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Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty Alias Arunachala Chetty.
Opinion Summary — Order of Reference to a Full Bench (24-11-1950)
Factual and Procedural Background
The decree-holder (petitioner) obtained a money decree on 10 April 1930 in O.S. No. 292 of 1930 for about Rs. 3,000, arising from two promissory notes. There was an attachment before judgment on 9 April 1930. The judgment-debtor effected a partition with his father (30 March 1930), was adjudicated insolvent (I.P. No. 20 of 1930; adjudication dated 11 September 1930), and various interlocutory proceedings followed, including the Official Receiver setting aside the partition as fraudulent and claim proceedings in which the decree-holder succeeded in setting aside a claim order.
The Insolvency Court ordered a stay of execution of the decree on 18 August 1931 under S.29 of the Provincial Insolvency Act; that stay continued until 10 February 1942 when the decree-holder obtained permission to execute and put proceeds into Court. The decree-holder filed execution petitions in 1942 (E.P. Nos. 745 and 746), which were dismissed in limine as barred by limitation under S.48, Civil Procedure Code. The present execution petition (E.P. No. 376 of 1944) claimed that the period between 18 August 1931 and 10 February 1942 should be excluded under S.15 of the Limitation Act because the stay was ordered by the Insolvency Court and the decree-holder was not responsible for that stay.
Both lower courts held that S.48 C.P.C. was not a period of limitation within the meaning of S.15 of the Limitation Act and therefore S.15 did not apply to exclude the stay period. Because of conflicting Bench rulings of this Court on the point, the matter was referred to a Full Bench for determination of an important question of law before deciding other subsidiary legal points arising in the C.M.S.A.
Legal Issues Presented
- The central question repeatedly referred to the Bench: "Is S. 48 Civil Procedure Code controlled by S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, or does it prescribe an absolute prohibition of an entertainment of a fresh execution application beyond twelve years from the date of the decree subject only to the exceptions contained in that same section?" (The opinion frames this question repeatedly using "S. 48 C.P.C." and the Full Bench reference also records the question in the text as "Is S. 43. Civil Procedure Code, controlled by S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act…?" The Court proceeded to decide the question as formulated with regard to S.48 C.P.C.)
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thandavamurthi v. Durgamba | Held S.48 C.P.C. does not prescribe a period of limitation and is not controlled by S.15 of the Limitation Act. | Noted as one of the earlier Bench rulings supporting the view that S.48 is an absolute bar; recorded as part of the conflict of authorities that required Full Bench resolution. |
| Subbarayan v. Natarajan | Held S.48 contains an unqualified prohibition (subject to its exceptions) and is not controlled by S.15(1) of the Limitation Act; stayed executions could not be excluded under S.15(1). | Described as the leading decision taking the view that S.15 does not apply; the Court analysed and distinguished the reasoning in this case and treated it as forming one side of the conflict. |
| Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Vaithilinga Vanniar | Held that S.78(2) Provincial Insolvency Act was comprehensive enough to control computation of the S.48 period and that time during insolvency must be excluded in computing the 12 years; execution petition was in time. | Considered an important later Bench ruling of this Court that took an opposite view to Subbarayan; found persuasive by the Full Bench as supporting application of general limitation rules to S.48. |
| Koer Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh (Allahabad Full Bench) | Held S.48 does not impose a complete bar irrespective of S.15; S.15 of Limitation Act applies to and affects S.48; S.48 prescribes a period of limitation. | Referred to at length and treated as a substantial authority favoring application of S.15 to S.48; the Court found its reasoning persuasive in resolving the conflict. |
| Phoolbas Koonwur v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahay (Privy Council) | Authoritatively held that Limitation Act provisions relating to computation apply to periods of limitation in the Civil Procedure Code; supported reading the two statutes together. | Relied upon as demonstrating legislative and jurisprudential practice of reading Limitation Act rules together with provisions in the Civil Procedure Code; used to justify that S.15 applies to S.48. |
| Sitaram v. Chunilalsa (Nagpur High Court) | Held S.48 C.P.C. is controlled by S.15 of the Limitation Act and that S.48 provides a "period of limitation" within S.15. | Noted as one of the High Court decisions in support of the view adopted by the Full Bench; treated as corroborative authority. |
| Ram Gopal Bhutada v. Sitaram Amnayya (Bombay High Court) | Held S.48 C.P.C. was controlled by S.15 of the Limitation Act. | Recorded as another High Court decision adopting the same approach; cited in support of the view that S.15 applies to S.48. |
| Nath Mal v. Jai Karan Das (Lahore High Court) | Adopted the earlier view that S.48 imposes an absolute and unqualified prohibition and is not controlled by S.15. | Noted as part of the line of authority opposing the application of S.15 to S.48; included among conflicting authorities. |
| Krityanand Singh v. Prithichand Lal Chowdri (Patna High Court) | Held S.48 is not controlled by S.15 (earlier view). | Noted among the High Court decisions that sided with Subbarayan's reasoning; part of the conflict considered by the Full Bench. |
| Jagannath Bai v. Sadhu Charan Bal (Patna High Court) | Took the view that S.48 is not controlled by S.15. | Recorded as another authority on the side opposing application of S.15; considered in the survey of cases. |
| Manickam Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar | Wadsworth J. held that period of stay under Madras Agriculturists Relief Act could not be excluded from S.48's 12 years by applying S.15 of Limitation Act. | Noted as a decision following Subbarayan; discussed by the Full Bench as part of the judicial landscape. |
| Ratnaswami Padayachi v. Kuppuswami Ayyar | Referred to the conflict on this point and the decision in Koer Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh but did not decide the point. | Mentioned to show the conflict in earlier decisions; the Full Bench noted it but observed it did not decide the central issue. |
| Kumara Venkata Perumal v. Velayudha Reddi | Obiter: Sadasiva Aiyar J. inclined to hold that the Civil Procedure Code is not a 'special statute' and that Limitation Act provisions govern the 12 years period in S.48 C.P.C. | Recorded as an obiter opinion supportive of the view that Limitation Act rules apply to S.48; used to show diverse judicial views. |
| Jurwan Pasi v. Mahabir Dhar Dube; Shiana Karan v. The Collector of Benares | Referenced (by Spencer J.) as supporting the narrow view that "prescribed" in S.15 refers to the schedule to the Limitation Act. | Mentioned as authorities relied upon by one Judge (Spencer J.) in Subbarayan; the Full Bench recorded these references in describing the competing reasoning. |
