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Kuppanna Goundan v. Palaniammal

Madras High Court
Nov 11, 1954
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Delivered by Krishnaswami Nayudu J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant husband sued his wife for dissolution of marriage under S. 5(1)(c) of the Madras (Hindu Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, VI of 1949, on the ground that the wife had deserted him continuously for more than three years prior to the petition. The parties were married circa 1940 and had a daughter who was over nine years old when the petition was filed.

Disputes began after a family partition in 1943. The respondent (wife) left the petitioner’s house and lived with her father. She filed a suit for maintenance (O.S. No. 171 of 1943) which was compromised on 20 October 1943 with an agreement to return, but she apparently did not rejoin the husband. Lawyer's notices were sent in 1943 and 1944 demanding she return. The husband married a second wife in 1944.

The respondent then filed O.S. No. 433 of 1944 for maintenance for herself and her minor daughter; the trial Court held she was at fault in not rejoining the husband and dismissed her claim. That dismissal was confirmed on appeal (A.S. No. 191 of 1946) on 22 August 1946. During the pendency of the appeal the Hindu Married Women's Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, XIX of 1946 came into force (23 April 1946). In a second appeal (S.A. No. 556 of 1947) Raghava Rao J. held that the Act had retrospective effect and that the respondent was entitled to separate maintenance and residence; on remand maintenance of Rs. 10 was directed.

In the present petition for dissolution, the husband relied on the earlier finding that the wife was at fault and asserted desertion from mid-1943. The respondent denied desertion, contending she was driven out by the husband, that the husband had taken a second wife which justified her separation, and that by virtue of Act XIX of 1946 she was entitled to separate residence and maintenance. The Subordinate Judge accepted the respondent’s contention that the separation was authorized by the decree for separate maintenance and residence and refused dissolution. The husband appealed; the point before this Court was described as one of importance: the legal effect of a decree granting separate maintenance to a wife who had earlier been found to have deserted her husband.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of S. 5(1)(c) of Act VI of 1949 (divorce for desertion), a wife's prior desertion (a finding made by earlier courts) continues to operate as desertion where subsequently a Court has granted her separate residence and maintenance under Act XIX of 1946.
  2. Whether the decree/order granting separate residence and maintenance under Act XIX of 1946 terminates or neutralizes the earlier state of desertion (i.e., whether separate living under that order can be treated as "without just cause" for the purposes of desertion).
  3. Whether animus deserendi (the intention permanently to bring cohabitation to an end) continued in the respondent after the High Court judgment in S.A. No. 556 of 1947, and whether the petitioner established such continuing animus in the three years immediately preceding his petition.
  4. The appeal also engages the question (raised in prior proceedings) of the retrospective effect of Act XIX of 1946 in cases where the husband had remarried prior to the Act, though the Court in this opinion assumed the High Court's view on retrospectivity for the parties and did not finally decide the correctness of that interpretation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent was found at fault by the decision in O.S. No. 433 of 1944 for refusing to rejoin the petitioner and therefore deserted him from about mid-1943.
  • Because the respondent deserted him for a continuous period of more than three years immediately preceding the petition, he is entitled to dissolution of the marriage under S. 5(1)(c) of Act VI of 1949.
  • The husband asserted he was obliged to marry a second wife when the respondent refused to return.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent denied that she voluntarily left; she said the petitioner drove her out after ill-treatment and refused to take her back.
  • Under Act XIX of 1946 she is entitled to separate residence and maintenance; the husband taking a second wife furnished just cause for her to leave and therefore her living apart is not desertion in law.
  • Her separate living was validated by the judgment of the High Court (Raghava Rao J.) in S.A. No. 556 of 1947 which held she was entitled to separate residence and maintenance.

