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C.M Raghavan & Another v. The State.
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference was made by the Sessions Judge of North Malabar to determine whether the omission to examine an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.), in circumstances where the accused's personal attendance had been dispensed with under Section 205 and the accused appeared by counsel who filed a statement on his behalf, vitiates the trial.
The prosecutorial facts in the underlying matter were that the accused were charged under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code before a Bench of First Class Magistrate. The first accused was granted exemption from personal attendance under Section 205, Cr. P.C. because he was employed as a Havildar Clerk at Bombay. The Bench Magistrate accepted the prosecution evidence that the first accused, along with the second accused, had caused simple hurt to the complainant (P.W. 1) and convicted them under Section 323, I.P.C.
Both accused filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge, contending that the conviction was illegal because the first accused had not been questioned under Section 342, Cr. P.C. The Sessions Judge accepted that contention and made the present reference, recommending quashing of the conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether omission to examine the accused under Section 342, Cr. P.C., after the prosecution witnesses have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence, vitiates the trial when the accused's personal attendance has been dispensed with under Section 205, Cr. P.C and he appears by counsel.
- Whether a written statement filed by counsel on behalf of an accused can be treated as compliance with the requirement of personal examination of the accused under Section 342, Cr. P.C., in the circumstances described above.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nataraja Mudaliar v. Devasigamani Mudaliar, 1930 M.W.N. 914 | Failure to examine the accused under S. 342 after prosecution witnesses and before defence vitiates the trial; written statement filed after prosecution evidence does not amount to oral examination under S. 342. | The Court acknowledged this authority as supporting the proposition that strict compliance with S. 342 is required, but noted it did not directly address the specific question when personal attendance has been dispensed with under S. 205. |
| Pramatha Nath Mukerjee v. Emperor, 1923 50 Cal. 518 | Non-compliance with S. 342 vitiates the trial even when the accused is not prejudiced; it is the duty of Magistrates to examine the accused after examination/cross-examination/re-examination of prosecution witnesses. | The Court cited this case as an authority for the strict duty of Magistrates to comply with S. 342 but observed it does not consider the S. 205 dispensation scenario. |
| Mazahar Ali v. Emperor | Observation that, in certain circumstances, a question addressed to counsel in the presence of the accused and answered by counsel may perhaps be taken as partial compliance with the section, though not full compliance. | The judgment was noted as a basis for the Pramatha Nath Mukerjee ruling; the Court quoted Rankin, J.'s cautionary observation but did not treat it as full compliance with S. 342. |
| In re Nainamalai Konan | Omission to question the accused after prosecution witnesses generally makes conviction illegal; a written statement cannot substitute for oral examination under S. 342. | The Court cited it to show prior authorities holding S. 342 mandatory in ordinary circumstances, but observed it does not address the S. 205 dispensation point directly. |
| Mahomed Elias Patel v. Emperor, 1914 41 Cal. 743 | S. 263 of the Cr. P.C. is governed by S. 342; there must be an examination of the accused in all warrant cases and the words "if any" in S. 263 do not apply to warrant cases. | Used to illustrate the breadth of the duty to examine an accused in warrant cases; Court referenced it among authorities emphasising the importance of S. 342. |
| Karamdin v. The Crown, 1934 15 Lah. 60 | S. 342 applies to summons cases also and non-compliance is fatal to the trial. | Cited as authority holding S. 342 mandatory even in summons cases, but not directly resolving the S. 205 dispensation issue. |
| In Re Annamalai Mudali | Not every failure to comply strictly with S. 342 renders a conviction illegal unless it occasioned a failure of justice; S. 537 may cure such irregularity. Court must ensure accused had opportunity to explain circumstances either by statement or answers to questions. | Relied upon to show that some non-compliances may be cured and that material prejudice/failure of justice is the critical inquiry in some authorities. |
| Kotayya v. King Emperor, 1947 M.W.N. 217 | A breach of a procedural proviso (there, to S. 162) does not necessarily render the trial invalid when the accused was not prejudiced. | Referenced to support the proposition that not every procedural breach automatically voids a trial in the absence of prejudice. |