| Huro Soondaree Chowdrain v. Anundanath Roy Chowdhury (case referred in Privy Council) | Used in Privy Council discussion to support that Limitation Act rules apply to provisions in the Civil Procedure Code. | Appears as part of the Privy Council's reasoning in Phoolbas Koonwur v. Lalla Jogeshwar; the Full Bench relied on the Privy Council line to support reading statutes together. |
| Rango Ramacharya Kutti v. Gopal Narayan (Bombay High Court) | Discussion concluded that S.15 should apply to S.48; the reasoning of Ramesam J. was considered unconvincing by Broomfield J. | Noted as persuasive commentary; later division bench of Bombay followed the view that S.48 is controlled by S.15 (see Ramgopal Bhutudu). |
| Ramgopal Bhutudu v. Siddharam Annayya (Bombay Division Bench) | Division Bench held that S.48 C.P.C. was controlled by S.15 of the Limitation Act. | Recorded as a division-bench authority consistent with the view adopted by the Full Bench. |
| Meer Bismulla v. Jagannath | Referred to in context of Nagpur decisions following Drigpal Singh. | Noted as forming part of the line of decisions consistent with applying S.15 to S.48. |
| Kirtyanand Singh v. Pirtichand (Patna) | The Court noted inclination to follow Subbarayan but did not decide the point. | Mentioned as a case that did not resolve the issue but formed part of the conflicting authorities. |
| Raja of Kirtyanand Singh v. Raja Pirtichand Lal Chowdry (Privy Council) | On appeal the Privy Council considered it unnecessary to decide the S.48/S.15 point. | Referred to as an instance where higher court left the question open. |
| Deorao Deshmukh v. Ramchand Kothari (Supreme Court) | Earlier Supreme Court decision cited, but noted did not deal with the present point. | Recorded as not directly dealing with the question before the Full Bench. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench engaged in a thorough statutory and historical analysis and considered conflicting Bench and High Court decisions. The Court's reasoning proceeded along these principal lines (as recorded in the opinion):
- Statutory language and textual question: the dispute turns on two connected issues in S.15 of the Limitation Act — the meaning of the words "the period of limitation" and "prescribed". If "prescribed" is read narrowly as referring only to periods set out in the Limitation Act schedule, S.15 would not apply to S.48 of the Code; if "prescribed" is general, S.15 would apply to periods in other statutes such as S.48.
- Legislative history and in pari materia construction: the Bench traced the development of limitation provisions and the Civil Procedure Code from 1859 through 1871, 1877 and 1908. The Court emphasised that Limitation Acts and the Code have been enacted and amended in close relation and should be read together as statutes in pari materia. The Privy Council decision in Phoolbas Koonwur v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahay was relied on to show that Limitation Act rules can govern periods prescribed in the Code.
- Role of Articles in the Limitation schedule: the Court noted that Arts. 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act explicitly refer to S.48 of the Code (and its predecessors), which indicates that the period fixed by S.48 is to be treated alongside periods in the Limitation Act. This incorporation in the schedule supported the view that S.48 prescribes a "period of limitation."
- Rejection of a strict/loose dichotomy: the Bench examined the distinction drawn by Ramesam J. in Subbarayan between a "strict" and "loose" sense of "period of limitation." The Full Bench rejected that dichotomy as artificial and without authoritative justification, and found the reasoning of those Judges who treated S.48 as a period of limitation more persuasive.
- Consideration of S.29 of the Limitation Act: the Court considered whether the Civil Procedure Code is a "special or local law" under S.29 and concluded that the Code is a general law of procedure, not a "special law" in the sense meant by S.29; therefore S.29 did not assist to exclude S.48 from the operation of S.15.
- Policy and reasonableness: although statutory construction of limitation provisions is not to be governed by hardship concerns alone, the Court noted the injustice that could result if a decree-holder were denied remedy because a stay (ordered by a Court and outside the decree-holder's control) consumed a portion of the 12-year outer limit. This policy point supported applying S.15 to exclude periods of court-ordered stay from computation of the 12 years.
- Remaining issues left open: the Bench identified an ancillary question — whether an acknowledgment under S.19 of the Limitation Act can give a fresh period of twelve years under S.48 — and recorded that this point was not decided and would require separate consideration if directly raised in future.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative and held that Section 48 Civil Procedure Code is controlled by S.15(1) of the Indian Limitation Act.
Implications (as recorded in the opinion)
- Direct legal consequence: The 12-year outer limit in S.48 C.P.C. is a "period of limitation" for the purposes of S.15 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, when computing the 12-year period in S.48, periods during which institution or execution of the decree has been stayed by injunction or order (and which satisfy the conditions of S.15) must be excluded.
- Effect on the present case and parties: on the general issue the decision supports the decree-holder's contention that time covered by a court-ordered stay (for which the decree-holder was not responsible) ought to be excluded in computing the 12-year period; the opinion framed the matter for Full Bench determination partly for that reason. (The opinion also deferred consideration of some subsidiary points and evidence issues until after the Full Bench decision.)
- Statutory interpretation precedent: the Full Bench resolved the internal conflict in Bench decisions of this Court in favour of the view that Limitation Act computation rules apply to S.48; the decision relies on legislative history and prior higher authority (including the Privy Council) and will guide future computation of limitation in execution matters involving S.48.
- Unresolved questions: the Court expressly left open the separate question whether an acknowledgment under S.19 of the Limitation Act can create a fresh twelve-year period under S.48; the opinion records that the point will require separate direct examination when raised.
- Narrower points deferred: the Full Bench reference was necessary because of conflicting Bench authority; after this Full Bench conclusion, the Court indicated that remaining procedural and evidential questions in the C.M.S.A. would be considered and disposed of in light of this ruling.
Note: This summary is strictly based on the contents of the provided court opinion. Quotations, case names and statutory references are taken from that text, and no material beyond the opinion has been introduced.
ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH (24-11-50)
Panchapagesa Ayyar, J.—An important question of law arises in this C.M.S.A, namely, whether the 12 years' period prescribed in S. 48, Civil Procedure Code is absolute and unqualified, and subject only to the exception in S. 48(2)(a), and imposes a complete bar to the entertainment of a fresh application for execution after the expiry of the period of 12 years, irrespective of the provisions of S. 15 of the Limitation Act, being not a period of limitation prescribed for any proceedings.
