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Singaram v. State

Madras High Court
Jul 22, 1953
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Structured Summary of the Judgment (Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 27 June 1952 at Chandrasekarapuram village an ascetic known as Mouna Swami was last seen alive at about 9 p.m.; the next morning his body was found murdered in the matam and certain jewels that he had been wearing were missing. The post-mortem recorded a fatal incised wound across the neck and other injuries; death was practically instantaneous from the fatal wound.

The accused were tried in S.C. No. 62 of 1952 in the Sessions Court for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused under Section 460, I.P.C. and under Section 380, I.P.C.; he sentenced each accused to transportation for life under Section 460 and to seven years rigorous imprisonment under Section 380, to run concurrently. Because conviction under Section 460 resulted in acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34, the State preferred an appeal (C.A. No. 175 of 1953) challenging the acquittal for murder. Each accused also appealed against his convictions and sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sessions Court was correct in convicting the accused under Section 460, I.P.C. (lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night with death caused during the commission) instead of convicting them under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. (murder by persons acting in furtherance of a common intention).
  2. Whether the available evidence — including possession/recovery of the deceased's jewels, confessional material and eyewitness/circumstantial evidence of the accused being in the vicinity at the relevant time — legally supports a conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C.
  3. What legal weight should be given to recent and unexplained possession of property of a murdered person: whether mere possession without an acceptable explanation permits the inference that the possessor committed or took part in the murder (i.e., the proper scope of the presumption under Section 114, Evidence Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Case

  • The prosecution alleged that both accused conspired to break into the matam at night and rob the Swami, and that in the course of that joint enterprise the Swami was killed; accordingly they should be convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C.
  • Evidence relied upon included: discovery of jewels (M.Os. 1–6) following statements given by the accused; the second accused's confessional narrative given before the Sub‑Magistrate; eyewitness and circumstantial evidence that the accused were together near the scene at or about the relevant time; and other witness evidence linking the recovered property to the deceased.

Defence's Arguments

  • The first accused denied any involvement in the robbery or the murder.
  • The second accused accepted that he made the confession but contended before the Committing Court that the confession was not voluntary and was the result of police tutoring.
  • Implicitly, the defence also sought to challenge any inference that mere possession of the deceased's property establishes participation in the murder.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narayana v. King Emperor (1932, M.W.N. 801) Held that if a person is found in possession of property proved to have been in the possession of a murdered person and he points out where it is concealed and admits concealment and fails to give any acceptable explanation, an inference under Section 114, Evidence Act may be drawn that he committed or took part in the murder. The court discussed this authority but expressed that its observations go “a little too far”; it rejected the proposition that mere unexplained possession, without any connecting link in time or movement between accused and deceased, is sufficient to infer participation in murder.
Sogaimuthu Padayachi v. King Emperor (1927, 50 Mad. 274) Referenced as an earlier Madras decision (distinguished in Narayana). The judgment notes that Narayana referred to and distinguished this earlier case, but the present court did not extract a separate, distinct rule from Sogaimuthu for application in this case beyond recognising the divergence of views in the authorities.
Emperor v. Basangouda Yamanappa (Bombay High Court, 1941 I.L.R. Bom. 315) Held that circumstantial evidence must be consistent only with the guilt of the accused; if the evidence is consistent with any other rational explanation, there is reasonable doubt; criticised Narayana's statement that it is not the duty of the court to suggest possible explanations. The court aligned with the Bombay High Court's caution: it emphasised the need for a connecting link between the movements of the deceased and the accused at or about the time of death and rejected any automatic inference of murder from unexplained possession alone.
R.T. 113 of 1952 (Bench of this Court, reported discussion) Summarised the basic principle that possession of property obtained by robbery which belonged to a murdered person, without explanation, permits an inference that the possessor either took part in the murder or was privy to it; noted divergence as to whether the accused must supply explanation or the court must search for other rational explanations. The present court relied on the summary of principles but observed that the present case did not turn on the burden of explanation alone because in this case there was also evidence (P.W.11) connecting the accused to the vicinity of the murder at the relevant time.
Queen Empress v. Sami (1890, 13 Mad. 426) Noted authority that, where murder and robbery form part of one transaction, recent and unexplained possession of stolen property is presumptive evidence against a prisoner on both robbery and murder; but conviction in that case also rested on additional facts such as conduct showing consciousness of guilt. The court cited this case to show that possession can be evidence for both offences where coupled with other incriminating circumstances; it used the principle to explain why possession plus additional connecting evidence (as here) supports a murder inference.
Woolmington (House of Lords) (referenced) Stands for the basic criminal law principle that no onus of proof shifts to an accused such that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the accused bears no general burden to prove innocence. The court invoked this principle to reject any approach that would place an onus on the accused to explain possession in order to avoid a murder inference; instead the court required an independent connecting link between accused and deceased in time/place.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by (i) reviewing the facts, (ii) analysing the legal significance of convictions under Section 460 versus Section 302 read with Section 34, and (iii) considering judicial authority concerning the evidentiary value of unexplained possession of the deceased's property.

