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Karuppanna Goundan v. Ponnuthayee Alias Subbammal And Others.

Madras High Court
Sep 13, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bench was referred a question concerning whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to extend time for an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside an execution sale where no allegation or proof of fraud is made or established against the auction-purchaser. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were that the decree-holder had committed fraud by keeping the judgment-debtors unaware of the sale in execution proceedings. The matter involves interpretation of the applicable provisions of Order 21 (notably Rules 80, 89, 90 and 92) and the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act in such applications. The appeal before the Court is a Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal, which the Court ultimately dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to extend time for an application to set aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, in a case where no allegation or proof of fraud is made or established against the auction-purchaser.
  2. Who are the necessary parties to an application under Order 21, Rule 90 (including applications made after the sale is confirmed), particularly whether the auction-purchaser must be made a party.
  3. Whether fraud in publishing or conducting the sale (committed by the decree-holder, auction-purchaser, or both) permits invocation of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to extend limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Argument advanced at the Bar

  • It was argued that the Proviso to Rule 92 does not make the auction-purchaser a necessary party to an application to set aside the sale; at most he is a proper party and it would suffice for notice to be served on him rather than his being formally impleaded.

Counter-argument / Submissions urged before the Court

  • It was urged (as a point of law) that where the alleged fraud was in conducting or publishing the sale and the auction-purchaser was not in the picture at that time, Section 18 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked unless the auction-purchaser himself was guilty of fraud.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Radhakishen Mahesri v. Tansukh Mahesri (1934) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 286 Holds that if the auction-purchaser is not impleaded at the time of the application, it is sufficient that notice be given to him before the sale is set aside. The Court relied on this decision to show that notice to the auction-purchaser before setting aside a sale is required and that the decision does not establish that the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party.
Dip Chand v. Sheo Prasad (1929) I.L.R. 51 All. 910 Indicates Order 21, Rule 89 does not require the applicant to nominate a specific opposite party; notice duty lies on the Court; formal naming of the auction-purchaser as defendant-like is not essential. Used to support the proposition that while the auction-purchaser need not be named in initial pleadings, the Court must give notice to persons affected and thus the auction-purchaser is to be regarded as a person affected.
Nitai Datta v. Bishun Lal Sao (1932) I.L.R. II Pat. 504 Held that it is not essential to make the auction-purchaser a party because Order 21, Rule 92 requires notice to all persons affected and the Court is incompetent to make any order until such notice is given. The Court cited this authority to explain that notice is mandatory before confirming or setting aside a sale and to discuss the status of the auction-purchaser as a person affected by the proceedings.
Jotindra Mohun Rai Chowdhury v. Brojendra Kumar Datta Munshi (1914) 24 I.C. 249 Referenced regarding the contention that Section 18 Limitation Act cannot be invoked unless fraud was by the auction-purchaser. The Court considered this line but rejected the restrictive reading, observing that Section 18 can apply where fraud is by the decree-holder even if the auction-purchaser was not responsible for the fraud.
Podila Venkanna v. Chinchindara Venkanna (1950) 1 M.L.J. 471 Reasoned that although the application to set aside sale is primarily against the decree-holder, persons affected include the auction-purchaser as well; supported invocation of Section 18 where fraud is proved against decree-holder or auction-purchaser or both. The Court expressed agreement with Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.'s view and relied on it to hold that Section 18 can be invoked when fraud is committed by the decree-holder even if the auction-purchaser was not guilty.
Gulam Kadir v. Municipal Council, Nagapattinam (1950) 1 M.L.J. 432 Discussed in relation to whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party. The Court observed that this decision did not take note of the necessity of the auction-purchaser being a necessary party and therefore did not displace the Court's conclusion on necessary parties.
Mahipathi Haldar v. Atul Krishna A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 212 Held that to set aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90 on ground of fraud in publishing/conducting sale, it is not necessary to prove that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud; fraud by decree-holder is sufficient. The Court endorsed this view as correctly stating that fraud of the decree-holder alone can invalidate a sale even if the auction-purchaser was unaware.
Mihirlal v. Panchakari Santra and Maji Bar Rahman v. Rahu Bux These authorities were noted as not having considered the question whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party. The Court distinguished these decisions on the ground that they did not address the necessity of impleading the auction-purchaser.
Pulla Reddi v. Pattabirami Reddi (1933) 65 M.L.J. 139 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 734 Authority indicating that fraud by the auction-purchaser invalidates the sale. Cited as an example of cases where auction-purchaser's fraud was held to invalidate a sale; used to show fraud by either necessary party suffices.
Pasumarthi Payidanna v. Ganti Lakshmi Narasamma (1914) 28 M.L.J. 525 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1076 Another authority showing that fraud of the auction-purchaser can invalidate sale. Cited to support the proposition that auction-purchaser's fraud is among circumstances that may vitiate a sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the problem in stages, focusing on (a) the nature of applications under Order 21, Rule 90/Rule 92, (b) who are necessary parties to such applications, and (c) the operation of Section 18 of the Limitation Act in cases of fraud.