The facts here are briefly these:— The petitioner (decree-holder) obtained a money decree for a sum of Rs. 3,000 and odd, in respect of two promissory notes, on 10th April, 1930, in O.S No. 292 of 1930 on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai, filed by him on 1st April, 1930. He had got an attachment before judgment on 9th April, 1930, in I.A No. 313 of 1930. The judgment-debtor effected a partition with his father on 30th March, 1930. Then he filed I.P No. 20 of 1930 in the Sub Court, Vellore, on 4th April, 1930, and was adjudicated insolvent on 11th September, 1930. His moveables were attached by this decree-holder on 11th April, 1930. The judgment-debter's father filed a petition and got many of the items attached before judgment released, claiming them to have fallen to him at partition, on 8th August, 1931. Then he bequeathed them to the judgment-debtors' sons by a will dated 9th August, 1931 and died on 16th August, 1931. The decree-holder filed a claim suit, O.S No. 33 of 1933, Sub Court, Vellore and got the claim order dated 8th August, 1931 set aside. The Official Receiver filed I.A No. 350 of 1933 in I.P No. 20 of 1930 on the file of the Sub Court, Vellore, to set aside the alleged partition dated 30th March, 1930 as a bogus one and in fraud of the creditors and got that partition set aside as fraudulent. The judgment-debtor filed C.M.A No. 30 of 1934 and A.S No. 86 of 1934 in the District Court, North Arcot, regarding the setting aside of the claim order and partition. Both were dismissed by the District Judge. The judgment-debtor filed C.R.P No. 58 of 1934 and S.A No. 222 of 1935 in this Court against the orders of the District Judge. They were dismissed on 5th February, 1937. The judgment debtor's sons asked the Official Receiver for partition and then filed a suit (O.S No. 27 of 1941) from which there was an appeal which was decided only on 21st March, 1944. The Insolvency Court ordered stay of execution of the decree in O.S No. 292 of 1930 on 18th August, 1931, under S. 29 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and that stay continued till 10th February, 1942 when the decree holder filed I.A No. 103 of 1942, in I.P No. 20 of 1930 in the Insolvency Court, (Sub-Court, Vellore) and got the permission to execute the decree and put the proceeds into Court. Then he filed E.P Nos. 745 and 746 of 1942 which were dismissed in limine as barred by limitation under S. 48, Civil Procedure Code. Later on, he filed the present Execution Petition (E.P No. 376 of 1944) and claimed that it was in time as he was entitled, under S. 15 of the Limitation Act, to deduct the period between 18th August, 1931 and 10th February, 1942, covered by the stay ordered by the Insolvency Court for which he was not responsible. Both the lower Courts held that he was not entitled to the exclusion of that period under S. 15 of the Limitation Act, as S. 48 Civil Procedure Code, did not prescribe a period of limitation, and was therefore not controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act, and imposed absolute bar [subject to S. 48(2)(a)] and not a mere period of limitation. There are some other minor points of law also involved besides the justice and validity of the rejection of I.A No. 157 of 1949 filed to prove fraud under S. 48(2)(a) by the judgment-debtor by the learned District Judge.
I have perused the records and heard the learned Counsel on both sides. I find it necessary, before discussing and deciding the minor legal questions and the propriety of the dismissal of I.A No. 175 of 1946 to get the important point of law referred to at the very outset-settled by a Full Bench decision of this Court. As pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, there is an unresolved conflict on the point regarding three Bench rulings of this Court. A Bench of this Court consisting of Wallace and Thiruvenkatachariar, JJ., held in Thandavamurthi v. Durgamba(1), that S. 48, Civil Procedure Code does not prescribe a period of limitation and is not controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act, and that its object is to prevent E.Ps being kept pending indefinitely. Another Bench of this Court consisting of Spencer and Ramesam, JJ., held in Subbarayan v. Natarajan(2), that S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, contains an unqualified prohibition, subject to exceptions contained in Cl. (2) thereof, against the execution of certain kinds of decrees more than 12 years old, and that it is not controlled by S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act of 1908, and that an application for execution of such a decree, even though stayed by an injunction or an order of Court, filed after 12 years from the date of the decree, cannot be saved from the bar under S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, by excluding under S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act, the time during which the execution was stayed by Court. But later on, in 1939, a Bench of this Court consisting of King and Krishnaswami Ayyangar, JJ., differred from the above two rulings and held in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Vaithilinga Vanniar(3), that the language of S. 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act was comprehensive enough to affect and control a computation of the period of time limited by S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, and that the period during which the insolvency was pending (in that case the adjudication was annulled and in this case it has not been annulled) must therefore, be excluded in computing the period of 12 years fixed by S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, and that the execution petition was therefore in time. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Sir John Thorn, C.J, and Iqbal Ahmed and Bajbai, JJ., held in Koer Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh, alter considering the ruling in Subbarayan v. Natarajan, and several rulings of Calcutta, Allahabad and other High Courts, that S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, does not impose a complete bar to the execution of a decree after the expiry of the period of 12 years irrespective of the provisions of S. 15 of the Limitation Act, and that the provisions of S. 15 of the Limitation Act do apply to and affect S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, and, so, where the execution of a decree has been stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction must be excluded in computing the period of 12 years prescribed by S. 48, Civil Procedure Code. They went on to say that S. 48, does prescribe a period of limitation, and that the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act have always been treated by the Legislature as intimately related to each other, and that, on the authority of the Privy Council in Phoolbas Koonwur v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahay, it must be taken that the intention of the Legislature was that the general provisions of the Limitation Act relating to the computation of periods of limitation should apply to periods of limitation prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. They also said that the operation of S. 15 of the Limitation Act is not restricted to the periods of limitation prescribed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act and that the word “prescribed” has been used in a general sense as meaning “prescribed by any enactment for the time being in force.” In Sitaram v. Chunilalsa(4), a Bench of the Nagpur High Court, and in Ram Gopal Bhutada v. Sitaram Amnayya(5), a Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that S. 48, Civil Procedure Code is controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act as it does provide “a period of limitation” within the meaning of S. 15, and that it will be unreasonable to make a party suffer for an act of Court like a stay preventing execution. On the other hand, a Bench of the Lahore High Court has in Nath Mal v. Jai Karan Das(6) and the Patna High Court in Krityanand Singh v. Prithichand Lal Chowdri(7), and Jagannath Bai v. Sadhu Charan Bal(8), taken the earlier view of this Court in Subbarayan v. Natarajan, namely, that S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, contains an absolute and unqualified prohibition of execution after 12 years and that it is not controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act. In Manickam Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar(9), Wadsworth, J., held that the period of stay under S. 20 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act could not be excluded from the 12 years' period mentioned in S. 48, Civil Procedure Code, by applying, S. 15 of the Limitation Act. In Ratnaswami Padayachi v. Kuppuswami Ayyar(10), Panchapakesa Sastri, J., referred to the conflict on this point and to the decision in Koer Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh, but did not have to give a decision of his own, as the case could be decided on another point.
