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Hussain Kasam Dada v. Vijayanagaram Commercial Association

Madras High Court
Aug 5, 1953
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two appeals under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act from orders of the Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam: the lower court allowed O.P. No. 36 of 1946 and dismissed O.P. No. 24 (the text contains both references to O.P. No. 24 of 1936 and O.P. No. 24 of 1940 in different paragraphs). The appeals were filed by the aggrieved party.

The underlying dispute involved three contracts between the appellant and the contesting respondent for the sale of groundnuts, with delivery stipulated for December 1945. The contracts (not produced in full but admitted by consent as specimens) provided: (i) 23-8-1945 — 500 bags at Rs.20-12-0 per bag; advance Rs.2,500; (ii) 26-8-1945 — 500 bags at Rs.21 per bag; advance Rs.2,500; and (iii) 13-11-1945 — 1,000 bags at Rs.24-12-0 per bag; advance Rs.5,000. Altogether advances of Rs.10,000 were paid and the appellant also supplied 977 gunnies for collecting the groundnuts.

The contracts contained a clause providing that disputes regarding performance would be subject to the decision of the Vizianagaram Commercial Association (Registered), and that such decision would be binding. The respondent failed to deliver the groundnuts; the appellant referred the dispute to the Association, which appointed arbitrators who awarded the appellant Rs.27,672-6-4 (comprising damages, refund of advances, cost of gunnies, and interest), the award dated 18-7-1946.

