order passed by the Central Road Traffic Board under S. 64-A of the Act. It was observed in that case that

“the order of the Government can therefore be treated as an order passed in effect revising the order of the Central Road Traffic Board refusing to vary the condition of the permit under 8. 48-A.”

In that case either The Regional Transport Authority or The Central Road Traffic Board had authority to deal with an application for variation. One of the two authorities therefore had jurisdiction to deal with the application and the final order of the Government passed under S. 64-A could be treated as an order in substitution of the order of either of the two authorities which had jurisdiction. There is nothing like that in the case before us because the only authority which dealt with the appellant's application was The Regional Transport Officer who had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

We are clearly of opinion that the order of the Government purporting to grant the appellant's application for variation in supersession of the order of The Regional Transport Officer refusing it was void because the Government had no original jurisdiction to make such an order end they could not make any order in lieu of the order made by the Regional Transport Officer because that officer himself had no jurisdiction to deal with the application’ Rajagopalan, J., was therefore right in setting aside the order of the Government’ The appeal is dismissed; but having regard to the fact that this point was raised subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, we make no order as to costs.

V.C.S