First, the Court noted the finding by lower courts that the decree-holder had committed fraud by keeping judgment-debtors unaware of the execution sale. It observed that Order 21, Rule 90 permits setting aside a sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale, but that such irregularity or fraud must be antecedent to the sale.

Second, the Court examined the role and status of the auction-purchaser. It explained the legal effect of confirmation of sale: until thirty days pass and the sale is confirmed, the auction-purchaser's right is inchoate; confirmation crystallises title. The Proviso to sub-clause (2) of Rule 92 requires that no order setting aside the sale be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected. The Court considered the argument that the Proviso only makes the auction-purchaser a "proper" party (needing notice) rather than a "necessary" party, but concluded that the duty to give notice is occasioned before any order is passed and that the auction-purchaser must be heard before an order setting aside the sale is made. From this, the Court concluded that the auction-purchaser is a necessary party whose absence would invalidate an order made without hearing him.

Third, the Court analysed the effect of this conclusion on applications made after the sale is confirmed. It held there is no relevant difference between applications made before confirmation and those after; in either case the auction-purchaser is a necessary party. It reviewed learned commentary (Mulla) and the cited precedents to show that earlier cases which allowed notice in lieu of impleading did not lay down that the auction-purchaser is not necessary—they simply permitted notice to suffice if he had not been impleaded at the time of filing.

Fourth, the Court addressed the contention that Section 18 of the Limitation Act (which allows extension of time in cases of fraud) could not be invoked unless the auction-purchaser committed fraud. The Court rejected that restrictive proposition. It agreed with authority (Podila Venkanna and Mahipathi Haldar) that a judgment-debtor kept out of knowledge of the execution sale by fraud of the decree-holder can invoke Section 18 to extend limitation, even if the auction-purchaser was not guilty. The Court emphasised that fraud under Section 18 must be fraud of the person against whom the application is made, and where both decree-holder and auction-purchaser are necessary parties, the fraud of either is sufficient to have the sale set aside. The Court also reasoned that it is impossible for a sale to be confirmed as against one party and declared invalid as against another, so fraud by either necessary party supports relief.

Finally, the Court reviewed other authorities (including decisions where the question of necessity of the auction-purchaser was not considered) and concluded that the correct approach is to identify necessary parties to the application; if any one of them is guilty of fraud, Section 18 may be invoked.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision was to dismiss the Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal. The core conclusions are:

  • The auction-purchaser is a necessary party to any application to set aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90, whether the application is made before or after confirmation of the sale; notice and an opportunity to be heard are required before any order setting aside or confirming the sale is made.
  • Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to extend the period of limitation for an application under Order 21, Rule 90 where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser or both; it is not necessary that the auction-purchaser himself be guilty of the fraud if the decree-holder committed it.

Implications: The immediate effect of the judgment is that the Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal was dismissed with costs. The Court treated the auction-purchaser as a necessary party to applications under Order 21, Rule 90/Rule 92 and allowed invocation of Section 18 when fraud is established against any necessary party (decree-holder or auction-purchaser). The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel rule of law beyond these applications of existing principles; it relies upon and reconciles earlier authorities to reach its conclusions.

