- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Rahimansa Rowther v. Madras Islamia Educational Institution, Vallam
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal — Tanjore)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a second appeal against the decree and judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore confirming the decree of the District Munsif of Tanjore in O.S. No. 134 of 1946. The suit was filed by the respondent for redemption of usufructuary mortgages and for possession of properties pertaining to its 7/10th share.
Key factual points contained in the opinion:
- Natharsa Rowther originally mortgaged three shops (Nos. 11, 12 and 13) on 27–29 March 1867 for Rs. 297. A son, Mohideensa, created a further mortgage in respect of the same properties for Rs. 50 on 5-12-1878.
- On the death of the original mortgagor the heirs' shares were apportioned: four sons with 2/10th each and two daughters with 1/10th each. Noor Bivi (a descendant) became entitled to 3/10th; the plaintiff acquired the remaining heirs' interests and thus became owner of a 7/10th share.
- There was a partition among the mortgagee's family on 16-11-1891 (Ex. P.1) admitting possession by the mortgagees as usufructuary mortgagees. Subsequent redemptions took place (one redemption concerning shop No. 13 resulted in delivery in 1934; other redemptions by Ismail Bivi occurred in 1931 and 1933).
- The plaintiff instituted the redemption suit (O.S. No. 134 of 1946) seeking redemption and possession in respect of its 7/10th share. Defendants 1 and 10 appealed (this is their second appeal).
- Defendants pleaded (a) that in a partition the equity of redemption had been allotted to Kadirsa and thus other heirs ceased to have interest in the equity of redemption, and (b) adverse possession. Both the trial court and the first appellate court found that defendants failed to establish an exclusive right in Kadirsa and failed to prove adverse possession.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the equity of redemption in the three mortgaged shops was allotted to Kadirsa by the alleged partition document (Ex. D.2), and, relatedly, whether Ex. D.2 was admissible in evidence without registration.
- Whether a document inadmissible for want of registration (Ex. D.2) could nevertheless be used for the collateral purpose of proving the nature or character of possession.
- Whether the plaintiff's suit for redemption was within the period of limitation applicable to redemption actions, having regard to an admission in Ex. P.1 (dated 16-11-1891) and subsequent redemptions by co-mortgagors.
- Whether one co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage can be sued by other co-mortgagors for redemption and what period of limitation applies in such circumstances (effect of Ss. 91, 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act and the Amending Act of 1929).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants 1 and 10) Arguments
- Ex. D.2 (dated 16-12-1878), an agreement between the surviving sons and grandsons of Natharsa, purportedly shows that the equity of redemption in the three shops was allotted to Kadirsa in the partition; this allotment extinguished other heirs' equity of redemption.
- They also pleaded that they had acquired rights by adverse possession in respect of the suit properties.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The respondent contended that Ex. D.2 was inadmissible because it purported to create title in immoveable property and therefore required registration.
- The respondent relied upon the distinction drawn in the authorities between mere recitals/acknowledgments of pre-existing rights and documents that themselves create rights, arguing Ex. D.2 falls in the latter category and is therefore not admissible without registration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari (Judicial Committee) | The distinction between a mere recital/acknowledgment of a pre-existing right (which may not require registration) and a document which itself creates a right (which requires registration). | The Court explained that Bhageshwari concerned a petition that merely acknowledged a pre-existing right and so did not require registration; it held Bhageshwari was not applicable to Ex. D.2 because Ex. D.2 purported to create title in praesenti and therefore required registration and was inadmissible. |
| Mukha Narain Singh v. Ramlochan Tiwari | Authority for the position that a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, and on limitation that time began to run from the due date of the mortgage and did not cease to run merely because other co-mortgagors redeemed. | The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that a co-mortgagor who redeems stands in the shoes of the mortgagee and that limitation for those seeking redemption relates to the period prescribed (sixty years under the relevant article) from the relevant starting point. |
| Raghavendracharya v. Vaman Srinivas | The view that if the subrogee has the same rights as the mortgagee, the period of limitation for a suit against him must be the same as for suits against an original mortgagee. | The Court cited this decision in support of the proposition that a co-mortgagor who redeems acquires the same rights as the mortgagee for purposes of redemption and limitation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Admissibility of Ex. D.2 and the effect of its recitals:
- The Court examined Ex. D.2 and found that, on its face, it purported to create title in favour of Kadirsa by agreement among heirs; the recitals and operative language show a transfer of the shops to Kadirsa in consideration of his meeting funeral expenses and redeeming the mortgages.