O.P. No. 24 was brought by the Vizianagaram Commercial Association under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act to file the award and pass a decree. O.P. No. 36 of 1946 was brought by the contesting respondent seeking to set aside the award. The learned Subordinate Judge tried both together, allowed O.P. No. 36 and dismissed O.P. No. 24; the present appeals challenge that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Are the three contracts forward contracts covered by the Oil Seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943, and if so, do they fall within any exemption that would render them valid?
  2. If the contracts are prohibited (and therefore illegal), can the arbitration clause — and the award made by the arbitrators under the Association's procedures — be enforced or filed as a decree?
  3. Does the exemption in the notification of 31st May 1943 (excluding certain forward contracts for groundnuts, etc., "not transferable to third parties") apply where the contract does not expressly state non-transferability on its face?
  4. If a contract is void or void ab initio, can recovery of advances or restitution (e.g., return or value of gunnies) be ordered by arbitrators or by the court under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act?
  5. Whether a procedural change in the Association's rules (reduction of arbitrators from five to three after the contract) affects the validity of the arbitration reference and award.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that although the contracts might be illegal as forward contracts, questions such as repayment of advance money and return/value of gunnies fall within the competence of arbitrators and could be referred and decided by them.
  • The appellant relied on Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act to argue that when an agreement is discovered to be void, any person who has received an advantage must restore it or make compensation.
  • It was also argued that arbitrators are judges of both fact and law, and an erroneous view of law by arbitrators would not necessarily vitiate an award; thus any legal error should not automatically invalidate the award.
  • The appellant suggested that the requirement of non-transferability might be established by evidence aliunde and need not appear on the face of the contract.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The contesting respondent urged that at the time the contracts were entered into the Association's rules required five members to be appointed as arbitrators, and that this procedural rule at the time of the contract should govern (rather than a later amendment reducing the number to three).
  • The respondent contended that the contracts were forward contracts falling within the prohibition of the Oil Seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943, and thus illegal; accordingly the arbitration clause and any award based on such illegal contracts would be void.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramnarain v. Liladhur, 33 Cal 1237 Rules of a body to which arbitration is referred are deemed incorporated in the contract. Used to explain that where incorporation applies, procedural rules relevant are those at time of reference rather than at contract formation; court found no substantial point in respondent's objection about number of arbitrators.
Satyanarayanamurthi v. Sitaramayya, 1950 Mad WN 389 Construction of exemption clause in forward contract prohibition; non-transferability must appear on face of contract. The court followed this decision to hold that unless non-transferability is specifically shown on the face of the contract, the exemption does not apply.
Seetharamaswami v. Bhagvati Oil Co., 1950 Mad WN 679 Same construction as above regarding exemption wording in prohibition order. Followed alongside the preceding decision to support the holding that the present contracts do not fall within the exemption because they lack an express non-transferability stipulation.
App. No. 97 of 1948 (Mad) Earlier authority referenced in relation to construction of exemption clause. Referred to as part of the body of authority supporting that non-transferability must be on the face of the contract.
Firm Hensraj v. Vasanji, 1949-4 Dom. LR (Bom) 7 Related decision on construction of similar exemption in forward contract prohibition. Referred to support the interpretation that absence of express non-transferability excludes the contract from the exemption.
Auryaprahakara Rau v. Gummudu Sanyasi, AIR 1925 Mad 885 Application of Section 65 of the Contract Act where a contract is discovered to be void; limitation considerations. Cited by appellant's counsel; court noted it but found such authorities not helpful enough to overturn other principles regarding ab initio void contracts.
Audesh Singh v. Rajeshwari Singh, AIR 1951 All 630 Application of Section 65 of the Contract Act (restitution where agreements become void). Referred to by appellant but court did not find it decisive in light of consensus authorities holding otherwise for ab initio void agreements.
Ariyaputra Naicken v. Muthu Chetti, AIR 1936 Mad 165 Decision where there was no illegal contract (distinguished). Cited by appellant's counsel; court recorded it but treated it as not on point to overturn its conclusion regarding illegality here.
Venkataramayya v. Pullayya, AIR 1936 Mad 717 (FB) Principles on fraud and when restitution/prevention of fraud can be invoked. Referred to clarify that mere fraudulent intention is not sufficient; court noted no question of fraud in present case.
Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan, AIR 1943 PC 29 Authorities on restitution and related matters. Cited by appellant's counsel; court found it not helpful in overturning its conclusion that the contract was ab initio void.
Ehaurao v. Radhabai, 33 Bom 401 Referenced among other cases on restitution/void agreements. Cited but not treated as altering the court's conclusion.
Venkataswami v. Suranna, AIR 1918 Mad 296 Authority (on arbitrators as judges of law and fact) relied on by appellant arguing that legal error by arbitrators does not vitiate award. Not found to assist appellant sufficiently given the contract's ab initio illegality.
Ghulam Khan v. Muhamad Hasan, 29 Cal 167 (PC) Similar principle regarding arbitrators' role and errors. Considered but not decisive in face of the primary issue of illegality.
Venkatarao v. Padmavalli Thayaramma, AIR 1944 Mad 324 Mistake of fact or law by arbitrators and its effect on award; whether award is impeachable. Referred to show that some mistakes will not vitiate an award; court found it unhelpful for appellant since the contract here was held void ab initio.
Appavoo Chettiar v. South India Rly. Co., AIR 1929 Mad 177 Arbitration and awards jurisprudence. Mentioned; court did not find it helpful to the appellant's case.
Hiyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 AC 356 (House of Lords) Leading English authority: if a party contends the alleged contract is void ab initio (e.g., illegal), the arbitration clause cannot operate because the clause is also void. Relied upon as the leading authority. The court adopted this principle to hold that where a contract is contended to be void ab initio the arbitration clause cannot be relied on to refer the dispute to arbitrators.
Joe Lee Ltd. v. Lord Dalmeny, 1927-2 Ch 300 Where the contract/rules incorporate an illegal subject-matter (gaming/wagering), the arbitration mechanism cannot be used to enforce disputes arising from that illegal contract. Quoted from Russell on Arbitration to illustrate that where subject-matter is illegal, no binding award can be made; used to support the general proposition on illegal transactions and arbitration.
Velu Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai, AIR 1950 Mad 444 (FB) Full Bench: partnership entered for illegal trade was ab initio void; Section 65 cannot apply where parties knew agreement was void at formation. Relied on as a persuasive local authority: since the contract here was ab initio void and known to be such, it cannot form basis for arbitration or for restitution under Section 65 in the present proceedings.
Prabhumal v. Basuram, AIR 1926 Lah 159 Rule that Section 65 of the Contract Act cannot apply to an agreement which is ab initio void and known to be so at formation. Followed as part of the authority supporting the proposition that restitution is not available under Section 65 where the agreement was void ab initio and known to be so.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several connected steps, grounded in statutory instruments, prior decisions, and established principles of arbitration law:

