Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Singana Sathiraju v. Merla Sathamma

Madras High Court
Mar 7, 1952
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment debtor is the appellant in a Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arising from execution proceedings under a decree dated 3-4-1935. In execution of that decree, the appellant's properties were attached and put up for sale in Execution Petition (E.P.) No. 104 of 1947. The execution petition was posted for sale on 6-2-1948 and for final hearing on 13-2-1948. On 6-2-1948 the court recorded an endorsement on the E.P.: “No instructions, no bids, sale stopped. E.P closed.”

On 11-2-1948 the decree-holder filed Execution Petition No. 73 of 1948, praying that it be treated as a continuation of E.P. No. 104 of 1947 and for fixing a date of sale and proceeding with the sale. The appellant raised two objections to E.P. No. 73 of 1948: (1) that the 6-2-1948 order was a final order and therefore the subsequent petition, presented 12 years after the decree, was barred by limitation; and (2) that because counsel had reported “no instructions” on 6-2-1948, counsel was not entitled to present E.P. No. 73 of 1948 and the presentation was not proper.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court's endorsement of 6-2-1948 (noting “No instructions, no bids, sale stopped. E.P closed.”) amounted to a final dismissal of E.P. No. 104 of 1947 such that a subsequent execution petition (E.P. No. 73 of 1948) would be barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the presentation of E.P. No. 73 of 1948 by counsel who had earlier reported “no instructions” amounted to an improper presentation because the vakalat (authority to act) had terminated.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • First objection: The endorsement/closing order of 6-2-1948 was, in effect, a final order dismissing the petition. R. 187 of the Civil Rules of Practice and O. 21 R. 69 of the Code of Civil Procedure were relied upon to show there had been default by the decree-holder and that the petition had been finally disposed of.
  • Second objection: Because counsel had reported “no instructions” on 6-2-1948, that amounted to withdrawal of his vakalat (authority) and therefore the subsequent presentation of E.P. No. 73 of 1948 by that counsel was not a proper presentation.

Decree-holder's Position (as reflected in the petition)

  • The decree-holder filed E.P. No. 73 of 1948 seeking that it be treated as a continuation of E.P. No. 104 of 1947 and for fixing a date for sale and proceeding with sale. The execution petition bears the decree-holder's signature.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gangaraju v. Bhimalingam Where property put up for sale is not sold because there were no bidders and the petition is recorded as “closed”, such a recording does not amount to a final disposal of the petition; a subsequent execution application may be a continuation of the prior one. The court relied on this authority to hold that the order closing E.P. No. 104 of 1947 for want of bids did not amount to a final order and that E.P. No. 73 of 1948 was a continuation of the earlier execution proceedings.
Krishna Pillai v. Ranganatha Pillai (Horwill J.) Observation that when a vakil reports he has “no instructions” it may be treated as withdrawal of his vakalat; in that case an application by the Advocate under the same vakalatnama to set aside an ex parte decree was dismissed. The court examined this decision but noted that O. 3 R. 4(2) (CPC) was not placed before Horwill J. The decision was discussed but not accepted as controlling because the rule requires written termination; the court distinguished the case on that basis.
V. Manickam Pillai v. Mahudum Bathummal Referred to in Krishna Pillai as supporting the view that reporting “no instructions” may amount to withdrawal of vakalat. The court noted that this decision was cited to Horwill J. but emphasised that the express statutory provision O. 3 R. 4(2) (CPC) requires written termination and that the decision was not considered against that specific provision in the earlier judgment.
Balakrsishna Aiyar v. Muthammal Holds that a vakil's mere oral statement of having no instructions does not amount to withdrawal of the vakalat unless it is stated in writing. The court relied on this decision to support its view that, absent a written withdrawal, an oral report of “no instructions” does not terminate the vakalat and therefore the presentation of E.P. No. 73 of 1948 by the counsel was proper.
Manickam Pillai v. Mahudum Bathumal (Full Bench) The Chief Justice observed that a written withdrawal need not be in any specified form and that an endorsement on a pleading that the pleader had “no instructions except to apply for an adjournment” could be a written withdrawal; further observed that when a pleader reports no instructions he may be deemed not to have appeared thereafter. The court considered these observations but limited their application: it acknowledged that a written endorsement can constitute withdrawal, but held that the Full Bench observations about oral reporting could not be applied to the present facts where there was no written termination and O. 3 R. 4(2) requires written termination.
Radhakrishnan v. The Collector of Jaunpuri (Privy Council) Holds that where the pleader stated he could not conduct the case and had received no instructions, the applicant could not be held to have appeared; relates to whether physical presence of Advocate with no written withdrawal amounts to appearance. The Full Bench relied on this decision in part; the court in the present opinion noted the Privy Council decision but used it only in the context of discussing the limits of oral reporting—ultimately reiterating that written withdrawal is required by O. 3 R. 4(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the two objections in turn, following statutory rules and precedent cited in the text.

