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Annamalal Mudaliar, In Re.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application to file a Special Revision (S. R.) as a Civil Revision Petition against an order dated 15-10-1951 (in the nature of an award) passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tiruvannamalai, in C.L. No. 920/50-51.
The High Court Office raised two preliminary objections: (1) the petition was not filed within 90 days of the impugned order (there being a delay of eight days), and (2) it was doubtful whether a Civil Revision petition of this nature could be entertained under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The Court directed the advocate to file a formal petition seeking condonation of the eight-day delay and indicated that orders would be passed excusing the delay; this procedural issue was not pursued further in the opinion. The core question for decision was the maintainability of the S.R. as a civil revision petition under Article 227 in light of statutory provisions (notably Section 51(6)(a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 and Section 57 of that Act) and the constitutional scope of Article 227.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court may entertain a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies despite the statutory clause in Section 51(6)(a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 providing that such a decision "shall be final".
- Whether Article 227 of the Constitution confers judicial revisional powers (as distinct from mere administrative superintendence) on the High Court over tribunals and other authorities.
- Whether the Deputy Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act qualifies as a "tribunal" amenable to the High Court's superintendence under Article 227.
- Whether the petitioner was obliged to pursue the statutory remedy under Section 57 of Madras Act 6 of 1932 before invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227.
Arguments of the Parties
Government Pleader's Arguments
- Article 227 is not as wide as Article 226; Article 227 must be construed as conferring only a general superintendence and not the broad powers of judicial revision comparable to Article 226's remedial writ jurisdiction.
- The clause in Section 51(6)(a) that "the decision shall be final" indicates finality and thus prevents the High Court from revising such decisions; the remedy provided by Section 57 (revision to the Local Government or Registrar) is the statutory channel that should have been pursued.
- The tribunals amenable to Article 227 are those discharging functions analogous to courts; the Registrar or Deputy Registrar is not such a tribunal and therefore is not within the supervisory scope of Article 227.
Other Parties / Petitioner's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioner's separate legal arguments beyond seeking to file the S. R. as a civil revision petition and the procedural note that the petitioner did not pursue the remedy under Section 57.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Valli Ammal v. Corporation of Madras, 23 Mad LJ 531 | That a statutory clause declaring decisions "final" does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere; "final" refers to departmental finality. | Relied upon to hold that Section 51(6)(a)'s finality clause does not prevent High Court revision under Article 227. |
| Narasimha Rao v. The Chairman Municipal Council, 68 Mad LJ 162 | Construction of "final" in municipal statute contexts (Section 287(3) of Old City Municipal Act). | Referred to in support of the proposition that statutory finality clauses do not exclude High Court interference. |
| Ramasami v. Muthuvellappa, 44 Mad LJ 1 | Similar treatment of "final" clauses in municipal statutes. | Used with other authorities to show finality clause's limited effect. |
| Ram Dubey v. Government of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1952 Madh B 57 | Exclusion of High Court jurisdiction by statute is ultra vires. | Adduced to support that exclusion of High Court's jurisdiction is impermissible. |
| Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya, AIR 1952 Madh B 51 | Supports that statutory attempts to exclude High Court supervisory jurisdiction are invalid. | Relied upon in the same line of authorities to reject absolute effect of finality clauses. |
| Israil Khan v. State, AIR 1951 Assam 103 | Authority for the principle that exclusion of High Court jurisdiction is improper. | Included among cases showing invalidity of excluding High Court supervision. |
| Muhammad Baquar v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 Hyd 82 | Illustrates limits on excluding High Court revisional power. | Referred to in support of the limits on statutory finality. |
| Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandal, 56 Cal WN 124 | Discusses scope of "tribunal" and applicability of High Court supervision. | Used both to show limitations on excluding HC jurisdiction and to define "tribunal" under Article 227 (see later references). |
| Sholapur Municipality v. Tuljaram, AIR 1931 Bom 582 | High Court intervention by revision under earlier statutory regimes (Section 107 Government of India Act). | Employed to show historical exercise of revision and to compare with constitutional provisions. |
| Emperor v. Jainnadas, AIR 1937 Bom. 153 | Pre-constitutional decisions recognising High Court revisional intervention. | Referred to as part of authorities showing historic scope of superintendence. |
| Balakrishna v. Emperor, 57 Bom. 93 (F.B.) | Commentary that removal of High Court extraordinary revision was unfortunate under 1935 Act. | Quoted to show Sub-section (2) of Section 221 (1935 Act) had curtailed HC's power and that its omission in the Constitution restored a broader role. |