  1. Characterisation of the contracts: The court accepted that the contracts were forward contracts within the meaning of the Oil Seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943, because delivery was to take place at a future date and not eo instanti.
  2. Exemption clause interpretation: The court examined the notification of 31st May 1943 which exempts forward contracts for groundnuts, etc., "not transferable to third parties." Relying on two decisions of the Madras High Court (Satyanarayanamurthi and Seetharamaswami) and related authorities, the court adopted the view that the non-transferability must appear on the face of the contract (i.e., there must be a specific recital on the document) and cannot be established merely by parol evidence. In the present case the contracts contained no express non-transferability clause; accordingly they did not fall within the exemption.
  3. Arbitration clause and illegality: The court addressed whether an arbitration reference made under an agreement that is illegal or void ab initio can be enforced. It relied heavily on the House of Lords decision in Hiyman v. Darwins Ltd. to the effect that if a party contends the contract is void ab initio (for example because making such a contract is illegal), then the arbitration clause is itself void and the issue cannot properly be sent to arbitration under that clause. The court found no contrary authority and adopted this principle.
  4. Effect of earlier authorities on restitution: The appellant's argument invoking Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act (restoration where an agreement is void) and various precedents was considered. The court noted a line of authority (including a Full Bench of this court in Velu Padayachi and Prabhumal v. Basuram) holding that Section 65 does not apply to agreements known to be void at their inception; in such circumstances the submission to arbitration forming part of a void contract is itself void. Applying these authorities, the court held that the contract being ab initio void could not serve as a basis for the arbitration or for enforcement of the award.
  5. Mistake by arbitrators and other procedural objections: The court acknowledged arguments that arbitrators may err in law or fact and that such errors do not necessarily vitiate an award. However, because the foundational problem was that the contract was void ab initio, any such argument about legal error by the arbitrators was insufficient to uphold the award here.
  6. Relief in the present proceedings: The court considered whether it could, in these appellate proceedings (which concerned only refusal to pass a decree in terms of the award), nonetheless direct refund of advances. The court declined to do so, noting that if the appellant sought restitution that would require a suit in the ordinary course; the present proceedings were simply a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court on the application to file and enforce the award and thus the court would not grant a decree for the advance amount in these appeals. The court expressly declined to opine on whether a separate cause of action for restitution might exist.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeals are dismissed. The court held that the contracts were forward contracts not falling within the exemption (because they lacked an express non-transferability clause on their face), and that the contracts were void ab initio/illegal for the purposes of the Order. Consequently, the arbitration clause could not be enforced and the award could not form the basis of a decree.

IMPLICATIONS:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The award made by the arbitrators cannot be filed as a decree in these proceedings and the lower court's allowance of O.P. No. 36 (setting aside the award) and dismissal of O.P. No. 24 is sustained by dismissal of these appeals. The court set aside the lower court order directing that costs be paid in O.P. No. 36 of 1946 and ordered that there be no order as to costs in either the lower court or this court.
  • On restitution: The court did not decide whether the appellant may have a separate cause of action to recover advances or the value of gunnies; it left open the possibility that a suit in the ordinary way might or might not succeed and declined to express any opinion on that matter in these appellate proceedings.
  • Precedential effect: The decision applies established principles—that an arbitration clause cannot operate where the underlying contract is void ab initio (as stated in Hiyman v. Darwins Ltd. and followed authorities)—but the court did not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond adopting and applying existing authorities. No new broad precedent was announced beyond the court's application of recognized authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition: APPEALS DISMISSED. No order as to costs in any of the proceedings.

Show all summary ...

Govinda Menon, J.:— These two appeals arise under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act from the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam, allowing O.P No. 36 of 1946 and dismissing O.P No. 24 of 1936 on his file.

2. The appellant had entered into three contracts with the contesting respondent for the sale of groundnut and though the contracts themselves have not been exhibited in the court below, the specimens have been admitted by consent of parties in order to know the nature of the agreements. The first contract related to the sale of 500 bags of groundnut and is dated 23-8-1945 at the rate of Rs. 20-12-0 per hag with the stipulation that the delivery would take place in December 1945. Towards the price, a sum of Rs. 2500 was paid as advance. The second contract dated 26-8-1945 related to the sale of another 500 bags of groundnut at the rate of Rs. 21 a bag with the stipulation for delivery in December 1945 itself. As advance towards this transaction a sum of Rs. 2500 was also paid. The third contract dated 13-11-1945 related to the sale of 1000 bags of groundnut at the rate of Rs. 24-12-0 a bag for which the advance paid was Rs. 5000 with a similar stipulation that delivery should take place in December 1945.

