Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

The Public Prosecutor v. M. Thommaia Fernando And Others.

Madras High Court
Jul 13, 1953
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

These connected appeals arise from the acquittal order passed by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tuticorin, in several cases relating to sales tax liability of certain respondents. The respondents are individuals who auction fish catches brought ashore by fishermen at Tuticorin. They announce upset prices and invite bids; if the reserve price is met, the sales are completed by the highest bidders paying the owners directly and taking possession of the catches. The respondents receive a commission for their auctioneering services.

The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer levied sales tax on these respondents, which was confirmed by the Commercial Tax Officer. The respondents appealed to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which held that they were not liable to pay sales tax. The Government did not seek revision against these tribunal orders.

Subsequently, the respondents were prosecuted for failing to pay the assessed sales tax for the year 1946-47, alleged to be an offence under Section 15(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The Sub Divisional Magistrate acquitted the respondents on the ground that they were not liable to be assessed as dealers under the Act. The State has preferred these appeals against that acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents are commission agents who fall within the definition of 'dealers' liable to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
  2. Whether the respondents are merely brokers or auction criers who do not come within the meaning of 'dealers' and thus are not liable to pay sales tax.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras, 1952 M.W.N 269 F.B Authoritative definition distinguishing 'broker' and 'commission agent' under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Used to clarify that commission agents have custody/possession and authority to transfer property, unlike brokers.
Provincial Government of Madras v. Veerabhadrappa, 1951 I.L.R Mad. 257 Earlier Bench decision dissented from by the Full Bench in Radhakrishna Rao. Not followed; Full Bench preferred Radhakrishna Rao's distinctions.
Province of Madras v. Shivalakshminarayana, 1949 M.W.N 229 Earlier precedent dissented from by the Full Bench. Not followed; Full Bench relied on other authorities.
Public Prosecutor v. Narasimha Reddi, 1947 M.W.N 528 Approved by the Full Bench for definition of broker and commission agent. Supported the Full Bench's authoritative definitions.
Pappanna Rowther v. State, Crl. R.C 1226 of 1952 Clarifies that a person selling goods alone can be a 'dealer' under the Act. Reinforces that buying is not a necessary condition to be a dealer.
State of Bombay v. Rajah Kulkarni, 1951 A.I.R Bom. 105 English decisions on brokers and commission agents as persuasive authority. Supported the conclusion that auction criers without custody or authority are brokers.
Bajranglal Laduram v. Ganesh Commercial Co., Ltd., 1951 A.I.R Cal. 78 English jurisprudence on brokers and commission agents. Used as persuasive authority consistent with Full Bench reasoning.
Governor General in Council v. Municipal Council, Madura, 1940 2 M.L.J 546 English decisions relevant to broker vs commission agent distinction. Considered persuasive in distinguishing roles of brokers and commission agents.
Basded Anandgir v. Shanta Anand, 1942 A.I.R All. 302 English case law on agency and brokerage. Supported the broker characterization of the respondents' activities.
Vimla Bai Doshpande v. Emperor, 1945 A.I.R Nag 8 English precedents on brokers and commission agents. Persuasive authority aligned with Full Bench view.
Gibbons v. Rule, 4 Bing 306 (Act against Brokers 1604) Definition of broker as agent who makes bargains and receives commission without possession. Used to define broker's role as mere negotiator without possession or authority to sell.
Baring v. Gorrie, 1831 2 B & Aid. 143 Broker not put into possession of property. Supports the distinction between brokers and factors or commission agents.
Lake v. Simmons, 1927 A.C 487 English authority on agency and brokerage. Considered persuasive in distinguishing brokers' lack of possession.
Stevans v. Biller, 1883 25 Ch. D. 31 Agency principles regarding brokers. Supports the characterization of brokers as lacking authority to sell in own name.
Metford v. Hughes, 1846 16 M & W 174 Agency and brokerage distinctions. Used to reinforce broker characteristics.
Fairlie v. Fenton, 1870 L.R 5 Exch. 169 Broker's lack of authority to sue or receive money; acts in principal's name. Clarifies broker's limited role consistent with respondents' activities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the nature of the respondents' activities against the legal definitions of 'broker' and 'commission agent' as authoritatively laid down by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras. The court noted that commission agents typically have custody or possession of goods and authority to transfer property and title to buyers, often selling in their own name. Conversely, brokers act merely as negotiators who arrange contracts between principals and third parties without possession or authority to transfer ownership.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the respondents merely announced prices and concluded auctions without handling the goods or transferring property. The purchasers took possession directly from the owners, and the respondents received only a commission for their auctioneering services. This conduct aligns with the role of brokers rather than commission agents.