| In Re Mathura Muthu Vannian | Held failure to examine accused after further cross-examination of prosecution witnesses (even though examined before framing of charge) was fatal and S. 537 would not cure the irregularity. | The Court noted that their Lordships later criticized a narrow view of S. 537's operation, indicating the authorities are not uniform on whether every breach is incurable. |
| Ishwar Das v. Bhagwan Das, 1934 A.I.R. All. 693 | Under S. 342 it was compulsory to examine the accused; a statement should be a personal statement by the accused and not by an advocate; an advocate's statement is "merely hearsay" and may deprive the Court of observing the accused's appearance/manner. | The Court observed this ruling supports the Sessions Judge's view but expressly disagreed with it; the opinion explains reasons for respectful disagreement with the single-judge view in that case. |
| Adeluddin v. Emperor, 1945 A.I.R. Cal. 482 | (Referenced in the order of reference.) | The Court stated this ruling "has not much bearing" on the specific question before it. |
| Maung Po Nyein v. Haka Singh, 1927 A.I.R. Rang. 73 | Holds a view contrary to Ishwar Das; supports the view that appearance by counsel can suffice in certain circumstances. | The Court noted that Maung Po Nyein is in consonance with the Bombay decisions that permit counsel's appearance to perform acts of the accused when S. 205 applies. |
| Dorabshah v. Emperor, 1926 A.I.R. Bom. 218 | Where personal attendance is dispensed with under S. 205, the court could act on the plea given by the accused's estate manager or pleader in a summons case; appearance by pleader involves performance of acts that devolve upon the accused unless Magistrate thinks the accused should be present (e.g., for S. 342 examination or pleading). | The Court relied on this case, treating its principles as applicable to warrant cases as well, and used it to support the view that S. 342 must be read subject to S. 205's dispensation. |
| Emperor v. Sursing Mathuradas, 1904 6 Bom. L.R. 861 | Statement by Batty J. regarding presence and the pleader giving plea (noted as a different factual scenario in Dorabshah). | The Court observed the dictum in that case was too widely expressed to apply to cases where S. 205 dispenses with personal attendance and therefore did not prevent applying Dorabshah's principle. |
| Emperor v. Jaffar Cassamusa, 1934 A.I.R. Bom. 212 | Where Magistrate dispensed with personal attendance and allowed appearance by counsel, the Magistrate need not question the accused personally under S. 342; S. 342 must be read subject to S. 205. | The Court expressly agreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in this case and followed it in its reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first framed the precise question: whether failure to examine the accused personally under S. 342 vitiates the trial when the accused's personal attendance has been dispensed with under S. 205 and the accused appears by counsel.
It reviewed authorities supporting the strict view that non-compliance with S. 342 generally vitiates a trial (Nataraja Mudaliar, Pramatha Nath Mukerjee, In re Nainamalai Konan, Karamdin, Mahomed Elias Patel). The Court observed, however, that none of those authorities directly addressed the special situation where the accused's personal attendance had been dispensed with under S. 205.
The Court then considered authorities that bear more directly on the S. 205 question. It examined Ishwar Das v. Bhagwan Das, in which a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that S. 342 required personal questioning and that a statement by an advocate was not equivalent; the Court expressly stated respectful disagreement with that view.
The Court relied upon Dorabshah v. Emperor and related Bombay decisions (including Emperor v. Jaffar Cassamusa) which held that when personal attendance is dispensed with under S. 205 and the accused appears by a pleader, the pleader's appearance involves performance of all acts that devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial, unless the Magistrate considers the accused's personal presence necessary for a particular purpose (such as S. 342 examination). The Court read S. 342 in the context of S. 205, emphasizing that S. 205(2) vests a discretion in the Magistrate to direct personal attendance at any stage.
Comparing S. 242 (requiring that particulars be stated and the accused asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted) and S. 342 (requiring the court to question the accused generally on the case after prosecution witnesses and before defence), the Court concluded both provisions are imperative in the ordinary situation where accused is present. But read together with S. 205, the provisions allow the Magistrate discretion: if the Magistrate dispenses with the accused's presence under S. 205(1) and does not exercise his discretion under S. 205(2) to call the accused in person, the trial is not rendered illegal by the omission to examine the accused personally under S. 342.
