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P. Mathurai Pillai v. State Of Madras
Factual and Procedural Background
These proceedings are writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by several motor transport operators in the State of Madras seeking writs of mandamus or other appropriate relief to restrain the State of Madras from enforcing provisions of the Madras Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 (Madras Act 16 of 1952) and the rules framed thereunder. A common question of law in all petitions is the legality and constitutional validity of the Act.
The petitioners operate motor transport services under permits and conditions prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the vehicles used for hire are already subject to a tax under the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Madras Act III of 1931). The impugned Act (Madras Act 16 of 1952) imposes a tax by section 3 on passengers, luggage and goods carried by stage carriages and on goods transported by public carrier vehicles (with specified rates), provides for composition (s.4), returns and assessment procedures (ss.5,7,8), penalties and recovery (ss.9,10), and rule-making power (s.16).
The petitions were heard and decided by Chief Justice Rajamannar (opinion authored by him). The court ultimately held the Act valid except for the first proviso to Section 3, which it struck down. The court directed the State to forbear from enforcing that proviso; otherwise the petitions were dismissed. There was no order as to costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Madras Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature because, in substance, it is a colourable attempt to tax the income of the operator (an entry in the Union List) rather than a tax on goods and passengers (entry 56 of the State List).
- Whether the Act, particularly the first proviso to Section 3, infringes the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on any trade or business (and whether that proviso also offends Article 14 by making an unreasonable classification).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (Mr. M.K. Nambiar) Arguments
- The Act is colourable legislation: though it purports to tax passengers and goods, in effect it taxes the operator's income derived from fares and freights, which falls under the Union List (taxes on income other than agricultural income).
- Item 56 of the State List (taxes on goods and passengers carried by road) cannot be relied upon to support a tax on the carrier/operator or on the operator's income.
- Comparison between the original Bill (which charged a surcharge on passengers and treated the operator as a mere collecting agent) and the enacted Act (which makes the operator the assessee and bearer of tax) shows that the Legislature's substance was to tax operators' income.
- The first proviso to Section 3 — which bars increasing fares above the Government-prescribed maximum even after imposing the new tax — prevents operators who already charged the maximum fare from passing the tax on to passengers and thus reduces their income; this makes the provision effectively a tax on income and also an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g).
- The proviso discriminates between operators charging the maximum fare at commencement of the Act and those not doing so, raising Article 14 concerns.
Respondent / State (Advocate-General) Arguments
- The Act is intra vires the State Legislature and falls within item 56 of the State List; the State List entry does not prescribe who must be the assessee, and it is permissible for the Legislature to make the operator the person liable to assess and pay the tax.
- The fact that the tax is measured by a proportion of fares and freights does not transform a tax on passengers/goods into a tax on income; the substance of the charging section (S.3) imposes the tax on passengers, luggage and goods.
- Although the Advocate-General acknowledged difficulty in defending the first proviso, he contended the Act as such is within legislative competence.
Additional Counsel Argument (Mr. Kumaramangalam)
- Contended that if the first proviso to Section 3 is invalid, the whole Act should be declared void — invoking the principle of severability and suggesting the Legislature might not have enacted the Act without the proviso.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gajapati Narayana Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375 | Definition and explanation of "colourable legislation" (legislation that, in substance, transgresses constitutional limits despite appearing to be within power). | Used to frame the enquiry into whether the Madras Act was a colourable attempt to tax income rather than passengers/goods; the court applied the test that substance, not form, determines competence. |
| Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, AIR 1939 PC 53 | What facts and circumstances may be considered in determining whether legislation is colourable; consideration of object/purpose and limits on using speeches. | Cited to justify excluding legislative speeches and to consider the effect and object of the statute; the court excluded individual speeches from evidence when deciding competence. |
| Rallaram v. Province of East Punjab, AIR 1949 FC 81 | Distinction between a tax on property (or other subject-matter) and a tax on income; identification of the subject matter by examining the charging section. | Applied to support the view that a tax measured by a value (or proportion of receipts) may still be a tax on the declared subject (here passengers/goods) rather than income; the court relied on this to conclude the Madras Act taxed passengers/goods. |