| Manmatha Nath v. Emperor, 37 Cal. W. N. 201 | Examples of earlier exercise of revision and its limits. | Appears as part of the historical survey of revisional powers restored by the Constitution. |
| Sakkal Sardar v. Issurdas, I.L.R. (1941) 2 Cal 366 | Interpretation that Section 224 (Act of 1935) conferred only administrative powers, not fresh revisional jurisdiction. | Used to show that earlier statutory bar limited judicial revision and to explain constitutional change. |
| Jahnabi v. Basudeb, 54 Cal. W. N. 628 | Similar view that Section 224 (Act 1935) did not confer new revisional jurisdiction. | Referred to in the historical analysis of judicial vs administrative superintendence. |
| Ryots of Carabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi, 70 Ind. App. 129 (P. C.) | Limitations on High Court extraordinary revision (Madras Board of Revenue example). | Cited as an instance where HC could not exercise revisional jurisdiction under prior law. |
| Bhagwan Dayal v. Chandu Lal, ILR (1938) 1 Cal. 256 | Decision on Deputy Collector's orders under Rent Act and HC's revisional powers. | Used to illustrate limits of HC revision under earlier statutory regime. |
| Re Adiraju Semanna, ILR (1938) Mad 988 | Decision on District Judge under Section 36, Legal Practitioners Act and HC's revisional jurisdiction. | Referred to as example of limitation under the 1935 Act. |
| Bonbehari v. Makhan Lal, ILR (1938) 2 Cal. 69 | Decision under Bengal Municipal Act and HC's revisional powers. | Used among authorities showing earlier limits to HC supervision. |
| Lalta Devi v. Balkrishna, AIR 1933 Lah. 327 | Listed among cases on High Court's revisional intervention. | Included in the catalogue of authorities showing instances where HC could exercise revision. |
| Gokool Chandra v. Motilal Ghose, AIR 1931 Cal. 553 | Another authority on exercise of revisional jurisdiction by HC. | Referenced in the list of precedents supporting HC intervention. |
| Jowahir Singh v. Fleming Shaw & Co., A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 28 | Authority included in the catalogue of HC's revisional case law. | Referred to as part of historical jurisprudence. |
| Indubala v. Lakshminarayan, A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 102 | Another case cited on HC revisional power. | Included among precedents showing scope of supervision. |
| Beli Ram v. Lal Shah, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 956 | Listed precedent on revisional jurisdiction. | Used as part of the supporting case-law corpus. |
| Soloman v. S. C. Stork, A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 758 | Precedent on HC revision principles. | Referred to in the list of authorities. |
| Lokenath v. Abani Nath, A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 102 | Another cited authority on HC supervision. | Included among cases supporting HC intervention where appropriate. |
| Behari Lal v. Sardarilal, A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 605 | Precedent addressing revisional jurisdiction. | Used in the catalogue of relevant authorities. |
| Ganesh v. Asanand, A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 259 | Case on HC's revisional powers. | Included in enumerated precedents. |
| Bhimnath v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1925 Pat 674 | Example: indefinite postponement of trial as ground for HC intervention. | Relied upon in describing circumstances warranting superintendence. |
| Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Jabbar, 54 Cal. W. N. 445 | Authority supporting broad supervisory power of High Court under constitutional provision. | Used to show Article 227 affords supervisory power over tribunals; cited in concluding Article 227 restored powers removed by 1935 Act. |
| Mani Ram v. Jhamru | Illustrates that the High Court's powers under Article 227 are broader than earlier statutory limits. | Used repeatedly to show scope of Article 227 and that availability of other remedies does not preclude HC interference. |
| Bimala Prosad v. State of West Bengal, 55 Cal WN 87 (S.B.) | Support that Article 227 gives a right to parties to seek variation or reversal of orders in proper cases. | Relied upon to treat Article 227 as conferring supervisory jurisdiction similar in effect to revision/appeal in proper cases. |
| Emperor v. P.C. Tarapore, AIR 1940 Sind 239 (F.B.) | Definition/explanation of "superintendence". | Quoted to explain the nature and limits of superintendence exercised by High Court. |
| Rajkumar Sen v. Ram Sundar, AIR 1932 P. G. 69 | Another authority on superintendence concept and scope. | Referred to in explaining the ambit of superintendence. |
| Abdur Rahim v. J. A. Pinto, AIR 1951 Hyd 11 (F B) | Supports the conclusion that Article 227 subjects tribunals to HC supervision. | Used as corroborative authority that tribunals come within Article 227. |
| Abdul Aziz v. State | Listed among authorities on Article 227's scope. | Referred to in the catalogue of cases supporting supervisory jurisdiction. |
| Hanunian Prasad v. Ram Autar, AIR 1952 Vindh P. 10 | Authority included among cases recognising Article 227's supervisory power. | Referred to in the discussion of Article 227's reach. |
| Sabitri Motor Service Ltd. v. Asansoi Bus Association, 65 Cal WN 81 | Held Commissioner acting as appellate authority under Motor Vehicles Act to be a "tribunal" under Article 227. | Applied to support the broad meaning of "tribunal" and to include non-court bodies discharging adjudicatory functions. |
| P.C. Guha v. B.A. Basil, 55 Cal WN 611 | Appellate Court under Rent Control Act held to be a "tribunal". | Used to reinforce that tribunals under special statutes can be subject to Article 227 supervision. |
