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S. Pl. P. Narayana Chettiar v. M. Ar. Annamalai Chettiar .
Judgment Summary — Subba Rao, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under S. 19(2) of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act sought to scale down a decree debt. On 9-3-1951 this Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 28,645-8-0 with subsequent interest. At trial the learned Subordinate Judge had dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, but on 20-10-1949 this Court in the appeal held the plaintiff to be the validly adopted son of M.A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar and that the suit was not barred by limitation.
The defendants contended that they would not be liable because their father, Palaniappa Chettiar, became a partner of the P.L.S. firm subsequent to the deposit. The Court therefore directed the Subordinate Judge to find when Palaniappa became a partner; the Subordinate Judge reported on 12-1-1950 that Palaniappa had been a partner from 3-2-1917. Objections to that finding were filed and the appeal was again posted on 23-2-1951, when the defendants filed an additional written statement raising a new point seeking relief under the laws of Burma in respect of interest. The matter was adjourned for investigation and argued on 5-3-1951; the Court allowed the defendants some relief as to interest and made the order on 9-3-1951, resulting in a decree in favour of the plaintiff except as to interest.
The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. They had earlier applied in the Subordinate Judge's Court for scaling down the decree; that application was dismissed as not maintainable. After that dismissal, defendant 2 filed the present petition in this Court seeking scaling down of the decree under the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under S. 19(2) of the Agriculturists' Relief Act (as amended by Act 23 of 1948), a party who did not raise a plea for relief under the Act at the time an appeal was disposed of is nevertheless entitled as of right to have the decree amended afterwards.
- How the retrospective operation of S. 19(2) is affected or controlled by Section 16 of Act 23 of 1948 (as presented in the opinion).
- Whether a party who had an opportunity to raise a plea under the Act but did not do so is precluded from raising it later (i.e., the effect of res judicata in this context).
- Procedural question drawn from precedent: when a plea under the Agriculturists' Relief Act is not raised before a judgment is pronounced, what procedure should appellate courts follow (as articulated in Sriramareddi v. Sriramareddi).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner relied on S. 19(2) of the Agriculturists' Relief Act (as added by Amending Act 23 of 1948) and contended that under that provision he was entitled, as of right, to have the decree amended notwithstanding that he did not raise the plea at the time the appeal was disposed of.
- Implicitly, the petitioner relied on the view that S. 19(2) brings within its ambit decrees passed after the commencement of the Act and that the amendment entitling relief could be claimed even when not pressed earlier.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff contended that because the petitioner did not raise the question of relief under the Act at the time the appeal was disposed of by this Court, he is now precluded from raising that plea.
- The plaintiff thus relied on the principle that a party who has an opportunity to raise a plea but does not do so is precluded (by res judicata principles) from raising it later.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkataratnam v. Seshamma, AIR 1952 Mad 591 (Full Bench) | Interpretation of Section 16 of Act 23 of 1948: clause (ii) applies to pending proceedings instituted before commencement of the Act where the decree or order passed has not become final before such commencement; clause (iii) applies to suits where the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before commencement and thus may apply even if the decree had become final. | The Court relied on the Full Bench's exposition to conclude that because at the date the Act came into force no final decree had been passed in the suit, Section 16 clause (ii) applied; therefore the petitioner should have raised the plea when the appeal was argued. |
| Sriramareddi v. Sriramareddi, AIR 1941 Mad 929 (Full Bench) | Procedure where a plea under the Agriculturists' Relief Act was not raised before an appeal was disposed of: the appellate Court should reserve the final order until an application for scaling down has been decided, remit the application to the trial Court for enquiry and report, and leave the decree open so the final decree states exactly what the judgment-debtor has to pay considering rights under the Agriculturists' Relief Act; but if the application is not made before judgment is delivered it will be too late. | The Court referred to and applied this Full Bench principle by observing that the position of a party who did not raise the plea after the Act came into force is not different from that laid down by the Full Bench; consequently the petitioner's late plea was not permissible and the petition was dismissed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the legislative provisions relied upon: S. 19(2) of the Agriculturists' Relief Act (as added by Amending Act 23 of 1948) and Section 16 of Act 23 of 1948 (the opinion notes that the retrospective operation of S. 19(2) is controlled by "S. 18 of Act 23 of 1948" and then reproduces Section 16). The text of Section 16, as quoted in the opinion, sets out three categories to which the amendments apply: (i) suits instituted after commencement; (ii) suits instituted before commencement in which no decree or order has become final before commencement; and (iii) suits in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before commencement.
The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Venkataratnam v. Seshamma, which clarified the scope of clauses (ii) and (iii): clause (ii) is for pending proceedings (decrees not final before commencement), while clause (iii) may apply even to decrees that had become final but were not executed or fully satisfied before commencement.
Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court noted that Act 23 of 1948 came into force on 25-1-1949 and that no final decree had been passed in the suit at that date. Therefore Section 16 clause (ii) applied to this case. Under clause (ii) the petitioner had the opportunity to raise the plea for relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act when the appeal was being argued before this Court.
The Court analyzed the procedural posture: although the defendants had filed an additional written statement raising a new point (relief under Burma law as to interest), they did not attempt to seek relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act at that stage. The Court held that a party who had an opportunity to raise a plea but did not do so is precluded, by principles akin to res judicata, from raising the plea at a later stage.
The petitioner argued that S. 19(1) (incorporated by reference in S. 19(2)) entitled amendment of the decree "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure." The Court rejected this argument on the ground that S. 19(2) must be read in light of Section 16 of Act 23 of 1948, which limits the retrospective operation of the amendments and delineates the procedural window in which relief may be claimed.
The Court also considered the Full Bench precedent in Sriramareddi v. Sriramareddi, which had prescribed that if an application for scaling down is not made before judgment is delivered the appellant must, at the appellate stage, reserve the final order and remit the question for enquiry; otherwise the final decree must be drawn up in accordance with the judgment. Having regard to Section 16, the Court found the present position not different from the procedure and constraints described in Sriramareddi.
Because Section 16(ii) applied and the petitioner had the opportunity to raise the plea before the appeal was disposed of, the Court concluded that the petitioner's late invocation of S. 19(2) was barred. The Court explicitly stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether the petitioner qualified as an "agriculturist" under the Act.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The petition for scaling down the decree under the Agriculturists' Relief Act fails and is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's request to scale down the decree under S. 19(2) was rejected; the decree as drawn by this Court on 9-3-1951 stands (subject to the earlier modification as to interest already made by the Court), and the petition is dismissed with costs.
- The Court applied existing Full Bench authorities (Venkataratnam v. Seshamma and Sriramareddi v. Sriramareddi) to determine procedural limits on invoking the Agriculturists' Relief Act after the Act's commencement. The opinion indicates that no different or new procedural rule is being created beyond those authorities; the decision enforces the procedural requirement that the plea be raised at the appropriate stage when Section 16(ii) applies.
Order: Petition dismissed.
Subba Rao, J.:— This is a petition under S. 19(2), Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act for scaling down the decree debt. On 9-3-1951 we passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff who had filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 28,645-8-0 with subsequent interest. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. On 20-10-1949 we delivered a judgment in the appeal against that decree holding that the plaintiff was the validly adopted son of M.A.R Arunachalam Chettiar and that the suit was not barred by limitation. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents contended that his clients would not be liable for the suit amount as their father Palaniappa Chettiar became a partner of P.L.S firm subsequent to the deposit. To enable us to decide the points raised we called for a finding from the learned Subordinate Judge on the following question:
“When did Palaniappa Chettiar, the father of the defendant became a partner of P.L.S firm?”
2. The learned Subordinate Judge submitted a finding on 12-1-1950 holding that Palaniappa Chettiar was a partner of P.L.S firm from the beginning, i.e, from 3-2-1917. After objections were filed to that finding the appeal was again posted before us on 23-2-1951. On that day an additional written statement was filed by the defendants claiming relief under the laws of Burma in respect of interest. As that was a new point raised for the first time, we adjourned the appeal to enable the learned counsel for the plaintiff to investigate the matter and meet the point raised. On 5-3-1951 the said point was argued and we agreed with the defendants to some extent and gave the relief accordingly. That order was made on 9-3-1951. The result was that the plaintiff got a decree as prayed for except in regard to interest. The defendants preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court against our decree. The defendants filed an application in the Subordinate Judge's Court for scaling down the decree, but that was dismissed. It is represented to us that the learned Judge dismissed that application on the ground that it was not maintainable. After the dismissal of that application the present petition is filed by defendant 2 in this Court for scaling down the decree under the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon S. 19(2), Agriculturists' Relief Act. Section 19(2) was added by Amending Act 23 of 1948. Sections 19(1) and 19(2) as they now stand read as follows:
“19(1) Where before the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt, it shall, on the application of any judgmen-debtor who is an agriculturist or in respect of a Hindu joint family debt, on the application of any member of the family whether or not be is the judgment-debtor or on the application of the decree-holder, apply the provisions of this Act to such decree and shall, not withstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amend the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction, as the case may be:
Provided that all payments made or amounts recovered whether before or after the commencement of this Act, in respect of any such decree shall first be applied in payment of all costs as are originally decreed to the creditor.
(2) The provisions of sub-s. (1) shall also apply to case where, after the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement.”