Key factual findings relied upon by the court included:

  • The deceased was alive and wearing identified jewellery at about 9 p.m. on 27 June 1952 and was found dead the next morning with the jewels missing.
  • Post-mortem established a fatal incised wound across the neck that would have caused practically instantaneous death.
  • Recovered jewellery (M.Os. 1–6) were connected to the Swami by witnesses and to the accused by recoveries following statements/confessions: M.Os.1–3 were recovered after statements by the second accused; M.Os.4–6 after statements by the first accused.
  • Eye‑witness/circumstantial evidence: P.W.11 saw the first and second accused together in the vicinity of the matam around midnight; P.W.12 testified to an earlier suggestion by the second accused that they should obtain the Swami's cash — all supporting a conspiracy to rob.
  • The second accused made a confession before the Sub‑Magistrate (Ex. P‑7) after the statutory warnings under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and Rule 85 of the Criminal Rules of Practice; the Sub‑Magistrate certified voluntariness. Portions of confessional and subsequent statements led to recoveries and described the raid and removal of the jewellery; the confession was, however, self-exculpatory as to the second accused's personal role in delivering the fatal cut while attributing that act to the first accused.

On the law, the court observed that Section 460, I.P.C. applies only where the persons committing lurking house-trespass by night or house-breaking by night did not have a common intention to commit any offence other than the trespass/breaking; if, however, they had a common intention (for example, to commit robbery) and in the course of that common enterprise death ensued, each may be guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34. Thus, the Sessions Judge's reliance on Section 460 was held to be irregular because the facts indicated a common intention to commit robbery and the killing occurred in the course of that common intention.

The court then addressed the contested evidentiary principle: whether unexplained or recent possession of the deceased's property alone supports an inference of murder under Section 114, Evidence Act. After reviewing competing authorities (including Narayana v. King Emperor and Emperor v. Basangouda Yamanappa), the court concluded:

  • Mere possession of articles belonging to a murdered person, without any connecting link between the movements of the deceased and the accused at or about the time of death, is not sufficient to infer that the possessor committed or was privy to the murder.
  • Although possession is an important circumstance, the presumption in the illustration to Section 114 Evidence Act cannot be extended to automatically infer participation in murder absent some additional connecting circumstance.
  • Usually, there must be evidence that the accused were with the deceased shortly before death or were found in the vicinity of the scene at a time proximate to the incident to justify the stronger inference of participation in the killing.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found the necessary connecting link present in this case: P.W.11's evidence placed both accused together near the matam at about midnight on the night of the murder; combined with the recoveries of the deceased's jewellery following the accused's statements and the other circumstantial material, the court found it permissible to draw the irresistible inference that both accused were guilty of murder.

Regarding the second accused's partially exculpatory confession, the court noted that although the confession did not in terms admit the second accused's participation in the killing, it did implicate the first accused. The court held that the confession could be relied upon against the first accused under Section 33, Evidence Act; but even without reliance on the confession, the court found there was ample circumstantial evidence to convict both accused of murder.