The Court also noted authorities (In Re Annamalai Mudali and Kotayya v. King Emperor) that qualify the absolute rule by recognizing that not every failure to follow S. 342 will occasion reversal; the critical inquiry in some authorities is whether the irregularity caused a failure of justice and whether S. 537 can cure the irregularity.
On statutory interpretation, the Court emphasized that S. 205(2) confers a discretion on the Magistrate to require personal attendance, and if the Legislature had intended to make examination under S. 342 obligatory even when personal attendance was dispensed with, S. 205(2) would not have been worded as it was. Thus the Court viewed S. 342 as subject to the Magistrate's discretion under S. 205.
In sum, the Court rejected the Sessions Judge's recommendation to quash the conviction on the sole ground of non-examination under S. 342 where the accused had been exempted from personal attendance under S. 205 and appeared by counsel. The Court concluded that the omission did not render the trial illegal in those circumstances.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference is not accepted. The Court holds that failure to examine the accused personally as required by Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not vitiate the trial when the accused's personal attendance has been dispensed with under Section 205 of the Code.
Direct consequences for the parties: - There is no illegality in the trial on the ground relied upon by the Sessions Judge and therefore no entitlement to an acquittal on that basis. The conviction and sentence are not quashed on the ground of non-examination under S. 342 where S. 205 dispensed with personal attendance and the accused appeared by counsel. - The papers in the reference are returned.
The opinion does not expressly discuss any broader prospective legal consequences beyond the immediate decision; it confines its decision to the circumstances presented and relies on prior authorities and statutory construction to justify reading S. 342 subject to the discretion conferred by S. 205.
This reference made by the Sessions Judge of North Malabar raises the question whether omission to examine the accused under S. 342, Cr. P.C who was permitted to appear by counsel under S. 205, Cr. P.C and whose counsel filed a statement on his behalf vitiates the trial.
The accused in the case was charged under S. 323 of the I.P.C before a Bench of First Class Magistrate. In the course of the trial the first accused was granted exemption from personal attendance under S. 205, Cr. P.C as he was employed as a Havildar Clerk at Bombay. The Bench Magistrates believed the prosecution evidence that the 1st accused along with the second accused caused simple hurt to P.W 1 and convicted the accused of an offence under S. 323, I.P.C
Both the accused filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge against the conviction and sentence passed upon them by the First Class Bench, contending that the conviction of the petitioners was illegal as the first accused was not questioned under S. 342, Cr. P.C Accepting the contention of the petitioners the Sessions Judge has made this reference recommending the quashing of the conviction of the petitioners.
In support of the view that the non-examination of the accused under S. 342, Cr. P.C vitiates the trial and that the accused are therefore entitled to an acquittal he relies on a number of decisions which I will presently refer to.
Reference is made to Nataraja Mudaliar…Accused v. Devasigamani Mudaliar…Complainant . 1930 M.W.N 914. It has been laid down in that case by Sundaram Chetti, J. that failure to examine the accused under S. 342, Cr. P.C after examination of the prosecution witnesses and before he is called upon to enter his defence vitiates the trial, as the provisions of S. 342 which are mandatory should be strictly complied with. It has also been held that what is contemplated under S. 342 is the oral statement of the accused and the filing of the written statement after the closing of the prosecution, evidence does not amount to an examination within the meaning of S. 342, Cr. P.C
In Pramatha Nath Mukerjee v. Emperor* 1923 50 Cal. 518 it has been held that non-compliance with the provisions of S. 342, Cr. P.C vitiates the trial even when the accused is not in any way prejudiced and that it is the duty of the Magistrates to examine the accused under S. 342, Cr. P.C after the examination cross-examination and re-examination of the prosecution witnesses.
This decision is based upon a ruling of a Bench of that Court in Mazahar Ali v. Emperor.3 At page 522 of the same report Rankin, J. observes:
“In the case of an accused, who is in no difficulty in understanding the proceedings, a question addressed to his counsel in his hearing and answered by his counsel in his hearing may perhaps be taken in certain circumstances as a compliance with the section. It is not a full compliance with the section, but I say nothing whatever to create any more trouble than is absolutely necessary in any case of that character.”
