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S. Ramakrishnaiah v. President, District Board, Nellore
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicant, a citizen of India and a teacher employed as Junior Assistant at Board High Schools in Kurichedu and later Singaroyakonda since 1950, was a member and office bearer of "The Andhra Rashtra Elementary Teachers' Federation" and its affiliated Taluk and District Federations. In April 1950, the applicant was served with an order by the President of the Nellore District Board directing teachers who were members or office bearers of unrecognised teachers' federations to either cease their connection or resign from their teaching posts, failing which disciplinary action would follow. This directive was based on Government Order (G.O.Ms No. 416, Education, dated 24th February 1939), which regulated the recognition of teachers' unions and prohibited teachers in recognised elementary schools from joining unrecognised unions without prior permission. Despite representations made by the applicant and others, a subsequent order threatened removal from service if explanations were not submitted. The applicant resigned his membership under compulsion and challenged the validity of the 1939 Government Order, contending it infringed his constitutional right under Article 19(1)(c) to form associations.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Government Order of 1939, which prohibits teachers in recognised elementary schools from becoming members of unrecognised teachers' unions without prior permission, is consistent with the fundamental right to freedom of association guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Government or its executive authorities can impose prior permission or approval as a condition precedent to an employee's right to join any association other than the recognised association.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The applicant argued that the rule preventing membership in unrecognised teachers' unions without prior permission is inconsistent with the fundamental right of freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c).
- The restriction imposed by the Government Order is an unreasonable limitation on the exercise of this freedom.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents contended that the applicant's actions contravened the provisions of the 1939 Government Order.
- The President of the District Board was justified in taking action against the applicant.
- The Government asserted that fundamental rights are not absolute and reasonable restrictions in the interest of the teaching profession are necessary to maintain discipline and ensure proper education.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United Public Workers v. Mitchell | Validity of restrictions on political activity by government employees | Used to illustrate the complexity of restricting state employees' political activities; however, the Court confined itself to the narrower question of association membership. |
| Whitney v. California | Freedom of association can be restricted when membership involves unlawful acts | Distinguished to clarify that the applicant's association was not unlawful, so the prohibition could not be justified on this ground. |
| New York Ex. Rel. Byrant v. Zimmerman | Permissible restrictions on membership in secret or unlawful organizations | Similarly distinguished; the associations here were not secret or unlawful. |
| Lovell v. Griffin | Invalidity of prior permission/licensing requirements infringing freedom of the press and speech | Illustrated the principle that prior restraint or administrative censorship of fundamental freedoms is unconstitutional. |
| Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organisation | Unconstitutionality of requiring permits for public assembly | Reinforced that official discretion cannot substitute for the right to free speech and assembly. |
| Schneider v. Irvington | Invalidity of ordinances requiring permits for canvassing and distribution of literature | Supported the principle against administrative censorship of fundamental freedoms. |
| Largent v. Texas | Unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech and press by requiring permits | Emphasized that dissemination of ideas cannot depend on administrative approval. |
| Romesh Thapper v. State of Delhi | Affirmed the principle against prior restraint on fundamental freedoms | Supported the Court's conclusion rejecting prior permission requirements for association membership. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged the importance of the teaching profession and the government's interest in maintaining discipline and proper education. However, it emphasized that fundamental rights, including the freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c), cannot be curtailed by administrative discretion or prior restraint. The Court examined the Government Order of 1939 and concluded that empowering the Director of Public Instruction to forbid or dissolve unions not conforming to prescribed rules, and requiring prior permission for teachers to join unions, constituted an impermissible abridgment of the constitutional right. The Court distinguished cases involving unlawful associations, noting the applicant’s union was not unlawful. It relied on established precedents to hold that freedom of association cannot be made subject to prior administrative approval or license, as such requirements amount to administrative censorship and are unconstitutional. Consequently, the relevant provisions of the Government Order were declared void to the extent that they abridged the applicant’s fundamental right.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that the provisions of Government Order 416, Education dated 24th February 1939, which empower the Director of Public Instruction to forbid or dissolve unrecognised teachers' unions and require prior permission for membership, are void to the extent that they infringe the right of freedom of association guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.
The direct effect of this decision is that teachers in recognised elementary schools cannot be prohibited from joining unrecognised teachers' unions by requiring prior permission or approval. The ruling does not extend to associations that are unlawful. No order as to costs was made. The opinion does not set a broader precedent beyond the specific invalidation of the impugned provisions.