Consequently, the court held that the Sessions Judge erred in invoking Section 460 and that the proper conviction was under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's final orders were:

  • The acquittal of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. was set aside. The appellants were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C.
  • The conviction under Section 460, I.P.C. was set aside.
  • Sentence: Each appellant was sentenced to transportation for life for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. The previously imposed sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 380, I.P.C. was affirmed and ordered to run concurrently with the life sentence.

Implications:

  • The direct practical effect is that both accused were held guilty of murder (Section 302) with common intention (Section 34) and received life transportation; the Sessions Court's use of Section 460 was disapproved.
  • The court clarified its evidentiary approach to cases of recent or unexplained possession of property of a murdered person: while such possession is an important circumstance, it cannot alone (without any connecting link in time or proximity between accused and deceased) justify the inference of participation in murder. The court required an additional connecting circumstance — for example, evidence that the accused were with the deceased shortly before death or seen in the immediate vicinity at a time proximate to the killing — before drawing the stronger inference of murder.
  • The judgment applied established authorities and distinguished between approaches that would place an evidential onus on the accused to explain possession and the court's duty to look for other reasonable explanations; in this case, the court found the combination of possession, recoveries, confessional material (as applicable), and contemporaneous presence at the scene made the murder inference irresistible.
N.T.R
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JUDGMENT

(Govinda Menon, J.)

These three appeals arise out of S.C No. 62 of 1952 on the file of the Court of session of the West Tanjore Division wherein the accused were tried for an offence under S. 302 read with S. 34 I.P.C in that they committed murder by causing the death of one Mouna Swami by cutting him with an aruval on the night of the 27th June, 1952 at Chandrasekarapuram village. The learned Sessions Judge found that those arraigned for this offence were guilty under S. 460. I.P.C and sentenced each one of them to transportation for life. He also found each one of them guilty under S. 380, I.P.C and sentenced each one of them to rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. The result of convicting the accused under S. 460 I.P.C was the acquittal of the accused under S. 302 read with S. 34, I.P.C and therefore the State has preferred CA No. 175 of 1953 questioning the correctness of the acquittal of the accused for the offence of murder. Each of the accused has filed an appeal against his convictions and sentences.