| In re a reference under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 1936 AC 352 (Lord Thankerton) | That the essential character of the tax is to be regarded, and machinery of assessment may be considered only insofar as it throws light on the general character. | Quoted to emphasize that the form of assessment (rate based on fares) does not change the essential character of the tax; used in distinguishing income tax from a property/subject-based tax. |
| Alberta Provincial Treasurer v. C.E. Kerr, 1933 AC 710 | Identification of the subject-matter of a tax is to be found in the charging section. | Cited to justify focusing on Section 3 (the charging section) to determine that the tax is on passengers and goods. |
| Attorney General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs for New South Wales, 5 CLR 818 | Illustration of distinctions between customs duties, property taxes and taxes on persons in respect of importation/movement of goods. | Invoked to elucidate how a tax described as on goods can be effectively a tax on persons in respect of a transaction; used as an explanatory principle but not determinative of invalidity here. |
| Atmaram v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Pat 359 | Decision upholding a Bihar statute similar to the Madras Act: a tax measured by fares/freights was held to be a tax on passengers and goods and within State competence. | Relied upon by the court as persuasive authority that a statute levying tax measured by fares can remain a tax on passengers/goods; court cited the Patna decision in support of its construction that the Madras Act taxes passengers/goods. |
| S. Ananthakrishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 395 | Authority for the proposition that taxing statutes are subject to Part III of the Constitution (fundamental rights) and Art. 13 principles. | Referenced to show that challenges based on fundamental rights may lie against taxation statutes; court considered Art. 19 challenges in that light. |
| Rajah of Bobbili v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 203 | Discusses the court's power to inquire whether legislative provision is so unjust and unreasonable as to destroy rights of property (drawing on analogous American cases). | Cited as precedent for examining whether the taxing provision unreasonably impairs the right to carry on business; used in the analysis of the proviso's effect on Article 19(1)(g) rights. |
| Smith v. Ames (1898), Northern Pacific Rly. Co. v. North Dakota (1915), Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States (1936) | United States Supreme Court decisions striking down railway rates that were unreasonable and made it practically impossible to operate profitably. | Discussed by counsel and the court by way of analogy when considering whether unreasonable regulation of fares/taxes can destroy the right to carry on business; used to inform the court's Art. 19 analysis. |
| A.R.V. Achar v. Madras State, AIR 1954 Mad 563 | Guidance on severability: whether the remainder of an Act can stand after striking down an offending provision. | Applied to decide that striking down the first proviso would not require invalidating the entire Madras Act; the court concluded the residue of the Act would stand. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis around two main questions: (1) whether the Act was within State legislative competence or was colourable taxation of income; and (2) whether the Act (in particular the first proviso to Section 3) infringed fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 14.
On the competence/colourable legislation issue the court applied established principles: substance, not form, governs (citing Gajapati Narayana Deo). It refused to rely on legislative speeches and confined itself to the statute's terms, its object as apparent from the enactment, and facts and effects that are judicially noticeable (citing Attorney General for Alberta). The court emphasized the primacy of the charging section (S.3) in identifying the subject-matter of the tax (citing Alberta Provincial Treasurer v. C.E. Kerr).
The court closely examined Section 3, which expressly levied tax "on all passengers, luggage and goods carried by stage carriages, and on all goods transported by public carrier vehicles." It concluded that this language is "unequivocal" and denotes a tax on passengers and goods. The court accepted the Advocate-General's point that an entry in the taxation lists does not have to specify the person who will be made the assessee; therefore, making the operator the person liable to account for and pay the tax does not by itself convert the tax into one on income.
The court considered and rejected the petitioners' contention that calculation of the tax as a proportion of fares/freights or making the operator the assessee converts the tax into an income tax. It relied on practical distinctions: an operator might make no profit in a year yet still be liable to pay the tax — behavior inconsistent with an income tax, which typically tracks net income. The court found Rallaram to be instructive: a tax based on a value or receipts can nevertheless in substance be a tax on the declared subject-matter and not on income.
The court addressed the significance of the original Bill (which treated the operator as a mere collecting agent) and the enacted text (which makes the operator the assessee). It noted the change but concluded that the substance of the Act, as written, still imposed a tax on passengers/goods; implicitly the operator would be expected to collect from passengers or consignors, and the wording of Section 3 (and its proviso) suggests the tax was intended to operate in that manner.