Table of Precedents, Authorities and Decisions Cited

Precedent / Authority Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rayden on Divorce (5th Edn.) Provides definitions and principles of "desertion" used in English law; supplies a list of ways desertion may be terminated and observes desertion is a continuing state. The Court relied on Rayden to adopt English principles (in the absence of Indian decisions) about factum of separation, animus deserendi, that desertion is continuing, and the recognized modes by which desertion may be terminated.
Williams v. Williams Authority from which Rayden derives part of the definition of desertion. Cited (via Rayden) as one of the authorities supporting the definition of desertion used by the Court.
Pratt v. Pratt Authority contributing to the definition of desertion in Rayden. Cited (via Rayden) as supporting the definition and principles concerning desertion.
Lately on Divorce (14th Edn.) States there is no single judicial definition of desertion applicable to every case; defines desertion as abandonment with intention to forsake without just cause. Used to underline that animus and context matter; court relied on this to explain that a de facto separation may not be desertion if animus is absent.
Frowd v. Frowd Defines desertion as "the cessation of cohabitation brought about by the fault or act of one of the parties." Adopted to emphasize the fault element in establishing desertion.
Indian Divorce Act, S. 3(9) Statutory definition: "desertion" implies an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it. Referred to as statutory support for the elements of desertion (factum of separation and lack of consent of deserted spouse).
Pardy v. Pardy (Sir Wilfrid Greene M.R.) Explains the two elements of desertion: factum of separation and animus deserendi. Quoted by the Court to focus analysis on whether the respondent retained the animus deserendi after the High Court judgment.
Raghava Rao J., S.A. No. 556 of 1947 (High Court decision) Held Act XIX of 1946 had retrospective effect and that the respondent was entitled to separate maintenance and residence despite the husband's second marriage having occurred prior to the Act. The Court treated this judgment as final and binding between the parties; it led to an order permitting the respondent to live separately and was central to the Court's conclusion that separate living was authorized and not necessarily desertion.
Sidda Setti v. Muniammal Referred to as expressing a contrary view (Krishnaswami Nayudu J. took a contrary view to Raghava Rao J. on retrospectivity). Not decided for purposes of this appeal; cited to note that one of the judges had in another matter taken a different view about the retrospectivity point, but the Court assumed the Raghava Rao J. decision to be final between the parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step-by-step as follows, applying legal principles expressly referenced in the opinion to the facts before it:

  1. The Court acknowledged the earlier finding in O.S. No. 433 of 1944 (confirmed on appeal) that the wife was at fault in not rejoining the husband in 1943 and accepted that this amounted to desertion at that time.
  2. The Court imported English principles (through the authorities cited, e.g., Rayden, Lately, Pardy v. Pardy, Frowd) to clarify the legal meaning of desertion: it requires both the factum of separation and animus deserendi (an intention permanently to end cohabitation). The Court noted desertion is a continuing state unless and until it is terminated in one of the recognized ways.
  3. The Court then confronted the intervening decree: in S.A. No. 556 of 1947 the High Court (Raghava Rao J.) held that Act XIX of 1946 had retrospective effect in the relevant context and awarded the respondent separate residence and maintenance. That judgment had become final for the parties.
  4. Because the High Court had granted the respondent a right to live apart under Act XIX of 1946, the Court reasoned that the respondent's separate living was under legal authority and could not be deemed to be "without just cause" merely because it followed an earlier finding of desertion. Thus the mere fact of separate living, when authorized by a Court order based on statutory rights, does not automatically sustain a later petition for dissolution founded on desertion.
  5. The Court observed that a husband who relies solely on the earlier act of desertion (1943) must also show the continuation of animus deserendi into the relevant 3-year period preceding his petition. Here, the petitioner did not demonstrate the respondent's continuing animus after the High Court judgment; the petitioner did not give the respondent notice or otherwise seek her return on terms that would have tested her state of mind post-judgment.
  6. The Court found the petition relied only on the previous proceedings and did not point to any post-High Court conduct showing the respondent's disinclination to resume cohabitation with the petitioner on terms that respected her statutory right to separate residence. Consequently, the Court held the separate living was not "without just cause."
  7. The Court also observed that allowing dissolution on the basis of prior desertion despite a subsequent court-validated right to separate residence would undermine the wife’s statutory rights and could enable husbands to evade maintenance obligations by seeking dissolution; courts must therefore apply the enactments cautiously to avoid unjust results.
  8. On the facts and in law, the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge and concluded that the petition could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision below. The opinion concludes that the petition for dissolution could not be sustained and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the husband's petition for dissolution under S. 5(1)(c) of Act VI of 1949 failed; the wife's right to separate residence and maintenance as adjudicated in S.A. No. 556 of 1947 stands, and the decree permitting her separate living prevents treating that separate living as desertion without further proof of continuing animus deserendi.
  • The Court emphasized that where a wife has acquired a judicially recognized right to separate residence and maintenance under Act XIX of 1946, that acquisition must be given due consideration before granting dissolution on the ground of desertion under Act VI of 1949; a mere historical finding of desertion, without proof of continued animus, is insufficient to obtain dissolution.
  • The Court cautioned that permitting dissolution in such circumstances could enable husbands to use Act VI of 1949 to evade obligations under Act XIX of 1946; hence both enactments should be applied carefully and with attention to the rights each confers.
  • The opinion did not purport to decide the larger question of the correctness of the High Court's interpretation of retrospective effect in S. 2(4) of Act XIX of 1946; for the parties to this case, the Court assumed the Raghava Rao J. decision was final and binding.
V.C.S
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(Delivered by Krishnaswami Nayudu. J).