(Delivered by the Chief Justice.)
The applicant in this case is a citizen of the Indian Union, a teacher by profession and employed as Junior Assistant, Board High School, Kurichedu from 16th January, 1950 and from August 1950 employed as Junior Assistant, Board High School, Singaroyakonda. An Association called “The Andhra Rashtra Elementary Teachers' Federation” was formed in 1947 with certain objects which related to educational and cultural advancement. One of the objects was to organise Taluk and District Teachers' Unions and to affiliate them to the Federation. The applicant became a member of the Federation in 1947. He was elected as the Secretary of the Darsi Taluk Federation in the same year and in 1948 he was Joint Secretary of the Nellore District Federation, and in 1949 he was elected as the Secretary of the main Federation itself. On or about 23rd April 1950 the applicant was served with an order of the President, District Board, Nellore, which ran as follows:
“It is learnt that the Nellore District Board Elementary School Teachers noted in the margin are working as members and office bearers of the Nellore District Elementary Teachers' Federation and of the various Taluk Elementary Teachers' Federations in the District as noted against their names. As the above associations are not the usual departmental associations, they ought not to have accepted the above posts without obtaining previous permission from the executive authority of the District Board. They are therefore directed to submit their explanations within a week from the date of receipt of this communication for not obtaining such previous permission. As it is objectionable to continue as members and office bearers of the above unrecognised Federations, they are directed either to cease their connection with the said Federations at once or resign their appointments as District Board teachers and report the fact to this office by 30th April 1959 the latest; failing which disciplinary action will be taken against them.
(Signed) N. Chenchurma Naidu, President.”
The applicant states that this action was apparently taken by the District Board President in accordance with what was contained in G.O.Ms No. 416, Education, dated 24th February 1939 (printed as Appendix 5 at page 162 of the Madras Elementary Education Manual). The material portion of this order is as follows:
“The Government consider that provision should be made for the departmental recognition of Elementary School Teachers' Unions with a view to ensure their working on useful lines. They have accordingly framed the rules set out in the annexure to regulate the working of these Unions. The Director of Public Instruction is empowered to accord recognition to Unions functioning in accordance with these rules, and to forbid the existence of, and dissolve, any Teachers' Union not conforming to these rules.
2. Teachers in Local Board/Municipal service should obtain the permission of the Board/Council concerned before forming Unions and should apply to the Director of Public Instruction for recognition through the President of the District Board/Executive Authority of the Council concerned.
3. Teachers in recognised elementary schools are prohibited from becoming members of teachers' unions or other teachers' organizations not constituted in accordance with the orders herein contained”
Admittedly, neither the Federation nor any of the Unions of which the applicant is a member is a recognised Union. The applicant states that he along with other teachers who were served with similar notices waited on deputation on the President in May 1950 and requested him to withdraw his order. On or about 17th August 1950 the applicant was served with another order bearing date 8th August 1950. It runs as follows:
“The teachers noted in the margin have neither submitted their explanations nor even oared to submit replies till now. If no replies are received from them by 15th August 1950 the latest, regular charges will be framed against them, for removal from service. They cannot be continued in service if they want to continue as members of the unrecognised federation.”
The applicant was under the circumstances compelled to resign his membership and post as office bearer of the District and Taluk Federations already mentioned. There is the reference to another communication from the Divisional Inspector of Schools, Anantapur, but Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar the learned Counsel for the applicant represented to us, that he was not dealing with that communication in this application and that he was confining himself to an attack against the validity of the rule in the G.O, of 1939 which prohibited teachers in recognised elementary schools from becoming members of Teachers' Unions or Teachers' Organisations not constituted in accordance with that order.