- Because Ex. D.2 purported to confer title in praesenti, the Court held it required registration. Not having been registered, Ex. D.2 was inadmissible in evidence to establish title.
- The Court distinguished the Bhageshwari decision relied upon by the respondent: Bhageshwari concerned a petition that merely acknowledged a pre-existing title and therefore did not create rights requiring registration. By contrast Ex. D.2 itself created a present title and so Bhageshwari did not assist the appellants.
2. Collateral use of an unregistered document:
- The Court accepted the well-established principle that a document inadmissible for want of registration may nevertheless be used for collateral purposes such as showing the character or nature of possession.
- The Court observed that appellants could rely on Ex. D.2 for showing that after redemption by Ismail Bivi (in 1931 and 1933) she claimed to be in possession in her own right. However, the Court noted this collateral use would be of little practical value if the substantive suit for redemption were otherwise within time.
3. Limitation and acknowledgment:
- The Court treated the admission in Ex. P.1 (dated 16-11-1891) — the partition among the mortgagee's sons admitting their possession as usufructuary mortgagees — as an acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. That acknowledgment postponed the time at which a suit for redemption would be barred.
- Applying the relevant article of limitation (Art. 148 of the Limitation Act was cited as prescribing a sixty-year period for redemption actions in the circumstances discussed), the Court calculated that from the admission date 16-11-1891 the suit would not be barred until 16-11-1951. The plaintiff's suit, filed on 3-6-1946, was therefore within time if the plaintiff was entitled to redeem.
4. Rights of a co-mortgagor who redeems and effect of 1929 amendment:
- The Court set out Ss. 91, 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act and explained that under these provisions a co-mortgagor who redeems is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems; S. 92 expressly gives such a redeemer the same rights as the mortgagee for purposes of redemption, foreclosure or sale.
- The Court noted the Amending Act of 1929 resolved prior conflict in judicial opinion and that, after amendment, defects disappeared: a co-mortgagor who redeems is in the position of the mortgagee, and his rights as a mortgagee relate back to the date of the mortgage for purposes such as priority over subsequent mortgages.
- The Court relied on authority and scholarly exposition (including the statement by Sir D.F. Mulla reproduced in the opinion) to support the legal proposition that a redeeming co-mortgagor is subrogated and that the limitation period applicable to actions against such a subrogee is the same as would apply against the original mortgagee.
5. Application to the present case and conclusion of analysis:
- Having held Ex. D.2 inadmissible to create title, and having found the acknowledgment in Ex. P.1 to operate as an acknowledgment delaying the running of limitation, and having accepted the principle of subrogation and the effect of the 1929 amendment, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's suit for redemption filed on 3-6-1946 was within the sixty-year period referenced (Art. 148) measured from the relevant acknowledgment.
- The Court therefore found no error in the courts below and affirmed that the defendants had failed to establish either exclusive allotment to Kadirsa or adverse possession sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's claim.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- The second appeal is dismissed with costs. The judgment of the Court below (the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore confirming the decree of the District Munsif in O.S. No. 134 of 1946) is correct. (Leave to appeal was refused.)
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect: The decree in O.S. No. 134 of 1946, as confirmed by the Subordinate Judge, stands; the plaintiff's suit for redemption was held to be within time and the defendants' contentions (exclusive allotment to Kadirsa by Ex. D.2 and adverse possession) were rejected.
- Legal significance: The Court applied established principles (the registration requirement for documents that create title, collateral admissibility for character of possession, subrogation of a co-mortgagor who redeems, and the relevant rules on limitation). The decision operates as an application of those existing principles to the facts of this case; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond the application of the cited authorities and statutory provisions.
End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.