In view of the open conflict of rulings between the two earlier Bench rulings of this Court and the later Bench ruling of this Court, and my view that the later Bench ruling embodies the more reasonable and equitable view, and that this view does not depend merely or even mainly, on the fact that the adjudication was annulled, which fact was not at all material for this purpose, and that the question of law involved is of great importance and of constant occurrence, and that it has to be decided one way or the other directly in order to dispose of this C.M.S.A I am of opinion that it is necessary that this important point of law be settled and the conflict resolved by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court. As the conflict is between Bench decisions of this Court, it is not enough to refer the matter to a Bench. It has to be referred to a Full Bench. The papers will be placed before his Lordship the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench for this purpose. After the Full Bench decision is received, arguments will be heard on the other legal points involved and the propriety of the dismissal of I.A No. 175 of 1946, and the C.M.S.A disposed of.
The question to be answered by the Full Bench is:—
“Is S. 43. Civil Procedure Code, controlled by S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, or does it prescribe an absolute prohibition of an entertainment of a fresh execution application beyond 12 years from the date of the decree subject only to the exceptions contained in that same section?”
(Pursuant to the above order of reference to the Full Bench by Panchapakesa Aiyar J., dated 24-11-1950, this appeal coming on for hearing, the Court expressed the following):—
OPINION.
The Chief Justice:—The point referred to us for our opinion is one of considerable difficulty. At every step of the reasoning in support of either view taken on it there is considerable divergence of judicial authority. There is much to be said for either view and ultimately our decision must depend upon what view appeals to us. The question is:
“Is S. 48 C.P.C controlled by S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, or does it prescribe an absolute prohibition of an entertainment of a fresh execution application beyond twelve years from the date of the decree subject only to the exceptions contained in that same section?”
S. 48 runs as follows:
“(1). Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of 12 years from:—
(a) the date of the decree sought to be executed, or,
(b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree.
(2). Nothing in this section shall be deemed:—
(a) to preclude the Court from ordering the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within 12 years immediately before the date of the application; or
(b) to limit or otherwise affect the operation of Art. 183 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.”
The section is given under a separate heading “Limit of time for execution,” The marginal note is “Execution barred in certain cases.”
S. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act in so far as it is material is in the following terms:
“(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.”
The legislative history of this provision is as follows: In the Act of 1859 there was no provision corresponding to this. In the Act of 1871 the corresponding provision was S. 16 which ran thus:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the commencement of which has been stayed by injunction, the time for the continuance of the injunction shall be excluded.”
In the next Act of 1877 the corresponding provision was S. 15 which ran thus:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the institution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded.”
The conflict of opinion is in respect of the construction of the two expressions “the period of limitation” and “prescribed” which occur in S. 15 of the Limitation Act. Does “prescribed” mean “prescribed in the schedule to the Limitation Act”, or does it mean ‘prescribed either in the schedule or in any other enactment?” Is the period of 12 years mentioned in S. 48 C.P.C a period of limitation within the meaning of S. 15 of the Limitation Act? It is obvious that unless the 12 years period is a period of limitation and “prescribed” is understood in an extended sense as not confined to the provisions of the schedule to the Limitation Act, S. 15 of that Act cannot apply in computing the period of 12 years under S. 48 of the Code.
Another statutory provision to which it is necessary to refer is S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act as it now stands after the amendment in 1922 which runs thus:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—
(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
The corresponding provision before the amendment was as follows:
“29(1). Nothing in this Act shall………(b) affect or alter any period of limitation specifically prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India.”
The Limitation Act of 1877, S. 6, was more or less in similar terms, namely,
“When, by any special or local law or hereafter in force in British India a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed.”
Whether the Civil Procedure Code is a special or local law within the meaning of S. 29 is also one of the questions which falls to be determined before arriving at a final conclusion on the point referred to us.
The earliest case of our Court with which we can start the discussion is that of Kumara Venkata Perutnal v. Velayudha Reddi. In this case Sadasiva Aiyar J. made the following observations though they were obiter:
“Following the observations in Phoobas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahay the observations in Nawalchand Nemchand v. Amichand Talakchand and Moro Sadashiva v. Visaji Raghunath, I am inclined to hold that the Civil Procedure Code is not a ‘special statute’ but it is a general law of procedure usually passed in the same year as the Limitation Act, and that the sections of the Limitation Act relating to exclusion of time and obtaining the benefit of the time spent in certain necessary acts, other and similar provisions govern also the 12 years period of limitation provided for in S. 48 C.P.C”
The other learned Judge (Wallis J.) thought it unnecessary to consider whether the time as limited by S. 48 C.P.C for the execution of a decree can be extended by virtue of the general provisions of the Limitation Act.
The leading decision in this Court directly on the point is to be found in Subbarayan v. Natarajan. It was therein held by Spencer and Ramesam JJ. that S. 48 of the Code contains an unqualified prohibition against execution of certain kinds of decrees more than 12 years old and is not controlled by S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act of 1908. Though the two learned Judges concurred in this final conclusion, their reasoning proceeded on different lines. Spencer J. held that the word “prescribed” in S. 15 Limitation Act must be understood as prescribed in the schedule to the Act, though the words “in the schedule” do not occur in the section. He made reference to two decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Jurwan Pasi v. Mahabir Dhar Dube and Shiana Karan v. The Collector of Benares as supporting him in his view. According to him, S. 48 has nothing to do with the periods of limitation prescribed in the schedule to the Limitation Act. He noticed the view to which Sadasiva Aiyar J. was inclined in Kumara Venkata Perumal v. Velayudha Reddi but apparently did not agree with him. He dismissed S. 29 of the Limitation Act as not affecting the matter one way or the other, because it related to special or local laws which contain special provisions of their own for the limitation of certain proceedings taken to obtain reliefs provided therein and did not include the Civil Procedure Code in its scope.