Turning to the challenge under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 14, the court accepted that the first proviso to Section 3 — which provides that the fare charged inclusive of the tax shall not exceed the maximum fare prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and in force at the commencement of the Act — posed a real problem. The proviso prevents operators who were already charging the Government-prescribed maximum fare at the commencement of the Act from increasing fares to pass on the tax; as a result, such operators must bear the tax out of their own pockets, which the court held diminishes the operators' income without justification and thus injuriously affects the right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g).
The court also found the proviso discriminatory between operators charging the maximum fare at the commencement of the Act and those who were not, and held there was no reasonable basis for that classification, thereby attracting Article 14 objection.
On severability, the court applied the test from its prior decision in A.R.V. Achar: one must ask whether the remainder of the statute can stand after deleting the offending provision. The court concluded the Act minus the first proviso to Section 3 would remain operative and valid.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the Madras Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 (Madras Act 16 of 1952) is constitutionally valid and within the legislative competence of the State of Madras except for the first proviso to Section 3, which the court declared invalid. The court directed the respondent (State of Madras) to forbear from enforcing that proviso. Otherwise the petitions were dismissed. There was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Operators who challenged the Act will not obtain a wholesale invalidation of the statute; they obtain narrowly tailored relief — the first proviso to Section 3 is struck down so that operators who were charging the maximum Government-prescribed fare at the commencement of the Act may no longer be prevented by that proviso from passing on the tax in the manner permitted by the remainder of the statute.
- Broader legal effect: The court applied established principles concerning colourable legislation, characterization by reference to the charging section, and severability. The decision upholds the Act's validity in substance as a tax on passengers and goods while policing a specific provision that infringed fundamental rights and equal protection. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond application of these principles to the facts; it resolves the matter by striking down the excessive proviso and leaving the rest of the Act intact.
Disposition: Petitions dismissed except that the State is directed to forbear from enforcing the first proviso to Section 3 of Madras Act 16 of 1952. No order as to costs.
Rajamannar, C.J:— These petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution pray for the issue of writs of mandamus or other appropriate writs, directions or orders directing the respondent, the State of Madras, to forbear from enforcing any of the provisions of the Madras Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952 (Act 16 of 1952) or the rules framed thereunder against the several petitioners. A common question of law arises in all these petitions concerning the legality and constitutional validity of the said Act (which will be hereafter referred to as the Act). The petitioners carry on the business of motor transport in different areas in the State. They are governed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
2. In respect of the motor vehicles employed in the business of the petitioners and which ply for hire they are subject to the tax levied under the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Madras Act III of 1931). The vehicles run under permits issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, subject to the conditions imposed under the licences and by the other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 43-1-(ii) empowers, the Government of the State to fix minimum or maximum fares or freights for stage carriages and public carriers to be applicable throughout the State or within any area or on any route within the State. It is common ground that the-Government of Madras have fixed the maximum fares in respect of the areas in which the several petitioners carry on the business of motor transport. The rates vary between urban areas and rural areas, between ghat roads and roads on the plains. We are not concerned however with these fares in these petitions. The material provisions of the impugned: Act (Madras Act 16 of 1952) are as follows: Section 3 which is the charging section runs thus:
“‘Levy of tax on passengers and goods — From, and after the commencement of this Act, there shall be levied and paid to the Government, a tax on all passengers, luggage and goods carried by stage carriages, and on all goods transported by public carrier vehicles, at the rate of nine pies in the rupee on the fares and freights payable to the operators of such stage carriages and at the rate of six pies in the rupee on the freights payable to the operators of such public carrier vehicles;
Provided that the fare charged by an operator inclusive of the tax leviable under this section shall not exceed the maximum fare prescribed by the Government under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and in force at the commencement of this Act;
Provided further that no tax shall be levied on any passenger, luggage or goods carried in a stage carriage, the total permitted daily mileage of which does not exceed fifty miles.”
3. Section 4 provides for composition of the tax on application by the operator. Section 5 makes it incumbent on the operator to submit returns in the prescribed form, and S. 7 prescribes the procedure to be followed where no returns have been submitted, or the returns submitted are found to be incorrect or incomplete. Section 8 deals with fares and freights which have escaped assessment. Section 9 prescribes the penalties for non-payment of tax, and S. 10 lays down the mode of recovery of the tax. Section 16 confers, power on the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and, in particular, to provide for the matters specified in cls. (a) to (g) of sub-sec. (2) of the section. The other provisions of the Act are not material.