| Kartar Singh v. Custodian M.E.P. Pepsu, AIR 1953 Pep 82 | Definition of "tribunal" as a wider term than Court; custodian held partly to act as tribunal. | Relied upon to conclude that agencies performing adjudicatory duties are amenable to Article 227. |
| Union of Workmen, R. S. N. G. N. & Rly. Co. Ltd. v. River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., AIR 1951 Assam 95 | Industrial Tribunal is a judicial body amenable to Article 227. | Used to show tribunals constituted under special Acts fall within Article 227 supervision. |
| Dr. M. Krishnamoorthi v. State of Madras, 1351-1 Mad LJ 709 | Holds that neither the Government nor disciplinary tribunals necessarily fall within Article 227 (distinguishing functions). | Referred to illustrate limits and distinctions in determining what is a tribunal under Article 227. |
| Mathur v. E. I. By. Co. | Allahabad HC held authority under Payment of Wages Act 1933 is not a tribunal for Article 227. | Used to show that not every statutory authority is a tribunal within Article 227. |
| Jagdip v. Harku, AIR 1926 Pat 37 | Denial of right to fair trial as ground for intervention. | Listed as an example where HC intervention is warranted. |
| Bishun Mohan v. Narayan Prasad, AIR 1924 Pat 434 | Decision considered hopelessly inadequate — ground for HC interference. | Included among examples of denial of justice warranting superintendence. |
| Pigot v. Ali Muhammad, AIR 1921 Cal 30 (S.B.) | Power to be exercised to do substantial justice even in criminal matters. | Referred to when describing circumstances for HC intervention. |
| Mohideen v. Bukshi Ram, 3 Rang 410 (F.B.) | Misuse or non-exercise of judicial discretion as ground for intervention. | Listed among examples where superintendence is appropriate. |
| Mt. Maharup Kuer v. Mahabir Singh, AIR 1928 Pat 111 | Order so bad on face of it as to amount to denial of justice. | Included in the catalogue of grounds for intervention. |
| Munigadu v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 1144 | Gross error on the face of the record. | Referred to as an example of interference for gross error. |
| Chater Bhuj v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 889 | Absence of reasonable opportunity of defence. | Listed as a ground for superintendence. |
| Venkata Ranga Bhusanam v. Karelia Ramaswami, AIR 1923 Mad 500 | Proceedings so erroneous as to manifestly amount to injustice. | Used to illustrate type of case where HC should intervene. |
| Shebalak v. Kama-ruddin, AIR 1922 Pat 435 (F.B.) | No absolute bar to approaching HC without exhausting other remedies. | Referred to show HC may entertain petitions even if other remedies exist in exceptional cases. |
| Sheo Prasad v. Sukhu Mehto, AIR 1923 Pat 518 | Refusal to frame triable issue as ground for intervention. | Listed among grounds warranting superintendence. |
| Aswini Kumar v. Dominion of India | High Court's powers under Article 227 are larger than under Section 115 C.P.C. | Quoted to demonstrate Article 227's broader scope. |
| Vurjee Vandass Moolji v. R.H. Singha & Co. | Supports broader HC powers under Article 227. | Referred to as part of the doctrinal support for expansive superintendence. |
| Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (S.B.) | Illustrates that Article 227 is not meant to correct slight errors or mere appreciation of evidence. | Used to caution against misuse of Article 227 for trivial complaints. |
| Sukhdeo v. Brij Bhushan | Absence, excess or refusal of jurisdiction as a ground for intervention. | Listed in the precis of grounds for HC interference. |
| Madhusudhan v. Shyam Dass | Ignoring provisions of law. | Included among causes justifying superintendence. |
| Girish Chandra v. Girish Chandra | Acting outside the limits of the statute or considering matters unjustified by the Act. | Used to show HC duty to ensure tribunals act within statutory limits. |
| Mt. Khela Wati v. Chet Ram (also cited as Mt. Khela Wati v. Chetram) | Arbitration or tribunal conduct against canons of justice to be set aside under Article 227. | Relied upon to demonstrate that arbitration under Co-operative Societies Act can be corrected if grossly unjust. |
| Ramhari v. Nilmoni | Consideration unjustified by statute. | Included as an example of grounds for HC intervention. |
| Anand Kumar v. Patch Singly | Finding not supported by evidence. | Listed among grounds for interference. |
| Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya, AIR 1952 Madh B 51 | Miscarriage of justice and arbitrary approach as grounds for intervention; also cited on invalidity of attempts to exclude HC jurisdiction. | Relied upon repeatedly as an authority for when Article 227 intervention is warranted. |
| Gurdwara Anandpur v. Kartar Singh | Example of illegal or improper order reviewable by HC. | Referred to among cases where HC intervened under Article 227. |
| Samanta Radha Prasanna v. Province of Orissa | Decision cited as authority on orders opposed to law. | Used to show circumstances where HC should interfere. |
| Muhammad Abdul Raoof v. State Of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 Hyd 50 (F.B.) | Transfer to secure fair and impartial trial. | Listed as an instance where HC intervention via Article 227 is available to secure fairness. |
| Shitab Singh v. Suraj Bali, 1952 All LJ 283 | Grave dereliction of duty as ground for HC superintendence. | Used in summarising the propositions for HC intervention. |
| Basant Lal v. Arjundas, AIR 1951 Vindh P. 4 | Existence of no other remedy as a justification for HC interference. | Included among authorities justifying Article 227 petitions when no alternate remedy exists. |
| Mitra v. Datta Gupta | Listed among cases illustrating miscarriage of justice grounds. | Referred to in the context of types of cases warranting intervention. |
