- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Janaba Muhamad Hussain Nachiar Ammal v. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras.
Factual and Procedural Background
The assessee, the wife of A. Sheik Abdul Khadar and described as a "non-resident" for purposes of the Income-tax Act, received sums totalling Rs. 9,180 from her husband (who was at Bangkok) during the year of account ending 31 March 1942. The husband remitted these amounts to India by bank drafts obtained in the name of his agent (referred to in the opinion both as Rahya Maricair and Yahiya Maricair), who paid the amounts to the assessee. The assessee did not submit any return encompassing these items for the assessment year 1942-1943.
Proceedings under s. 34 of the Income-tax Act were initiated by issue of the prescribed notice dated 25 July 1949. On appeal from the assessment (confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner) the assessee advanced two contentions (set out below). The Tribunal negatived both contentions. Two questions were referred to this Court under s. 66(1) of the Act for decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proceedings under S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act initiated on 25 July 1949 to assess the amount of Rs. 9,180 (which escaped assessment during the year 1942-1943 by failure to submit a voluntary return) are valid in law?
- Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 9,180 received by the assessee from her husband through Mr. Yahiya Maricair is assessable to Income-tax under S. 4(2) of the Income-tax Act?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The initiation of proceedings on 25 July 1949 under s. 34 as amended by Act XLVIII of 1948 was invalid because the department's right to revise the assessment was governed by the old s. 34 (pre-amendment), under which the period of limitation for failure to file a return was four years; that four-year period expired on 31 March 1947, and the amended Act came into force only on 30 March 1948, so the extended eight-year period could not be invoked.
- The sum was not remitted directly by the non-resident husband to the wife but through an intermediary (the agent), and therefore such receipts could not be deemed to be income of the wife under s. 4(2) of the Act.
Department's / Commissioner's Arguments
- The amended s. 34 (Act XLVIII of 1948), which came into force on 30 March 1948 and extended the limitation period to eight years, should apply; thus notices issued within that extended period (e.g., 25 July 1949) were valid.
- Reliance was placed on the observations of Chakravarthi, C.J., in Income-tax Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd., to support the proposition that the amended s. 34 should be read into the Act from its coming-into-force date and applied according to its terms.
- S. 31 of Act XXV of 1953 was also referred to in support of the contention that the notice dated 25 July 1949 was valid (although the Court notes that s. 31 did not purport to enlarge or amend the scope of the amended s. 34).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Income-tax Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd. | Interpretation of the substitution of new s. 34 effective 30 March 1948: the new section is to be read into the Income-tax Act from that date; cases ending within eight years of that date fall within its purview if notices are given within the eight years. Also observations on when an amendment enlarging time will not revive a dead right. | The Court analysed the Calcutta Discount Co. decision: it found that (a) in that case there was no change in the rule of limitation (it remained eight years), and (b) many of the Chief Justice's observations were directed to that factual position. The Court treated the decision as informative of the general principles but not as deciding that an amendment which enlarges limitation always applies where the earlier limitation had already run out. The Court relied on the Calcutta Discount Co. reasoning to extract the settled principle that an amendment does not revive a previously barred right. |
| Gopeswar Pal v. Jibanchandra | Illustration that a rule of procedure can affect substantive rights (example cited by Chakravarthi, C.J.). | The Court noted the citation (as used by Chakravarthi, C.J.) to observe that procedural changes (such as limitations) can, in principle, affect substantive rights, and therefore required closer scrutiny of the amendment's effect on pre-existing rights. |
| Khandkar Mohammad Sahleh v. Chandrakumar Mukherji | Authority for the proposition that if time is enlarged by a new enactment but, at the date when the enactment comes into force, no proceeding can any longer be commenced under the previous law in a particular case, the new enactment will not apply to that case. | The Court invoked this authority (as cited in Calcutta Discount Co.) to support the established principle that a right already barred at the date of the amendment is not revived by the amendment. |
| Ramanathan Chettiar v. Kandappa Goundan | Principle that the law of limitation is procedural and applies retrospectively to causes of action arising before enactment, but that a right already barred under the earlier law is not revived by a later enactment. | The Court relied on this statement of principle to determine that, where the four-year limitation had already expired before the amended s. 34 came into force, the extended eight-year limitation could not be invoked to revive the department's right to reassess. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded step-by-step, adhering closely to the statutory text, the procedural history, and established principles of construction of limitation statutes:
- The Tribunal's factual finding that under the old (unamended) s. 34 the applicable period of limitation for a case of failure to submit a return was four years was accepted by this Court as correct. The Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that the old s. 34 already provided an eight-year period for such failures, explaining that the eight-year rule under the old s. 34 applied only to cases of concealment of particulars of income or deliberately furnishing inaccurate particulars, not to mere failure to file a return.