4. The two main grounds on which the validity of the Act is assailed are (1) that it is beyond the legislative competence of the Madras, State Legislature and (2) that it infringes the fundamental rights conferred on every citizens under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
5. Mr. M.K Nambiar who addressed to us the leading arguments developed the first ground by characterising the impugned Act as a colourable piece of legislation in the sense that by the. Act the State Legislature was really taxing the income of the operator under the guise of taxing goods and passengers. Taxes on income other than agricultural income fall in the Union List (item 82). In the State List item 56 is “Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways”. Learned counsel also drew our attention to item 89 of the Union list, namely,
“Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights”
and pointed out that there was no entry corresponding to the latter part of item 89 of the Union list in item 56 in the State List. He also (referred us to items 57 and 58 which includes taxes on vehicles suitable for use on roads and taxes on animals and boats respectively. The contention of Mr. Nambiar was that though the Act ostensibly purports to provide for the levy of a tax on passengers and goods carried in stage carriages and public carrier vehicles in the State of Madras as declared in the preamble yet, in effect the Act proceeds to tax the income of the operator and is thus colourable. What is colourable legislation has been recently explained by the Supreme Court in — ‘Gajapati Narayana Deo v. State of Orissa’, AIR 1953 SC 375 (A) as follows:
“If the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in respect to the subject-matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression “colourable legislation” has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed these powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise.”
6. To ascertain whether a particular enactment is a colourable legislation or not, it is the substance of the Act that is material and not merely its form or language. The substantial question is, does the subject-matter of the Act fall within the powers of the legislature which enacted it? What, facts and circumstances can be taken into account and what cannot be in arriving at a conclusion in this matter are discussed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in — ‘Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada’, AIR 1939 PC 53 (B). One of such facts would be the effect of the legislation as to which the Court might take into account and any public general knowledge of which the Court would take judicial notice. The object or purpose of the Act in question should also be considered. One other important principle laid down by the Lord Chancellor in that decision is thus expressed:
“It must be remembered that the object or purpose of the Act, in so far as it does not plainly appear from its terms and its probable effect, is that of an incorporal entity, namely, the legislature, and, generally speaking, the speeches of individuals would have little evidential weight.”
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to some of the speeches in the debate in the legislative bodies, but we have completely excluded them in arriving at a conclusion in this case. Mr. Nambiar also invited our attention to the provisions of the Bill as originally drafted and its provisions as changed by the Select Committee which were subsequently accepted by the Legislature. The Bill was first published in the Fort St. George Gazette (Part IV-A Extraordinary) on 30-6-1952 as L.A Bill No. 4 of 1952. The preamble to the Bill ran as follows:
“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the levy of a tax by way of surcharge on fares paid for being carried in stage carriages in the State of Madras.”
8. The charging section (S. 3) was as follows:
“‘Levy of a surcharge on passengers carried in stage carriages’— On every passenger carried for hire or reward in any stage carriage, a tax (hereinafter referred to as the “surcharge”) shall be collected and paid to the Government at the rates and in the manner hereinafter provided in this Act:
Provided that the Government may, by notification, exempt stage carriages plying exclusively in the areas specified therein from the payment of the surcharge.”
9. Section 4 provided for the rates of surcharge. Under S. 5 the operator was made the agent of the Government for collecting the surcharge. The other provisions are not relevant. Mr. Nambiar emphasises on the radical difference between the scheme of the original Bill and the scheme of the Act as passed by the Legislature. In the original Bill the tax was really a surcharge on the fares paid by the passenger and the operator was merely a collecting agent of the Government. In essence the tax was on the passengers and goods. But in the Act as finally passed the tax is levied against the operator himself; he is the assessee and the entire burden falls on him. It is the operator who can compound the tax. In essence and effect, therefore, Mr. Nambiar contended that the Act imposed a tax on the income of the operator which he derived from the fares and freights. Item 56, he submitted, can only justify a tax on goods and passenger and cannot support a tax on the carrier. Mr. Nambiar posed the following alternatives as regards the nature of the tax, namely whether the tax is really a tax on the passenger or on the fare or on the operator or on the income of the operator or on the vehicle, and he said it was really a tax on the income of the operator.