In the village of Chandrasekarapuram, an ascetic known as Mouna Swami was residing in a matam adjoining a Subramanya Temple both of which had an adjacent tank and were situated on the eastern extremity of the village. Towards north runs a road from Valangiman to Papanasam and it is also seen from the plan Ex. P. 26 that there was a fencing on three sides of the compound wherein the matam and the temple were situated and on the fourth side, viz, the southern side, there was a wall about 5 feet in height. It is not necessary to relate in any detail the habits of this Swami for it is not disputed that on the night of the 27th of June 1952 this Swami, as usual, after taking his night refreshment which consisted of a glass of milk, went to sleep in the Matam which was a small building sorrounded on three sides by walls with an opening to the east closed by a thatti door. It is further in evidence that when he was last seen alive, i.e, at about 9 p.m on the night of occurrence, he was wearing kashayam robes and had a gold chain on his neck and some gold rings on his fingers. The next morning at about 6 a.m he was found murdered in the matam and the jewels on his person were missing. According to the postmortem certificate Ex. P-1, this Swami had died of shock and hemorrhage due to the injuries on his person of which the necessarily fatal injury was injury No. 5, viz, an incised gaping wound across the middle of the neck 3″ × 3″ Gutting the vessels and stomach underneath with a cut on the vertebra below to a depth of ¼ inch. There were also five other injuries but injury No. 5 being necessarily fatal, death would have been practically instantaneous. There is therefore no doubt whatever that somebody inflicted the wounds on this unfortunate hermit during the night in question and robbed him of the jewels on his person. According to the prosecution case, the two accused in the Court below were the murderers and thieves. A brief resume of the prosecution evidence can now be given P.W 1 who was employed as a gardner of the Subramanya Swami temple and who used to sweep and clean the matam as well deposed that on the 27th June, 1952 at about 6 p.m he left the matam and the temple after finishing his daily work and returned home. At that time Swami was alive and was at the matam. P.W 2 the Poojari attached to the Subramanya Swami temple employed by the Swami, was in the temple till 9 p.m on the 27th June and it was he who gave the Swami his milk food for the night. On the morning of the 28th, when both P.Ws 1 and 2 went to the matam and the temple at about 6 a.m they found the Swami murdered and the jewels on his person missing. The evidence of P.W 2 which could not be, and has not been, questioned, is that on the previous night, i.e at 9 p.m on 27-5-1952, the Swami was wearing the gold chain on his neck and rings on his fingers as it was customary for him to do. When P.W 1 and 2 saw the dead body inside the matam and the articles there thrown pell mell, information was given to P.W 4, the village headman under whose protection the Swami was and who used to supply the Swami with the necessary wherewithal as well as his food. This information was given to him by P.W 1 at the instance of P.W 2. Immediately P.W 4 informed his opposite house neighbour P.W 5, and both of them proceeded to the matam, found the Swami lying murdered in a pool of blood, and the vessels and other utensils lying scattered. The village headman prepared a yadast Ex. P-2 to the police and the Sub-Magistrate of Valangiman and sent them immediately. The Sub Inspector of Police, P.W 20 arrived on the scene at about 9-30 a.m and saw the corpse of the Swami lying on a quilt spread on two benches with injuries on his person. The articles were seen lyings cattered and the boxes were found open. After holding the inquest the dead body was sent for post mortem examination to the doctor. At the inquest the Sub-Inspector examined the gardner, the poojari, the village headman and his friend Doraiswami Ayyar. For sometime there was no clue whatever regarding crime. But strenuous investigation led the police to a clue which, when pursued further, unearthed the mystery. On 19-7-1952 the second accused was arrested in the village of Chandrasekarapuram. He made a statement which led to certain discoveries. The admissible portions of the statement are Ex. P-4, P-4 (a), P-4 (b). From the backyard of his house the second accused produced a tin box, M.O 8 which contained M. Os. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 which were respectively two gold rings and piece of gold chain The recovery of these articles, as a result of a confession made by the second accused is proved not only by the Sub-Inspector P.W 20, but also by the village headman P.W 4 and Doraiswami Ayyar P.W 5. In pursuance of the statement made by the second accused, the first accused was arrested on 20-7.1952 at about 12 noon in the village of Avoor. The first accused also made a statement which led to some discovery. This statement, as is the case with the other, is proved by the Sub Inspector and also by two respectable individuals of that village, P.Ws 7 and 8. The admissible portions of that statement are Ex. P-9 and P-9 (a), which are to the folloing effect:

“Ex. P-9: I have buried and placed the two rings and half the portion of the minor chain (kept in a small piece of cloth) north of Ammi (mortar)”

“Ex. P-9 (a): If (anybody) comes with me. I shall take out and produce the two rings and half the portion of the minor chain, which have been buried in my house.”

These are M. Os. 4, 5 and 6 which are respectively a piece of gold chain and two rings. M. Os. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are identified by P.W 2 as having belonged to the Swami and as in his possession on the night he was murdered. In addition we have the evidence of P.Ws 13 and 14, a wife and husband respectively, who deposed that they got made M. Os. 2, 3, 4, and 5 and presented them to the Swami. P.W 15. a clerk in Gopaldoss and Co., Kumbakonam, speaks to the fact of Pws. 13 and 14 having made the chain originally made up of M. Os. 3 and 4 and the 2 rings, M. Os 2 and 5. The 2 rings, M.Os 1 and 6 are proved to have been pledged with the Swami by P.W 16 who proves the same. Her husband P.W 17 corroborates her evidence. The second accused was then produced before the sub magistrate of Nidamagalam before whom he made he made the confessional statement Ex. P-7 which is proved by the Sub Magistrate himself as P.W 6. The confession was recorded after all the necessary warnings required under S. 164 Cr.P.C and Rule 85 of the Criminal Rules of Practice had been given and after all the formalities had been regularly, properly and consistently complied with. The Sub Magistrate deposes that he statisfied himself that the confession was volunary before the same was recorded. In this confession the second accused, after previous discussion and confabulations, decided to raid the Matam at night and rob the Swami of the materials. We do not think it necessary to extract the confession in extenso but shall only give an excerpt to show how the Swami came by his death.