The attack is based on Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution which guarantees to every citizen the right to form Associations or Unions. The contention in brief is that the rule which prevents the applicant from becoming a part member of an unrecognised teachers' union save at the risk of suffering dire consequences is inconsistent with the fundamental right of freedom of association. In any event it is an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of such freedom. On this point the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents does not meet the objection. The Assistant Secretary to Government (Education Department) who has sworn to the affidavit is merely content to state that the applicant's action was in direct contravention of the provisions of the G.O, and the first respondent, i.e, the President, District Board, was within his rights and justified in the action taken by him. In another part of the affidavit, however, dealing with the later communication of the Divisional Inspector of Schools which was issued in pursuance of a memorandum by the Government, the following enunciation of the general policy of the Government is to be found:
“The basic and fundamental rights referred to by the petitioner are not absolute and can never be so in practice. Reasonable restrictions in the interest of the profession have to be imposed, especially in a case like the teachers' profession whose primary duty is to educate along correct lines and form the character and conduct of the future generations of this country. While freedom of thought and action are necessary to develop the inherent virtues, certain amount of discipline also is necessary to develop them along right lines. The teachers' profession which is dedicated to the correct education of the young men of the country must therefore like any other profession throw themselves wholeheartedly into its work and not indulge in political ideologies.”
We do not propose to discuss the very important and large question as to how far the employees of the State can be prevented either by legislation or by executive orders from taking part in active politics. Much can be said on both sides of the question as is evident from the differing judgments in United Public Workers v. Mitchell(1), in which the Validity of an Act of Congress making it unlawful for employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government to take any active part in political management or in political campaigns out of as well as in working hours, and a regulation of the Civil Service Commission making such conduct ground for removal of civil service employees came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of the United States. The point which arises for decision in the present case lies within a narrow compass. The question is whether any employee of the State or a local body could be prevented from becoming a member of an association which is not recognised by the Government, whether the previous permission or approval of the Government could be made a condition precedent for the exercise of the employee's right to become a member of an association. Of course, it is obvious that the Government as employer may choose to recognise only one association as representative of a particular class of employees; but can the Government prohibit an employee from becoming a member of any association other than the recognised association? Here again, we are not concerned with the complication of such an association being an unlawful one. In that case really, the employee voluntarily runs the risk of being penalised for becoming a member of an unlawful association. It has been held in Whitney v. California(2) and New York Ex. Rel. Byrant v. Zimmerman(3) that the constitutional right of freedom of association is not infringed by a statute providing punishment for one who knowingly becomes a member of or assists in organising, an association to advocate, teacher aid and abet the commission of crimes or unlawful acts of force, violence or terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political changes or by a statute prohibiting, under penalty membership in a secret, oathbound organisation which has not filed its constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and oath of membership. It was not contended by the learned Advocate General that the associations of which the petitioner before us happened to be a member were unlawful associations.
It is well established that the exercise of any of the fundamental rights like the right of free speech, right of freedom of religion or the right of freedom of association cannot be made subject to the discretionary control of administrative or executive authority which can grant or withhold permission to exercise such right at its discretion. It is equally well established that there cannot be any restriction on the exercise of such a right which consists in a previous restraint on such exercise and which is the nature of administrative censorship. The guaranteed freedoms cannot be abridged or abrogated by the exercise of official discretion. It suffices to give a few leading instances to illustrate this well established rule. In Lovell v. Griffin(4) a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars, hand, books etc., without permission obtained from the City Manager was held to be invalid because it struck at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to licence and censorship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organisation(5) a municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways etc., was held to be unconstitutional. It was observed by Mr. Justice Roberts in that case that uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of free speech should not be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right. In Schncider v. Irvington a municipal ordinance which prohibited canvassing, soliciting and the distribution of circulars or calling from house to house without first having received a written permit from the chief of police was held to be bad, because the liberty of free speech was made to depend upon the exercise of the police officer's discretion. In Largent v. Texas a municipal ordinance making it unlawful for any person to solicit orders or to sell books, wares or merchandise within the residential portion of a city without first obtaining a permit from the municipal authority was held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press and of speech. It was observed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed:
“Dissemination of ideas depends upon the approval of the distributor by the official. This is administrative censorship in an extreme form.”
Indeed we do not understand the learned Advocate General to controvert this position which has also found favour with our Supreme Court [See Romesh Thapper v. State of Delhi].
Applying this principle we must hold that the rules contained in G.O 416, Education dated 24th February 1939, in so far as they empower, the Director of Public Instructions to forbid the existence of, and dissolve, any Teachers' Union not conforming to the rules and compelling teachers in Local Board or Municipal service to obtain the permission of the Board or Council concerned before forming unions and in so far as they prohibit teachers in recognised elementary schools from becoming members of teachers unions or other teachers' organisations not constituted in accordance with the orders of the Government should be declared to be void as constituting an abridgment of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The application is to this extent allowed; but there will be no order as to costs.
V.C.S
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