Ramesam J. did not agree with Spencer J. in confining the application of S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act to the periods of limitation provided in the schedule to the Act. He held that the Civil Procedure Code was a general law and hence periods of limitation in it were governed by the Limitation Act. On the second point, however, he held that the period of 12 years mentioned in S. 48 C.P.C is not a period of limitation within the meaning of S. 15 of the Act. He pointed out that the phrase “period of limitation” could be used in the two senses, a strict and a loose sense. In the strict sense it meant such a provision that a proceeding to which it is sought to be applied will be in time if filed within the period and beyond time if filed after it. The period in S. 48 C.P.C was not a period of limitation in the strict sense, for an application for execution of a decree of the kind mentioned in S. 48 will in general not be in time if filed within 12 years. It will be out of time unless it is within three years from any of the dates mentioned in the third column of Art. 182. Referring to Col. 1 of Art. 182 which speaks of the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for in Art. 183 or by S. 48 C.P.C and the first column in Art. 181 which runs thus, “application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by S. 48, C.P.C, 1908.” the learned Judge expressed his opinion that it was in the looser sense, the phrase “period of limitation” was there used. The learned Judge was inclined to hold that it was in the stricter sense that the phrase was used in S. 15 of the Limitation Act. He was well aware that there was no conclusive reason in support of this view because he said, “On this question one has to find the sense in which it is used, as best as he can.” He agreed finally with Spencer J. in holding that in computing the period of 12 years in S. 48 C.P.C, S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act could not be applied. The next decision of this Court to which reference may be made is Tandavamurti v. Durgamba. The learned Judges (Wallace and Thiruvenkatachariar. JJ.) came to the same conclusion as the learned Judges in Subbarayan v. Natarajan but apparently on the ground that S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act applies only to the periods prescribed in the schedule to that Act and does not apply to the periods mentioned in S. 48 C.P.C This was the ground on which Spencer J. based his decision, though Ramesam J. was of a contrary view. There is no further discussion in Thandavdmurthi v. Durgamba and it does not carry the matter further. Wadsworth J. followed the ruling in Subbarayan v. Natarajan in Manickam Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar. He held that the period of stay under Madras Act IV of 1938 could not be excluded under S. 15 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of calculating the 12 years contained in S. 48 C.P.C He felt himself bound by the decision in Subbarayan v. Natarajan though his attention was drawn to the decision in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Vaidhialinga Vanniar in which the reasoning of Ramesam J. in Subbaraya v. Natarajan had been criticised, and to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh in which a different view had been taken. No other decision of this Court was brought to our notice which deals directly with S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act in its application to S. 48 of the Code.
But it will be useful to refer to the decision in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Vaidhialinga Vanniar though it is not a direct case on the point-The learned Judges (King and Krishnaswami Aiyangar JJ.) were there concerned with the construction of S. 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Under that provision where the order of adjudication has been annulled under that Act, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree other than a suit or application in respect of which the leave of the Court was obtained under Sub-S. (2) of S. 28, the period from the date of the order of adjudication to the date of the order of annulment has to be excluded. The learned Judges held that the benefit of this provision would enure to a decreeholder even in the computation of the period of time limited by S. 48 C.P.C Krishnaswami Aiyangar J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench discussed at length the question: What is and what is not a period of limitation. He was clearly of opinion that the period of 12 years limited by S. 48 of the Code should be regarded as a period of limitation. He said:
“If the law fixes a period of time after which a suit or other proceeding is not to be entertained by the Court, the period so limited is etymologically a period of limitation.”
He was not satisfied about the necessity or the correctness of classifying rules of limitation as falling under two heads, strict and loose. This classification was artificial and not founded on any rational basis and not warranted by the statutory language. At the same time he was not evidently prepared to say that Spencer J. was wrong in holding that in computing the period of 12 years under S. 48 of the Code, it was not permissible to exclude under S. 15 of the Limitation Act the period of time during which the decree had been stayed by an order of Court. Of course, it was not necessary to canvass the correctness of the decision in that case, as the learned Judges were concerned with construing a section in another Act, namely, the Provincial Insolvency Act. There is no clear indication as to what the learned Judges would have held if the very question which arose in Subbarayan v. Natarajan, had arisen before them. There is one statement in Krishna, swami Aiyangar J.'s judgment which appears to me to be not quite correct. He said at page 619:
“Both the learned Judges held that the section was inapplicable, as on its true construction the word ‘prescribed’ found in it meant ‘prescribed in the schedule to the Act’ though these latter words do not occur in it.”
With great respect to the learned Judge, I venture to point out that this was the view of Spencer J. only and not of Ramesam J. who was not prepared to place such a narrow construction of the word “prescribed”.
In Allahabad the question was very elaborately discussed by a Full Bench in Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh. The decision of the Full Bench was that the provisions of S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act applied to and affected S. 48 C.P.C The learned Judges held that the word “prescribed” has been used in S. 15 of the Limitation Act in a general sense as meaning “prescribed by any enactment for the time being in force” and that S. 48, C.P.C does prescribe a period of limitation. Sir John Thom C.J relied upon the following circumstances in concluding that S. 15 of the Limitation Act need not be confined in its operation to periods of limitation prescribed by the Act itself or by its schedule. The terms of S. 15 were perfectly general and it must be assumed that the Legislature advisedly did not include the words “by this Act” or “by the first schedule of the Act”. The first schedule of the Limitation Act is not the only statutory provision which prescribes a period of limitation. S. 29 of the Limitation Act refers to the periods of limitation which are prescribed by any special or local law. The learned Chief Justice summed up the position thus:
“In view of the unqualified terms of S. 15 of the Act, and of the fact that periods of limitation are prescribed in a number of statutory enactments, it does not appear that there is any justification, judical authority apart, for restricting the operation of the section to the periods of limitation prescribed by the Act or by the First Schedule.”
In considering the second question, “Does S. 48 C.P.C prescribe a period of limitation?”, the learned Chief Justice refers to the terms of Art. 181 of the Limitation Act as well as Art. 182. Having regard to the language used by the Legislature in Arts. 181 to 183 and to the heading of S. 48, namely, “Limit of time for execution”, it appeared to be clear to him that S. 48 of the Code does prescribe a period of limitation. He found great difficulty in accepting the distinction between periods of limitation in a loose sense and periods of limitation in a strict sense. His definition of “a period of limitation” is as follows:
“It appears to me that if the result of a statutory provision is in substance to fix a period within which a person must take appropriate and necessary action if he desires to assert his rights in a Court of law, that provision prescribes a period of limitation.”
