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Alphonso Pinto v. Thukru Hengsu And Another.
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a suit in ejectment initiated by the plaintiff-respondent against the tenant-appellant and his father, the first defendant. Initially, on 12th April 1933, a chalgeni chit lease was executed for a one-year period concerning the suit holding. Despite the lease term ending, the tenant continued possession without surrender. Subsequent renewals occurred in 1937 and 1942. On 6th November 1945, the landlord issued a registered notice to quit, which led to the filing of the ejectment suit on 17th April 1946. Both lower courts decreed in favor of the plaintiff. The present appeal challenges those decrees.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice to quit issued by the landlord was valid despite omitting reference to the lease renewals in 1937 and 1942.
- Whether the appellant tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements made on the leased property despite lease clauses denying such rights.
- Whether the terms of the original lease, particularly the covenant regarding improvements, apply to the tenancy created by holding over after the lease expiry.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The notice to quit was improper and invalid because it referenced only the original 1933 lease and omitted the two subsequent renewals.
- The appellant is entitled to compensation for improvements made on the property, arguing that after the expiration of the last lease in 1942, the tenancy by holding over should not include the restrictive clause on improvements.
- Relied on the precedent in K. Gnanadesikam Pillai v. Antony Benathuth Boopalarayar to argue that certain terms of the original lease should not carry over to the tenancy by holding over.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Gnanadesikam Pillai v. Antony Benathuth Boopalarayar | Determination that collateral securities do not carry over to tenancy by holding over; distinction between terms that apply and those that do not. | The court held this precedent did not directly apply; it distinguished the case by emphasizing that essential covenants such as those regarding rent and improvements do carry over to tenancy by holding over. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the validity of the notice to quit, determining that the omission of references to the lease renewals did not invalidate the notice as it contained the essential elements: a clear call to quit and a reasonable time period. Regarding compensation for improvements, the court emphasized the explicit lease clauses prohibiting tenants from claiming compensation for improvements and affirming landlord ownership of such improvements. The court rejected the appellant's argument that these clauses would not apply during tenancy by holding over, relying on established legal principles that the terms of the original lease extend to such tenancies unless expressly altered. The precedent cited by the appellant was found inapplicable as it dealt with collateral securities, not covenants like those concerning improvements. Additionally, the court noted that the landlord had supplied materials for repairs, offsetting any claim for compensation. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to compensation for improvements.
Holding and Implications
The second appeal is dismissed with costs.
The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the ejectment decrees in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, confirming the validity of the notice to quit and denying the appellant any compensation for improvements made. The court further allowed the appellant a two-month period to remove improvements without prejudice to possession. No new legal precedent was established by this ruling.
This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment. The tenant is the appellant. On 12th April, 1933, the appellant and his father, the 1st defendant, executed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent a chalgeni chit in respect of the suit holding. The period of the lease was one year, but after the efflux of the period, the tenant did not surrender possession but continued to be in occupation. There was a renewal of the lease in 1937 and again in 1942, Exs. A-14 and A-13. On 6th November, 1945, the landlord issued a registered notice calling upon the tenants to quit and deliver possession. The suit in ejectment was filed on 17th April, 1946. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit.
In second appeal, Mr. Krishna Rao learned Counsel for the appellant, urged two grounds. He first contended that there was no proper notice to quit. This contention is based entirely on the fact that in the notice to quit, Ex. B-1, there is a reference to the chalgeni chit dated 12th April, 1933, but there is no reference to the two renewals in 1937 and 1942. I do not think that the omission to mention the two later leases, in any way renders the notice to quit improper or invalid. The notice in question contains the essential features of such a notice, namely, that it calls upon the tenants to quit and deliver possession and it also prescribes a time within which the possession has to be surrendered. So long as there is no defects in respect of these particulars and the period of notice is reasonable, it cannot be said that the notice is invalid, because the particulars as regards the tenancy are not accurately set out. I agree with the Courts below that Ex. B-1 is a valid notice to quit.
Mr. Krishna Rao next contended that in any event the appellant is entitled to the value of the improvements effected by the defendants. Unfortunately for the appellant, there are two obstacles in his way. The first is the clause in each of the three leases specifically providing that the tenants had no right to make any kind of improvements, and even if they made any improvements, they had no right to any compensation. There is also an admission in each of the three leases that the entire improvements on the property and the material itself all belong to the landlord and not to the tenants. Mr. Krishna Rao tried to get out of the mischief of this clause by arguing that the last of the leases, namely, the lease of 1942, had expired after a period of one year, and thereafter the defendants must be deemed to have been only tenants holding over, and the term embodied in the clause above mentioned will not be one of the implied terms of the tenancy by holding over. I do not agree with this contention. It is well established that if there is no agreement fixing the terms of a new lease, the terms of the old lease must be deemed to be applicable. Where the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term, he holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to the new situation. The defendant must therefore be held to be subject to the covenant in respect of improvements contained in the original lease. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the ruling in K. Gnanadesikam Pillai v. Antony Benathuth Boopalarayar(1). That decision does not directly apply to the facts of this case. In that case, there was a collateral security for the payment of rent, and it was held that after the determination of the lease and there was a holding over, it is not possible to carry over the collateral security which was not part of the lease transaction so as to enable the plaintiff landlord to claim a charge for the arrears of rent for the whole of the subsequent period. In that decision, reference was made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in which it was held that a stipulation in the Original lease that at the expiration of the term the lessee should give up possession without notice, could not be imported into the new tenancy, created by holding over and the acceptance of rent. But it does not follow that other terms, such as the liability to pay rent, to repair, and stipulations as regards improvements will not be imported into the tenancy created by the holding over. Mulla in his Commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 3rd edition, at page 738 gives some of the terms which have been held to apply in the case of a tenancy by holding over; a covenant to pay rent in advance, to repair, a proviso for re-entry for non-payment of rent, a covenant as to the user of the premises. The clause in question in the three leases is a provision in the nature of a covenant as to the user of the premises. This must be held to be one of the terms of the tenancy by holding over. The defendants will not, therefore, be entitled to claim any compensation for improvements.
There is also another obstacle in the way of the appellant, and that is the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff herself supplied timber to the defendants to effect repairs to the house which was on the property and other expenses were adjusted towards arrears of rent. The fact therefore is, there is no liability to pay any compensation. On this ground also the defendants will not be entitled to claim anything in respect of the improvements effected by them.
In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Mr. Krishna Rao prayed that some time may be given to his client to remove the improvements made by him. In the circumstances, I think a period of two months would be reasonable. There will be a direction that the defendants will have this time to remove the improvements effected, without causing any prejudice to the holding.
V.C.S
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