10. The argument which he strongly pressed in support of his contention was founded on the terms of the first proviso to Section 3 of the Act. Under that proviso, in cases where already the maximum prescribed by the Government under the Motor Vehicles Act is being charged by the operator the fare shall not be increased in spite of the imposition of the new passenger and goods tax. The operator cannot in such cases pass on to the passenger or owner or consignor of the goods the tax which the operator is under an obligation to pay himself. The result is that his income is considerably diminished. The new tax therefore virtually amounts to a tax on the income of the operator. This proviso was attacked on another ground also which would be dealt with later. We may confess that it is this proviso which has given us considerable difficulty, and the learned Advocate-General also admitted that it was difficult to support it. He however argued that the Act itself was not beyond the competence of the State Legislature and the tax imposed by it did fall within item 56 of the State List.
11. His contention was that the item itself does not indicate that the incidence of the tax should fall in the first instance on goods or passengers. The subject-matter of most of the items in the lists which relate to taxes is either property or event or transaction or activity. For example there are taxes on lands, buildings, income and mineral rights. There are taxes on the sale or purchase and on the entry of goods. And there are taxes on professions, trades, callings and on the consumption of electricity. But obviously any tax can actually be assessed only on a person and collected from him or from property in his hands. It is rarely that we find an item which provides expressly for a tax on persons. As the item itself does not specify who the assessee should be, there is nothing illegal in the carrier, that is, the operator, being made the assessee. The real question is whether truly and substantially the tax is or is not on goods and passengers.
12. We agree with the learned Advocate-General that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The charging section, that is, S. 3 is unequivocal in its imposition of the tax on:
“all passengers, luggage and goods carried by stage carriages, and on all goods transported by public carrier vehicles.”
13. It was not disputed by Mr. Nambiar that the mere fact that the tax was calculated at some proportion of the amount of fares and freights would not by itself make the tax anytheless a tax on passengers and goods. It is true that under Section 5 of the Act, it is the operator who has to submit returns and who has to pay the tax under S. 6. The tax nevertheless remains a tax on passengers and goods. It is in no sense a tax on income. It may be that a particular operator may not make any profit or gain in a particular year. But all the same he would be liable to pay this tax. If it were a tax on income, he would not have been liable for that year. On our opinion, this one circumstance conclusively demonstrates the nature of the tax. The decision of the Federal Court in — ‘Rallaram v. Province of East Punjab’, AIR 1949 FC 81 (C) is very instructive in this connection. In that case the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act was impugned as ultra vires the Punjab Legislature. Section 3 thereof levied a tax on buildings and lands at such rate not exceeding 20 per cent of the annual value of such buildings and lands as the Provincial Government may direct. The tax was payable by the owner of the buildings and lands.
14. Section 5 of the Act provided that the annual value of any land or building shall be ascertained by estimating the gross annual rent which such land or building might reasonably be expected to get from year to year less certain allowances. The Act was impugned on the ground that it was really a tax on income falling within item 54 of the Federal List and not a tax contemplated by item 42 of the Provincial List, namely, a tax on lands and buildings, berths and windows. It was held by the Federal Court that in pith and substance the tax levied by the Act was a tax on lands and buildings covered by item 42 of the Provincial List and it was not a tax on income within the meaning of item 54 of the Federal List, even though it was based on the annual value of the land or building. Fazl Ali J. who delivered the judgment of the court cited the following observation of Lord Thankerton in — ‘In re a reference under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920’, 1936 AC 352 (D),
“It is the essential character of the particular tax charged, that is to be regarded, and the nature of the machinery, — often complicated — by which the tax is to be assessed is not of assistance, except in so far as it may throw light on the general character of the tax.”
15. The learned Judge then pointed out the real distinction between the Income-tax Act and the impugned Act thus:
“the real distinction between these two Acts seems to be that whereas the Income-tax Act purports to get at the true income, there is no such pretence in the impugned Act which uses the annual value merely for the purpose of determining the importance or the value of the property to be taxed.”