He sought support for this definition in the ruling of the Privy Council in Phoolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshwar Sahay. Iqbal Ahmad J. discussed both the questions which fell to be considered. The learned Judge gives additional reasons for holding that the word “prescribed” in S. 15 of the Limitation Act is used in a general sense as meaning “prescribed by any law whatsoever”. In the group of sections from 3 to 29 in Ss. 3, 6 and 29 after the word “prescribed” reference has expressly been made to the first schedule. The omission of this qualification in the other sections including S. 15 is significant and with a set purpose, namely, to make those sections of universal application. If the Legislature intended to use the word “prescribed” in all sections of the Act in one and the same sense, then it would have been easy to define that word in S. 2 of the Act. The learned Judge was unable to discover any reason why the rules as to computation of period of limitation which accord with common sense should have been intended by the Legislature to apply only to periods of limitation provided for by other enactments. The learned Judge answers the argument founded on S. 29 by referring to the course of legislation on the subject.
On the other question, namely, whether S. 48 prescribes a period of limitation, after giving it his best consideration and after referring to the decision in Subbarayan v. Natarajan the learned Judge arrived at the conclusion that S. 48 did prescribe a period of limitation. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons for his decision which were practically identical with those given by the learned Chief Justice. In addition to these reasons, the learned Judge points out that to hold that S. 48 is not subject to the rules laid down by S. 15 of the Limitation Act would lead to startling results. 1 must confess that I was much impressed with the illustration that he gave (at page 669):
“Take a case in which a Hindu son files a suit assailing the validity of a decree passed against his father and the family property and execution of the decree is stayed by an injunction and litigation does not terminate for a period of 12 years, On what principle the Court in such a case can refuse to execute the decree after the period of 12 years passes my comprehension.”
Bajpai J. was in complete agreement with the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice and Iqbal Ahmad J. on both the questions.
The question came up before the Bombay High Court in Rango Ramacharya Kutti v. Gopal Narayan. Though the actual decision in the case was on a different point, Broomfield J. discussed the decision of this Court in Subbarayan v. Natarajan. The learned Judge thought that the reasoning of Ramesam J, was not very convincing. Referring to the view of Ramesam J. that the period prescribed by S. 48 was not strictly a period of limitation, he said:
“I must confess that I cannot see that there is much difference between an enactment which forbids execution upon a decree more than 12 years old and one prescribing a maximum period of limitation of 12 years.”
He finally concluded that on general principles there seemed to be no reason why S. 15 should not be applied so as to extend the period prescribed by S. 48 of the Code. In a later decision of that Court the point was directly decided by a Division Bench. In Ramgopal Bhutudu v. Siddharam Annayya, Broomfield and Macklin JJ. held that S. 48 C.P.C was controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act. In effect the learned Judges differed from the reasoning in Subbarayan v. Natarajan , and fully approved that in Drikpal v. Pancham Singh.
The later decisions of the Nagpur High Court have also followed the ruling in Drigpal v. Pancham Singh and not that in Subbarayyan v. Natarajan. In Sitarama v. Chunnilalsa, Grille, C.J and Sen, J. after examining the several decisions on the point were of opinion that S. 48 of the Code was controlled by S. 15 of the Limitation Act. In addition to the reasons given by the learned Judges in Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh, they gave another reason based on S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. In their view, any enactment which prescribed a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application was a special law with reference to the Limitation Act which embodied the general law regarding limitation. The Civil Procedure Code was a general law in matters of civil procedure, but in so far as it prescribed a period of limitation it was a special law regarding limitation. Otherwise the reasoning is identical with the Allahabad Full Bench [Vide also Meer Bismulla v. Jagannath].
In Kirtyanand Singh v. Pirtichand and Kulwant Sahay J. was inclined to take the view in Subbarayan v. Natarajan, but it was not necessary to decide the point. There is no discussion and the other learned Judge merely agreed with him. This case went up on appeal to the Privy Council in Raja of Kirtyanand Singh v. Raja Pirtichand Lal Chowdry, but their Lordships considered it unnecessary to deal with this point.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Deorao Deshmukh v. Ramchand Kothari, was also cited to us, but it is clear that their Lordships did not deal with the point now before us.
In this state of divided judicial opinion I think it useful and instructive to trace the course of legislation in so far as it has a bearing on the present question. In doing so, I propose to deal with the several Limitation Acts and the Civil Procedure Code together as having material bearing on each other. It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in pari materia and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other. [Vide Rukma Boye v. Lalloo Bhoy]. Arunachala Chettiar v. Periasami Servai and Tribeni Prasad Singh v. Ramasray Prasad Chowdry]. It is not without significance that in the same year when the one Code was replaced by a subsequent Code, similarly a new Limitation Act succeeded the one already in existence.
It is sufficient to begin from 1859. In that year the Civil Procedure Code, Act VIII of 1859 came into force on 22nd March 1859 and Act XIV of 1859 came into force soon after on 4th May 1859. It is abundantly clear from a perusal of the provisions of the two enactments that they should be read, together. The Limitation Act did not provide the periods for several applications for which subsequent Limitation Acts provided by the Articles in the schedule. S. 1 of this Limitation Act declared that no suit shall be maintained in any Court unless the same was instituted within the period of limitation thereinafter made applicable to a suit of that nature. The periods of limitation for several kinds of suits were set out in Cls. (i) to (xvi). S. 2 corresponds to the present S. 10, S. 3 to S. 29 and S. 4 to S. 19. Ss. 5 to 14 laid down rules for the computation of the period of limitation in suits. These rules did not apply to applications either for execution or for other reliefs. Ss. 19 and 20 were the main provisions relating to execution. S. 19 provided a period of 12 years for enforcement of the judgment, decree or order of a Court established by Royal Charter and for revivor and enlargement of time by payment or acknowledgment. S. 20 dealt with other judgments, decrees and orders and ran thus:
“No process of execution shall issue from any Court not established by Royal Charter to enforce any judgment, decree, or order of such Court, unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce such judgment, decree or order, or to keep the same in force within three years next preceding the application for such execution.”