This appeal arises out of a petition by a husband against his wife under S. 5(1)(c) of the Madras (Hindu Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, VI of 1949.

The husband is the appellant. He sued his wife, the respondent for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion. The parties were married in about 1940 and they had a daughter above 9 years old on the date of the petition. There was a partition in the family of the petitioner in 1943 and differences arose between the respondent's father and the petitioner over the allotment of properties to a deaf and dumb brother of the petitioner and the respondent left the house of the petitioner and lived with her father. The respondent filed a suit against the petitioner for maintenance in O.S No. 171 of 1943 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Erode. On the intervention of mediators, the suit was compromised on 20th October 1943 and the respondent agreed to go back to the petitioner and live with him. But apparently she did not join in pursuance of the compromise and the petitioner caused lawyer notice to be sent to her in 1943 and again in 1944 demanding her to come and join him. His case is that since she refused to join him he was obliged to marry a second wife. The second marriage took place in 1944. The respondent then filed another suit O.S No. 433 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Erode, for maintenance for herself and her minor daughter. She charged the petitioner of not providing any maintenance or taking her back to live with him but on the other hand married a second wife; and she therefore claimed entitled to separate maintenance. The trial Court held on the evidence that the respondent was at fault in not having joined the petitioner and rejected her claim for maintenance. She appealed against that decision and in A.S No. 191 of 1946 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Coimbatore, the dismissal of the suit was confirmed on 22nd August 1946. During the pendency of the appeal, the Hindu Married Women's Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, XIX of 1946 became law on 23rd April 1946. A further contention was then raised in appeal that by virtue of the second marriage the respondent would in any event be entitled to separate maintenance as the petitioner has taken a second wife. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that the Act was not retrospective and as the second marriage took place prior to that enactment, the respondent would not be entitled to any relief. As against that judgment, second appeal No. 556 of 1947 was filed in this Court and Raghava Rao, J. held that the Act had retrospective effect and that the respondent was entitled to separate maintenance and residence and remanded the suit for fixing the maintenance and accordingly on remand a sum of Rs. 10 for separate residence and maintenance was directed to be paid by the petitioner.