| Union of Workmen of R. S. N & I. G. N. & Rly Co Ltd v. R. S. N. Co Ltd, AIR 1951 Assam 96 | See related entry above on industrial tribunals being amenable to Article 227. | Referred to among authorities that tribunals are within Article 227 jurisdiction. |
| State of West Bengal v. Durga Devi, AIR 1951 Cal 100 | Illustrates that Article 227 is not for correcting slight errors. | Used to emphasise limits of Article 227 intervention. |
| Bavalal v. Jivanlal, AIR 1951 Sail 43 | Not intended to correct mere failure to appreciate evidence by a final tribunal. | Referred to as authority restricting Article 227's use. |
| Emperor v. P.C. Tarapore, AIR 1940 Sind 239 (F.B.) | Repeated reference: definition and scope of superintendence. | Reiterated in the section describing supervisory powers and remedies available to HC. |
| Sant Lal v. Kedar Nath, AIR 1935 All 519 | Authority on superintendence and HC's disciplinary or corrective role. | Used when explaining HC powers to direct enquiries/disciplines for maladministration. |
| Rajkumar Sen v. Ramsundar, AIR 1932 PC 69 | Previously cited on superintendence and HC control. | Referred to in the description of supervisory powers. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by addressing three discrete points raised by the Government Pleader and the Office objections.
Point 1: The Court examined the statutory clause in Section 51(6)(a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 which declares certain decisions "final" and not to be called in question in any civil or revenue Court. The Court reviewed prior Madras High Court decisions and other authorities and concluded that such a clause indicates departmental finality (i.e., finality as regards internal departmental appeal) and does not oust the High Court's revisional jurisdiction. On this basis, the Court decided Point 1 in favour of the petitioner: the "decision shall be final" clause will not prevent High Court interference in revision.
Point 2: The Court analysed the scope of Article 227 by reference to historical statutory antecedents (Sections 107 and 224 of Government of India Acts of 1915, 1919 and 1935) and the constitutional text. The Court noted that Sub-section (2) of Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 had curtailed judicial interference by High Courts under that Act; that subsection was omitted in the Constitution (Article 227/327 discussion). The Court reasoned that the omission effectively restored to High Courts the power they exercised under earlier law (Section 107) and that Article 227 therefore confers supervisory power which can include judicial revisional functions in proper cases. The Court cited a chain of authorities to show that Article 227 applies to courts and tribunals and that the conditions previously imposed by Section 115 C.P.C. on revisional jurisdiction have been removed by the constitutional scheme.
Point 3: The Court addressed whether the Deputy Registrar is a "tribunal" within Article 227. It referred to judicial interpretation that "tribunal" is a wide term encompassing bodies other than courts that decide rights between parties under laws enacted by the State, and which perform adjudicatory (not merely executive) functions. The Court relied on authorities where administrative officials exercising adjudicatory functions were treated as tribunals and concluded that a Deputy Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act is a duly constituted tribunal performing judicial work and is therefore amenable to Article 227 superintendence.
Limits of Superintendence: The Court emphasised that Article 227 does not confer an unlimited power to correct every hardship. It summarised the well-established limits drawn from precedent — High Court intervention is appropriate where there is denial of fair trial, gross error on the face of the record, miscarriage of justice, abuse of natural justice, absence or excess of jurisdiction, or where no other adequate remedy exists. Conversely, Article 227 is not meant to correct mere errors of appreciation of evidence or trivial mistakes.
Application to the present case: On this understanding, the Court held that the Special Revision could be filed as a civil revision petition because the High Court has revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 over the judicial work of a tribunal like the Deputy Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act. However, admission of the petition would still depend on the facts and merits of the individual case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the Special Revision (S. R.) can be filed as a civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the clause in Section 51(6)(a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 declaring decisions "final" does not prevent High Court interference in revision. The office objection on delay was addressed by directing the advocate to file a formal petition for condonation of the eight-day delay, with orders to be passed excusing the delay. The office note was answered and the petition was posted for consideration of admission.
Implications:
- The direct effect on the parties: the petitioner is permitted to present the S. R. as a civil revision petition under Article 227, subject to condonation of the procedural delay and to the Court's subsequent consideration of admission on the merits.
- On the law: the opinion treats Article 227 as conferring supervisory jurisdiction on High Courts that, in proper cases, includes powers similar to judicial revision over tribunals and bodies exercising adjudicatory functions. It emphasises that such power is not unlimited and is to be exercised only where serious mala fides, gross error, or miscarriage of justice or similar grave grounds exist.