In In re Nainamalai Konan4 it is stated that an omission to question the accused generally on the case after the prosecution witnesses were examined makes the conviction of the accused illegal and a written statement filed by the accused cannot be substituted for the examination of the accused under S. 342, Cr. P.C which is mandatory.
In Mahomed Elias Patel…Accused Applicant; v. Emperor 1914 41 Cal. 743 it has been laid down that S. 263 of the Cr. P.C is governed by S. 342 and that there must be an examination of the accused in all warrant cases and that the words if any in S. 263 do not apply to warrant cases.
In Karamdin v. The Crown 1934 15 Lah. 60 Tek Chand, J. laid down that s. 342 of the Cr. P.C would apply to summons cases also and that non-compliance therewith would be fatal to the trial of the case.
It must be observed that none of these cases deals with the question whether failure to examine the accused under s. 342, Cr. P.C vitiates the trial when his presence is dispensed with under s. 205 of the Cr. P.C
Another decision referred to in the order of reference is one in In Re Annamalai Mudali7. In that case it has been laid down by a Bench of this Court that every failure to comply strictly with the provisions of s. 342 of the Cr. P.C does not render the conviction of the accused illegal unless it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice and that s. 537 of the Code cures such an irregularity. It is also stated there that it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the accused explains or has an opportunity to explain the circumstances from which an adverse inference could be drawn against him either through his statements or by answers to questions or by both.
In this connection it would be useful to refer to a judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Kotayya v. King Emperor 1947 M.W.N 217. In that case one of the questions that had to be considered by their Lordships was whether the breach of the proviso to s. 162 of the Cr. P.C would result in the trial becoming invalid when the accused was not prejudiced in any way. Their Lordships answered it in the negative.
Dealing with the contention of Mr. Pritt, learned counsel for the accused based upon certain rulings, one of which was in In Re Mathura Muthu Vannian9 which laid down, that failure to examine an accused after further cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, even though he was examined before the framing of the charge was fatal to the validity of the trial and that s. 537 of the same Code would not cure such an irregularity, their Lordships stated that that argument was based upon too narrow a view of the operation of s. 537.
It is clear from the last two decisions that it is not every case of non-compliance with the provisions of s. 342 of the Cr. P.C that vitiates the trial leading to the quashing of the conviction of the accused person.
The only decision referred to by the Sessions Judge in this case which has a direct bearing on the present case is the one reported in Ishwar Das v. Bhagwan Das 1934 A.I.R All. 693 2. The ruling in Adeluddin v. Emperor 1945 A.I.R Cal. 482 referred to by the Sessions Judge has not much bearing on the question to be decided in this case.
No doubt the ruling in Ishwar Das v. Bhagwan Das supports the case for the reference. In that case a Bench of Special Magistrates who dispensed with the presence of the accused under S. 205 of the Cr. P.C directed the accused under S. 205 (2) of the Code to appear in person to give an explanation under S. 342 of the Code. In an application in revision against that order it was laid down by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court that under S. 342 it was compulsory on the part of the Magistrate to examine the accused for the reason that the provision of law was in furtherance of justice and to enable the Court to decide the issue in a criminal case. He also stated that,
“These provisions indicate that the legislature intends that the statement should be a personal statement made by the accused and not a statement made on his behalf by an advocate. A statement made by an advocate is merely hearsay and the Court may ask questions from the advocate on which the advocate has no instructions. Moreover, the Court may desire to note the appearance of the accused and his manner when the accused replies to the question asked.”
The learned Judge who decided that case declined to follow a ruling of the Rangoon High Court in Maung Po Nyein v. Haka Singh 1927 A.I.R Rang. 73 which holds the contrary view and explained away a decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dorabshah v. Emperor 1926 A.I.R Bom. 218 stating that the decision dealt with summons cases under Ss. 242 and 243 and that it was entirely a different matter from the statement made under S. 342, Cr. P.C
For the reasons to be stated presently I express my respectful disagreement with this view of the learned Judge.