The court further supported this conclusion with persuasive English decisions and statutory definitions, emphasizing that the respondents did not carry on a business of buying or selling goods as required to be classified as dealers under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Therefore, the respondents were correctly held not liable to be assessed for sales tax.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are dismissed.

The court upheld the acquittal of the respondents, confirming that they do not qualify as dealers under the Madras General Sales Tax Act but rather as brokers not liable to pay sales tax. This decision directly affects the parties by negating the sales tax liability of the respondents in these cases. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond affirming the application of existing authoritative definitions and principles.

Show all summary ...

These are connected appeals preferred by the learned Public Prosecutor against the order of acquittal of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tuticorin, in S.C Nos. 439, 485, 487, 526 and 531 of 1951.

The facts are: The respondents before us live at Tuticorin on the foreshore of the sea, Every day the fishermen go out in boats or canoes and bring in the catches These catches are stacked on the foreshore by the persons to whom they belonged and these owners stand by the side of these catches. They employ these present respondents for auctioning these catches. The respondents cry out the upset price, invite bidders and when the price offered exceeds the reserve price the sales are knocked down in the names of the highest bidders and those bidders pay prices to the owners and take over from them the catches If the reserved, prices are not reached the owners take the fish to the market. These respondents are paid for the duties performed by them at the rate of quarter to one anna per rupee. On these facts the respective contentions are advanced, viz., that these respondents are commission agents coming within the meaning of ‘dealers’ and liable to sales tax and that they are only brokers or criers at auctions and do not therefore come within the meaning of ‘dealers’ liable to pay sales tax.

In this case and in similar cases there is no dispute that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Tuticorin, levied sales tax and the Commercial Tax Officer, Tirunelveli East, confirmed them. Thereupon appeals were preferred before the sales tax appellate tribunal, Madras, and it was held that these respondents and persons similarly situated were not liable to be assessed to sales tax. The Government has not preferred any revisions from these orders (Tribunal appeal Nos. 276, 277, 278 etc. dated 23rd July, 1952 and appeal No. 275/52 dated 29th October, 1952.)

These respondents were prosecuted before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tuticorin, on the foot that they failed to pay the sales tax assessed on them for the year 1946-47 in spite of the B notice served on them, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 15(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.

The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate came to the conclusion that these respondents are not liable to be assessed and that therefore they have not committed an offence under S. 15 (b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and acquitted them. Hence these appeals by the State.

The short point for determination in these appeals is whether these respondents are commission agents coming within the category of dealers or whether they are mere brokers or criers at auctions and not liable to be assessed to Sales Tax.

It is fortunate for us that the terms ‘broker’ and ‘commission agent’ in so far as they relate to the Madras General Sales Tax Act have been authoritatively defined by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras 1952 M.W.N 269 F.B which considered and dissented from the earlier Bench decision (Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri, JJ.) Provincial Governmet of Madras v. Veerabhadrappa 1951 I.L.R Mad. 257 and which in its turn had dissented from Narasingamuthu Chettiar in re3 and Province of Madras v. Shivalakshminarayana 1949 M.W.N 229 and approved Public Prosecutor v. Narasimha Reddi 1947 M.W.N 528, and the conclusions arrived at by the Full Bench were as follows:

“A broker is an agent employed to make a bargain for another and receive a ‘commission on the transaction which is usually called brokerage. He has usually neither the custody nor the possession of the goods. It is the broker's duty to establish privity of contract between the principal and the third party. The broker cannot sell in his own name nor can he sue on the contract. A commission agent, on the other hand to whom goods are entrusted by sellers with full authority to transfer property and title in the goods to buyers who obtain delivery from the commission agents themselves without even being aware of the identity of the seller principal, is not tike a broker. He has, almost invariably, custody or possession of the goods, actually or constructively. He often sells in his own name and in certain circumstances can sue the buyer himself. A commission agent is uot bound to keep separate accounts at his bankers, for he is not a fiduciary agent and the moneys he receive are his own; and by the custom of the trade he is only liable as debtor to his employer for the amounts received. In spite of the parties supposing their relationships to be that of principal and agent, in point of law, it may be different.