3. In all, therefore, a sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid as advance for all the three contracts for the delivery of 2000 bags of groundnuts. The appellant also supplied 977 gunnies for collecting the groundnuts. In the contracts there was an agreement that in case of dispute arising, between the parties regarding the performance and fulfilment of the terms of the contracts, they would be subject to the decision of the Vizianagaram Commercial Association (Regd.) and such a decision would be binding on all the parties. Presumably, on account of me fact that the price of groundnut rose abnormally, during the intervening period i.e, between the dates of the signing of to contracts and the date of their fulfilment, the contesting respondent did not act according to the terms and no delivery of groundnut bags was ever made. The appellant therefore referred the matter to the Vizianagaram Commercial Association (Regd.) which appointed the arbitrators who enquired into the matter and passed an award which was to the effect that the contesting respondent had to pay a sum of Rs. 27672-6-4 to the appellant made up of a sum of Rs. 16375 being the damages due on account of the non-delivery of the groundnut bags, Rs. 10,000 being the advance received by the contesting respondent under the three contracts, Rs. 600 being the cost of 977 empty gunnies which were not returned and Rs. 697-6-4 being the interest on the advance amount and the price of gunnies at 1 per cent, per mensem from 31-12-1945 till the date of the award, viz., 18-7-1946.

4. O.P No. 24 of 1940 was by the Vizianagaram Commercial Association (Regd.) who appointed the arbitrators, under Section 14 of the Act for filing the award and passing a decree thereof. O.P No. 36 of 1946 was by the contesting respondent for setting aside the award; and these two were tried together by the learned Subordinate Judge who, as stated above, allowed O.P No. 36 of 1946 and dismissed O.P No. 24 of 1946. Hence the two appeals by the aggrieved party.

5. Various points were raised before the learned Judge of which the most important ones were whether the contracts in question were prohibited by the Oil Seeds Forward Contracts Prohibition Order, 1943 and if so whether the award is null and void. The lower court's finding on this point was against the appellant. In this court the only serious contest between the parties related to the decision on this controversy. Though the respondent feebly attempted to question the correctness of the decision of the learned Judge regarding the validity of an award made by three members of the Vizianagaram Commercial Association (Regd.) as being one made by the association itself, to whom alone the reference was made, and on which point the learned Judge had found, against the respondent's contention, we do not think that there is any substantial point arising in that dispute.

6. What is urged on behalf of the contesting respondent is that at the time the contracts were entered into, the rules of the association, to which the reference to arbitration has to be made, were to the effect that five members of the association should be appointed as arbitrators. This rule was later on altered on 24-6-1946 by reducing the number to three. It is therefore urged that the rule which obtained at the time of the contracts should be the guiding principle and not the amended procedure. No authority has been cited before us to justify this contention. If, as laid down in — ‘Ramnarain v. Liladhur’, 33 Cal 1237 (A), the rules of a body to which the agreement of arbitration is referred to by the parties should be deemed to have been incorporated in the contract by virtue of the agreement of parties, then it has necessarily to be Held that on a matter of procedure the relevant factors should be the rules as existing at the time of the reference and not at the genesis of the contract.

7. The substantial argument is based upon the prohibition contained in the Oil Seeds (forward Contract Pronibition) Order, 1943, which was first promulgated on the 29th May, 1943. Subsequently, there was a notification exempting certain kinds of contracts from the ambit of the prohibition. A forward contract is defined in S. 2 sub-clause (2) of the Order as a contract for the delivery of oil seeds at some future date. In the contracts in question there is no doubt that the delivery is not ‘eo instanti’ the contract itself but is intended to take place some days or months later. There can be no difficulty therefore in acceding to the respondent's contention that the contracts in question are forward contracts. But the notification dated 31st May, 1943 by which certain kinds of forward contracts are excepted has also to be noticed in this connection. That notification lays down as follows:

“Forward contracts for groundnuts, linseed, mustard seed, rapeseed or toriaseed of specified qualities or types and for specific delivery at specified price— ‘not transferable to third parties are excluded from the provisions of this order’.”

8. What has therefore to be considered is whether the contracts in question within the exemption namely that if they are not transferable to third parties then such contracts are not vitiated by the terms of the Oil Seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order.

9. There have been two decisions of this court on the subject reported in — ‘Satyanarayanamurthi v. Sitaramayya’, 1950 Mad WN 389 (B) and — ‘Seetharamaswami v. Bhagvati Oil Co.’, 1950 Mad WN 679 (C). Both these related to the exemption clause contained in the Vegetable Oils and Oil Cakes (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order. But the exemption is worded in exactly the same terms and therefore in both these cases the learned Judges held that unless there is a specific recital on the face of the contract itself that it is not transferable, the contract itself will come within the mischief contemplated by the order prohibiting forward contracts. Unless it is shown that one of the terms of the contract is that a delivery order of a railway receipt or a bill of lading relating to it is not transferable, contracts which do not contain any stipulation as regards such documents cannot fall within the exclusion clause of the Notification. In the present case it is undoubted that there is no such clause apparent on the face of the contract or even deducible from its terms.