This is a second appeal against the decree and judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore confirming that of the District Munsif of Tanjore in O.S No. 134 of 1946, a suit filed by the respondent for redemption of the usufructuary mortgages and for possession of properties pertaining to its 7/10th share. One Natharsa Rowther had four sons and two daughters. They were Kadir Hussain, Kadirasa, Mohideensa, Mohammad Kanni, Miran Bivi and Chinna Pillai Bivi. Natharsa Rowther mortgaged his three shops bearing Nos. 11, 12 and 13 situated in survey number 176/1-A at Vallamvadakku, Sethi village to one Nizam Rowther on 27th, 28th and 29th March 1867 for a sum of Rs. 297. Natharsa's son Mohideensa created a mortgage in regard to the same properties in favour of the said mortgagee for a sum of Rs. 50 on 5-12-1878. After the death of the original mortgagor his four sons became entitled to 2/10th share each and the two daughters 1/10th share each. Noor Bivi daughter of Chinna Pillai Bivi and also daughterin-law of Kadirsa succeeded to her mother's 1/10th share and also to Kadirsa's 2/10th share and thus became entitled to 3/10th share in the mortgaged properties. Defend, ants 1 to 10 are her heirs. The other heirs of Natharsa conveyed their interest to the plaintiff and the plaintiff therefore became entitled to the 7/10th share in the said properties.
On 16-11-1891 there was a partition in the mortgagee's family and his son's Kamal, Mohideensa and Natharsa got one shop each. Mohideensa assigned his shop to Kamalsa. Kamalsa's heirs received their proportionate share of the mortgage amount from Noor Bivi and released shops, Nos. 11 and 12. Noor Bivi instituted O.S No. 98 of 1932 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tanjore, for redemption of shop No. 13 and obtained a decree on 28-6-1933 and took delivery of the shop on 18-7-1934. The daughters of Noor Bivi conveyed these shops to the 1st defendant under Ex. D.9 dated 13-12-1938.
The plaintiff who became the owner of 7/10th share in the mortgaged properties filed the aforesaid suit for redemption and possession of the properties pertaining to its share. Defendants 1 and 10 pleaded that in a partition between the heirs of Natharsa the equity of redemption in the suit properties was allotted to Kadirsa and that, therefore, the other heirs of Natharsa ceased to have any interest in the equity of redemption. They further contended that they acquired right by adverse possession to the suit items. Both the Courts found that defendants failed to establish the exclusive right of Kadirsa to the plaint schedule properties. They also agreed in holding that the defendants did not establish their plea of adverse possession. Defendants 1 and 2 have preferred the above second appeal.
The first question is whether the equity of redemption was allotted to Kadirsa in the alleged partition. In support of such an allotment defendants relied upon Ex. D.2 dated 16-12-1878. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that this document was not admissible in evidence as it required registration. Ex. D.2 purports to be an agreement entered into between the surviving sons of Natharsa and his grandsons. As the arguments turned upon the recitals in the document the material portions may be extracted:
“Whereas Natharsa Rowther, our father and grandfather of Sheik Mohammad Rowther after partitioning and giving to us the other properties set apart for the maintenance of himself and his wife and also for funeral expenses the shops situated in the eastern row of the Jevuli shop street, Vallam……Whereas father and mother Ismail Bivi were under the protection of the aforesaid Kadiras Rowther after the partition effeoted in our family; whereas the said Kadirsa Rowther met the funeral expenses of Ismail Bivi Ammal on her death, whereas in accordance with the wish expressed by Natharsa Rowther while he was alive that his funeral expenses should also be met by Kadirsa Rowther himself and that he should take the three shops absolutely the said Kadirsa Rowther himself met the funeral expenses of the said Natharsa Rowther, whereas disputes arose among us as Mohideensa Rowther effeoted a second usufructuary mortgage over the middle shop to Kadirsa Rowther, son of Nijam Rowther of Kolikkottai on the 5th of this month for a sum of Rs. 50 claiming the same as belonging to himself and took the amount himself, whereas we have agreed to the settlement made by the panchayatdars that in lieu of the sum of Rs. 50 got by Mohideensa Rowther through the Othi Sheik Muhammad Rowther should get the jewels worth Rs. 45 which belonged to Ismail Bivi and which were with Sheik Muhammad Rowther and about which there was a dispute, that Kadirsa Rowther should give a sum of Rs. 45 to Muhammad Gani Rowther, that Kadirsa Rowther himself should pay the Othi amount of Rs. 347 payable by Natharsa Rowther and Mohideensa Rowther in respeot of the aforesaid shops and redeem them and take them absolutely.