- The Court did not purport to create a novel legal principle beyond its application of existing precedent; it relied extensively on prior decisions to articulate limits and scope. The opinion therefore resolves the procedural question in favour of allowing a civil revision under Article 227 in the circumstances recited but leaves the substantive admission and determination to further consideration.
1. This S. R. is sought to be filed as a Civil Revision Petition against the order dated 15-10-1951, in the nature of an award, passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tiruvannamalai, in C. L. No. 920/50-51.
2. The High Court Office thereupon took two objections viz., that this Civil Revision petition has not been filed within 90 days of the date of the order and secondly, that it does not appear that a civil revision petition of this nature can be preferred on the foot of Article 227, Constitution of India.
3. Taking the first point, there is a delay of 8 days and the learned advocate is directed to file a formal petition for excusing the delay and orders will be passed excusing the delay. This aspect of the case need not detain us further.
4. The maintainability of this S. R. as a civil revision petition depends upon the decision whether it would be open to the High Court to revise, the order. Under Section 51(6)(a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 any decision passed by the Registrar under clause (a) of sub-section (2) or under Sub-section (5) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue Court. Section 57 prescribes a revision to the local Government or to the Registrar from such a decision. In this particular case the petitioner has not pursued the remedy under Section 57 of the Act. Secondly, it is contended by the Government Pleader that Article 227, Constitution of India is not couched in such wide terms as Article 226 which enables the High Court to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, various writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the constitution of India or for any other purpose and that Article 227 has to be construed as one conferring on the High Court no special authority beyond general superintendence on subjects set out under the various sub-clauses therein. Thirdly, it was contended that the tribunals contemplated therein are those tribunals which though not described as courts strictly speaking, discnarge the same or analogous functions as are being discharged by Courts and that the Registrar is not one such tribunal synonymous with court. I shall now deal with these points one by one.
5. Point l: The clause inserted "that the decision shall be final", in Section 51 (6) (a) of Madras Act 6 of 1932 has been the subject of decisions of Madras High Court. This High Court has held repeatedly that this clause does not take away the right of a Court to interfere but only indicates tne finality so far as the right of appeal within the department is concerned; see the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in --'Valli Ammal v. Corporation of Madras', 23 Mad LJ 531. Dealing with the word 'final1 in Section 287 (3) of the Old City Municipal Act, See -- 'Narasimha Rao v. The Chairman Municipal Council, Narasaraopet,' 68 Mad LJ 162, -- 'Ramasami v. Muthuvellappa', 44 Mad LJ 1. The exclusion of the High Court's Jurisdiction is 'ultra vires' has been herd in --'Ram Dubey v. Government of Madliya Bharat', AIR 1952 Madh B 57; --'Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya', AIR 1952 Madh B 51; -- 'Israil Khan v. State', AIR 1951 Assam 103; -- 'Muhaniad Bacjuar v. State of Hyderabad', AIR 1951 Hyd S2; and --'Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandal', 56 Cal WN 124. Point 1 therefore has to be decided in favour of the petitioner viz., that the decision passed by the Registrar shall be final will not in any way prevent the High Court from interfering in revision.
6. Point 2: The restrictions sought to be imposed upon the scope of Article 227, Constitution of India as well as confining the superintendence to administrative superintendence have been the subject-matter of a catena of decisions showing that the position taken by the Government Pleader is untenable. In regard to the scope of Article 227 viz., whether it includes powers of judicial revision as contra-distinguished from administrative supervision alone, we must bear ill mind the following facts. Under Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915, 'Superintendence' was interpreted to include judicial as well as administrative superintendence, and the High Court was intervening by revision in proper cases, under Section 107, Government