The Limitation Act did not provide any periods of limitation for several applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Nor did it provide for appeals and review. Now we find all these periods contained in the Civil Procedure Code of 1859. To give a few illustrations, S. 119 provided for a period of thirty days for an application to set aside an ex parte decree. S. 230 prescribed one month for an application by a person dispossessed of immovable property in execution of a decree to be put back into possession. Under S. 246 a period of one year was prescribed for a suit to establish a right negatived in claim proceedings. Under S. 256 the period of limitation for an application, to set aside an execution sale on the ground of any material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale was 30 days from the date of sale. S. 33 prescribed the periods of limitation for appeals to the District Court and to the Sudder Court and S. 377 for an application for review. In 1859 therefore it could not be said that the general law relating to limitation of suits and applications was contained only in the Limitation Act. Nor could it be said with any justification that the Civil Procedure Code was a special law relating to limitation. The fact was that both the enactments were treated as supplementary to each other and concerned with procedural law. It followed that if there was a general provision in the Limitation Act, it would govern also provisions as to limitation contained in the Civil Procedure Code. This was authoritatively laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Phooldas Koonwar v. Lala Jogeshwar. I have already referred to S. 246 of the Code of 1859 which prescribed a period of one year for a claim suit. The question which arose for decision was whether this provision was subject to be modified by Ss. 11 and 12 of the Limitation Act. These sections provided for computation of the period of limitation in case of persons under legal disability like minors and lunatics. A person under disability was permitted to bring the action within the same time, after the disability shall have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time when the cause of action accrued, unless such time exceeded the period of three years in which case the suit had to be commenced within three years from the time when the disability ceased. Their Lordships held that Ss. 11 and 12 applied to S. 246 of the Code of that year. The following observations of their Lordships contain the ratio decidendi of that decision:
“The two Statutes were passed in the same year, the assent of the Governor General being given to Act VIII on the 22nd of March, to Act XIV on the 4th of May 1869. The object of the first was to enact a general Code of Procedure for the Courts of Civil Judicature not established by Royal Charter. The object of the second was to establish a general law of limitation in supersession both of the Regulations which had governed those Courts and of the English Statutes which had regulated the practice of Courts established by Royal Charter. Looking to the fifth subsection of the first section, and the third and the eleventh sections of Act XIV of 1859, their Lordships have no doubt that the intention of the Legislature was that the period of limitation resulting from the 246th section of Act VIII should, in the case of a minor, be modified by the operation of the eleventh section of Act XIV; and that this construction has obtained in the Courts of India appears from the case of Huro Soondaree Chowdrain v. Anundanath Roy Chowdhury.”
The importance of this decision of the Privy Council appears to me to be this, that the Rules laid down in the Limitation Act relating to the computation of the periods of limitation need not necessarily be confined to periods prescribed in that Act and in proper cases due regard being of course had to the language, can be applied to periods of limitation prescribed by other statutes of a general nature like the Civil Procedure Code.
There is no provision in the Code of 1859 corresponding to the present S. 48. The only limit of time imposed on an application for execution of a decree other than that of a Chartered High Court was that contained in S. 20 of the Limitation Act. There was no provision corresponding to S. 15 of the present Limitation Act either.
The Limitation Act of 1871 (IX of 1871) repealed the Limitation Act of 1859. Its scheme was far more comprehensive than the Act of 1859. It not only provided for the limitation of suits, it also provided for appeals and certain applications to Court which had been provided in the Civil Procedure Code of 1859. Another important provision enacted by this statute which is however not very material for us is the provision of rules for acquiring ownership by prescription. This Act of 1871 repealed practically all such portions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 which contained periods of limitation for specified applications, illustrations of which were already given earlier in this judgment. The third column of the first schedule to this Act relating to Act VIII of 1859 shows the extent of the repeal of the provisions of the Code relating to limitation. Corresponding provisions are made in the second schedule of the Act in the form of Articles. It is sufficient to mention Art. 167 which provided for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Art. 169 which related to the enforcement of a judgment, decree or order of chartered High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Art. 168 provided for the execution of the decree or order of any Court of which a certified copy had been registered under the Indian Registration Act. This Act clearly demonstrates the close relationship between the Code and the Limitation Act in the matter of prescribing periods of limitation. It was in this Act for the first time we find a provision corresponding to the present S. 15. This provision is S. 16 which runs thus:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the commencement of which has been stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall be excluded.”
It did not expressly apply to applications for execution.
In 1877 there were two corresponding enactments dealing with procedure and limitation, namely, Act X of 1877 and Act XIV of 1877 respectively. It is in the Code of this year that a provision corresponding to the present S. 48 of the Code makes its first appearance in S. 230. That section in so far as it is material ran as follows:
“Where an application to execute a decree for the payment of money or delivery of other property has been made under this section and granted, no subsequent application to execute the same decree shall be granted unless the Court is satisfied that on the last preceding application due diligence was used to procure complete satisfaction of the decree; and the order of the Court granting any such subsequent application shall be conclusive evidence that due diligence was used to procure such satisfaction.
And no such subsequent application shall be granted after the expiration of twelve years from any of the following dates (namely);
(a) the date of the decree sought to be enforced, or of the decree (if any) on appeal affirming the same, or
(b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs the payment of money or the delivery of property by instalments—the date of the default in paying or delivering the instalment in respect of which the applicant seeks to enforce the decree.
Nothing in this section shall prevent the Court from granting an application for execution of a decree after the expiration of the said term of twelve years, where the judgment debtor has by fraud or force prevented the execution of the decree at some time within 12 years immediately before the date of the application.”
Evidently because of this new additional provision fixing a period of limitation that there were consequential changes in the second schedule of the Limitation Act (1877). In the Limitation Act of that year, Art. 178 was a new Article which ran thus:
“Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by the Civil Procedure Code, S. 230 Three years. When the right to apply accrues.”
In Art. 179 after the words “for the execution of a decree or order not provided for by No. 180” in Column 1, the following words were added, namely, “Or by the Code of Civil Procedure, S. 230”. It must be noticed, however, that S. 15 of that Limitation Act in terms applied only to suits and not to applications including applications for execution. There was another Civil Procedure Code in 1882 to which it is not necessary to refer.
Then we come to 1908 in which year again there was another Civil Procedure Code and another Limitation Act, Act V of 1908 and Act IX of 1908 respectively. The corresponding provisions in these two enactments do not contain many radical changes, though there are some changes. For instance, while the old S. 230 of the Code of 1877 and of 1882 applied only to decrees for payment of money or delivery of other property, the present S. 48 is made applicable to all decrees of any kind whatever except decrees granting injunction. The reference to “subsequent applications” is omitted as well as the words “or of the decree in appeal, if any, affirming the same.” In the Limitation Act, S. 15 has been expressly made applicable to an application for the execution of a decree.