“We drew out the hook and entered inside. Singaram told me to focus the light. Swamiar was sleeping soundly. Above his head the bunch of keys was hanging. Singaram took out the bunch of keys. Swamiar at once awoke. Soon after he woke up, he extended the aruval in front of his face.. He asked him, where have you placed all? Take out'. At once he gets alarmed and got up. At once Singaram delivered a forcible cut in his neck. I was focussing the light above hire. He fell out, receiving the single cut. He further dealt with five or six cuts. I got frightened and put out the light. He asked me to switch on the light. I switched on the light I said, ‘saying that we might rob the jewels and go away, you have brought me and alas! You have committed a murder like this’. He remarked, ‘do not make noise. Be quiet.’ At once he broke the box, opened the papers and scrutinised them. I was standing switching on the light. There was a trunk in the bureau. He asked me also to see it. I scrutinised all of the papers with one hand. There was a ring in a packet. It took it out and gave it to him. He took out Rs. 30 from a cover. We went near the Swamiar and saw. He lay in his lying posture. He cut the minor chain worn in the Swamiar's neck by means of the tip of the aruval. After taking it, he removed the three rings worn by the Swamiar in his hand. One ring could not be removed. He cut it a little and drew it. It came out. After taking them all he wiped the blood in the aruval in the cloth by the side of the head. At once we both came out. We went to the Kamakshiamman koil straight.”

This confession so far as the murder is concerned is exculpatory of the second accused, but it is clear that both of them had previously conspired to break open into the Swamiar's sanctuary and rob him of the jewels. The only other witnesses about whom reference has to be made are P.Ws 11 and 12. P.W 11 deposes that while he and the second accused were sleeping in the tea shop belonging to the second accused which was very near the Matam and the temple and adjoining the Papanasam Valangiman road the first accused came to the tea shop at about 12 midnight and he and the second accused were talking together in whispers. Thereafter the first accused who had brought some arrack poured it into two glasses and each one of them took one glass. Then they went out. The next morning P.W 11 learnt that the Mouna Swami had been murdered. The substance of this witness's deposition is that just before the murder, accused 1 and 2 met together in the tea shop of accused 2, had a drink and went out together. If this evidence has to be accepted, it shows that both the accused were seen together in the near vicinity of the Matam on the night when the Swamiar was attacked and killed. We have been shown no reason why the evidence of P.W 11 who from cross examination does not seem to be an interested person at all, should not be believed. P.W 12 speaks to the fact that the second accused told him ten days prior to the occurrence that they should get the cash from the Swamiar and for which purpose he invited the witness to join him. But the witness turned down the idea pointing out that he wanted to earn an honest living and not earn anything by robbery. By this evidence the prosecution attempts to prove that the two accused entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of breaking open into the house of the Swamiar and robbing him of the jewels and that in the course of that robbery, they conjointly committed the murder of the Swamiar.

In the Sessions Court the first accused completely denied having anything to do with the robbery or with the murder. The second accused, before the Committing Court, admitted having made the confession to the Sub Magistrate but stated that it was not a voluntary statement but was the result of tutoring by the police. As we have already stated, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty under S. 460 I.P.C and S. 380, I.P.C