of India Act, 1919, in cases where Section 115, Civil P. C- or Section 430, Criminal P. C. did not apply; -- 'Sholapur Municipality v. Tuljaram', AIR 1931 Bom 582 and -- 'Emperor v. Jainnadas', AIR 1937 Bom. 153 and--'Balakrishna v. Emperor', 57 Bom. 93 (F.B.) -- 'Manmatha Nath v. Emperor', 37 Cal. W. N. 201. But Sub-section (2) of Section 221, Government of India Act, 1935, expressly barred this power of judicial interference and Beaumont C. J. in -- 'Balakrishna v. Emperor', observed that this taking away of the power of extraordinary revision from the High Court was an unfortunate thing. By reason of Sub-section (2) it was held under the Act of 1935 that Section 224 had no application to legal proceedings and did not confer any fresh revisional jurisdiction and that it only conferred powers of an administrative character; -- 'Sakkal Sardar v. Issurdas', I. L. R. (1941) 2 Cal 366; -- 'Jahnabi v. Basudeb', 54 Cal. W. N. 628. Therefore it was held in the following leading cases that the High Court could not interfere in revision exercising judicial functions such as the Madras Board of Revenue as in -- 'Ryots of Carabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi', 70 Ind. App. 129 (P. C.), or the Deputy Collector making an order under the Rent Act as in -- 'Bhagwan Dayal v. Chandu Lal', ILR (1938) 1 Cal. 256 or the decision of the District Judge under Section 36, Legal Practitioners Act as in -- 'Re Adiraju Semanna', ILR (1938) Mad 988 or the decision under the Bengal Municipal Act as in -- 'Bonbehari v. Makhan Lal', ILR (1938) 2 Cal. 69. Other cases on which it was consistently held that the High Court could exercise its powers of revision only where no revision lay under Section 115, C. P. C. are:
-- 'Municipality of Sholapur v. Tulja Ram', AIR 1931 Bom. 582; -- 'Lalta Devi v. Balkrishna', AIR 1933 Lah. 327 (382); -- 'Gokool Chandra v. Motilal Ghose', AIR 1931 Cal. 553; -- 'Jowahir Singh V. Fleming Shaw & Co', A. I. R. 1937 Lah. 28; --'Indubala v. Lakshminarayan', A. I. R. 1935 Cal. 102 (107); -- 'Beli Ram v. Lal Shah', A. I. R. 1935 Lah. 956 -- 'Soloman v. S. C. Stork', A. I. R. 1934 Cal. 758; -- 'Lokenath v. Abani Nath', A. I. R. 1934 Cal. 102; -- 'Behari Lal v. Sardarilal', A. I. R. 1933 Lah. 605; -- 'Ganesh v. Asanand', A. I. R. 1933 Lah 259; -- 'Bhimnath v. Jagannath', A. I. R. 1925 Pat 674.
7. But under the Constitution of India, Article 327 is a reproduction of Section 224, Government of India Act of 1935 with the following changes; (i) "and tribunals throughout the territories" have been added in Clause (1) after courts; (ii) Sub-section (2) of Section 224, Government of India Act 1935 has been omitted; (iii) Clause (4) of Article 227 has been newly provided; I have already pointed out how Sub-section (2) of Section 224 barred judicial interference by the High Courts. This omission of Sub-section (2) of Section 224 in this Article shows that the Constitution of India has restored to the High Court the power It had under the Government of India Act of 1919:
-- 'Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Jabbar', 54 Cal. W. N. 445; -- 'Mani Ram v. Jhamru', (April); -- 'Bimala Prosad v. State of West Bengal', 55 Cal. W. N. 87 (S. B.). Therefore, it is now possible to hold by reason of this omission that the various conditions imposed by Section 115, Civil P. C. for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction as construed by the Privy Council decision in -- 'Vekatagiri Tyengar v. H. R, E. Board', Madras', 62 Mad L. W. 374 (P. C.) and -- 'Joy Chand v. Kamalaksha', 63 Mad L. W. 6:1949-2 Mad L. J. 6 (P. C.) have been removed. That this would be the proper construction of the Article receives strong support from the express exemption from the High Court's Superintendence of a Court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to Armed forces from which the inference is irresistible that all other tribunals and Courts, both civil and criminal are amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 Constitution of India; Vide --'Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Jabbar', 54 Cal WN 445; -- 'Abdur Rahim v. J. A. Pinto', AIR 1951 Hyd 11 (F B) and -- 'Abdul Aziz v. State', . Thus we arrive at the position that Article 227 confers upon the High Court a power of supervision over all judicial matters decided by any Court or tribunal within the State; -- 'Bimala Prosad v. State of West Bengal', (S B) --'Muhamad Baquar v. State of Hyderabad', AIR 1951 Hyd 82, -- 'Hanunian Prasad v. Ram Autar', AIR 1952 Vindh P. 10; -- 'Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya', AIR 1951 Madh B 51 (April); --Municipal Board Allahabad v. - District Judge, Allahabad', .