- The Court acknowledged that the amended s. 34 (by Act XLVIII of 1948), effective 30 March 1948, would, if applicable, provide an eight-year period for cases of failure to submit returns. The critical question, however, was whether the amended provision could be applied so as to revive or extend the department's right to open assessments where the prior (four-year) limitation had already expired before the amendment's effective date.
- The Court examined the decision in Income-tax Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd., noting that in that case there had been no change in the applicable limitation for that assessee (it was eight years both before and after amendment). The Court observed that several passages in that judgment were directed to that factual position and that some observations were obiter.
- The Court reiterated the well-settled principle (also stated in Ramanathan Chettiar and referenced authorities) that, although limitation is procedural and new limitation provisions can apply retrospectively to causes of action arising before their enactment, a right that has already become barred under the law in force at the date a later enactment comes into force is not revived by that later enactment.
- Applying that principle to the present facts: the department's right to reopen the assessment under the old s. 34 expired on 31 March 1947. Between that date and 30 March 1948 (the date the amended s. 34 was read into the Act), no valid proceedings could have been initiated under the old s. 34 in respect of the relevant assessment year. On these grounds the Court concluded that the amended eight-year limitation could not be applied to revive the department's right in respect of this assessee.
- The Court also considered the departmental reliance on s. 31 of Act XXV of 1953 and observed that s. 31 did not amend or enlarge the scope of the amended s. 34; accordingly s. 31 did not affect the core question whether the extended eight-year period under the amended s. 34 applied where the former four-year limit had already elapsed before 30 March 1948.
- As to the second referred question (assessability under s. 4(2)), the Court indicated that, should an answer be necessary, it would confirm the Tribunal's view: although the bank drafts were in the agent's name, the moneys were admittedly received by the assessee from her husband through the agent, and thus they constituted "remittances" from the husband within the meaning of s. 4(2).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court answered Question 1 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In other words, the proceedings under s. 34 initiated on 25 July 1949 were not valid in law insofar as they sought to reassess the sums of Rs. 9,180 which had escaped assessment for the year 1942-1943 due to the assessee's failure to submit a return, because the four-year limitation under the old s. 34 had already expired before the amended s. 34 came into force.
As to Question 2, the Court observed that, if an answer were necessary, it would confirm the Tribunal's conclusion that the sums received through the agent constituted "remittances" from the husband within s. 4(2) of the Income-tax Act and thus were assessable in the assessee's hands.
Direct consequences and costs: The notice dated 25 July 1949 was held invalid for the purpose of reopening the assessee's assessment under the circumstances described. The assessee succeeded on the first question and was awarded the costs of this reference; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 250.
Broader implications: The Court applied and reaffirmed the established principle that an amendment extending or enlarging a period of limitation does not revive a right which had already become barred under the earlier law at the time the amendment came into force. The opinion does not state that it establishes a novel precedent beyond applying this settled principle to the facts before it.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by Rajagopalan, J.)