It appears to me from the course of legislation to which I have adverted above that the provisions of the Limitation Act must be read with those provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which are intimately connected therewith. There is no doubt room for comment in the fact that while other provisions prescribing periods of limitation for applications, appeals and suits found in the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 are subsequently transferred to the Limitation Act, the provision corresponding to S. 48 of the Code, namely, S. 230 of the Code of 1877 continued to remain in the Code and did not find a place in the subsequent Limitation Act. But it is equally apparent that the Legislature was well aware that S. 48 of the Code also prescribed a period of limitation apart from the period of limitation prescribed by the Articles in the Limitation Act. This appears to me to be conclusively established by the reference to S. 48 of the Code (and its corresponding provision in the earlier Code) in column 1 of Arts. 181 and 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (and the corresponding Articles in the earlier Acts). I do not find anything repugnant to legal sense in that for an application for execution there should be an outside limit of a longer period after which there should be no further execution at alias well as shorter periods for successive applications within this longer period.
It was contended before us that S. 29 of the Limitation Act as it now stands after the amendment by Act X of 1922 might help us to come to the conclusion that S. 15 (1) controls S. 48 of the Code. This depends upon the question whether the Civil Procedure Code can be deemed to be a special or local law within the meaning of S. 29 of the Limitation Act. It is certainly not a local law, but is it a special law? We have seen how the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court in Sitaram v. Chumlalsa, were inclined to hold that the Code could be treated as a special law in so far as it provides a period of limitation in S. 48. I am unable to agree with this view. I think that the expression “special law” which has not been defined in the Limitation Act, was intended to cover only laws like the Rent Act of 1859 which was held by the Privy Council to be a complete Code in itself. In the ordinary sense “special” is used in antithesis to “general”. A special Act as opposed to a general or public Act means one that is directed towards a special subject or special class of objects. [See Garnett v. Bradley]. It is a specious argument to say that the Civil Procedure Code deals with a particular subject, namely, procedure. The special law contemplated is the law which gives rise to special causes of action and which itself provides for the method of enforcement of rights conferred by that Act or for redress of injuries suffered by the application of the provisions of that Act. The Provincial Insolvency Act, for instance, would be a special law; likewise the Incometax Act. The Civil Procedure Code is not such a special law. It is a general law relating to procedure. 1 am definitely of opinion that S. 29 has no bearing on the question referred to us.
On a careful consideration of the decided cases on the point and the course of legislation I have arrived at the following conclusions: The expression “prescribed” in S. 15(1) of the Limitation Act does not mean “prescribed by the first schedule” to the Act. It would include a case where a period of limitation is prescribed by any general statute like the Civil Procedure Code. I venture to think further that even if it be understood in the strictest sense, the period fixed by S. 48 of the Code must be deemed to have become a part of the Limitation Act by a process of incorporation in Arts. 181 and 182. Column 1 of Art. 181 speaks of application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or in S. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Whether the word “prescribed” in S. 15(1) would apply to periods of limitation provided by other statutes or not, it is clearly indicated by Art. 181 that the period fixed by S. 48 is in pari materia with the periods of limitation provided in the schedule to the Limitation Act, Column 1 of Art. 182 further supports this view. The period of 12 years mentioned in S. 48 of the Code is a period of limitation. The term “period of limitation” means the time prescribed by law at the end of which a right ceases to be enforceable in a Court whether by a suit or application. Some provisions of law not only bar rights of action after the lapse of a prescribed period but even extinguish rights and title altogether. But the common features of all statutes of limitation is that they fix a certain period after the expiry of which an action is not maintainable. Ramesam, J., was inclined to hold that in the strict sense a rule of limitation implies that they if an action is brought or an application is made within the time prescribed, it will not be barred. Applying this test, he considered the rule laid down in S. 48 of the Code would not be a rule of limitation in the strict sense, because even if an application for execution is made within the period fixed by that section, the application may be nevertheless barred unless it is within three years from any of the dates mentioned in the third column of Art. 182. With great respect, I find no authority for defining “limitation” in the manner in which Ramesam, J., understood it to mean. Even so, I do not see any anomaly. If an execution application is filed within 12 years of the date specified in S. 48 of the Code, such an application will be maintainable under S. 48 of the Code, but that does not mean that it may not be barred on account of another provision, namely, Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. Presumably Ramesam, J. was of opinion that the period specified in Art. 182 of the Limitation Act is a period of limitation. But the test which he lays down will not be satisfied even as regards that Article. For an application may be within time according to Art. 182 but if such application is beyond the period of twelve years specified in S. 48 of the Code, it will not be maintainable. Ramesam, J. himself explains later the mutual operation of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act and S. 48 of the Code. The very fact that S. 48 of the Code operates in curtailment of the period provided by Art. 182, to my mind conclusively shows that S. 48 also prescribes a period of limitation. I respectfully agree with Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J. and Thom. C.J in their criticism of the reasoning of Ramesam, J. based on a distinction between a stricter and a looser sense of the expression “period of limitation” for which there appears to be no warrant either in authority or in principle.
Though it is true that in construing statutes of limitation, considerations of hardship and anomaly are out of place, it is, I think, permissible to adopt a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible. One can understand the policy underlying S. 48, namely, the desirability of giving a quietus to proceedings in execution. A judgment-debtor cannot be harassed interminably. It is evidently because that all rights under the decree would cease to be enforceable thereafter that a long period of limitation of 12 years was fixed in S. 48 of the Code. But then the decree-holder should have had an opportunity of working out his rights under the decree for this full period of 12 years. If by an act of Court over which the decree-holder has no control he is prevented from recovering the fruits of his decree during the full period of twelve years, it appears to me to be highly unreasonable that by the mere lapse of twelve years from the date of the decree, his rights should become extinct rights which he was prevented from enforcing for a part at least of the period of twelve years. I recall in this connection the instance referred to by Iqbal Ahmad, J. in Drigpal Singh v. Pancham Singh.
Though it did not directly arise in this case, one other question has given me considerable difficulty, namely, the applicability of S. 19 of the Limitation Act to S. 48 of the Code. Will an acknowledgment in writing before the expiry of the period prescribed by S. 48 of the Code furnish a fresh period of twelve years from the date of the acknowledgment? If the expression “prescribed” in that S. (19) means “prescribed not only in the schedule but also prescribed by S. 48 of the Code,” then it may be contended that an acknowledgment will have that effect. It has, however, been held by the Patna High Court in Mahant Krishna Deval Gir v. Mst Sakina Bibi, the words “fresh period of limitation” in S. 19 do not refer to the term of twelve years prescribed by S. 48 of the Code. No reasons are given. The question will have to be carefully examined if and when it arises directly. The question referred to us must be answered as follows:
“Section 48 Civil Procedure Code is controlled by S. 15(1) of the Indian Limitation Act.”
Panchapagesa Sastri, J.:—I agree.
Somasundaram, J.:—I agree.
V.C.SProvincial Insolvency Act.
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