This summary is strictly confined to matters expressly stated in the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

1. The question referred to the Bench is as follows:

Whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to give an extension of time to an application to set aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, in a case in which no allegation or proof of fraud is made or established as against the auction-purchaser.

The finding concurrently arrived at by both the lower Courts is that the decree holder was guilty of fraud in that the judgment-debtors were kept out of knowledge about the sale in the execution proceedings by his act. Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, makes it clear that an application under that rule can be made to set aside a sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. It means that a material irregularity or fraud must be one antecedent to the sale. It is not likely in the majority of cases that the intending auction-purchaser would have played fraud in publishing or conducting the sale for at that stage he is nowhere in the picture and when the decree-holder himself becomes the purchaser and is guilty of fraud then the application would come within the purview of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and not under Order 21, Rule 90.

2. That being the case the question has to be viewed from the standpoint as to who are the necessary parties in an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, after the expiry of thirty days from the date of the sale after which in the absence of any application under Rule 80 or 90 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, or after an application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale whereupon the sale shall become absolute. Until the expiry of that period and the sale is confirmed in his favour, the auction-purchaser has not obtained any legal title to the properties sold and it is only an inchoate right which becomes fructified and crystallised when the sale becomes confirmed. Proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Rule 92, Order 21, lays down that no order setting aside the sale shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby. There was some argument at the Bar that this Proviso does not make it obligatory that the auction-purchaser is a necessary party to an application for setting aside a sale but is only a proper party and where it is intended to set aside the sale it would be sufficient if notice of the application is served on him on the footing that he is one of the persons affected by the application. In our view, the occasion for giving notice is before any order is passed on the petition. That is, it becomes necessary before an order setting aside the sale is made, that the auction-purchaser who is one of the persons affected thereby is heard. The state of things contemplated in Order 21, Rule 92, has reference to an application made within thirty days and this rule normally does not take into account an application after the sale has become absolute. If according to the Proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Rule 92, Order 21, it is necessary that the auction-purchaser is heard before an order setting aside the sale is made, he should be deemed to be a necessary party whose absence would invalidate any order passed without hearing him. If that is so, it is all the more necessary to hold that any application after the sale is confirmed for the invocation of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, must necessarily have as one of the parties the auction-purchaser whose rights by that time have become crystallsed and which would take effect from the date of the sale. Under these circumstances we do not find any difference as regards the necessity of the auction-purchaser being made a party to an application to set aside a sale between a case where an application is made before the sale is confirmed and the one where the application is made after the confirmation of the sale. At page 908 of Mulla's Civil Procedure Code (12th edition), the learned author in discussing the question of necessary parties observed a; follows:

Under the present Code the Proviso to Rule 92 would seem to imply that the auction-purchaser was a necessary party but it has been held that he need not be named as an opposite party in the applications and all that is necessary is that notice should be given to him before the sale is set aside under the Proviso to Section 92 which imposes a duty on the court to give him notice.

The learned author cites as authority for this proposition the decisions in Radhakishen Mahesri v. Tansukh Mahesri (1934) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 286, Dip Chand v. Shea Prasad (1929) I.L.R. 51 All. 910, 911 and Nitai Dutta v. Bishun Lal Sao (1932) I.L.R. II Pat. 504. All that the decision in Radhakishen Mahesri v. Tansukh Mahesri (1934) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 286, lays down is that if for any reason the auction-purchaser is not impleaded at the time an application for setting aside the sale is made, it would be sufficient if before the sale is set aside, notice is given to him because he would be one of the persons affected by that order. The question that came up for decision was whether an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, without the auction-purchaser being made a party to it was bad in form. Nowhere do the learned Judges lay down the proposition that the auction-purchaser is not a necessary party. To the same effect are the observations in the decision in Dip Chand v. Sheo Prasad (1929) I.L.R. 51 All. 910, 911 where it was held that Order 21, Rule 89 of the Civil Procedure Code does not require the applicant to nominate any person as the opposite party and it is not essential that there should be an application in writing in which the auction-purchaser must be shown as the opposite party, as a defendant is described in a plaint. Order 21, Rule 92(2) indicates that the duty of giving notice to all persons affected should rest on the Court or its officials, and there is nothing to indicate that the applicant for setting aside the sale should trace out who are the parties affected by his application and make them parties to it.