The assessee, the wile of A. Sheik Abdul Khadar, a “non-resident” for the purposes of the Income-tax Act, received from her husband, who was at Bangkok, sums totalling Rs. 9180 during the year of account ending with 31th March 1942. These amounts were remitted by the husband to India by Bank drafts obtained in the name of his agent, Rahya Maricair, who paid the amounts to the assessee. The assessee did not submit any return of these items, which constituted “income” in her hands under S. 4(2) of the Act, in the assessment year 1942-1943. The proceedings under S. 34 of the Act were initiated with the issue of the prescribed notice on 25th July 1949. The Tribunal recorded that in her appeal against the assessment, which had been confirmed by the Assistant Commissioner, the assessee contended that
“(1) the initiation of proceedings on 25th July 1949 under S. 34 as amended by Act XLVIII of 1948 is invalid as the department's right to revise the assessment was governed by the old s. 34 where the period of limitation prescribed was only four years in the case of a failure to file a return, and this period having expired on 31st March 1947, that is, four years from the end of the year of default, and the Amended Act having come into force only from 30th Maroh 1948, the eight year period provided therein could not be invoked and (2) that the amount was not remitted directly by the non-resident husband to the wife but through an intermediary and therefore such income could not be deemed to be an income of the wife under the provisions of S. 4(2) of the Act.”
Both the contentions were negatived by the Tribunal.
The questions referred to this Court under S. 66(1) of the Act were:
1. Whether the proceedings under S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act initiated on 25th July 1949 to assess the amount of Rs. 9180 which escaped assessment during the year 1942-1943 by failure to submit a voluntary return are valid in law?
2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 9180 received by the assessee from her husband through Mr. Yahiya Maricair is assessable to Income-tax under S. 4(2) of the Act.
S. 34 was amended by Act XLVIII of 1948, and the amended S. 34 came into force on 30th March 1948. It was common ground, that the period of limitation would have been eight years for cases of failure to submit any return of income in the relevant assessment year had the amended S. 34 applied. The contention of the assessee was that the period was only four years under S. 34 as it stood before it was amended in 1948, and that that period of limitation expired on 31st March 1947. The further contention was that between 31st March 1947 and 30th March 1948 no action could have been taken against her under S. 34 as it stood during that period, and that the extended period of limitation could not therefore be applied to her case. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee, that the period of limitation was only four years under S. 34 as it stood before it was amended in 1948. That finding, in our opinion, was correct. We must reject the plea of the learned Counsel for the Commissioner, that even under the old S. 34 the period of limitation was 8 years for failure on the part of the assessee to submit a return. The failure to submit a return was neither concealment of particulars of income nor furnishing deliberately inaccurate particulars thereof within the meaning of the old unamended S. 34, to which two classes alone the eight years rule applied. The assessee's case fell into the other class for which the old S. 34 provided, “any other case”, to which the four year rule applied.
Even at the outset we must make it clear that we are concerned only with a case of liability to assessment under S. 34 of the Act of an assessee who had failed to submit the return in the relevant assessment year. The effect of S. 1(2) of the Amending Act XLVIII of 1948 was that the a trended S. 34 was deemed to have been part of the Act on 30th March 1948. The contention of the learned Counsel for the assessee was, that since one of the main amendments of S. 34 altered the rule of limitation from four years to eight years, the amended rule of limitation would not apply to a case, where even before 30th March 1948 the prescribed period of limitation of four years had run out by efflux of time. Mr. Rama Rao Sahib, the learned Counsel for the department, urged that the language of the amended S. 34 was clear enough, and that whatever might have been the period of limitation under the unamended S. 34, it was the new period of limitation under the amended S. 34, that would apply under the express language of the amended S. 34. Both the learned Counsel relied on the observations of Chakravarthi, C.J, in Income-tax Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd. (1).