The petitioner in the present petition for dissolution of marriage relies on the finding in O.S No. 433 of 1944 that the respondent was at fault in not joining the petitioner and his case is therefore that she has deserted him ever since the middle of 1943 and for a continuous period of more than three years before the petition and he has become entitled to dissolution of marriage on that ground. The respondent in her counter statement denied that she went away to her parents' house but stated that on the contrary it was the petitioner who drove her out after ill-treatment, that he refused to take her to his house, that under Act XIX of 1946 she is entitled to separate residence, that the second marriage by the petitioner is just cause for her to leave the petitioner and that therefore it would not constitute desertion in law so as to entitle the petitioner to ask for dissolution. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the contention of the respondent that she was living separately as she is entitled to do so by virtue of the decree in O.S No. 433 of 1944 and her living separately from her husband could not be said to be without just cause and refused to grant the dissolution of marriage. The present appeal is against that order and it came up before our learned brother, Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. and this appeal is posted before us, as the learned Judge considered that the point that arises in this appeal is of some importance and there is no decision as to what exactly is the effect of the order or decree of Court granting separate maintenance to the wife who had already deserted the husband and in respect of which there has been a finding of two Courts.

The petitioner would be entitled to dissolution of marriage under S. 5(1)(c) if he shows that the respondent has without just cause, deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. “Desertion” has not been defined in the Act. In Rayden on Divorce, 5th Edn. at page 101. the learned author defines “divorce” as the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouses. He derives his definitions from the decisions in Williams v. Williams(1) and Pratt v. Pratt(2). In Lately on Divorce, 14th Edn., it is observed at page 104 that there is no judicial definition of desertion that can be applied to meet the facts of every case, but it is in essence the abandonment of one spouse by the other with the intention of forsaking him or her without just cause. The learned author also referred to the decision in Frowd v. Frowd(3), where desertion has been defined as “the cessation of cohabitation brought about by the fault or act of one of the parties.” In S. 3(9) of the Indian Divorce Act, “desertion” has been defined as implying an abandonment against the wish of the person charging it. As pointed out by Sir Wilfrid Greene M.R in Pardy v. Pardy(4), the two elements required to be present on the side of the deserting spouse to constitute desertion are the factum of separation and the animus deserendi or intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. There is therefore possibility of cases arising where there may be a de facto separation, but the animus in the deserting spouse to desert maybe absent in which case it cannot be held that the spouse who is charged with desertion can be considered to be guilty of desertion. In English law, desertion may be terminated in several ways. In Raydon on Divorce at page 115, it is provided that desertion may be terminated in the following ways:

“(1) the factum of return to cohabitation; (2) supervening insanity on the part of the deserting spouse rendering him or her incapable of continuing on animus destrtndi; (3) a supervening animus revettendi, coupled with a bona fide approach to the deserted spouse with a view to resumption of cohabitation; but not a mere animus revertendi unaccompanied by some notification to the deserted spouse; (4) a supervening consensus to live apart; for example, under a separation agreement bona fide made; (5) supervening conduct on the part of the deserted spouse which is an effective and reasonable cause in preventing the deserting spouse from returning to cohabition; (6) a supervening order of a Court of competent Jurisdiction precluding the deserting spouse from returning to cohabitation.”

It is also well established that desertion is a continuing offence and once the state of desertion has arisen it will continue until it is terminated, and a spouse who has been deserted is in the position that the presumption is in his or her favour and against the deserting spouse, and it is not incumbent on the deserted spouse to show that he or she was at all times during the three years immediately preceding the petition ready and willing to receive back the deserting spouse. This is the view of the learned author Rayden based on English decisions referred to at page 114.

Divorce being a new remedy granted to married people in India to get themselves separated and statutorily recognised under Act VI of 1949 in the absence of Indian decisions the principles of the law of divorce as understood in England may be applied; but their application must be consistent with Indian notions and ideas of the rights and duties of the spouses to one another and also the parties in this case being Hindus—the notion of a Hindu marriage being a sacrament and not a contract. There is no noubt in the present case a finding in O.S No. 433 of 1944 that the wife was at fault in not having joined the petitioner. It can therefore safely be taken that it is the wife that deserted the husband in this case and applying the English principles as to the continuance of a state of desertion unless terminated by conduct on the part of the wife and showing an animus revertendi the position would be that the respondent continued to be guilty of desertion ever since she left her husband's protection in 1943 and that state of desertion must therefore be deemed to have continued until the date of the presentation of the present petition for the dissolution of marriage by the husband.