Now, therefore, we consent and agree that Kadirsa Rowther should pay a sum of Rs. 297 being the amount due under the usufruotuary mortgage executed by Natharsa Rowther in respeot of the three shops and the sum of Rs. 50 being the amount due under the mortgage executed by Mohideen Rowther, in all a sum of Rs. 347, redeem the said shops and take them absolutely.”
The document was signed by the sons and grandsons of Natharsa Rowther and was attested by several witnesses. Under this document the heirs of Natharsa Rowther other than Kadirsa carried out the wish of Natharsa Rowther that the said shops should be given to Kadirsa Rowther. After the death of Natharsa Rowther there were disputes between the members of the family. Those disputes were settled through the intervention of Panchayatdars. As part of their decision Kadirsa had taken over the liability of Mohammad Gani and the other members gave the shops to Kadirsa. They fulfilled the wish of Natharsa Rowther by transferring the said items to Kadirsa. Under Ex. D.2 they purported to confer for the first time title on Kadirsa in respect of the three shops. The document conferred title on Kadirsa and therefore it required registration and not having been registered it is inadmissible in evidence.
But it is contended that Ex. D.1 did not create interest in the immoveable property but had recorded the pre-existing gift. As I have already pointed out, it is clear from the recitals that Ex. D.2 itself purported to create title though disputes between the members of the family had their origin in a wish expressed by Natharsa Rowther. Learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Bhageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari(1). There, the owner of an impartible estate made a gift in June 1909 of a portion of the estate in favour of his second wife who thereupon entered into possession. In 1916 the owner of the estate filed a petition with the commissioner in which he related the deed of gift to his wife, expressed a doubt as to whether the deed of gift was valid, and asked the commissioner either to declare that the deed was valid or to give sanction to the execution of a fresh deed of gift. The wife also filed a similar petition. One of the questions raised was whether the petition filed by the wife was admissible in evidence as it was not registered. Their Lordships in connection with that contention made the following observations at page 301:
“The distinction is between a mere recital of a fact and somethitg which in itself creates a title……in the present case the statement In the petition of the respondent did not create any right in the Thakur. It merely acknowledged as a fact that such right was his. There was, therefore, no necessity for registration.”
Their Lordships, therefore, held that the petition did not create any right in Thakore but only acknowledged his pre-existing right. This judgment, therefore, has no bearing on the admissibility of Ex. D.2 Here the document itself creates a right in praesenti and, therefore, not having been registered is inadmissible in evidence.
It is then contended that this document though not admissible to establish title of Kadirsa or his heirs could be relied upon for the collateral purpose of showing the nature of possession. It is undoubtedly true that a document inadmissible for want of registration can be relied upon for proving the character of possession. The appellants can, therefore, rely upon this document for the purpose of showing that after Ismail Bivi redeemed the mortgages, that is from the years 1931 and 1933 she claimed to be in possession in her own right. But this circumstance will not be of any practical value to the appellants if the suit for redemption be otherwise in time. A few relevant facts bearing on the question of limitation or adverse possession may now be stated. The usufructuary mortgages were dated 27th, 28th and 29th of March 1867. Under Ex. P.1 dated 16-11-1891, i.e, the partition that was effected between the sons of the mortgagee they admitted their possession of the three shops as usufructuary mortgagees. The Court below held that the said admission operated as acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. That that admission was an acknowledgment was not disputed before me. One of the co-mortgagors, that is Noor Bivi redeemed mortgages in 1931 and 1933. The representatives of the other mortgagors filed the suit for redemption on 3-6-1946. If they are entitled to redeem the mortgage their suit would be well within time under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act as that Article prescribes the period of limitation as sixty years. As the acknowledgment was dated 16-11-1891 the suit would not be barred before 16-11-1951, and the suit having been filed on 3-6-1946 would, therefore, be within time.
The question, therefore, is whether one of several co-mortgagors could file a suit for redemption against the other co-mortgagors who redeemed the mortgage. The relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act read as follows:
S. 91:
“Besides the mortgagor any of the following persons may redeem or institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property, namely, (a) any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon, the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same.