In Income-tax Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd.. , the assessee was assessed to Income-tax for the assessment years 1942-1943, 1943-1944 and 1944-1945. under S. 23(3) of the Act, on returns furnished by the assessee. The amended S. 34 came into force on 30th March 1948. On 28th March 1951, notices were issued to the assessee under S. 34 of the Act on the ground, that the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that the income for each of the years had been under-assessed. One of the contentions of the assessee was that under the language of the amended S. 34 no proceedings at all could be taken for any of the assessment years prior to 30th March 1948. That contention was negatived by Chakravarthi, C.J, and Sarkar, J. At page 482, the learned Chief Justice observed:
“The plain effect of the substitution of the new S. 34 with effect from the 30th March 1948, is that from that date the Income-tax Act is to be read as including the new section as a part thereof, and if it is to be so read, the further effect of the express language of the section is that so far as cases coming within Cl. (a) of Sub-S. (1) are concerned, all assessment years ending within 8 years from the 30th March 1948, and from subsequent dates, are within its purview and it will apply to them, provided the notice contemplated is given within such 8 years. What is not within the purview of the section is an assessment year which ended before 8 years from the 30th March, 1948. All the three assessment years in question in the present case ended within 8 years from the 30th March 1948. .. ……”
It should however be noticed that even under the old S. 34, the 8 years rule of limitation would have applied to the assessee, the Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd., because it was a case of alleged concealment of income or deliberately furnishing inaccurate particulars of the income. That aspect of the case was stressed more than once in his judgment by Chakravarathi, C.J At page 490 the learned Chief Justice pointed out:
“Under the old section as well, the Income-tax Officer could proceed on his own view of a possibility that incomes have escaped assessment or might have been under-assessed although it was called “discovery”; and since the time-limits for so proceeding were the same, the new section affects no rights previously unaffected.”
It is against this background that we have to consider the scope of the observations of the learned Chief Justice on which the learned Counsel for the assessee relied. At pages 488-489, the learned Chief Justice observed:
“It seems to me, however, that to dispose of the question as to S. 34 affecting substantive rights merely by saying that the section is concerned with procedure, is to over simplify the problem. A rule of procedure can affect substantive rights as, for example, a rule of limitation which takes away a right of suit which was still available under the previous law or enlarges the time for bringing a suit which had become barred; Gopeswar Pal v. Jibanchandra , The subject-matter of S. 34 being essentially a rule of limitation, the matter requires a little more scrutiny.”
The learned Chief Justice continued:
“But since S. 34 had a predecessor which prescribed the same limits of time for initiation of proceedings, more or less in the same circumstances, it would prima facie appear that by the new section no pre-existing rights are adversely affected.”
As we have pointed out earlier, in the case of that assessee, the Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd., the amended S. 34 did not effect any change in the rule of limitation. That was obviously what the learned Chief Justice stressed again in the passage we have just quoted. At page 490, the learned Chief Justice observed:
“Nor is the enlargement of time for the completion of an assessment a violation of any right, for, if a man is liable to be proceeded against, he cannot say that he has right to be proceeded against within a certain time or not at all………Provided that the right or liability is not itself affected, the time for asserting the right or enforcing the liability may always be enlarged or abridged.”
The exception to that rule was what the learned Chief Justice pointed out in the succeeding passage:
“It is true that if time is enlarged by a new enactment, but at the date when the enactment comes into force, no proceeding can any longer be commenced in a particular case under the previous law; the new enactment will not apply to such a case; Khandkar Mohammad Sahleh v. Chandrakumar Mukherji (2),”
With reference to the Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd., the learned Chief Justice pointed out:
“But no such situation has been caused here. Time has not been enlarged at all. On the day the new section came into force and on any day thereafter, proceedings in respect of the same assessment years could be initiated under the old section, if it had remained in operation, as under the new section.”
It was the same principle the learned Chief Justice reiterated when he observed at page 492:
“The enlargement of the period within which the proceedings must be concluded does not also affect any substantative right for the same reasons as apply to enlargement or abridgment of the period for the initiation of proceedings, so long as the result is not to extinguish an existing right or revive a dead one.”