  1. On the question whether the 6-2-1948 endorsement amounted to a final dismissal, the court considered the provisions relied upon by the appellant:
    • R. 187 of the Civil Rules of Practice: The court held R. 187 applies only to defaults in compliance with orders as to payment of batta and other specified steps; it does not apply to the present facts and therefore is not applicable to treat the order as a final dismissal.
    • O. 21 R. 69 (CPC): The court observed O. 21 R. 69 empowers the court to adjourn sales under certain terms but does not prescribe what the court should do if sale is not adjourned. The practice of “closing” a petition for statistical purposes does not amount to a final dismissal. The court relied on Gangaraju v. Bhimalingam to hold that where a petition is closed for want of bids, there is no final disposal and a subsequent execution petition may be treated as a continuation. Applying this, the court concluded E.P. No. 73 of 1948 is a continuation of E.P. No. 104 of 1947 and not barred as a fresh, time-barred petition.
  2. On the question whether presentation by counsel who had reported “no instructions” was proper, the court examined the law on termination of a vakalat:
    • The court relied on the express provision of O. 3 R. 4(2) (CPC), which states that an appointment of a pleader shall be filed in Court and shall be deemed in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or pleader and filed in Court, or until the client or pleader dies or until proceedings end. The court emphasised the language of O. 3 R. 4(2) as clearly requiring a writing to determine the authority.
    • The court considered prior authorities (Krishna Pillai, V. Manickam Pillai, Balakrsishna Aiyar, and the Full Bench in Manickam Pillai v. Mahudum Bathumal) discussing whether an oral report of “no instructions” suffices. It noted that some judgments treated oral reporting as withdrawal, but observed that Horwill J.'s decision in Krishna Pillai did not appear to have the statutory provision (O. 3 R. 4(2)) placed before the judge.
    • The court held that for a proper termination of vakalat, a document in writing is necessary (though its form is immaterial) showing intention to determine authority. In the present case there was no writing terminating the vakalat; the counsel only orally reported no instructions. The court therefore concluded there was no proper termination of the vakalat.
    • The court also noted that the execution petition bore the signature of the decree-holder himself, which independently rendered it a valid petition even apart from representation by counsel.
    • On balance, relying on the statutory rule and authorities such as Balakrsishna Aiyar that support the need for a written withdrawal, the court concluded the presentation of E.P. No. 73 of 1948 on 11-2-1948 was a proper presentation and the appellant's objection on this ground fails.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave is refused.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • E.P. No. 73 of 1948 was held to be a continuation of E.P. No. 104 of 1947; the court ruled that the earlier endorsement closing the petition for want of bids did not amount to a final order or dismissal that would bar continuation.
  • The court held that the presentation of E.P. No. 73 of 1948 on 11-2-1948 was proper: (a) the execution petition bore the decree-holder's signature, making it valid on its face; and (b) in the absence of any written termination of the vakalat pursuant to O. 3 R. 4(2), an oral statement by counsel that he had “no instructions” did not terminate the vakalat.

The opinion does not state or purport to create any broad new legal principle beyond applying existing statutory rule O. 3 R. 4(2) and relevant authorities to these facts; the decision's practical effect is the dismissal of the appeal and validation of the continuation and presentation of the execution petition.

V.C.S
Show all summary ...

The judgment debtor is the appellant in this civil miscellaneous second appeal. In execution of a decree passed against him on 3-4-1935, his properties were attached and brought to sale in E.P No. 104 of 1947. The execution petition was posted for sale to 6-2-1948 and for final hearing to 13-2-1948. On 6-2-1948 the following endorsement is found on the E.P “No instructions, no bids, sale stopped. E.P closed.” On the 11th of February 1948 the decree-holder filed an Execution Petition No. 73 of 1948 with a prayer that it may be treated as a continuation of the prior E.P No. 104 of 1947 and for fixing a date of sale and for proceeding with the sale.

Two objections were raised on behalf of the appellant (1) that the order dated 6th February 1948 was a final order and E P. No 73 of 1948 having been presented 12 years after the date of the decree, is barred by limitation and (ii) that the Counsel having reported no instructions on the 6th of February 1948, he is not entitled to present E.P No. 73 of 1948 and the presentation is not a proper presentation.