8. Point 3. The argument is that Article 227 covers only cases of tribunals discharging the same or analogous functions as were being discharged by Courts. This argument was advanced in -- 'Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandal', 56 Cal WN 124 and repelled by Chakravartti and Mookerjee JJ. It was pointed out therein that the word 'Tribunal' in Article 227 means a person or a body other than a Court set up by the State for deciding rights between contending parties in accordance with the rules having the force of law and doing so not by way of taking executive action, but of determining a question. The learned Judges have pointed out how in this view the Commissioner of a Division acting as the appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act was held to be a tribunal within Article 227 in -- 'Sabitri Motor Service Ltd. v. Asansoi Bus Association', 65 Cal WN 81 and an appellate Court under the Rent Control Act of 1950 was held to be a tribunal in -- 'P.C. Guha v. B.A. Basil', 55 Cal WN 611. The learned Judges concluded that the effect of the addition of the word 'Tribunal' to the word 'Court' in Art 227 and the removal of the bar against revision of Judgments in exercise of the power of superintendence, meant that all agencies whether Courts or not, performing the duty of deciding disputed questions of right between parties on behalf of and under the sanction of the State and in accordance with State-made laws are placed under the 'Administrative and judicial control of the High Court.' On this line of reasoning we have other decisions which may be usefully referred to. In -- 'Kartar Singh v. Custodian M.E.P. Pepsu', AIR 1953 Pep 82, Teja Singh C. J. and Kesho Ram Passey J. held that the word 'Tribunal' is a general term and it includes a Court of justice or in other words every Court of justice or a Court can be described as a tribunal, but every tribunal is not necessarily a Court, that since the Legislature has used both the words together their intention appears to be that the word 'Tribunal' should have a wider meaning than Court or Court of justice and that probably it would be permissible to think that it is used in the popular sense meaning a person or body of persons having authority to hear and decide disputes so as to bind the disputants. In that case it was held that apart from the administrative and executive functions that the Custodian under the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, has to perform, it was also a part of his duty to work as a tribunal in the sense mentioned above and so in respect of what he did as a tribunal he was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. In -- 'Union of Workmen, R. S. N. and I. G. N. & Rly. Co. Ltd. v. River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.', AIR 1951 Assam 95: Thadani C. J. and Ram Labhaya J. held that a duly constituted Industrial Tribunal is a judicial body and amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court in revision under Article 227 in regard to matters arising out of awards passed under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is on the same principle that my Lord the Chief Justice and Panchapskesa Ayyar J. have held in -- 'Dr. M. Krishnamoorthi v. State of Madras', 1351-1 Mad LJ 709 that neither the Government nor the disciplinary proceedings Tribunal holding enquiry on charges against Government servants and recommending disciplinary action would fall under Article 227, Constitution of India; and the Allahabad High Court has held in --'Mathur v. E. I. By. Co.', (F B) that authority invested with jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act 1933 is- not a tribunal. The use of the unqualified word jurisdiction includes all different Jurisdictions of the High Court -- Civil, Criminal, Admiralty, Testamentary, Matrimonial, etc.
9. Therefore the S. R. in this case can be preferred as a civil Revision Petition because this High Court has got revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 by way oi superintendence over the judicial work of a duly constituted tribunal, like the Deputy Registrar under the Co-operative Soicieties Act.
10. The matter does not rest here because the superintendence conferred on the High Court does not mean any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship; vide -- 'Manmatha Nath v. Emperor', 39 Cal W.N. 201; -- 'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Siikumar Mukherjee', (S.B.). 'Superintendence has been defined and explained in -- 'Emperor v. P.C. Tarapore', AIR 1940 Sind 239 (F.B.), -- 'Rajkumar Sen v. Ram Sundar', AIR 1932 P. G. 69, -- 'Muhamad Baquar v. State of Hyderabad', AIR 1951 Hyd 82 and -- 'Israil Khan v. State', AIR 1951 Assam 106. The limits within which the prerogative can be exercised by the High Court have been the subject-matter of several recent decisions and the scope of such exercise has now become fairly delimited. I shall briefly summarise the recent well-known decisions indicating the power to correct and interfere. In construing the scope of the powers under this Article 227 we can usefully bear in mind the cases under Section 107 because it is now settled opinion that Article 227 has restored to the High Court the powers exercised under Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915. The following summarised statement will indicate the scope of interference under Section 107.
Denial of right of fair trial: -- ' Jagdip v. Harku', AIR 1926 Pat 37; decision hopelessly Inadequate --'Bishun Mohan v. Narayan Prasad', AIR 1924 Pat 434. Indefinite postponement of trial: --'Bhimnath v. Jagannath', AIR 1925 Pat 674; power to be exercised in doing real and substantial Justice even in criminal matters: -- 'Pigot v. Ali Muhammad', AIR 1921 Cal 30 (S.B.). Misuse of power and non-exercise of judicial discretion: -- 'Mohideen v. Bukshi Ram', 3 Rang 410 (F.B.); Order so bad on the face of it as to be in a sense denial of justice: -- Mt. Maharup Kuer v. Mahabir Singh', AIR 1928 Pat 111; Gross error on the face of record: -- 'Munigadu v. Emperor', AIR 1925 Mad 1144; Absence of reasonable opportunity of defence:
-- 'Chater Bhuj v. Emperor', AIR 1930 Lah 889; Proceedings so erroneous as to manifestly amount to injustice: -- 'Venkata Ranga Bhusanam v. Karelia Ramaswami', AIR 1923 Mad 500; No absolute bar to party coming to High Court before exhausting other remedies: -- 'Shebalak v. Kama-ruddin', AIR 1922 Pat 435 (F.B.); Refusal to frame triable Issue: -- 'Sheo Prasad v. Sukhu Mehto'; AIR 1923 Pat 518.