In Dorabshah v. Emperor the question that arose for consideration was whether the Court could act on the plea of guilty of an estate manager of the accused. One of the principles laid down in that case was that where the Court had dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused under S. 205, the Court could act on the plea given by his Counsel in a summons case. In reaching that conclusion the learned Judges relied on a number of English decisions in which under similar circumstances it was held that an accused could appear and plead by counsel or attorney. In the course of the judgment it was observed at page 219 by Fawcett, J.
“Then again under S. 366, in a case where the accused's personal attendance has been dispensed with, he need not even attend to hear judgment, if the sentence is one of fine or he is acquitted, and if his pleader is present at the delivery of the judgment. Having regard to these provisions I think it is clear that in a case where the Court has allowed an accused to appear by a pleader it must be taken that such appearance involves the performance of all acts that devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial unless the Magistrate thinks it necessary or desirable that the accused himself should be present for any particular purpose, such as for examination by the Court under S. 342 or pleading to a charge under S. 255. In such a case I cannot see any sufficient ground, in spite of the fact that Ss. 242 and 243 speak of the accused only, for holding that his pleader may not make the necessary answers and plead guilty or not guilty on his behalf.”
Referring to a statement of law made by Batty J. in Emperor v. Sursing Mathuradas 1904 6 Bom. L.R 861 the learned Judge (Fawcett, J.) observed that in that particular case the accused was present at the time when the pleader gave his plea and that it was a different case from the one he had before him and that the dictum of Batty J. was too widely expressed if it was meant to apply to a case falling under S. 205 of the Cr. P.C A careful reading of this judgment leaves no doubt in my mind that this case would equally apply to a warrant case also and there is no force in the distinction sought to be made by Bennet, J. in Iswar Das v. Bhagawan Das.
S. 242 of the Cr. P.C lays down that
“When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted; but it shall not be necessary to frame a charge.”
The relevant portion of s. 342 runs thus:
“The Court … . shall for the purpose afore said question him, generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.”
It is evident from a comparison of both the provisions of law that stating the particulars of the offence to the accused and asking him if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted under s. 242 are as imperative as questioning the accused generally on the case under s. 342.
I therefore think that the decision in Dorabshah v. Emperor applies with equal force to warrant cases also.
The principle enunciated in this case was followed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Jaffar Cassamusa 1934 A.I.R Bom. 212. It was laid down in that case that where the Magistrate dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused who is permitted to appear by counsel he need not question the accused personally under s. 342 which must be read subject to the provisions of s. 205. With respect I agree with the view taken by the learned Judges in this decision.
The principle laid down in Maung Po Nyein v. Haka Singh is in consonance with the view taken in both the Bombay cases.
Apart from the decisions cited above, an examination of the provision of s. 205, Cr. P.C leads to the same conclusion. S. 205 of the Cr. P.C is in the following terms:
“ (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and permit him to appear by his pleader.
“ (2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and if necessary, enforce such attendance in manner herein before provided.”
Under sub-sec. (2) it is in the discretion of the trial Magistrate to direct the accused to appear in person whose personal attendance is dispensed with under sub-sec. (1) of s. 205. If the Legislature intended to make it obligatory on the part of the trial Magistrate to examine the accused under s. 342 even when his personal attendance was dispensed with, it would not have expressed itself in the wording of sub sec. (2). It looks to me that the intendment of sub sec. (2) is to vest the discretion in the Magistrate to direct the accused to be present whenever he thinks it necessary either for questioning him under S. 342 or for any other purpose. It is for the Magistrate to consider whether it is necessary to direct the personal attendance of the accused who was exempted under S. 205, Cr. P.C for questioning him under S. 342 of the Code and if he does not insist on the appearance of the accused in court for that purpose, the trial cannot be rendered illegal.
I therefore hold that failure to examine the accused personally as required by S. 342 of the Cr. P.C does not vitiate the trial when his personal attendance is dispensed with under S. 205 of the Cr. P.C So there is no illegality in the trial of the case which entitles the accused to an acquittal.
For these reasons, the reference cannot be accepted. The papers are returned.
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