16. His conclusion is summed up as follows:
“In the first place, we have to look into the charging section of the statute, because as was pointed out in — ‘Alberta Provincial Treasurer v. C.E Kerr’, 1933 AC 710 (E), ‘the identification of the subject matter of the tax is only to be found in that section.’ The charging section in the present case is S. 3, which in clear terms levies not a tax on income but a tax on buildings and lands. It is true that we must look not to the mere form but to the substance of the levy, and the tax must be held to be invalid, if in the guise of a property tax it is really a tax on income. There is however nothing in the impugned Act to show that there was any intention on the part of the Legislature to get at or tax the income of the owner from the building.”
17. The following passage from the judgment of Higgins J. in — ‘Attorney General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs for New South Wales’, 5 CLR 818 at p. 851 (F), cited by Quick in his book “The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia” throws some light on the point:
“But is a customs tax a tax on property as such? The Customs Tariff 1902 speaks of ‘duties……on …. goods’ and the expression is roughly accurate although probably if fully expressed it would be a tax on persons in respect of the importation of goods; just as a property tax is usually, though not necessarily, a tax on persons in respect of their property. The customs tax is a tax not on property as such, but on persons in respect of and on account of the movement of commerce known as the act of importation. There is a fundamental difference between taxing men for having property and in particular for moving property into a country from overseas. When the Commonwealth imposes a customs duty the duty is not payable unless it be attempted to move the goods from London to Australia.”
18. The learned Advocate General relied on the word “carried” which occurs in item 56 as supporting his contention that the carrier is contemplated as the object of taxation. Ingenious as the suggestion is, we do not think it safe to base our conclusion on this fact.
19. An Act of the Bihar Legislature very similar to the Act now impugned was held to be not beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature by a Special Bench of the Patna High Court in — ‘Atmaram v. State of Bihar’, AIR 1952 Pat 359 (G). Section 12 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 is the material provision, and it runs thus:
“12(1) From and after the commencement of this Act, there shall be charged, levied and paid to the State Government, a tax on all passengers carried by motor cabs, stage carriages and contract carriages and on all goods transported by public carriers at the rate of two annas in the rupee on all fares and freights payable to owners of such motor cabs, stage carriages, contract carriages or public carriers.
(2) Where any fare or freight charged is a lump sum paid by a person as a subscription or contribution for a season ticket or for any privilege, right or facility which is combined with the right of such person being carried or his goods transported by motor cabs, stage carriages, contract carriages or public carriers, as the case may be, without any further payment or at a reduced charge the tax shall be levied on the amount of such lump sum or on such amount as appears to the prescribed authority to be fair and equitable having regard to the rate or rates of fares or freights fixed by a competent authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
(3) Every owner shall, in the prescribed manner, pay into a Government treasury the full amount of the tax due from him under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), as the case may be, at such intervals as may be prescribed and shall furnish such returns, by such dates and to such authority as may be prescribed.”
20. Section 14 of that Act provides for a composition of the tax. Rule 9 of the Bihar Passengers and Goods Transport Tax Rules, 1950 provides that a ticket for the carriage of a passenger and his luggage shall contain among other particulars the “fare and tax, if any”. Sarjoo Prosad J. pointed out that the fact that the tax is to be measured in proportion to the fares and freights realised does not alter the nature of the tax or affect its intrinsic character which is actually a tax upon the goods and passengers carried on motor vehicles, and this fact cannot convert the tax into a tax on the income of the owners.
21. It was held in the above Patna case that although the statute did not expressly authorise the carriers to collect the tax from the passengers and consignors of goods, yet the statute must be construed to have implicitly granted this right to them. Both the main provision as well as the first proviso of Section 3 of the Madras Act also appear to indicate that the tax can be passed on to the passenger or consignor of goods, though there is no express provision to that effect. If the tax leviable under the section is not contemplated as one which would be eventually collected from the passenger or consignor, the proviso becomes unintelligible, because it speaks of the fare charged by an operator inclusive of the tax leviable under the section.
22. If the tax was never intended to be recovered from the passenger, there is no question of the fare including the tax. This circumstance also demolishes the argument on behalf of the petitioners that the tax is a tax on the income of the operators. It is true that the original Bill in terms made the operator the agent of the Government for collection of the tax, but evidently it was thought that it would be more convenient to make the operator himself the assessee, leaving him to collect the tax from the passenger and consignor in turn. We have no hesitation in holding that the Act does not impose a tax on income and that the tax imposed by it is a tax on passengers and goods and falls within item 56 of the State List.