In the Madras General Sales Tax Act ‘Dealer’ is defined as any person who carries on the business of buying or selling goods. ‘Sale’ is defined as a transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for consideration.

In the case of a commission agent the accepted mercantile practice is that he has control over or possession of the goods and he has the authority from the owner of the goods to pass the property in and title to the goods. If this is so, when a commission agent sells goods belonging to his principal with his authority and consent without disclosing to the buyer the name of the owner, there is certainly a transfer of property in the goods from the commission agent to the buyer. A business which consists in such transactions can properly be described as a business of selling goods. A similar position would arise even in the case of a commissision agent buying for an undisclosed principal. A commission agent doing this kind of business would fall within the definition of ‘dealer’ in the Sales Tax Act. Neither the definition of ‘dealer’ nor of ‘sale’ contemplates as a necessary condition, that the goods sold should belong to the person selling or buying”.

In addition, it has been pointed out by Balakrishna Ayyar, J. in Pappanna Rowther v. State* Crl. R.C 1226 of 1952, that in the General Sales Tax Act the word ‘dealer’ is defined as meaning “any person who carries on business of buying or selling” and that it would be noticed that the word used is ‘or’ and not ‘and’ that a person will be a dealer within the meaning of the Act who keeps on selling goods even though he does not buy any.

Therefore applying these principles let us see whether these respondents are brokers or commission agents. In this case the facts established show that it is the boatmen who bring the catches to the shore and that it is these owners who stand by the side of the catches and that these respondents had nothing more to do than to cry out the prices and that if the sales are knocked down as being over and above the reserve price, the purchasers take the fish direct from the boatmen and the respondents get only a commission of quarter to one anna in the rupee for crying out and concluding the auction and that at no stage these respondents handle the goods and have no authority to transfer the property in the goods to the purchasers and do nothing more than bringing the purchasers and sellers together. There can be no doubt that such persons who do nothing more than crying out the bids at the auction and who have no custody or possession over the property auctioned and have no authority to pass the property in the goods to the purchasers can only be brokers.

These activities of these respondents fall only within the scope of the duties of a broker as laid down in the Full Bench decision cited above and which is only in consonance with the trend of English decisions also on the subject, which though not binding on me may be legitimately looked into as persuasive and helpful: State of Bombay v. Rajah Kulkarni 1951 A.I.R Bom. 105, Bajranglal Laduram… v. Ganesh Commercial Co., Ltd.…* 1951 A.I.R Cal. 78, Governor General in Council v. Municipal Council, Madura 1940 2 M.L.J 546, Basded Anandgir v. Shanta Anand 1942 A.I.R All. 302, Vimla Bai Doshpande v. Emperor 1945 A.I.R Nag 8.

“Brokers are those that contrive, make and conclude bargains and contracts between merchants and tradesmen in matter of money and merchandise, for which they have a fee or reward (Jacob cited by Best, C.J Gibbons v. Rule 4 Bing 306; this definition is derived from the Act against Brokers 1604 (I Jac. 1, C. 21) cited Friperer; See also the Bank of England Act 1697 (8 & 9 Will, 3, C. 20, S. 60, where the definition is those who ‘make or drive’ bargains). A broker is not put into possession of the property to be sold as a factor is: Baring v. Gorrie 1831 2 B & Aid. 143, See Lake v. Simmons 1927 A.C 487 and Stevans v. Biller 1883 25 Ch. D. 31 and also Metford v. Hughes 1846 16 M & W 174.

“There is no doubt a broker cannot sue he has no authority to sell in his own came, or to receive the money, and has nothing to do wity the goods. This is so laid down in Story on Agency, Ss. 28-34, 109-. To use the brief but expressive language of an eminent Judge, a broker is one who makes a bargain for another, and receives a commission for so doing. Properly speaking, a broker is a mere negotiator between the other parties, and he never acts in his own name, but in the names of those who employ him. When he is employed to buy or sell goods, he is not intrusted with the custody or possession of them, and is not authorised to buy or to sell them in his own name. (S. 28). So, a broker hay ordinarly no authority virtute officii, to receive payment for property sold by him (S. 109)” Fairlie v. Fenton 1870 L.R 5 Exch. 169 172 per Cleasby B. at P. 172.

The conclusion of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate in all these case is correct and hence these appeals are dismissed.

N.T.RAppeals dismissed.

Sales Tax Act.