No doubt the observations of the learned Chief Justice on which the learned Counsel for the assessee relied
“It is true that if time is enlarged by a new enactment, but at the date when the enactment comes into force, no proceeding can any longer be commenced in a particular case under the previous law, the new enactment will not apply to such a case.”
constituted obiter. But it was a well settled principle of construction of statutory amendments altering periods of limitation that the learned Chief Justice referred to and it is that well settled principle of law we are called upon to apply to the case of the assessee in these proceedings. It was that same principle that was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Kandappa Goundan (3):
“It is well settled that the law of limitation being procedural law, its provisions operate retrospectively in the sense that they apply to causes of action which arose before their enactment. But it is equally well established that if a right to sue has become barred by the provisions of the Act then in force on the date of coming into force of a later enactment, then such a barred right is not revived by the application of the new enactment.”
It is on this basis that we have to decide the question, whether the amended S. 34, either by express terms or by necessary intendment, provided that, even in cases where the period of limitation in force before 30th March 1948 had expired, the effect of the amended S. 34 is to confer jurisdiction on the assessing authority to re-assess the income of a year which could not have been reassessed at any point of time anterior to 30th March 1948. It should be remembered that the amended S. 34 did not prescribe a period of limitation for the first time. It amended the existing law prescribing a period of limitation. Under such circumstances, what is the effect of the amendment is the question, and that question has to be decided on the basis of the well settled principle of law, that if the exercise of a right had become barred by the provisions of the Act then in force, such a right is not revived by the application of a new enactment. In the present case, the right to reopen the assessment in the case of the assessee under the old S. 34 expired on 31st March 1947. Between 31st Merch 1947 and 30th Match 1948, when the amended S. 34 came into force, the department could not have taken any valid proceedings to assess or re assess the assessee on the income she was deemed to have received during the year of account ending with 31st March 1942, with the corresponding assessment year ending with 31st March 1943.
We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Rama Rao Sahib, that the learned Chief Justice held in the Calcutta Discount Co., Ltd., case, that the amended S. 34 should be constred and applied, completely ignoring any amendment in the rule of limitation that would apply to a given case. Once again we should point out this factor the learned Chief Justice himself was fully alive to that in the case of the Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd., there was no change in the rule of limitation; it was 8 years under the old section and continued to be 8 years under the amended section.
In our opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the assessee is well founded that the new rule of limitation of eight years prescribed by the amended S’. 34 would not apply to the case of the assessee before us, whose was an instance of a failure to submit a return, when the period of limitation of four years had run out long before 30th March 1948, when the amended S. 34 came into force as part of the Income-tax Act with effect from that date, 30th March 1948.
The learned Counsel for the Department next referred to S. 31 of Act XXV of 1953 in support of his contention that the notice issued on 25th July 1949 was valid. The learned Counsel himself had to realise that S. 31 of the Act XXV of 1953 did not enlarge the scope of the amended S. 34; nor did it purport to amend it. The validity of the notice dated 25th July 1949 will still have to be decided with reference to the provisions of the amended S. 34. S. 31 of Act XXV of 1953 does not therefore affect the question at issue, whether the extended period of limitation of 8 years would apply to the assessee when the period of limitation applicable to the assessee had expired before the amended S. 34 came into force on 30th March 1948.
Our answer to the question 1 is in the negative and in favour of the assessee.
In view of our answer to question 1, it may not be necessary to record an answer to the second of the questions referred to this Court. Should, however, an answer be necessary, we would confirm the view taken by the Tribunal, that though the Bank drafts had been taken in the name of an agent, since the moneys were admittedly received by the assessee from her husband through the agent, Yahiya Maricair, they constituted “remittances” from the husband within the meaning of S. 4(2) of the Income-tax Act.
Since the assessee has succeeded on the first question she will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.
V.C.S
Alert