As regards the first of these objections, the learned Counsel relies on R. 187 of the Civil Rules of Practice and argued that there was a default on the part of the decree-holder and that the order closing the petition amounted to a dismissal of the petition and therefore it was a final order. But it must be noted that R. 187 will have application only in cases of default of compliance of any order of Court as to payment of batta and other steps to be taken as provided therein. R. 187 has therefore no application to this case. Further, the learned Counsel relied upon O. 21 R. 69 and contended that in as much as the sale was posted for the 6th of February 1948 and neither the decree-holder nor his Counsel appeared and requested for an adjournment, the order disposing of the petition amounted to a dismissal and, therefore, it was a final order. O. 21 R. 69 only empowers the Court to exercise its discretion to adjourn any sale under certain terms and conditions provided therein but it does not say anything as to what the Court ought to do in case the sale is not adjourned. The Court has rightly in such cases closed the petition for statistical purposes and it cannot amount to a final order dismissing the petition. This position is covered by t e authority of the judgment of Justice Happell in Gangaraju v. Bhimalingam(1) where it has been held that where in an execution application the property is put up for sale but is not sold because there were no bidders and thereafter the District Munsif makes an order that the petition was “closed” there is no final disposal of the petition and a subsequent execution application filed would be in continuation of the prior one. I, therefore, consider that the petition, having been closed only for want of bids the order closing the petition does not amount to a final order and E.P No. 73 of 1948 is a continuation of the previous execution proceedings.

The only other question that has to be considered is whether the petition has been properly and validly presented. From the original of the execution petition it is found that the decree-holder himself has signed it and that will be a valid petition but the question has been whether the presentation by the Counsel, who is stated to have reported no instructions on the previous occasion, would amount to proper representation. As matters stand there appears to be some doubts expressed to as to the power of the Counsel, who reports no instructions orally to represent his client in subsequent proceedings. The learned Counsel argued this question and I consider it necessary to deal with it.

The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment of Horwill J. in Krishna Pillai v. Ranganatha Pillai(2). In that case, as the defendants were not ready their Advocate through another Advocate reported no instructions. The suit was then decreed ex parte. In an application to set aside the ex parte decree by the Advocate under the same vakalatnama, it was held that it was not a proper vakalatnama as the Advocate has withdrawn it when he reported no instructions in the suit. The application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed. The learned Judge agreed that the dismissal was proper and observed that when the Vakil reports no instructions, it means that he withdraws his vakalatnama, and if authority was necessary for that position, the learned Judge referred to the decision in V. Manickam Pillai v. Mahudum Bathummal(3), and observed that that decision supported the view taken by the learned Judge. It does not appear however that the provision of law relating to the withdrawal of vakalats and the termination of the vakil's authority was placed before the learned Judge. O. 3 R. 4(2) provides that every appointment of a pleader shall be filed in Court and shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader as the case may be and filed in Court or until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. The language of O. 3 R. 4(2) is clear that the power given under the vakalat is in force until determined as provided by the rule i.e, by means of a document signed by the client or pleader as the case may be. Thus when the pleader wants to terminate his authority, he can file in Court a document withdrawing his vakalat from the client and when the client wants to terminate the authority of his Vakil he can file a document in writing signed by him. There is no such writing in the present case and admittedly the Counsel orally reported no instructions. I consider it is necessary that to determine the authority of a Counsel some document in writing is necessary whatever may be the form of the document showing an intention on the part of the Counsel to determine the vakalat. In the absence of such a document, it cannot be said that the vakalat has been duly and properly determined. The decision in Balakrsishna Aiyar v. Muthammal, supports this view. In that case, it was held that the mere fact that a Vakil after having appeared for the party at many hearings says he has no instructions does not amount to his withdrawal from the undertaking in his vakalatnama unless it is so stated. There is no difficulty in view of the specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure to say that in the present case the presentation by the Counsel on the 11th of February 1948 was a proper presentation even apart from the signature of the party in the execution petition, since there is admittedly nothing in writing to cancel the vakalatnama.