23. The next ground of challenge is based upon the fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen to carry on any trade or business. The argument, if we understand it aright, is that the tax unreasonably restricts the exercise of this right, and as the first step in the argument authorities were cited in support of the proposition that even a taxing statute is subject to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and will be covered by Art. 13 which declares that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by that Part and any law made in contravention of this Article shall to the extent of the contravention be void. Reliance was placed on the observations made by us in — ‘S. Ananthakrishnan v. State Of Madras’, AIR 1952 Mad 395 (H) and — ‘Rajah of Bobbili v. State of Madras’, AIR 1952 Mad 203 (I). Reference was also made to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which struck down railway rates which were unreasonable and made it practically impossible to run the railways with profit, viz., — ‘Smith v. Ames’, (1898) 42 Law Ed 819 (J); — ‘Northern Pacific Rly. Co. v. North Dakota ex. rel. me. cue’, (1915) 59 Law Ed 735 (K) and — ‘Baltimore and Chio Railroad Co. v. United States’, (1936) 80 Law Ed 1209 (L).
24. Similar decisions of the American Supreme Court were discussed by this court in AIR 1952 Mad 203 (I), decisions in which it had been laid down that the court had the power to enquire whether any legislative provision was so unjust and unreasonable as to work a practical destruction to rights of property. But we fail to see how the Act by itself affects adversely the exercise of any fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners. If the tax imposed on operators like the petitioners can be passed on to the passengers and consignors, there can be no interference with their substantive rights. All that can be said is that the petitioners may be put to the inconvenience of submitting returns and paying the tax in the first instance. But that, we cannot hold, is an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of their right to carry on their business. Indeed, Mr. Nambiar conceded that in that case there can be grievance only so far as those operators are concerned who were already charging fares at the maximum rate prescribed by the Government under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act at the commencement of Act 16 of 1952.
25. So far as the petitioners in W.P Nos. 69, 70, 262, 56, 52, 133, 409, 411, 427, 428 and 147 of 1953 are concerned, the maximum rate appears to have been in force. Now the petitioners in these cases will undoubtedly be hit by the first proviso to S. 3. They will be bound to pay the tax, but they will not be entitled to pass on the tax to the passengers or consignor because the proviso expressly says that the fare inclusive of the tax leviable under S. 3 shall not exceed the maximum fare prescribed by the Government and in force at the commencement of the Act. In our opinion the proviso does injuriously affect the exercise of the petitioners right to carry on their business. It diminishes their income without any justification. So long as they have been charging the maximum fare prescribed by the Government they are well within their rights. Now, Act IS of 1952 imposes a burden which they have to discharge. The effect of the proviso is that they have got to discharge this from their own pocket.
26. The proviso appears to offend not only Art. 19 but also Art. 14 because of the discrimination made between operators who were charging the maximum fare at the commencement of the Act and those who were not. There appears to be no reasonable basis for such a classification. Presumably the maximum fare was fixed having regard to the circumstances vitally bearing on the expenditure necessary to work the transport service efficiently. To take away a portion of the gross income of the operators amounts certainly to a curtailment of the rights to which they were entitled at the commencement of the Act. The learned Advocate-General was unable to defend the provision. As the proviso stands, it looks as though the operator cannot include the tax in the fare even if subsequent to the commencement of the Act the maximum fare prescribed by the Government is enhanced. That also appears to us to be very unreasonable. We therefore hold that the first proviso to Section 3 of the Act is bad and should be struck down.
27. Mr. Kumaramangalam appearing for the petitioners in one of the cases contended that if the proviso was invalid the entire Act should go, applying the rule relating to the severability of statutes. He contended that the legislator might not have passed the Act without the proviso.
28. We had occasion to deal with this topic recently in — ‘A.R.V Achar v. Madras State’, AIR 1954 Mad 563 (M). We have there held that it is not desirable to speculate as to what the Legislature would or would not have done. The proper rule to apply is to find out if the residue of the Act would stand after deleting the offending provision. We are clearly of opinion that it will.
29. We therefore hold that Madras Act 16 of 11952 except for the first proviso to S. 3 thereof is constitutional and valid. The only relief to which the petitioners will be entitled is a direction to the respondent to forbear from enforcing the provision in the said proviso. Otherwise the petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
A/V.R.B
30. Petitions dismissed.
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