3. In Nitai Datta v. Bishun Lai Sao (1932) I.L.R. II Pat. 504 the learned Judges laid down the principle that it is not essential to make the auction-purchaser a party to an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure, because all that Order 21, Rule 92, provides is that no sale can be confirmed or set aside, unless notice of the application has been given to all the persons affected thereby and what the rule means is that the Court is incompetent to make any order at all till such notice is given.

4. They further lay down that although the law does require that the application under Order 21, Rule 90, should be made within thirty days of the sale, it does not impose any period of limitation for the issue of notice.

5. We do not propose to approve or question the correctness of the view that the auction-purchaser need not be added as a party within thirty days of the sale. But as he is one of the persons affected by the setting aside of the sale the Proviso enjoins the Court to issue notice to him. He is, therefore, a necessary party to the proceedings before the Court, whether added in the first instance or subsequently impleaded. If an order either confirming the sale or setting it aside cannot be made without notice being given to the auction-purchaser it automatically follows that he is a necessary party and we are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that in any application to set aside a sale either before its confirmation or afterwards, the auction-purchaser must be heard and as such he must be deemed to be a necessary party to the application.

6. But it is urged that as the fraud alleged is one in conducting or publishing the sale and as the auction-purchaser was not in the picture at that time as laid down in Jotindra Mohun Rai Chowdhury v. Brojendra Kumar Datta Munshi (1914) 24 I.C. 249, Section 18 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked unless fraud was on the part of the auction-purchaser. In our opinion that makes no difference. In Podila Venkanna v. Chinchindara Venkanna (1950) I M.L.J. 471 Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., was of the opinion that though the application to set aside the sale in execution of the decree is primarily an application against the decree-holder since he is the person at whose instance the sale proceedings were initiated and for whose benefit the sale is held, person affected by setting aside the sale is not only the decree-holder but the auction-purchaser as well. We agree with the learned Judge that a judgment-debtor who is kept out of the knowledge of the execution sale by fraud, can, in an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the sale, invoke the aid of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation, where fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser or both. As we stated already it will be in very rare cases that the auction-purchaser will find it possible to commit fraud in conducting or publishing a sale and the question, therefore, has to be viewed from the point of view of the parties to the application. It is no doubt true that fraud as contemplated under Section 18 of the Limitation Act must be a fraud of the person against whom the suit or application is made, and if in our opinion both the auction-purchaser and the decree-holder are necessary parties to the application for setting aside the sale, then the application is directed against both and that being the case, the fraud of one or the other would be sufficient to have the sale set aside. It is impossible to have the sale confirmed as against one party and declared invalid as against the other. The decision of Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in Gulam Kadir v. Municipal Council, Nagapattinam (1950) 1 M.L.J. 432, in our opinion, does not take note of the necessity of the auction-purchaser being a necessary party. We agree with the opinion expressed by Mukherjea, J., as he then was, in Mahipathi Haldar v. Atul Krishna A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 212, where the learned Judge held that for setting aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that there was fraud in publishing or conducting the sale it is not necessary to prove that the auction-purchaser was also guilty of fraud. Where fraud had been committed by the decree-holder in bringing the property of the judgment-debtor to sale, it would be sufficient to invalidate the sale even though the auction-purchaser was not aware of that. No doubt this decision has not found acceptance at the hands of benches of the same Court in the decision in Mihirlal v. Panchakari Santra and Maji Bar Rahman v. Rahu Bux . But in both those cases the question whether the auction-purchaser is a necessary party has not been considered. In our view the correct approach to the question is who are the necessary parties to the application and if any one of them is guilty of fraud, Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be invoked. That the fraud of the auction-purchaser invalidates the sale is also evident from a number of cases, notably, Pulla Reddi v. Pattabirami Reddi (1933) 65 M.L.J. 139 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 734 and Pasumarthi Payidanna v. Ganti Lakshmi Narasamma (1914) 28 M.L.J. 525 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 1076. We are inclined to agree with the view taken by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in Podila Venkanna v. Chinchindara Venkanna (1950) 1 M.L.J. 471. This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.