S. 92:
Any of the persons referred to in S. 91 (other than the mortgagor) and any co-mortgagor shall, on redeeming property subject to the mortgage, have, so far as regards redemption, foreclosure or sale of such property, the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee.”
S. 95:
When one of several mortgagors redeems the mortgaged property, he shall, in enforcing his right of subrogation under S. 92 against his co-mortgagors, be entitled to add to the mortgage money recoverable from them such proportion of the expenses properly incurred in such redemption as is attributable to their share in the property.”
Under the aforesaid sections it is obvious that the co-mortgagor will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee if he redeems the mortgage. To put it in other words he will be substituted for the mortgagee whom he has paid off. The aforesaid sections have been amended by Act XX of 1929. Before the amendment there was a sharp conflict of judicial opinion in regard to the right of one of several mortgagors if he redeems the entire mortgage. But that conflict was set at rest by the Amending Act. The effect of the amendment on the rights of a co-mortgagor has been succinctly and accurately stated by Sir D.F Mulla in his Transfer of Property Act at page 598 (3rd edn.,):
“All these defects now disappear, and under the combined effect of Ss. 91 and 92 the case of one co-mortgagor redeeming is merely an instance of subrogation. The redeeming mortgagor has not merely a charge, but the mortgage, as to his share, is extinguished, and as to the shares of the other mortgagors he stands in the shoes of the mortgagee…. Where a co-mortgagor redeems the entire mortgage, his right as a mortgagee relates back to the date of the mortgage which he has redeemed for the benefit of priority over subsequent mortgages.”
The question of limitation in regard to such a suit fell to be considered in Mukha Narain Singh v. Ramlochan Tiwari. The facts in that case were the 4th defendant's predecessors in interest executed a usufructuary mortgage in 1866 in favour of the predecessor in interest of the 3rd defendant. The due date for payment was May or June 1870. The first defendant who is a transferee of a share of the mortgage property redeemed the mortgage in 1905. The plaintiffs who became the owners of the entire equity of redemption filed the suit on 4th September 1933 for redeeming their share of mortgage by proportionate payment of the mortgage debt. It was not in dispute that Art. 148 of the Limitation Act applied. The question was whether the period of limitation started in 1870 from the due date of payment or in 1905 when the first defendant redeemed the mortgage. The learned Judges after noticing the conflict of views that existed prior to the Amending Act of 1929 pointed out that by the Amending Act the co-mortgagor who redeemed the mortgage was clearly subrogated to the position of the mortgagee and they expressed their view on the question of limitation at page 944:
“Here also time had begun to run against all the mortgagors from the time when the right to redeem accrued, that is to say, from the due date of the mortgage, and did not cease to run against the plaintiffs merely because the other co-mortgagors redeemed the mortgage.”
This judgment is, therefore, authority for the position that one of several mortgagors who redeems the mortgage is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and therefore the co-mortgagor can redeem the subrogee within the period prescribed under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, that is, sixty years from the due date of payment. Broomfield and Lokur, JJ., expressed the same view in Raghavendracharya v. Vaman Srinivas(2). There also a co-mortgagor redeemed the entire mortgage and the other co-mortgagors filed a suit for redemption against the said co-mortgagor. The question for consideration was whether limitation would run under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act from the date of redemption or from the date when the debt becomes due under the original mortgage. The learned Judge observed at page 194:
“If the subrogee has the same rights as the mortgagee, the period of limitation for a suit against him must be the same and not different.”
They pointed out “that by reason of the amendments to Ss. 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act a co-mortgagor who had redeemed the mortgage had all the rights of the mortgagee including the right to interest on being redeemed.” I respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Bombay and Patna High Courts as they are consistent with the provisions of Ss. 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property Act. Indeed S. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly states that the co-mortgagor redeeming the mortgage has the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee.
I, therefore, hold that the plaintiff's suit for redemption having been filed within the period of sixty years from the date of the acknowledgment is clearly within time. In the result the judgment of the Court below is correct and this second appeal is dismissed with costs. (Leave refused).
V.C.S
Alert