In paragraphs 23 and 24 of his judgment, the learned sessions judge discusses the effect of the evidence to find out what the offence is. If we accept the evidence outlined above, in our opinion there can be no doubt whatever that both the accused are guilty of murder and that the lower court was not justified in convicting them of an offence under S. 460, I.P.C This section can be invoked only if, from the evidence, it is clearly possible to conclude that before the commission of the lurking house trespass by night, or house breaking by night, the offenders did not have a common intention of commiting anything other than the above mentioned offence and that thereafter, if during the course of the commission of such an offence one of the persons causes death or grievous hurt to any person, then only, every person jointly concerned in committing lurking house-trespass by night or house breaking by night shall be guilty of an offence under S. 460 I.P.C It seems to us that in the present case the invocation of S. 460 I.P.C is irregular. If on the other evidence we are satisfied that the accused are guilty of the acts alleged, then S. 460 I.P.C is out of place. Such being the case, it has to be seen whether the facts and circumstances are such as would impel us to draw the only conclusion that is possible, namely, that both the caused are guilty of an offence under S. 302 read with S. 34, I.P.C

The following facts cannot be disputed. At 9 P.M on 27—6—52 the deceased was alive and was possessed of M. Os. 1 to 6 of which M. Os 2 to 5 were on his person. The next morning he was found murdered having come by his death as a result of the injuries inflicted on him. The jewels on his person were missing. We accept the evidence of P.W 20 that on the information given by accused 2, accused 1 was traced and arrested. As a result of the statement Ex. P-4 series made by the second accused, M. Os. 1 to 3 were discovered. Further, as a result of statements made by the first accused, M. Os, 4, 5 and 6 were also discovered. Lastly the other important piece of evidence which cannot be discarded is that at or about the time when the murder took place, the two accused were seen together in the near vicinity of the scene of murder. From these circumstances, is it possible to hold that the accused are the murderers.

There has been a line of cases in this Court: of which the latest reported one is in Narayana v. King Emperor 1932. M.W.N 801 where a Bench consisting of Beasley C.J and Reilly J. came to the conclusion that if a person is found in possession of property proved to have been in the possession of the murdered person at the time of the murder, or if he is able to point out the place where such property is concealed and admits having concealed it and fails to give any explanation of the possession of the property, which can be reasonably accepted, then an inference can reasonable be drawn under S. 114 of the Evidence Act that such person committed the murder or took part in its commission. It was futher held that it is not the duty of the Judge or the Jury to find out whether there are reasonable explanations for the possession of the articles belonging to the deceased by the accused. The learned Judges referred to and distinguished an early case of this court in Sogaimuthu Padayachi v. King Emperor 1927 50 Mad. 274. The Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Basangouda Yamanappa 1941 I.L.R Bom. 315 considered the Madras decision and disagreed with the expression of opinion by Reilly J. that it is not the duty of the Court to suggest a possible explanation as to how the accused came by possession of the articles which belonged to the deceased and were in his possession at or about the time of death. Beaumont C.J laid down that the circumstantial evidence must be consistent and consistent only with the guilt of the accused and that if the evidence is consistent with any other rational explanation, then there is an element of doubt of which the accused is entitled to the benefit. The point on which therefore the two decisions differ is regarding the duty of the accused to suggest the explanation. This divergence of opinion was considered recently by a Bench of this court in R.T 113 of 1952 where Chandra Reddy, J. comes to the following conclusion:—

“It is seem from all the decisions that the basic principle is that if an accused person is found in the possession of articles which were obtained as a result of robbery and these articles belonged to a person who was murdered and are proved to have been on the body of the murdered person at the time of murder, and there is no explanation for the possession of those properties, an inference could be drawn that either he took part in the murder or he was privy to it. The only divergence of judicial opinion Is with regard to the question whether the explanation for possession should be given by the accused himself or whether it is the duty of the court to see if there can be other rational explanations for the possession consistent with the innocence of the accused as could be gathered from the evidence on record. However in this case the necessity to reconcile the various decisions does not arise. It is pertinent to note in this connection that no explanation is offered by any of the appellants for the possession of these jewels”.