The learned Counsel for the appellant however relied upon the observations of the learned Chief Justice in the Full Bench case reported in Manickam Pillai v. Mahudum Bathumal, also referred by Horwill, J. in Krishna Pillai v. Ranganatha Pillai, as supporting the contention that even an oral representation by the Counsel that he has no instructions to appear would amount to cancellation of the vakalat notwithstanding the specific rule in the C.P.C It was held that when a pleader engaged in a case reports that he has no instructions, whether after he has asked for an adjournment and been refused or not, he must be deemed not to have appeared in the case thereafter even if there be no formal withdrawal in writing of the vakalat. It was held further that the Court must be deemed to have given its leave within the meaning of O. 3 R. 4(2) C.P.C to the pleader to withdraw his vakalat when it does not object to such withdrawal. In that case, on the day when the case came up for hearing, the pleader asked for an adjournment and stated that if adjournment were not granted, he had no further instructions, to go on with the case. He had previously filed a vakalat in the ordinary form. He did something more than the mere asking for an adjournment. He took the plaint which he had drawn and signed and endorsed it as follows:

“I have no instructions except to apply for an adjournment.” The provision in the Civil Procedure Code was slightly different in language. Sub-R. 2 was in the following terms:

“Every such appointment, when accepted by a pleader shall be filed in Court and shall be considered to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader as the case may be and filed in Court. …..”

The learned Chief Justice observed that the statute does not require the writing containing the withdrawal by the pleader of his vakalat to be in any specified from and that that which he endorsed on the back of the plaint was a perfectly good written withdrawal from his duties and obligations under the vakalat. I entirely agree that there is nothing even in the present rule prescribing the form of withdrawal excepting that there must be a withdrawal in writing signed by the pleader. Since there was an endorsement on the plaint that he had no instructions except to apply for an adjournment, it was held that it amounted to a proper withdrawal of his vakalat The following observations of the Chief Justice in that case were relied upon to show that even a representation would be sufficient to terminate the vakalat:

“But, while basing our decision on that short ground, we think, in view of some decisions of that Court, one recently reported decision and another which is unreported that we ought to point out that when this matter was dismissed in those oases, a tention does not seem to have been drawn to the decision of the Privy Council in Radhakrishnan v. The Collector of Jaunpuri. The facts of that case are set out in a question from the judgment of the Subordinate. Judge, which runs as follows:

“That day (i.e, the day for hearing) the pleader for the applicant stated that he could not conduct the case, and he had received no instructions from his client. Thereupon the Court proceeded to try the case and tried and decided the issues on the evidence adduced on the plaintiff's behalf and decreed the suit against the applicant

“Their Lordships held in that case that the applicant could not be held in the circumstances to have appeared. We trust that if this matter comes before the Courts again, notice will be taken of that decision, because, so far as appears a wider question is determined there, as there is no statement a feature that exists in this case, to the effect that the pleader has filed an instrument in writing taking himself out of his vakalat a withdrawal on his part which Or. III R. 4 contemplates.

“The exact question put to us is, if when a pleader reports no instructions, whether after he had asked for an adjournment and been refused, or not, the Court is correct in holding that the party for whom the pleader was appearing has not appeared. We think that the only answer can be that, at any rate, in the circumstances of the case, the pleader cannot be deemed to have appeared.”

The learned counsel contends that it may be but he is not definite that the unreported decision may be referred to in the judgment of the Full Bench decision in Balahrishna Aiyar v. Muthammal. The question that arose for determination in that case was whether simple reporting of no instructions orally would amount to a proper withdrawal of the vakalat. The Privy Council decision referred to by the learned Chief Justice was Radhakrishnan v. The Collector of Jaunpuri. The only question that arose for decision there was whether after reporting no instructions, the physical presence of the Advocate in Court would amount to appearance even though the party was absent since there was no written representation withdrawing his vakalat. The learned Chief Justice's opinion in Manicham Pillai v. Mahudum Bathumal was that it does not matter whether the reporting of no instructions was in writing or oral. Once the Counsel states that he is unable to proceed with the case and had no instructions to do to, it amounted to non-appearance of the party and that was probably the subject matter of the unreported decision mentioned in the judgment. The observations of the learned Chief Justice could not have been intended to apply to a case like the present one where the Counsel reports no instructions without anything in writing. For a proper termination of the vakalat, O. 3 R. 4(2) must be strictly observed in the sense that there must be something in writing; the form of the document is immaterial provided the intention to terminate the authority is clearly expressed. The decision of Horwill J., reported in Krishna Pillai v. Ranganatha Pillai(4) was based on the observations of the learned Chief Justice in Manicham Pillai v. Mahudum Bathumal quoted above, which have relation to the question of termination of Counsel's authority under a vakalat and the attention of the learned Judge has also not been brought to the express provision in the Civil Procedure Code, viz., O. 3 R. 4(2). I have already found that, in this case the Execution Petition No. 73 of 1948 even otherwise has been duly and properly presented. The appellant fails in both the objections.

The appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave refused.

V.C.S