10. Both the decisions above mentioned are clear in this respect and they refer to an earlier decision in — ‘App. No. 97 of 1948 (Mad) (D)’’, as well as to a decision of Eesai J. of the Bombay High Court in — ‘Firm Hensraj v. Vasanji’, 1949-4 Dom. LR (Bom) 7. It is urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that these decisions should not be held to lay down the correct law and that the provision regarding the non-transferability need not appear on the face of the contract but can be established by evidence aliunde. In view of the consensus of opinion on this topic expressed by three different benches of this court we do not think we would be justified in adopting a different interpretation. We are prepared to follow them and hold that in this case the contract in question is a forward contract.

11. Even if such a forward contract is illegal under law, still the appellant contends that the question of the repayment of the advance money and the return or the gunny bags or their value should be decided according to the terms of the contract and as such it is within the competence of all the parties to refer at least that matter along with the others to the arbitrators who have got authority to adjudicate upon that dispute and pass an award accordingly. This contention raises the question as to how far advances made on an invalid contract can be demanded since the fulfilment of the contract is impossible under the law.

12. Appellants' learned counsel invites our attention to Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act which is to the effect that when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the contract has become void after it was entered into or whether it was ‘ab initio’ void and known as such to the parties at the time it was entered into. Reliance was placed upon a number of cases for the proposition that when an agreement becomes void, the benefit arising thereunder, which a party has received, must be refunded. In — ‘Auryaprahakara Rau v. Gummudu Sanyasi’, AIR 1925 Mad 885 (E), a contract for the sale of Karnam Inam lands after enfranchisement was held to be only a transfer of an expectancy and was invalid under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act and the fact that the would-be vendor was in physical possession of the property did not make any difference in ‘spes successionis’. Therefore, a suit for refund of money advanced must be brought within three years from the date when the pronote was discovered to be void under Section 65 of the Contract Act.

13. Here was a case where the contract was discovered to be void. Recently one of us had held that when money was paid to a party regarding the assignment of a Karnam's office, the contract itself was void from the very beginning and benefits arising under such contracts cannot be restituted. Other cases on which the learned counsel relied are — ‘Audesh Singh v. Rajeshwari Singh’, AIR 1951 All 630 (F), where Section 65 of the Contract Act had been applied; — ‘Ariyaputra Naicken v. Muthu Chetti’, AIR 1936 Mad 165 (G), where there was no illegal contract and — ‘Venkataramayya v. Pullayya’, AIR 1936 Mad 717 (FB) (H), where it has been held that in order to prevent a person who has been a party to a fraudulent transaction from pleading his own fraud, the intended fraud must have been effected, or there must have been a substantial part performance of the intention to defraud. The mere fraudulent intention evidenced by the transaction is not sufficient. There is no question of any fraud here as both the parties knew, at the time the contract was entered into, that it was illegal under the Oilseeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943. Other decisions on which learned counsel relied are — Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan’, AIR 1943 PC 29 (I) and — ‘Ehaurao v. Radhabai’, 33 Bom 401 (J). We do not think that any of these cases can be of any help so far as the appellant is concerned.

14. He further contended that since arbitrators are judges both of fact and of law, any erroneous view of law taken by the arbitrators would not vitiate the award. In this case, according to the appellant, the arbitrators, if at all, only erred. The rulings in — “Venkataswami v. Suranna’, AIR 1918 Mad 296 (K) and — ‘Ghulam Khan v. Muhamad Hasan’, 29 Cal 167 (PC) (L), were relied upon for this argument. In a recent decision in — ‘Venkatarao v. Padmavalli Thayaramma’, AIR 1944 Mad 324 (M), the learned Judges held that an award was not impeachable on account of a mistake of fact vitiating the award and since in that particular case the mistake was with regard to the general law and not with regard, to any private right, it could not be invoked to obtain, the intervention of the court for setting aside the award. We do not find anything helpful so far as the appellant is concerned in — ‘Appavoo Chettiar v. South India Rly. Co.’, AIR 1929 Mad. 177 (N).