With due deference to the eminent Judges who took part in Narayana v. King Emperor and Emperor v. Basangoude Yamanappa, it seems to us that mere possession by an accused person of articles which were on the person or custody of a murdered man without any explanation for such possession cannot lead to an inference that he took part in the murder or that he was privy to it. The presumptions mentioned in the illustration to S. 114 of the Evidence Act cannot be stretched to that extent. One can very well imagine a case where a jewel on the person of a murdered individual came to be in the possession of another without any kind of reasonable explanation being offered by that individual. The fact that no rational explanation is possible, or that the explanation offered is unacceptable, should not militate against the innocence of the individual with regard to the offence of murder. Something more is necessary than mere possession of articles. In the present case we have the evidence of P.W 11 which we accept in its entirety that the two accused were in the near vicinity of the Matam where the Swamiar was sleeping at or about the time when be came by his death and that is a circumstance which would ordinarily be sufficient to entitle the Court to presume that the accused were parties to the murder or were privies to it. Ordinarly the presumption from the possession of articles belonging to the deceased by accused persons immediately after the murder or robbery should be drawn only where some more evidence is present to show that the accused persons were seen with deceased immediately before his death or that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused persons. In Queen Empress v. Sami 1890 13 Mad. 426 at page 432 the learned Judges observe as follows:

“In cases in which murder and robbery have been shown to form parts of one transaction, it has been held that recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder. All the facts which tell against the appellant, especially his conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt, point equally to the conclusion that he was guilty as well of murder as of the robbery committed………”

In that case, the learned Judges, though they expressed themselves in rather wide terms in the passage above quoted, were of opinion that in addition to the circumstance regarding the unexplained possession of the stolen property there were other matters also which showed that accused was the murderer.

The decision in Narayana v. King Emperor seems to lay down that there is some kind of onus on the accused to prove how he came to be in possession of the articles. As laid down by the House of Lords in the Woolmington Case5 there can be no onus of proof cast on an accused person in cases of this nature and so it will be difficult to agree with certain observations contained in Narayana v. King Emperor. We are of opinion, as observed by the learned judges of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Basangounda Yamanappa that the observations in Narayana v. King Emperor go a little too far. We wish to point out that unless some kind of connecting link, however, remote it may be, is made out between the movements of the deceased and the accused, at or about the time of murder, even if no reasonable explanation can be suggested or invented by the Court for the possession by the accused of the stolen articles, it would be unsafe to convict the accused person of the offence of murder. Usually some testimony would be forthcoming that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused or that the accused were found somewhere in the vicinity of the scene of murder at a time which has sufficient proximity to the incident. Unless some such connection can be made out we feel that the inference of murder should not be drawn.

In the present case, as we have already stated, the evidence of P.W 11 is sufficient to show the connection mentioned by us above.

The second accused in his confession does not in so many terms implicate himself in the act of murder. But he definitely recites first accused's part in the murder. This confession can under S. 33 of the Evidence Act be taken into consideration against the first accused. Even without that confession in our opinion there is ample evidence in the case for the court to come to the irresistible conclusion that the two accused are the murderers; and the self-exculpatory statement by the second accused should not in any way detract from the other circumstantial evidence from which the conclusion could be drawn that the second accused is also one of the murderers. The learned Sessions Judge has laboured hard to apply S. 460, I.P.C which in our opinion cannot be invoked, for, both the accused can be held guilty under S. 302 read with S. 34 I.P.C Where one or more persons with only an intention to commit robbery or theft, after committing lurking house trespass or house breaking by night, inflict an injury on any body or put an end to the life of any person, it is only then that S. 460, I.P.C can be invoked. The necessary foundation for the application of S. 460, I.P.C is “the absence of any kind of common object or common intention between the delinquents. A person without a common object, or a common intention with another, can be held guilty under S. 460 I.P.C if the circumstances mentioned in that provision of law are complied with. In the present case we are definitely of opinion, in view of the evidence discussed by us above, that the inference is irresistible that both the accused are guilty of an offence under S. 302 read with S. 34, I.P.C Therefore the acquittal of the appellants under S. 302 read with S. 34, I.P.C is set aside and they are convicted under those sections. The conviction under S. 460 I.P.C is set aside. The appellants are each sentenced to transportation for life. The sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment imposed on each accused under S. 380 I.P.C will also stand. The sentences will run concurrently.

N.T.R