Then coming to the High Court's powers under Article 227 it has been laid down that the High Court's powers under Article 227 are larger than under Section 115 Civil P.C. -- 'Aswini Kumar v. Dominion of India', ; -- 'Mani Ram v. Jhamru', and -- 'Vurjee Vandass Moolji v. R.H. Singha & Co.', . The fact that other remedies are open will not prevent the High Court from interfering; vide -- 'Ma'ni Ram v. Jhamru'. The following precis shows the existence of the powers to correct and interfere In the following cases; Without jurisdiction: --'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee', (S.B.); Absence, excess or refusal of jurisdiction: -- 'Sukh- deo v. Brij Bhushan', ; Ignoring the provisions of law: -- 'Madhusudhan v. Shyam Dass', ; Acting outside the limits of the Statute: -- 'Girish Chandra v. Girish Chandra', ; Proceeding against natural justice: -- 'Mt. Khela Wati v. Chet Ram', ; Consideration unjustified by Act;
-- 'Ramhari v. Nilmoni', ; Finding not supported by evidence: -- 'Anand Kumar v. Patch Singly, ; Injustice: -- 'Aswini Kumar v. Dominion of India', Arbitrary dismissal of suit: -- 'Mani Ram v. Jhamru', Miscarriage of justice by arbitrary or despotic approacli: -- 'Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya', AIR 1952 Madh B. 51; Illegal and Improper order:
-- 'Gurdwara Anandpur v. Kartar Singh', ; Opposed to law: -- 'Samanta Radha Prasanna v. Province of Orissa', ; To secure fair and impartial trial transfer can be made: -- 'Muhammad Abdul Raoof V. State Of Hyderabad', AIR 1951 Hyd 50 (F.B.).
Article 227 although it does not in terms give a right to interfere with orders is an article which does give a right to High Court to interfere in proper cases and therefore does give rights to the parties to move the High Court to vary or reverse orders i.e. to exercise powers similar to those exercised in appeal and hence must be construed in the same manner as provisions in a statute would be construed which gave a right to parties to challenge a decision by appeal or revision; -- 'Bimala Prosad v. State of West Bengal', (S.B.). Where a tribunal has been set up under a special Act, it is the duty of the High Court to see, in the exercise of its power of superintendence, that such tribunal acts within the limits of the Statute creating it, and applies correctly and properly the laws it is authorised to administer:
--'Girish Chandra v. Girish Chandra', . If in an arbitration under the Co-operative Societies Act, the conduct of the case and the decision is against all canons of justice, the High Court will set aside the order of the tribunal under Article 227: --'Mt. Khela Wati v. Chetram', . In the case of the Tribunals, the power of the High Court under Article 227 at least includes power to require that the facts should be fully investigated and fairly found and when found fairly considered after giving the parties a proper opportunity to explain them; --'Haripada Dutta v. Ananta Mandai', 56 Cal WN 124. Power conferred by Article 227 is not in any way controlled under Article 226: --'Ramprasad v. State, 1952 All LJ 161.
11. The substance of all these decisions can be summed up in three propositions viz. it does not involve a responsibility of the superintending tribunal for the correctness of the decisions of the inferior Courts, either in fact or law. If the inferior Court, after hearing the parties, comes to an erroneous decision on a matter within its jurisdiction, the Court having power of superintendence never interferes. The only mode of questioning the propriety of such a decision is by appeal. Nor can this power be invoked to get round any express provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law. Secondly, the general superintendence conferred by this constitutional provision over all jurisdictions subject to appeal involves a duty to keep them within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. Therefore, the interference under Article 227 would naturally be in cases where there is a grave dereliction of duty: --'Shitab Singh v. Suraj Bali', 1952 All LJ 283, or there is a flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law of natural justice or there is in existence no other remedy for remedying the wrong: -- --Madhusadhan v. Shyam Doss', ;
--'Basant Lal v. Arjundas', AIR 1951 Vindh P. 4; or prevent miscarriage of justice: --'Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya', AIR 1952 Madh B 51; --'Mani Ram v. Jharmu', ; --'Mitra v. Datta Gupta',; --'Union of Workmen of R. S. N & I. G. N. & Rly Co Ltd v. R. S. N. Co Ltd', AIR 1951 Assam 96; --'Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Jabbar', 64 Cal WN 44b; Nor is Article 227 meant for correcting slight errors: -- 'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee', (S.B.); --'State of West Bengal v. Durga Devi', AIR 1951 Cal 100, or to interfere in cases of mere failure to appreciate evidence on the part of a final tribunal. --'Bavalal v. Jivanlal', AIR 1951 Sail 43;
--'Israil Khan v. The State', AIR 1951 Assam 106.
12. In short, superintendence includes power to guide, advice and encourage Judges of the subordinate Courts, to direct subordinate Courts and tribunals to carry out its orders; and to direct enquiry with a view to take disciplinary action for flagrant maladministration Of justice; see --'Emperor v. P.C. Tarapore', AIR 1940 Sind 239 (F.B.); --'Sant Lal v. Kedar Nath', AIR 1935 All 519, and --'Rajkumar Sen v. Ramsundar', AIR 1932 PC 69. If we bear these propositions in mind and apply these well-established principles to the facts of the case on hand, the extraordinary powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 would enable the High Court to ensure that the tribunals are kept within the bounds of their authority and that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner.
13. So this S. R. can be filed as a civil revision petition but its admission depends on the facts of this case subject to the observation made above. The office note is answered accordingly and for consideration of admission post the matter.
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