But the question still remains whether in view of the passing of the Hindu Married Women's Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, XIX of 1946, and the recognition of the respondent's right by the judgment of the High Court of Raghava Rao J. in S.A No. 556 of 1947 to separate residence and maintenance it could still be said that the wife's living apart from the husband is not permitted by law and in the circumstances it could still be held that the state of desertion continued and not yet become terminated. In this case, Raghava Rao J. took the view that Act XIX of 1946 is retrospective in effect and that it was applicable to cases where the wife comes to Court for separate maintenance and residence whose husband had taken a second wife not after the Act but prior to the coming into force of that enactment. We are not expressing our opinion as to the correctness of that interpretation of the words “if he marries again” in S. 2(4) of Act XIX of 1946, since in any event sitting singly one of us—Krishnaswami Nayudu J. took a contrary view in Sidda Setti v. Muniammal. For the purpose of this case the correctness of that interpretation has to be assumed, since in so far as the parties to the suit are concerned the decision of Raghava Rao J. has become final. It must therefore be assumed that in the present case, by an order of Court the respondent has been permitted to live apart from her husband by virtue of the provision for separate residence. Her living separately from the husband, that is, the fact of separate living could not therefore be said to be without sufficient authority and by such separate living she could not be considered to have committed an act of desertion. She was therefore entitled to get separated from the husband, but yet if animus deserendi is still shown to continue to be present in the respondent, it will be open to the petitioner to contend that the state of desertion which commenced in 1943 continued to subsist during the three years prior to the presentation of the petition in which case the respondent could not contend that the continuation of that mental frame of the respondent's mind could be said to be for any just cause. Though there may be a presumption that the state of mind continues, there is nothing to show that she refused her consortium to her husband, if her husband was prepared to take her and provide her with a separate residence, where his second wife would not come and live with him. Without giving her an opportunity to express her state of mind after the judgment of the High Court in second appeal the petitioner rushed to Court with a petition for dissolution relying on her living separately as furnishing a cause of action for dissolution of marriage under S. 5(1)(c) of Act VI of 1949. Admittedly, the husband did not send any notice of demand asking her to live with him or permitting her his company without the company of the second wife. In the counter statement of the respondent, she denied that she refused to live with him. The cause of action is solely based on the previous proceedings between the parties and not on any conduct of the respondent after the judgment of the High Court in the second appeal, whereby she has shown any disinclination to have the company of the petitioner. The cause of action on which the dissolution is asked for is her staying away from the petitioner, which staying has now been shown to be fortified by an order of Court based on the rights which a wife has acquired under Act XIX of 1946 consequent on the husband taking a second wife. It must therefore be held that the separate living in the present case is not without just cause since it has not been shown that the animus deserendi continued. It also appears, to us that the petition is not a bona fide one and is filed only with a view to escape the liability of paying separate maintenance to the respondent ordered in the previous proceedings. To rely upon the act of desertion in 1943 and to hold that such state of desertion continued right upto the date of the filing of the present petition ignoring the intervening proceedings and the judgment of the High Court in second appeal and basing a decree for dissolution on desertion would amount virtually to negativing the right of the wife to the benefits of Act XIX of 1946. If the mere fact of separate living as a result of an order obtained by the wife for separate residence and maintenance under Act XIX of 1946 could be considered as a ground for dissolution, that may furnish an easy handle to husbands to resort to Act VI of 1949 and seek to get rid of the first wife. In granting dissolution of marriages under Act VI of 1949, the acquisition of right by the wife under the previous enactment, Act XIX of 1946, has to be given due consideration before a final order severing the marriage tie on the ground of desertion is passed by the Court. Both the enactments, Act XIX of 1946 and Act VI of 1949 have been introduced with a view to protect and enlarge the rights of married persons, and being enactments making inroads into the law of marriage as prevailing among the Hindus must be carefully and cautiously applied so that unreasonable and unjust results may not follow.

We agree with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the petition could not be sustained and dismiss the appeal with costs.

V.C.S