4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that as the petitioner did not raise the question of his relief under the Act at the time the appeal was disposed of by us, he is now precluded from raising that plea. But the advocate for the petitioner says that under S. 19(2) he is entitled as of right for the amendment of the decree notwithstanding the fact that he did not raise the plea at the time of disposal of the appeal. Under S. 19(2) the provisions of S. 19(1) apply to cases where after the commencement of the Act a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement. The decree in this case was made on 9-3-1951, and therefore the decree in question was one made after the Act came into force. But the retrospective operation of S. 19(2) is controlled by S. 18 of Act 23 of 1948. Section 16 reads as follows:
“16. The amendments made by this Act shall apply to the following suits and proceedings, namely:
(i) all suits and proceedings Instituted after the commencement of this Act;
(ii) all suits and proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act, in which no decree or order has been passed, or in which the decree or order passed has not become final, before such commencement;
(iii) all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act;
Provided that no creditor shall be required to refund any sum which has been paid to or realised by him, before the commencement of this Act.”
5. The scope of this section has been laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in — ‘Venkataratnam v. Seshamma’, AIR 1952 Mad 591 (A). Satyanarayana Rao J. in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, states at p. 593 as follows:
“Bearing these principles in mind it is clear that Cl. (ii) applies to pending proceedings, that is, proceedings which were instituted before the commencement of the Act but which did not become final before such commencement. This is made clear by the clause ‘in which the decree or order passed has not become final’. It implies therefore that if the decree or order passed in a suit or proceeding becomes final before the commencement of the Act, the provisions of the Act cannot be applied to such a suit or proceeding. But in Cl. (iii) the words ‘in which the decree or order passed has not become final’ do not occur. It is quite general and applies to all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act so that it seems to apply to decrees or orders even if they had become final before the commencement of this Act provided the decree or order has not been executed or fully satisfied.”
6. Section 16(1) applies to suits instituted after the commencement of the Act, Cl. (ii) to suits or proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Act in which no decree or order has been passed which has become final, and cl. (iii) to suits or proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed in full before the commencement of this Act. A combined reading of the three provisions indicates that cl. (ii) will apply if the decree or order had not become final before the Act and Cl. (iii) if the decree or order, though became final, was not satisfied before the commencement of the Act. Act 23 of 1948 came into force on 25-1-1949. We delivered judgment on 9-3-1951. At the time the new Act came into force no final decree was passed in the suit. Therefore S. 16 Cl. (ii) applies. If Section 16(ii) applied, the petitioner could and should have raised the plea when the appeal was argued before us that his client was entitled to relief under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. Though he filed an additional written statement claiming reliefs in respect of interest under Burma laws, no attempt was made to ask for a relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. A party who had an opportunity to raise a plea but did not raise the plea is precluded by principles of ‘res judicata’ from raising the plea over again at a subsequent stage. But it is said that the principle of ‘res judicata’ had no application to the present case as S. 19(1) which is incorporated by reference to in S. 19(2) says that a petitioner would be entitled to the relief given to him under that section notwithstanding anything stated in the Code of Civil Procedure. But this argument ignores the fact that the scope of S. 19(2) is itself limited by the provisions of S. 16 of Act 23 of 1948.
7. In — ‘Sriramareddi v. Sriramareddi’, AIR 1941 Mad 929 (B), a Full Bench of this Court had to consider the case of an applicant who did not raise the plea under the Madras Agriculturists'. Relief Act at the time when the appeal was disposed of. The facts were: A Division Bench of this Court pronounced a judgment in an appeal. After the judgment has been pronounced an application was made on behalf of respondent 4 by his mother who was his guardian for an order under Ss. 6, 7 and 8, Agriculturists' Relief Act for scaling down the debt. The Act had not been pleaded at any stage before the appeal was heard and decided. When the suit was decided by the trial Court the Act had not come into force. But the Act was in force at the time the suit came up for disposal by the appellate Court. Dealing with the situation, Leach C.J who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench laid down the procedure to be followed in such cases at page 932:
“We consider that the proper course will be to reserve the final order until the application far scaling down has been decided. All questions arising in the appeal other than the question of scaling down can be decided and the decree left open until a report has been received from the trial Court, the application for scaling down being remitted to that Court for enquiry and report. If this procedure is followed the final decree of this Court will state exactly what the judgment-debtor has to pay, bearing in mind all that he is entitled to under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. But if the application is not made before the judgment is delivered, it will be too late for a judgment-debtor to raise the question. The judgment in such circumstances will be the final judgment and the decree must be drawn up in accordance therewith.”
8. Having regard to the scope of S. 16 of 1 Act 23 of 1948 we are inclined to hold that despite the amended S. 19(2) of the Act the position of a party who did not raise the plea under the Agriculturists' Relief Act after the said Act came into force is not different from that laid down by the Full Bench in the aforesaid decision.
9. In this view it is not necessary to consider the question whether the petitioner is an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
B/M.K.S
10. Petition dismissed.
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