15. But the real difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the contract was ‘ab initio’ void. The leading case on the subject regarding an agreement for arbitration with regard to the contracts which have become incapable of performance, or which are ‘ab initio’ void is that of the House of Lords reported in — ‘Hgyman v. Darwins Ltd.’, 1942 AC 356 (O). The law in England until then was rather fluid, but there is authoritative pronouncement on the subject in the decision above referred to. At page 366 in the speech of Viscount Simon L.C the following-passage occurs:

“If the dispute is whether the contract which contains the clause has ever been entered into at all, the issue cannot go to arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the submission. Similarly, ‘if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio (because for example, the making of such a contract is illegal), the arbitration clause cannot operate for on this view the clause itself is also void’. But in a situation where the parties are at one in asserting that they entered into a binding contract, but a difference has arisen between them whether there has been a breach by one side on the other, or whether circumstances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties from further performance, such differences should be regarded as differences which have arisen “in respect of” or “with regard to”, or “under” the contract, and an arbitration clause which uses these, or similar expressions, could be construed accordingly.”

16. No decision has been brought to our notice which takes a different view.

17. In Redman's Law of Arbitrations and Awards, 5th Edn., at page 81, dealing with “claims that benefits forfeited”, the learned author discusses the whole subject in the following manner:

“A clause in an insurance policy that all differences arising out of the policy shall be referred……and the obtaining the award of such arbitrators………shall be a condition precedent to any liability or right of action against the company.

In respect of any matter in difference is a submission both as to liability and amount, and it entitles the insurers to raise an issue of fraud which, under the conditions of the policy, will result in a forfeiture of all benefits thereunder, or to test the truth or untruth of statements which are the basis of the contract of insurance, although on their untruth being established all benefits will be forfeited in accordance with the terms of the contract. The burden of proving that the statements are untrue lies upon the insurer.”

18. Similarly, other observations are contained in Russel on Arbitration, Fourteenth Edn., at pages 3 and 246. The passage dealing with ‘illegal transactions’ runs as follows:

“Where the subject-matter of a reference is illegal no award can be of any binding effect. Thus in — ‘Joe Lee, Ltd. v. Lord Dalmeny’, 1927-2 Ch 300 (P), where the plaintiffs were bookmakers and had engaged in betting transactions with the defendants upon the terms of a set of rules which, provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, it was held that the rules formed part of the contract between the plaintiffs, and the defendants, which was one of gaming and wagering and was unenforceable, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have the disputes submitted to the tribunal provided for in the rules. But where mixed questions of law and fact have been submitted to arbitration, and the transactions between the parties have been closed by a general award, good on the face of it, the court will not, on the suggestion that some illegal matter has been included, enquire into this, or reopen the question in order to set aside the award upon this ground.”

19. At ‘page 246’ it is stated that a submission forming part of a void contract is itself void and cannot be enforced. In — ‘Velu Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai’, AIR 1950 Mad 444 (FB) (Q), a Full Bench, to which one of us was a party, considered the question regarding the illegal nature of partnership entered into for the purpose of conducting business in arrack or toddy on a licence granted, or to be granted, to only one of them. It was held, such a partnership was ‘ab initio’ void, whether the contract of the partnership was entered into before the licence was granted or afterwards. Further, the decision was that a suit for the recovery of the balance of money due under a settlement of accounts in respect of such a partnership was not maintainable. There are earlier cases on the subject of other High Courts such as the one reported in — ‘Prabhumal v. Basuram’, AIR 1926 Lah 159 (R), where Shadi Lal C.J and Zafar Ali J. held that Section 65 of the Contract Act cannot have any application to any agreement which is ‘ab initio’ void and is known to be such to the parties at the time it was entered into. Following these decisions, we have to hold that since the contract in question is ‘ab initio’ void, it cannot form the basis of a reference to arbitration.

20. Mr. Azizuddin contends that at least this Court should direct the refund of the advance paid. If there had been a suit for that amount alone in the ordinary way, without a reference to arbitration, and an application for passing a decree in terms of the award, we would have considered that question in a different aspect.

21. But as these appeals arise only out of a refusal to pass a decree in terms of the award, we cannot therefore, in these proceedings, which are only a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court, grant the appellant a decree for the amount. It may be that as a result of the admission made by the respondent in these proceedings that he has received the money, the cause of action might or might not arise in favour of the appellant for filing a suit. We do not wish to express any opinion on that topic. His rights if any, will not be affected by this decision.

22. The appeals therefore fail, but in the circumstances we dismiss both of them without any order as to costs whatever. The order of the lower court, in favour of the respondent, directing the costs to be paid in O.P No. 36 of 1946 is set aside. The result is, there will be no order as to costs in any of the proceedings either in the lower court or in this court.

B/D.H.Z

23. Appeals dismissed.